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Abstract
Crisis management centres on managing the risks to the reputations of corporations and 
other public institutions that crises are said to increase. It attests to the commercialisation 
of notions of risks and the expansion of risk management in an increasingly globalised 
environment. Arguments about the need for such work are based on a wider rhetoric of 
the risk-prone context in which organisations function and on the professional belief that 
they are judged by the way in which they are publicly represented. In particular, crisis 
management consultants talk about the need to continually attend to the appearance of 
their client. The thesis draws on theories of symbolic interactionism and risk society and 
the consultants’ own lay theories to explore the emergence of a new profession and a new 
way of depicting and managing risk.
This study focuses attention on to the factors involved in the social mediation of risks, the 
social construction of reality, and attempts made by professionals to re-design how social 
reality appears. It looks at single-issue politics affecting the political agenda, the role of 
the mass media, as well as the imputed role of the media and single-issue politics, how 
corporations can and do respond, in very sophisticated ways, to threats to their political 
and ideological perspectives, and so advance their interests. The thesis also comments on 
how professional fields are created, demonstrating the work that goes into proposing, 
sustaining and promoting particular areas of expertise.
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Introduction
This study examines the new field of crisis management, a consultancy practice 
embedded within the wider public relations industry. Whereas public relations tends to 
focus on the construction of desired reputations, the specific task of crisis management is 
to preserve those reputations at times of challenge or adversity. In particular, crisis 
management refers quite pragmatically to perception management rather than to the other 
elements involved in the handling of a crisis. The manner in which crisis management 
consultants manage perceptions shapes their definitions o f‘crisis’ and ‘crisis 
management’. Crisis management is thus characterised as an issue in the regulation of 
adverse publicity:
‘A crisis is an event which happens to an organisation which suddenly propels it 
into the limelight making it the target of unfavourable information and unwanted, 
potentially unfavourable media coverage’ (Michael Regester, in interview: July 7, 
1997).
Crisis management consultants1 argue that the most appropriate way to tackle crises is by 
‘getting your side of the story across’ to audiences. The service they sell to public 
organisations is, therefore, perception management.
This thesis will focus on the 1995 controversy surrounding the disposal of the Brent Spar, 
an oil storage and loading facility owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, which has been portrayed 
by consultants as a powerful illustration of their professional argument and practice.2 
They claim the controversy posed a major threat to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, a large
1 The word ‘consultants’ refers throughout the thesis to the consultants I interviewed (see Appendix A, 
page 344) and the literature on crisis management by its practitioners (Bland 1997; Bland 1998; Regester 
and Larkin 1997; Seymour and Moore 2000) maintain this argument.
2 Ibid.
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and hitherto seemingly invulnerable organisation, and that the case of the Brent Spar 
exemplifies how crises can arise, reputations can be damaged, social reality can be 
contested, risks can be used for particular purposes, authority can be questioned and crisis 
management can be deployed as the cure (Regester and Larkin 1997: 63-75).
In 1991, the Brent Spar came to the end of its operational life. The company conducted a 
series of feasibility studies and consultations to assess options for its disposal and, in 
1994, came to the conclusion that the best choice would be deep sea disposal in the 
Atlantic Ocean. In February 1995, the UK government approved their decision and 
informed other governments who did not, at that stage, contest it. In April, Greenpeace, a 
non-governmental organisation focusing on environmental issues, initiated a protest 
campaign by boarding the Brent Spar and announcing to the world’s press that it 
contained over 100 tonnes of toxic sludge (it later claimed there were 5500 tonnes of oil 
on board.) Greenpeace also claimed that the sea disposal of the Brent Spar would set a 
precedent (an idea contested by Shell and the UK government) for disposing o f400 other 
oil rigs and that this posed a major threat to the marine environment (Rose 1998).
Greenpeace’s boarding of the Brent Spar was a secretly planned manoeuvre that surprised 
all the parties involved. The organisation set up recording equipment on the installation to 
enable it to transmit video images to the world’s television media. Amongst those images 
were graphic shots of Shell’s attempts to prevent Greenpeace’s boarding of the Brent 
Spar by using high-pressure water hoses. Greenpeace’s images were used in television 
news reports, and, according to the consultants, Shell was cast as a Goliath-like bully and 
exploiter against Greenpeace’s heroic David. Consultants remark that Greenpeace had
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succeeded in conveying its interpretation of reality to the world, whereas Shell had not, 
and this failure was responsible for the company’s later defeat in managing the crisis.
In the end, Shell was obliged to abandon its plan for sea disposal, although it had already 
spent a considerable sum of money and four years arriving at it.3 The company had been 
criticised. Consultants say it had been represented as aggressive and overbearing. There 
was a widespread perception that it had caused environmental damage and was ethically 
in the wrong. It even encountered violent protest in Germany, where petrol stations were 
firebombed.
Greenpeace had succeeded spectacularly well. It had halted the sea disposal of the Brent 
Spar and had done so by exerting media pressure on, and mobilising public and 
government opinion against, Shell. Greenpeace’s triumph was, however, short-lived. It 
subsequently transpired that Greenpeace had exaggerated the amount of oil in Brent Spar. 
Although the organisation was unrepentant about its campaign, it was obliged in time to 
concede that it had made a mistake (Greenpeace News Release: September 5, 1995)
(Rose 1998).
This thesis will concentrate on how crisis management consultants - an emerging 
profession - construct a particular representation of the Brent Spar crisis to supply 
parables and nostrums about the new, globalised risk society in which they see companies 
as being obliged to function. I shall turn to theories of symbolic interactionism and the 
risk society to consider the consultants’ reasoning, and will show that consultants also 
develop their own version of these theories to create and justify their response to crises.
3 See page 100 for the total cost of decommissioning Brent Spar.
In doing so, I shall explore the relationship between professions and ideologies in a 
hitherto unexamined area of the social world. In short, it will be argued that the Brent 
Spar incident illustrates perfectly the emergence of a new vision of how the world works.
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Chapter 1 ‘CRISIS MANAGEMENT’ - A GENERAL OUTLINE
This chapter is an introduction to crisis management, examining consultants’ definitions 
of crises, their accounts of the management of crises and their reasoning as to why crisis 
management is necessary.4 It discusses the theories of symbolic interactionism and the 
risk society, outlines the origins and evolution of crisis management and explores how it 
is promoted.
Crisis management consultants suggest that crises generally assume one of two guises:
‘The Cobra - the “sudden” crisis. Disaster hits, taking a company completely by 
surprise, and plunging it straight into crisis.
The Python - the “slow-burning” crisis, or “crisis creep”. A crisis can steal up and 
gradually crush you, issue by issue’ (Seymour and Moore 2000: 10).
The Cobra: the case of Exxon-Valdez
On March 24, 1989, a 987ft oil tanker, Exxon-Valdez, the property of the oil company 
Exxon, was on its way from Alaska’s Valdez to California. It had been navigating 
through Prince William Sound, an abundant natural habitat, when it crashed and spilled 
ten million gallons of oil. The disaster became instant news, with pictures of the region’s 
wildlife dying in the oil slick broadcast worldwide.
Despite persistent media inquiries, Exxon pursued a ‘no comment’ policy for over a 
week. When the company eventually held its first press conference, the chairman of 
Exxon attacked the media for their reporting of the situation. He showed no emotion over
4 The management of crises and the consultants’ methods of crisis management are two distinct things, as I 
will show, and I use the term ‘crisis management’ only to refer to the latter.
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the environmental disaster caused and offered no condolences to fishermen whose 
income had been destroyed as a consequence (Regester and Larkin 1997: 134-137). The 
chairman failed, in other words, to represent his company as caring or responsible and 
gave an impression of arrogance.
The immediate consequence for Exxon was that the spill cost the company an estimated 
$7 billion in clean-up expenses, fines and lost market share. The company slipped from 
being the largest oil company in the world to the third largest (Regester and Larkin 1997: 
134-137). Consultants argue that what was perhaps most damaging for Exxon, however, 
was being perceived as an insolent and ruthless organisation. This led to anger against the 
corporation and to a related lack of empathy, resulting in a willingness to apportion a 
greater degree of blame to Exxon (Regester and Larkin 1997: 134-137).
The Python: the case of Inters Pentium 1
At the time of this 1994 crisis Intel made nine out of ten of the microprocessors for 
personal computers. Pentium 1, the company’s high-performance microprocessor chip, 
was known by Intel to fail to produce the right answer in complex division calculations. 
Owing to the relatively small number of users likely to require complex divisions, the 
company felt that marketing the chip was an acceptable risk to take and went ahead 
without having devised a contingency plan should any problems arise.
The crisis arose in July 1994, when Thomas Nicely, a professor of mathematics at 
Lynchberg College, Virginia, discovered the fault in the chip when calculating complex 
equations. He contacted Intel for assistance but Intel declined to acknowledge that the
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error was in the Pentium chip. After several futile consultations with Intel, who continued 
to deny an error in the chip, Professor Nicely and his colleagues publicised the fact that 
the chip was faulty on the Internet in September 1994 (Regester and Larkin 1997:58).
Other Internet users also highlighted the same error in response and an Internet site was 
set up as a forum, within which Intel came under strong criticism. Media interest and 
industry concern began to grow, and in October 1994 Intel agreed to replace the chip in 
PCs - but only if its users could demonstrate that they used their PCs to calculate complex 
equations. This response exacerbated the situation and provoked further criticism from 
the Internet news group, the media and the industry (Regester and Larkin 1997: 133-134). 
The issue became a crisis.
In December 1994, major customers such as IBM and Fujitsu suspended shipments of all 
products with the Pentium chip. By then there was a perception that the fault in the chip 
was extensive rather than limited to complex division calculations. Moreover, Intel’s 
initial denial of a fault in the chip encouraged the perception that they were deceiving 
people. When IBM halted their shipment the New York Stock Exchange stopped trading 
in Intel shares for several hours. Investor confidence suffered and Intel stock weakened as 
its share price dipped.
Subsequently, Intel publicly acknowledged an error in the floating point segment of the 
chip and agreed to replace all chips at huge financial cost (the recall alone cost £306 
million) and considerable damage to its reputation (Regester and Larkin 1997:55-57). 
Consultants argue that Intel’s failure to respond quickly to criticism and admit the error at 
an earlier stage meant that Intel had summoned the crisis upon itself. Arguably, the
widespread perception that the Pentium was intrinsically faulty had undermined 
confidence in Intel (and the chip) (Regester and Larkin 1997).
All consultants interviewed argue that episodes such as the Exxon-Valdez and Intel’s 
Pentium 1 have become more salient because organisations operate in an increasingly 
hostile and volatile environment. A combination of factors - increased scepticism about 
those in positions of power, growing consumer discernment, the sophistication of 
pressure groups, the impact of a technologically advanced mass media on public opinion, 
the quantity and speed of global information - expose companies to criticism and 
exacerbate situations. The reputations of corporations are exposed to increased risk. 
Incidents or circumstances can quickly turn into crises in which the extensive criticism 
levelled at companies gives rise to negative public perceptions of them, undermining 
public confidence in them, damaging their reputation, and even jeopardising their 
continued existence.
The argument consultants make is that few companies are equipped to respond with the 
speed required to handle crisis situations, curtail hostile media reporting and prevent 
unfavourable interpretations being perpetuated in the public domain, and that ‘crisis 
management’, on the other hand, equips companies to influence media representations, 
control perceptions and thereby manage risks to their reputation (Seymour and Moore 
2000; Regester 1987; Regester and Larkin 1997; Green 1992; Bland 1997; Bland 1998).
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Consultants’ definitions of crisis and its management
Consultants describe ‘crisis situations’ (i.e., crises of type one and two when they reach 
crisis stage) as involving the following:
■ unexpectedness and surprise
■ a disruption to routine
■ an escalating flow of events coupled with a sense of losing control
■ heightened media interest involving increased levels of media scrutiny, 
inquiry and speculation
■ a widespread view/interpretation of the incident as a crisis (in the media)
■ the proliferation of negative publicity5
Publicity naturally emerges as the main focus of a consultant’s conception of a crisis:
‘... it is usually the publicity that will sink you [i.e.- the organisation], not the 
damage from the incident itself. Incidents happen all the time. It would be fair to 
say that most incidents or potential crises you never hear of. For instance, a 
disgruntled employee sends in a package of documents which could discredit a 
company with the threat to send it to the newspapers if he is not paid something 
like three years’ salary and a car. It’s probably all scandals he has claimed to have 
unearthed, which if made public could cause a loss of confidence in the company. 
This sort of thing happens all the time and could become a crisis if handled in the 
wrong way. Things go wrong all the time, an incident becomes a crisis because the 
public find out about it and identify the situation in a negative way’ (Michael 
Bland,6 in interview: July 10, 1997).
Given that adverse publicity is such a pivotal aspect of a crisis, the consultant’s crisis
management approach tends to centre insistently on perception management. The other
5 All the consultants interviewed described these characteristics, which are also detailed in their 
publications, e.g. Bland (1997) (1998), Seymour and Moore (2000), Regester (1987).
6 He is an author and lecturer on crisis management and an independent crisis management consultant.
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aspects of a crisis, such as potential loss of life or livelihood for those affected, tend to be 
submerged, for consultants, beneath a publicity-driven analysis. Indeed, it is the 
likelihood of adverse publicity that seems to define a crisis. The consultants’ definitions 
of crisis and crisis management are pragmatic and call attention to the areas they consider 
central and work on. Perception is central. This is evident in Michael Bland’s account of 
an incident faced by one of his clients:
‘One food company found that one batch of a product was contaminated on a 
massive scale with salmonella but the salmonella were dead - they had cooked 
them, they had been killed at the manufacturing stage. So the dilemma was should 
we announce it and cause panic and loss of public confidence or should we hold our 
breath and hope no one will find out. My contention is that whatever the situation 
may be, what counts is people’s perceptions about the situation. There was no 
danger as the salmonella were dead but people would perceive of the situation in a 
negative way. In this particular incident the company held its breath. I am not 
saying that is the right thing to do but sometimes realistically it is. The thing to do 
is to hold your breath and build contingency plans and prepare in case anyone does 
find out and prepare what to say about not having said anything previously. People 
do bluff and they get away with it. The problem is that if you do lie and you don’t 
get away with it, you are dead because you face a worse crisis. The best policy is to 
come out with it and then control the story from the outset’ (in interview: July 10, 
1997).
In the crisis management discourse, ethics tend to be sidelined. The statement above 
implies that unethical conduct courts unnecessary dangers, and Bland discourages 
dishonesty by pointing to the harm it could cause a company if discovered. While he does 
not necessarily endorse dishonesty, it does appear that ethics is submerged beneath a 
pragmatic imperative driven by the need to protect corporate self-interest. Bland’s 
acknowledgement that bluffing is sometimes a successful strategy also tends to suggest 
that the approach corporations take, and the advice consultants give, is determined by 
expediency. And it is the case that the ethical responsibilities of corporations and 
consultants in a crisis situation differ. For example, in the case where a corporation has
16
caused damage, to the environment, for example, their accountability (ethically and 
legally) for that will inevitably be more direct and onerous than any accountability a 
consultant might bear in relation to it. This is not to say that consultants do not bear 
ethical responsibility consonant with their role, but it is important to bear in mind that 
consultants advocate a strategic and pragmatic stance and not an ethical one. Radical 
critics like Pearce and Tomb (1998) argue that what corporations are ultimately interested 
in is creating rhetorical realities that sell products and ideologies, and they would view 
‘crisis management’ as part of that project. ‘Crisis management’ has much to do with 
how businesses improve profits and the measures they use to convince consumers of their 
viewpoint.
The consultants’ emphasis on crisis management as a form of preparation for a possible 
crisis is supported by their account of what their work involves:
■ creating strategic plans for the management of communications should a crisis 
arise;
■ providing training for clients in dealing with crises through mock crisis scenarios;
■ advising on how to handle communications once a crisis occurs. In such 
instances, they counsel on the communications strategy to be employed and put 
this into operation.7
Clearly, consultants promote crisis management as an ongoing effort:
7 The consultants provided this description of their work in interviews.
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‘Crisis management is not simply responding to crises as they occur but a 
preparatory process against crises occurring’ (Michael Seymour, Managing 
Director of Crisis Management Burson-Marstellar, in interview: July 7, 1997).
‘A coherent approach [to crisis management] begins with the identification of 
potential crises ... [there is a] need to catalogue the areas of risk: to assess the risk 
parameters’ (Regester and Larkin 1997:173).
‘A crisis is a final instance. Most crises would not be crises if issues management 
was successful’ (Peter Sheldon Green,8 in interview: July 9,1997).
Consultants view issues management as beneficial both in its own right and to crisis 
management. ‘Issues’ are defined as ‘social concerns’ ‘created by discussion, debate or 
outright conflict of opinions’ (Seymour and Moore 2000:159). Basically, an issue is ‘a 
point of conflict between an organization and one or more of its audiences’ (Regester and 
Larkin 1997: 42). (An example of such an ‘issue’ is the debate about the health risk posed 
by mobile phones.) Regester and Larkin argue that issues management affects the 
handling of crisis and that ‘an issue ignored is a crisis ensured’ (1997: 63-89).
Consultants suggest that crises are preventable through issues management:
‘To fail to prepare fully is dangerous because every company carries the potential 
for issues to hit them at any time. Corporate crises are prolonged and complicated 
when a neglected issue seasons the initial event with outrage. Many crises are 
eminently preventable, or can at least be contained, if companies tackle those pre­
existing problems [in order to] bring issues to the attention of the public on their 
own initiative, turning issues management into a form of crisis prevention’ 
(Seymour and Moore 2000: 161).
Defining crises as creeping events, as well as sudden, facilitates this argument.
8 Green is the author of ‘Reputation Risk Management ’ (1997) and the Managing Director of a public 
relations consultancy, Sheldon Communications.
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Michael Bland observes that, while in the past companies purchased crisis management 
advice after a crisis, this situation has changed:
‘Crisis management, since recently, is changing its nature. It is now more about 
issues management. The argument made [by the consultants] is that clients have to 
take account of issues management more in order to limit or manage negative 
external interest in the company. It is now held that it is no longer good enough to 
bolt the stable door after the horse has not only escaped but gone on the Nine 
O’ClockNews to tell the world what a hopeless rider you are’ (in interview: July 
10,1997).
Bland relates this change to two factors: consultants publicising the importance of 
preparing for crisis, and greater client receptivity to that idea.
The consultants’ conception of crisis prevention is one that expands crisis management 
and develops their role. Their formulation of crisis management thus widens the field to 
include the continual monitoring of ‘potential crises’, that is, watching and managing 
issues. They hold expertise in both areas of issues management and crisis management 
and, given that issues quite possibly arise more often than full-blown crises, their 
argument may be read as an effort to expand their work and, consequently, earnings. This 
suggests that how consultants define crisis and its management has much to do with how 
they would like their field to develop. The practical actions they can take also influence 
their definitions.
Origins and evolution of crisis management
While crises and their management are anything but new, ‘crisis management’ is a 
relatively recent phenomenon and has only existed in the UK since the 1980s. Regester 
Larkin, the only consultancy specialising in this area, was established as late as 1994.
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Consultants I spoke to reported a greater demand for their counsel and suggested that 
crisis management has now shed its neophyte status. My examination reveals that crisis 
management remains a small, yet commercially successful, specialist area of public 
relations.
An examination of the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) yearbooks9 
yields an enlightening picture of the origins and development of crisis management in the 
UK. In 1981, of the 109 members of the PRCA, none listed ‘crisis management’ as apart 
of their services. While this does not mean that these consultancies were not providing 
advice on how to manage public relations during crises, it does indicate that PR 
companies did not differentiate between counselling on how to handle crises and other 
areas of public relations.
By 1987 this situation had changed. Of the 113 members of the PRCA, 7 consultancies 
listed ‘crisis management’ (1987 PRCA Yearbook). And by 1995, there was a dramatic 
growth in PR consultancies offering crisis management as part of their portfolio of 
services. From a membership of 131, 30 consultancies were then providing crisis 
management (1995 PRCA Yearbook). But, while crisis management had grown since the 
1980s and might appear established in the sense that many consultancies listed it, it still 
constituted a very small percentage of public relations work. For instance, the PRCA 
membership statistics of 199810 show that only 4% of the total consultancy functions on
9 These only go as far back as 1981. The primary objectives of the yearbooks are to list members of the 
PRCA, the range of services they offered and to publicise consultancies and assist organisations to choose 
between them.
These were outlined in the PRCA yearbook 1999.
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behalf of clients was crisis management. The biggest area of consultancy work on behalf 
of clients was that of consumer PR, about 23%.
By 2000, 36 companies out of 129 member consultancies offered crisis management. 
However, I found that crisis management was practised by some consultancies while 
others merely listed it as a service. It appears that some consultancies developed 
competence in crisis management and hence gained a greater share of interested clientele. 
For example, Michael Regester, founding partner of Regester Larkin, told me that his 
consultancy often received referrals from other PR consultancies whose clients had 
approached them with an interest in crisis management. The consultancies passed their 
clients on to them, Regester said, because they felt that they were not as equipped in 
crisis management as Regester Larkin. Quite a few of Regester Larkin’s clients had come 
via that route.
Initially, crisis management was imported into the UK from the United States in the mid 
1980s via large, world-wide public relations consultancies. Kipping and Engwall (2002) 
observe that highly industrialised countries with large multi-product corporations, 
particularly those with a high degree of internationalisation, were more likely to exhibit 
an expansion in consulting than countries with a low degree of industrialisation and/or 
with mainly small companies. The US has thus contributed significantly to the 
development of the international consulting industry.
Large international consultancies such as Burson-Marsteller, Shandwick and Hill & 
Knowlton imported crisis management services into the UK, but certain individuals, such 
as Michael Regester, in their own small practices, were also active in promoting it. In
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comparison with the big world-wide consultancies, Regester’s firm is small. In contrast to 
Burson-Marsteller’s 190 employees and Hill & Knowlton’s 400, Regester Larkin has 15 
employees including its founding member.11
In the UK, the Institute of Public Relations (the professional body for public relations 
practitioners) accredits independent consultants and companies, and the Public Relations 
Consultants’ Association has certain procedures and codes which its members must 
follow. However, there are no regulations governing who can set up a company and 
provide advice on crisis management or any other area of public relations. Consultants 
say that their reputations, experience and track record enabled them to gain business. 
Clients would most often know them through word of mouth, conferences and specialist 
publications such as PR Week, the trade paper for the industry. The whole of the 
consulting industry relies heavily on reputation and on personal connections to persuade 
clients of the quality of their services and establish new relationships (Kipping and 
Engwall 2002).
The emergence of crisis management as a specialist area may reflect a wider tendency 
within public relations towards a greater differentiation and specialisation of functions. 
This is evident in the PRCA’s multiple categorisation of the member consultancies’ 
services: ‘consumer PR’, ‘financial PR’, ‘lobbying’, ‘crisis management’, ‘community 
PR’ and so forth.12
11 Figures listed in the PRCA yearbook 2002.
12 These categories are from the PRCA yearbook 1999.
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Consultants report that high-risk industries such as the nuclear, oil, chemical, 
pharmaceutical and aviation sectors tend to have the most elaborate crisis management 
plans. This is a consequence, consultants argue, of the high risks associated with these 
industries combined with the level of public, governmental and media scrutiny levelled at 
them. These industries are also the ones most prone to regulation should crises occur and 
precipitate legislation. For instance, the Health, Safety and the Environment Act 1974 
applied to the companies within these industries and required them to pay a greater level 
of attention to such matters. It should be noted that such industries are often highly 
profitable and can afford more extensive services, such as crisis management training 
programmes.
Consultants say that their clients tend to be large corporations, and this is manifest in the 
list of consultancies’ clients provided in the PRCA yearbooks. While governments and 
the public sector might use crisis management, consultants mainly target the private 
sector. This is evident in the way consultants devise their texts on crisis management - the 
usual presumption is that their audience are companies.13 In turn, the target market 
influences how consultants formulate crisis management as predominantly concerning 
the private sector and big business.
The fundamental principles of crisis management
Following on from their claim that companies must prepare for crises, the literature on 
crisis management describes the specific activities involved in being prepared for crises. 
These activities normally include contingency planning that identifies risky areas in a
13 The quotations I use below illustrate this, eg. the citation from Seymour and Moore (2000) on page 29.
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business’s operations, testing the efficiency of contingency plans and training clients in 
handling crises through ‘simulations’. However, the fundamental basis of crisis 
management centres on communication strategy.
The communication strategy the consultants recommend involves assessing and 
responding to perceptions. Consultants advise companies to view the problem/situation 
as others are seeing it and to base responses on an assessment of their views. Consultants 
identify the most important audiences as ‘key publics’. As will become evident below, 
managing communications and relations with them are held to be highly significant in the 
management of crises.14
Key Publics
The key publics of a company are its most important stakeholders. These will vary 
depending on the particular organisation, its ownership, size and structure, product or 
service market and so forth. Charkham’s (1992) study of corporate governance suggests 
that such stakeholders can be divided into two groups: contractual and community. 
Contractual stakeholders are those to whom an organisation has a clear-cut obligation. 
They are said typically to include shareholders, employees, customers, distributors, 
suppliers and lenders. Typical community stakeholders are identified as the consumers, 
regulators, government, pressure groups, local communities and the media.
14 The consultants’ argument is that key publics have to be identified and communicated with. But one 
problem I will identify in my discussion of Brent Spar is that the key publics may not always be evident.
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Key publics are important to crisis management in two ways. Firstly, they are seen as 
vital audiences holding and promulgating views on the crisis and thereby influencing the 
views of others. Secondly, consultants also attribute a strategic significance to such 
groups’ ability to help control the crisis - their favourable descriptions of the situation can 
influence perceptions of the crisis:
‘While in a crisis the media will be the most vocal and demanding group, 
executives must remember all those to whom they must communicate ... since 
many audiences can assist by accurately describing the situation when they are in 
turn approached for comment’ (Seymour and Moore 2000:116).
Building good relations with the key publics of a company can play a beneficial role in 
bringing a company out of crisis and contributing to its recovery. Equally though, key 
publics are also in a position to harm or discredit a company.
The media
The media are the most important key public because ‘the media are the conduits for 
other audiences and if you get it wrong with them you get it wrong with everyone’ 
(Michael Regester, in interview: July 7,1997).
Given that they believe that favourable media portrayal of the corporate view can lend 
legitimacy to it, consultants seek to ‘manage’/control media representations. They 
identify their objective as being ‘to secure total acceptance of your [a company’s] point 
of view’ (Seymour and Moore 2000:166). It is significant that this does not square with 
the central thesis of the sociology and social psychology of the media: that it is very
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difficult to predict or manage media effects, and I discuss this in the examination of the 
Brent Spar case.
There is very little variation in consultants’ maxims for dealing with the media and the 
ensuing recommendations frequently recur in interviews and in the literature on the 
subject.
Companies are advised to comply with and cater for media requests for information 
because the objective of crisis management is to control media representations. 
Consultants believe that if companies do not respond to journalists’ demands for 
information, journalists will inevitably turn to other sources for information. This is 
undesirable, as the company at the centre of the crisis may not have control over what 
others say about the crisis. As demonstrated below, consultants advise companies to 
position themselves as attractive news sources and thereby direct news coverage. This 
recommendation recognises the importance of sources and the influential role sources are 
seen to play in the construction of news stories (Ericson 1989; Hall 1978; Gamson and 
Modigliani 1989; Riechert and Miller 1997; Schlesinger 1991; Anderson 1991).
It is instructive, at this point, to reflect on cases consultants cite as demonstrating 
instances of crisis /w/smanagement. These cases demonstrate and explain the consultants’ 
reasoning and usefully reflect the tendency of consultants to advance their brand of crisis 
management by classifying ways in which crises are mismanaged.
Delayed and defensive communications: the case of Exxon-Valdez
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Consultants argue that speedy responses from the company are especially important. The 
media will demand information and the company has to position itself as a good news 
source to curtail hostile representations and prevent negative interpretations being 
perpetuated. Consultants also argue that it is often the lack of early communication that 
gives rise to negative perceptions of a company.
Consultants point to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill as a classic example of a badly handled 
crisis:15
‘It was an environmental disaster that was badly handled from the beginning. The 
company adopted a defensive posture, decided not to communicate and, in the end, 
was castigated ... If you allow rumour and speculation to take over, you may never 
succeed in wresting control back again’ (Michael Seymour, Management Review, 
February 1995).
Exxon wrongly pursued a ‘no comment’ policy for over a week, consultants maintain. 
Communications should have begun immediately. Possibilities for limiting the damage to 
Exxon were missed by not communicating with, and thus alienating, the fishermen and 
the media, both of whom were key publics. Admissions of sympathy and regret must be 
expressed soon after a disaster. Consultants say that companies are often reluctant to 
communicate because they do not wish to incur liability claims, but suggest that there are 
ways in which sympathy may be expressed without attracting legal penalties:
‘Admitting sorrow does not mean the company is liable. What needs to be said is: 
“We deeply regret this has happened and will leave no stone unturned in 
establishing the cause’” (Regester and Larkin 1997: 161).
15 Many consultants I interviewed mention this incident. It is also to be found cited in texts on crisis 
management, for example, Regester and Larkin (1997: 134-8).
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The point consultants make is that an admission of sorrow is a communication response 
designed to build community relations and avert negative media coverage as far as 
possible:
‘...the Exxon-Valdez pollution is world famous. But the world outside the US 
hardly heard about the massive 300 000 gallon oil slick served up on the California 
beaches a few months later when BP’s American Trader managed to hole itself. 
This was because BP visibly went into immediate “apologise and clean up” mode 
and ended up being praised by the US coastguard and the media for the speed and 
responsibility of its response’ (Bland 1998: 9).
Regester and Larkin argue similarly in saying that the chairman of Exxon should have 
taken the approach Sir Michael Bishop, chairman of British Midland, took when one of 
its Boeing 737s crashed a few weeks after the Pan Am Lockerbie crash:
‘His response was remarkable. Many people in senior managerial positions, fearful 
of being misreported by the media ...will not give interviews until they have all the 
facts at their fingertips ...[But] communication has to begin immediately. Sir 
Michael Bishop gave interviews when he had no knowledge about the cause of the 
accident... lack of information at the outset of a crisis is typical ... faced with this 
dilemma, Sir Michael focused on expressing how he felt about what had happened 
and what he was going to do about the situation. He immediately began to 
“manage” the flow and content of news to the media ... There was not much 
“content” to what he said but he understood and implemented one of the golden 
rules of crisis communication - begin it at once, from the top of the organization’ 
(1998: 148).
Consultants suggest that Exxon’s failure to communicate at an early stage was later 
compounded by misguided and damaging communications. The company’s press 
conference missed, disastrously, an opportunity to express sympathy to the fishermen and 
to cooperate and communicate with the press (Regester and Larkin 1998:134-138). In a 
live interview, the chairman of Exxon, Lawrence Rawls, admitted that he had not read the 
latest plan for the clean-up operation, stating: ‘it is not the role of the chairman of a large
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world-wide corporation to read every technical plan’ (Regester and Larkin, 1997: 136). 
Consultants accept that this may well be true, but could have been stated differently. The 
presentational aspects of such a statement, or its diplomacy, were not considered. 
Moreover, consultants endorse the view that during crisis situations senior managers must 
be briefed and relieved of routine responsibilities and give undivided attention to 
managing the crisis:
‘However accurate the claims of the leanest, meanest, most predatory corporation 
may be, the fact remains that it necessarily remains locked into normal rhythms of 
business. The structures work well in peacetime, but in a crisis they are severely 
tested and occasionally useless. Wartime conditions prevail; big decisions with a lot 
riding on them must be made in a drastically shorter time than usual’ (Seymour and 
Moore 2000:21).
The situation was further aggravated, consultants claim, when the chairman of Exxon 
attacked the media for reporting that nothing was being done. Consultants argue that this 
was largely due to Exxon’s counterproductive ‘no comment’ policy.
Moreover, the company should not have retaliated defensively in response to the anger of 
fishermen whose lives were badly affected by the oil spill, or to the persistent inquiries of 
the press. Consultants claim that such defensive communications created the harmful 
impression of the organisation as insensitive and disdainful. In short, Exxon had failed to 
represent itself as sympathetic and responsible, which had widespread consequences. 
Regester and Larkin observe that new legislation (after the Exxon-Valdez oil spill) 
requiring all new ocean-going tankers to be built with double hulls proved to be a costly 
punishment not only for Exxon but for the oil tanker industry as a whole (1997: 134-6). 
They suggest that double hulls would not have prevented the spill and that the new 
legislation was a ‘cosmetic knee-jerk political reaction’ by governments who felt they
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had to react to the perception of Exxon and other oil companies as irresponsible - a 
perception nurtured by Exxon’s ‘appalling communications in the aftermath of the 
Valdez disaster’ (Regester and Larkin 1997:137).
Michael Regester insists that events might have proceeded differently had:
‘Exxon acted quickly, been more communicative and co-operative with the media 
at an earlier stage, expressed human concern about the damage caused not only to 
the environment but also to those whose livelihood depended on the sea, and had 
demonstrated that the company cared about what had happened and was doing the 
best it could do to alleviate the damage’ (in interview: July 7,1997).
These aspects of the crisis have since been recognised by Exxon’s chairman Lawrence 
Rawls, who is quoted in an academic examination of the crisis management involved in 
the Exxon-Valdez incident as having said that he ‘has since changed his mind ... if he 
were to do it again, he says he would go directly to the site and no doubt handle 
communications differently’ (Deppa et al. 1993:263).
It is notable that the consultants’ account of the faults in Exxon’s management of the 
crisis do not comment on the measures the company was taking to clean up the oil spill or 
ask whether those measures were sufficient. The entire focus is on the company’s 
approach to communications. The consultants’ analysis of Exxon’s failure in this regard 
tends to emphasise that crisis management, for consultants, is solely a question of 
communications strategy.
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Contrary to the consultants’ argument that this crisis brought criticism of oil companies, 
Daley and O’Neill (1991) argue that the press reports ‘naturalised’16 the use of and 
dependency on oil, and withdrew from consideration the pursuit of alternative energy 
sources. As a result, the press reports directed environmental issues ‘away from the 
political arena and into the politically inaccessible realm of technological inevitability’, 
thereby reproducing ‘the political and corporate hegemony of Big Oil’ (cited in Allan et 
al. 1999: 9).
Allan, Adam and Carter (1999) argue that the news media frequently represent 
environmental crises as event-oriented catastrophes rather than as the outcome of a 
company’s decisions and calculations. According to this view, media criticism of 
companies during crises does not always threaten their existence and may even help their 
fixture survival. This is contrary to what is often stated by consultants because the 
consultants’ objective is to argue that a greater communications effort is required.
Dyer et al (1991), in a study which compared the Associated Press coverage of Exxon 
Corporation with the company’s press releases before and after the Exxon-Valdez ran 
aground, found that Exxon was keen to frame this story in environmental terms, while the 
Associated Press coverage focused on legal responsibility. Dyer et al concluded that:
‘... news media do not merely reflect the company line, they play an adversarial 
role. That is, the news media, in this case, rejected the company position that the 
disaster should be framed primarily as an environmental concern and insisted on 
framing it in terms of legal responsibility’ (Allan et al 1999:50).
161 take it that the authors use this term to describe the effect of the reports not questioning oil dependency. 
They suggest that because of that omission the news reports presented oil use and dependency as 
given/‘natural’ rather than problematic.
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Perhaps it is true that early communication can ensure the likelihood of a less 
antagonistic media response. Certainly, Dyer et al’s study shows that companies may be 
able to do very little once a dominant interpretation takes hold in the media - an 
observation that enhances the argument for early communications with the media.
The media’s need for a story: the Braer incident
Consultants say, in interviews and in their publications, that when a crisis occurs, there is 
usually a lack of hard information available to the company involved. Internal inquiries 
will often be undertaken and attempts made to assess what went wrong, but the company 
is likely to have very little information at the beginning. Simultaneously there is an 
external demand for information, especially from the media. This poses a number of 
problems for crisis management:
‘... the media will descend on the site of the accident like a plague of locusts 
which needs to be fed. If it isn’t fed by the organization which finds itself, however 
inadvertently, at the centre of the crisis, it will feed from the hands of others. And 
become deeply suspicious of the hand which obviously isn’t feeding it’ (Regester 
and Larkin, 1997:145).
If a company does not respond to the media’s search for comments on the situation, not 
only will the media rely on the comments of external commentators (whose views may be 
critical of the company) but may also speculate on the basis of likely factors or rumours 
in order to fill the information void.
This happened in the case of the Braer. On January 5, 1993, the Braer oil tanker was 
carrying 84,000 tonnes of crude oil from Norway to Quebec when it lost engine power 
and, propelled by 100 mile per hour gale-force winds, went aground in the Shetland
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Islands. The extreme weather conditions thwarted salvage attempts and, over the course 
of a week, the Braer spilled all its cargo. The spill caused damage to the extensive 
wildlife in the area and immediate, but not long-term, damage to the local salmon-fishing 
industry. Fortunately, the high winds that had grounded the Braer also rapidly dispersed 
the oil slick.
Below is Michael Regester’s account of this incident and the need to fill the information 
void. He was managing the crisis on behalf of Ultramar, the owners of the crude oil 
contents of the Braer:
‘Whenever a crisis occurs there is often an information void because you may know 
what has happened, you may not know what caused it, and you know something 
about what is being done to make it better, but then usually there is a 
communication gap and it is completely crucial to fill the gap yourself, that is, the 
organisation involved. If you do not fill this gap, the press will fill it from other 
sources or even to the point where they make it up.
So, there we were in the Shetlands. The weather was dreadful, 100 mile per hour 
gale-force wind and 500 journalists. Because the weather was so bad people 
couldn’t get on to the tanker to stem the oil leaking, nor could they get the 
helicopters up there. So essentially nothing had happened. The Shetland Island 
Council, who were in charge of the clean-up, or those who were acting on behalf of 
the owners of the Braer could have filled the gap with all sorts of things such as 
stating that the helicopters were on standby or what they could be doing if the 
weather was not so bad, all positive messages. Instead of which they said nothing 
was happening. So I overheard reporters talking to editors over the phone and 
reporting that nothing was happening. I could not hear what the editors were saying 
but they were clearly saying “well, make it up then”. Suddenly, what people were 
hearing and reading around the world was that the island was completely blackened 
with oil, that the oils contained carcinogens, can get leukemia from breathing it, 
school kids were being evacuated, sheep were being evacuated, all the salmon fish 
farms were contaminated and on and on it went. Then one day the media found 
another story and they went away.
In the Shetland Islands the most important industry is oil, the second most 
important industry is fishing and the export of salmon to Japan. All the Japanese 
just stopped importing salmon from the Shetlands because the perception was that
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all of the Shetland Island salmon was contaminated - which it was not, some were, 
but not all. There is an instance where perception became reality’ (Michael 
Regester, in interview: July 7,1997).
Regester maintains that this instance highlights the problems involved in not 
communicating in order to fill the communication gap - that it is in the company’s 
interest to provide a story to meet the inevitable media demand for one.
The consultants’ main concern is that the company involved must do everything possible 
to ensure favourable reporting. Sociologists Miller and Riechert, drawing on Vincent et 
al’s (1989) observations of different phases of crises, argue that in covering a disaster, 
journalists need different kinds of information in different phases of the crisis:
Phase 1: This stage of crises involves a disruption of normality. At this stage, the media’s 
preferred sources are eyewitnesses. While companies’ statements are listened to, they are 
treated with scepticism.
Phase 2: This stage is called the ‘investigation phase’. The preferred sources are 
government investigators who are to establish the facts, and experts who can put the facts 
in context and offer theories as to why the disaster occurred.
Phase 3: This stage is called the ‘restoration phase’. It involves attempts by officials to 
explain how the disaster occurred, and entails assurances that the probability of 
reoccurrence has been minimised and justice served (Miller and Riechert 1999: 49). 
Miller and Riechert observe that these objectives have to be met. If not:
‘... then the disaster itself will slip into the background and news coverage will be 
driven by conflict amongst stakeholders at which time government officials,
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stakeholder spokespersons, and the general public become the principal source of 
news’ (1999:49).
In order to secure advantageous coverage companies are advised to call in the help of 
third parties to put across the company’s perspective, a strategy that demonstrates a 
response to the conditions identified in Phases 1 and 2, i.e.: media scepticism towards 
companies’ statements. The consultants’ argument that, should a company fail to 
communicate, perceptions will be governed by other sources and other claims is 
sustained by Miller and Riechert’s observation that conflict exists between stakeholders. 
If restorative narratives are not employed in Phase 3, news coverage will be driven by 
that conflict.
Furthermore, consultants claim that once a particular interpretation of the situation has 
been perpetuated within the media, such a representation may become dominant, 
entrenched and difficult to reverse. This observation is also made by media researchers 
who have argued through the analysis of news ‘frames’ that it is possible for a dominant 
perception to be propagated in the media.
Miller and Riechert recognise that:
‘...the ways that news media frame issues can come directly from stakeholders 
with vested interests. Because news often comes from unexpected events, generally 
the first journalists who cover them have little expertise and little time to gather 
background information. They are, therefore, reliant on their sources to provide 
initial briefings and set expectations ... these briefings can have a powerful effect 
on the frames set in early news coverage’ (1999:50).
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They also argue that the initial news frames are likely to be passed on as other journalists 
rely on observations made by the initial media accounts - in this way, initial frames may 
become dominant as they continue to be sustained.
Michael Santangelo, a journalist from the New York Daily News describing the press 
reaction to the fatal Pan Am Flight 103 crash at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 
1988 colourfully expressed how important it is for the media to have a story:
‘The New York press corps to use the vulgar name - is known as the “gang bang”. 
The term “gang bang” is going out of style now, and it’s being known as the “wolf 
pack”. It’s not much different. I don’t mean to condemn myself but you get this sort 
of - everybody needs to get a story. Until you get a story, ravenous. Somebody 
gives you a story, you calm down. Then you sit down. You see a lot of people 
[reporters covering the same story] - we all know each other... a lot of us are 
buddies. We talk: “How ya doing? How’s the kid? How’s the wife? You get 
divorced yet? Yeah. Oh you bought a new car... ” It’s like a sewing circle. But we 
can’t do that until we’ve got a story. We’re all crazy until then’ (quoted in Deppa et 
al. 1993: 123).
Basically, consultants advocate creating useful media representations by exploiting the 
requirements under which journalists work. Ericson (1989) observes that sources 
habitually exploit those needs. Deppa et al. (1993), in a study of the Pan Am Flight 103 
crash, concluded that ‘the development of a working relationship with the media in the 
face of a disaster is central to any crisis communications plan’ (1993: 255). That 
observation supports the consultants’ claim regarding the significance of the media to 
crisis management.
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Managing media representations
Ericson et al’s argument that ‘news is a product of a transaction between journalists and 
their sources’ (1989: 377) also accounts for the significance that consultants place on 
positioning their clients as a news source.
Consultants would concur with Ericson et al’s observation that ‘failure to control the 
news media can mean a loss of control over organisational life and serious harms’ (1989: 
388). Ericson et al argue that sources assess news organisations in a very pragmatic 
manner, that all organisations attempt to ‘police knowledge’ and that such attempts can 
be ‘construed in terms of protecting interests’ (1989:20).
Concepts developed by media studies, such as news values and frames, are ones 
consultants appear to understand, and apply in the construction of strategies for 
influencing media coverage. As Ericson et al observed, ‘journalists find a career path 
from newsrooms to PR work for source bureaucracies’ (1989: 7) - a factor that explains 
why consultants are so knowledgeable about playing to media formats in order to achieve 
particular ends.
News values and news frames determine how stories are constructed. With regard to 
news values, researchers argue that they influence what is reported and how this is 
covered:
‘When journalists scrutinise the world looking for news, they evaluate what they 
see according to news values. These values are criteria forjudging what to report 
and how much emphasis to provide. Nearly all introductory textbooks contain lists
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of news values which include such things as consequence, timeliness, proximity, 
prominence and human interest’ (Miller and Riechert 1999:48).
Consultants appear to use a similar analysis when advising companies:
‘... a story is subject to the same constraints as any commodity - it has to sell. 
When you have a problem, or are perceived to have one, your view of the “facts” is 
likely to differ from how an editor will see the essential dramatic ingredients 
needed for a “good” story. Your message needs to respect those ingredients, 
without losing its integrity, if it is to be effective’ (Seymour and Moore 2000: 48).
Thus, companies are advised to format their crisis communications to meet the 
requirements of the media in order to influence media representations.
What consultants attempt to do in crisis situations is to give ‘quotable quotes’ (Ericson et 
al 1989: 383) and ‘to keep reporters preoccupied with things they are bound to be 
interested in’ (Ericson et al 1989: 18). For example, consultants are aware that the media 
will want to know the cause of an incident even if the company involved does not have 
that information. Deppa et al (1993) argue that journalists are under immediate editorial 
pressure in this regard:
‘It takes investigators a year to find out the cause of a plane crash, but my boss on 
Long Island wants me to tell them what the cause was two hours after it happens’ 
(Howard Kessler, a journalist working for New York Newsday who was covering 
ftie Pan Am 103 crash, quoted in Deppa et al. 1993: 123).
Such pressure may provoke reporters to offer speculative responses, as Regester noted in 
the Braer case (Regester and Larkin 1997:138-142). (Incidentally, Regester’s critique of 
the handling of the Braer crisis suggests that consultants attempt to control the news in 
precisely the manner identified above, by Ericson.)
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The consultants’ claim that during crises there is a greater demand on organisations to 
manage information is supported by research identifying the media’s attraction to 
situations involving conflict as a news value:
‘... situations involving conflict provide the drama needed to attract audiences and 
(indicates to the media) that the level of conflict is indicative of the passions 
participants feel and therefore the importance of the story to them’ (Allan et al: 
1999: 51-2).
Miller and Riechert’s observations that ‘conflict motivates stakeholders to increase their 
efforts to influence the public and policy makers’ (1999: 51-2) and that by ‘capitalising 
on conflict between stakeholders, those stakeholders also attempt to exploit the 
imperatives under which journalists operate’ (1999:45-55) demonstrate how news values 
can be exploited.
The consultants’ claim that crises attract a high level of media attention embraces the 
wider issues relating to the situation. This argument is supported by research revealing 
that events frequently trigger media interest in subjects that might not otherwise have 
received coverage. For example, Miller and Riechert argue in relation to environmental 
risks and the media that:
‘Environmental risk abounds in contemporary society, but generally lies dormant 
until some event drives it onto the public agenda. Whether the triggering event is a 
natural or human-made disaster, or is due to a stakeholder initiative, it activates 
contending stakeholders who seek to win public and policy maker support... News 
media participate in the process by accepting and modifying the frames presented to 
them’ (1999: 53).
Allan, Adam and Carter argue that this is discernible in a:
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‘... variety of instances of news coverage concerned with other environmental 
disasters during the mid-1980s and since, including the 1984 chemical leak at the 
Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India ... A further instance is the oil spill 
of the Exxon Valdez ...’ (1999:8).
The evidence that issues often receive media attention as a result of specific 
events/incidents lends support to the consultants’ contention that issues management can 
facilitate crisis management. The academic identification of events as activating 
‘contending stakeholders who seek to win public and policy maker support’ is suggestive 
of crisis management, which attempts to do just that. It also reinforces the crisis 
management argument that companies need to do more during crisis situations, given that 
other groups will try and influence media coverage.
Academics also identify news values that consultants say are present in crisis situations: 
that the story has a strong visual element, exclusivity, identifiable ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’ 
and an underlying political theme (Chapman et al 1997). On identifying ‘goodies’ and 
‘baddies’, Chapman et al (1997), based on an extensive content analysis of environmental 
stories, argue that the media often seek to assign blame or responsibility for a situation. 
With reference to the 1996 Sea Empress oil tanker disaster in particular, Chapman et al 
observe that the question of blame or responsibility is most often asked in disaster-type 
crises. Consultants also note these themes.
Media researchers observe that certain situations act as canvasses on which moral and 
political lessons can be painted. Consultants argue that this increases the demand on 
organisations to play a role in influencing those pictures when they aim to control how 
they themselves are depicted. According to media researchers, crisis situations (which 
frequently have elements attractive to news values) will draw media attention or, more
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complexly, will be transformed into material which can attract such attention. The notion 
of news frames explains that process.
Gaye Tuchman (1978), drawing on Erving Goffman’s study ‘Frame Analysis ’ (1974), 
developed the concept of ‘news frames’ to describe the way in which journalists process 
new information. Tuchman argues that: ‘an occurrence is transformed into an event, and 
an event is transformed into a news story’. Consultants make a similar observation. They 
maintain that it is important for companies to understand that the media will take a 
particular prescriptive view of events and ask particular types of questions, and that 
companies must accept and respond appropriately to the news construction process. What 
media studies call ‘framing’, consultants tend to characterise as the manageability of 
perceptions.
Also, given that most people do not have direct lived experience of many of the varied 
concerns addressed by crisis management consultants, the media play an even greater 
role as conveyers of information and interpreters of events: ‘we are inescapably 
dependent on the media to comprehend the “world out there” beyond our immediate 
experience’ (Allan, Adam and Carter 1999:15). Allan et al maintain that while they ‘are 
not suggesting that there is a “reality out there” that is being falsified ...by journalists or 
other media practitioners’ (1999: 13), they are of the view that facts often do not speak 
for themselves, contrary to what some journalists may insist.
Miller and Riechert examine news media framing in the context of contentious issues and 
argue that:
41
‘ . opposing stakeholders try to gain public and policy-maker support for their 
positions not by offering new facts or by changing evaluations of the facts, but by 
altering the frames or interpretative dimensions for evaluating the facts’ (1999: 44).
The notion of news frames reveals how journalists may be presenting information in a 
manner which appears to be objective yet is not:
‘Framing allows journalists to focus on facts and still shape discourse - either 
consciously or unconsciously’ (Miller and Riechert 1999:45).
A natural question arising from this consideration o f ‘framing’ is: in whose interest does 
it take place? There is no clear consensus on this point. Miller and Riechert disagree with 
researchers such as Entman (1991), Fine (1992), and Homig (1992), who argue that 
framing is:
‘... driven by unifying ideologies that shape all content on a topic into a specific, 
dominant, interpretation consistent with the interest of social elites. [They 
conceptualise] framing as an ongoing process by which ideological interpretative 
mechanisms are derived from competing stakeholder positions’ (1999: 46).
Certainly, some media studies consider that an organisation’s access to the media 
influences their ability to frame news, but although elites have access, they do not appear 
to have it all their own way. For instance, Ericson et al (1989) suggest that the media play 
an important role in policing elites for procedural irregularities and that ‘there is a 
continual struggle over what is proper procedure for organisations to follow’ (1989:17). 
Cottle (1999) argues that while news access is an important influence on the creation of 
definitions, there are other processes at work and that more access does not necessarily 
mean greater control over media representations.
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The idea that framing is commonplace, and that claims making is a strategy available to 
those interested in influencing both opinion and the formation of policy, is common to 
media studies and consultants. Crisis management itself is an endeavour that starts with a 
desired frame/interpretation (that of the company’s) and attempts to influence how others 
perceive (frame/interpret) the situation. Given that other claims makers are also present in 
this process, companies do need to influence media representations. Ericson et al observe:
‘... there are escalating investments in knowledge control because knowledge is so 
difficult to guard, and because the demand for knowledge is so elastic and 
insatiable. Policing knowledge becomes an end in itself... private corporations as 
much as government bureaucracies are bound to buy into it’ (1989:260).
Academic accounts of framing identify a further process - that certain frames become 
normalised and thus dominant. Deppa et al (1993) argue that one aspect of the media 
reporting of crisis events is that the media stories, as time goes by, take on a routine. 
Stories report similar interpretations of the situation and this story (interpretation) 
becomes authoritative, as happened in the case of the Braer. Ericson et al (1989) identify 
a process they call ‘pack journalism’, where there is a convergence of similar news 
content across media and markets. This is why consultants encourage interpretations to 
be managed from an early stage before they become governed from elsewhere and a 
damaging interpretation gains momentum. They aim to create a ‘pack journalism’ that is 
directed by them. Pack journalism, Ericson et al (1989) argue, arises from various factors, 
one of which is sources trying to create it:
‘By restricting reporters to particular times and places, and by enclosing on 
knowledge, sources can effectively circumscribe news stories so that “pack 
journalism” is the only outcome’ (1989:29).
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Consultants explicitly endorse this type of action.
It is interesting that the media may be aware that claims makers wish to influence their 
coverage. Indeed, this partly explains the scepticism they display towards the claims 
made by companies during crisis situations. Deppa et al (1993) argue that during crises 
the media now expect the organisation involved to have crisis management plans in place 
- they expect to be briefed, to be kept informed, to be restricted, to be managed and, 
consequently, the media are on their guard. Consultants, in turn, are mindful of media 
scepticism, and this is arguably reflected in their concern to build good relations with the 
media and other key publics who can bolster the company’s claims and interpretations of 
the situation and furnish the media search for additional sources.
In summary, academic research suggests that real possibilities exist for the perpetuation 
of certain interpretations in the media, and it is apparent that consultants actively 
encourage the exploitation of opportunities to do so.
Consultants’ communication strategy and symbolic interaction ism
Although consultants do not refer to symbolic interactionism and disclaimed any 
knowledge of it when directly questioned, interactionism provides an enlightening 
theoretical framework through which to conceptualise the consultants’ approach to crisis 
management.
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An outline o f symbolic interactionism
Comte divided the study of society into statics (structure) and dynamics (change). 
Interactionists are critical of those who develop the statics aspect of social life, claiming 
that it produces a theory of people as the ‘living dead’ and that it does not allow for the 
active person who defines society and directs self (Charon 1979). Instead, symbolic 
interactionism, which borrowed from Simmel’s Formalism and American Pragmatism, 
portrays society and the social as a fluid and changeable series of transformations which 
cannot be described in terms of structure and statics (Rock 1979). Symbolic 
interactionism sees the empirical world as in a continual state of flux; the Spencerian 
notion of equilibrium is discounted and the focus is placed upon the processes involved.
Even though their view of society emphasises its dynamic nature, interactionists do not 
completely discount the existence of an objective reality. They ‘operate from an 
assumption that a physical objective reality does indeed exist independent of our social 
definition, that our social definitions do respond, at least in part, to something “real” or 
physical’ (Charon 1979:36). Therefore, they do not claim that the world is only a 
subjective entity, even though the subjective aspects of social life are given a greater 
emphasis than the idea of the world as an external entity. Yet interactionists see all 
human action as responding to a social definition of external reality: ‘...the Symbolic 
Interactionist man is the inhibitor and creator of a symbolic world in which the existence 
of language, symbols and gestures enable him to attach meanings to objects and actions 
in everyday life, to interpret the world around him and to daily create social life’ 
(Plummer 1975:11). Furthermore, each individual because he sees the world, has an
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individual personal reality (Charon 1979). However, we are not wholly free to determine 
our own course of action. It should be understood that symbolic interactionists primarily 
see the world as a subjective reality, as process and interaction. Their task is therefore to 
study the emergent and constantly changing nature of social life.
Symbolic interactionism regards society as a process in which both stability and change 
inhere in the meanings that individuals develop in interaction with each other and with 
themselves. Meanings are seen as being modified and constructed through interaction. 
The focus is upon emergence and negotiation - the processes by which social action in 
groups, organisations or societies, are continually being constructed in everyday life.
George Herbert Mead is acknowledged as a central founding figure of the interactionist 
movement and all modem discussions of the approach give Mead a central place. Mead 
begins by making a distinction between humans and animals, asserting that what 
separates these two species is the existence of language or what he terms the ‘significant 
symbol’. Language, states Mead, developed in the course of interaction. Interaction itself 
is, and was originally, a means of facilitating the achievement of practical results in co­
operation with each other. He maintains that shared meanings gave rise to language as it 
is based on mutual understanding between communicators. Nevertheless, we can never 
be sure that meanings are actually shared; all we can do is see the outward signs.
Meaning takes a central role in the thinking of symbolic interactionists as it is their 
contention that social interaction produces meanings and that human beings act towards 
things on the basis of the meanings things have for them. Thus, we create our world by 
giving meaning to it. Such meanings change and develop and, as they do, the world
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changes and develops. The processes of interaction in which we create our shared world 
take place through language or ‘external conversations’. However, meanings are also 
modified and handled through an internal interpretative process used by each individual 
in dealing with the signs each encounters. This internal interpretative process is also a 
conversation between two different parts of the self which Mead identifies as the T  and 
the ‘Me’.
Mead recognises the ‘Me’ as ‘... the organised set of attitudes of others which one himself 
assumes’ (Mead 1969:230). This is because the significant symbol, for practical 
purposes, calls out the same reaction in myself as it does in others; it enables me to view 
myself as others see me. The second aspect of the self - i.e., the ‘F- Mead identifies as 
‘the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others ...’ (Mead 1969:230). It is the 
part of the self that Mead sees as the source of originality and creativity. It is the part that 
views the self in an introspective manner, but which cannot itself be viewed.
This conception of a partitioned self involves a description of the process of socialisation. 
It is contended that as a child grows older, he comes to see himself in an increasingly 
wide context until he takes on what Mead terms the ‘role of the other’. The ‘other’ can be 
particular or generalised. Mead classifies the ‘generalised other’ as ‘(t)he organised 
community or social group which gives the individual his unity of self...’ (Mead 
1969:220). This enables him to view himself as he imagines the society as a whole views 
him. Craib pinpoints this process as the individual taking on a ‘social conscience’ 
(1992:88). Taking the role of the other is never an authentic process of knowing how 
others see the world; it is only a speculative exercise. Finally, Mead states that it is by
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taking view of the generalised other that shared meaning arises: ‘(i)t is through the ability 
to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant 
(Rock 1979:110).
Symbols are defined in social interaction and are thus conventional: they are
representative of something else only because people have come to agree that they shall 
be’ (Charon 1979:41). Many objects can take on a symbolic quality, words are symbols 
and as Meltzer claims, our acts are often symbols: ‘(h)uman beings ... respond to one 
another on the basis of the intentions or meanings of gestures. This renders the gesture 
symbolic, i.e., the gesture is a symbol to be interpreted...’ (Charon 1979:42).
Language serves for symbol creation and, as Hertzler argues, it performs an important 
function as it is ‘within and by means of the linguistic framework that the ideationally 
established world exists and operates. Language is the means and mode of man’s whole 
mental existence’ (Charon 1979:54).
Interactionists hold that it is through symbolic interaction with each other that we give the 
world meaning: ‘Meaning ... arises out of the social interaction that one has with one’s 
fellows’ (Charon 1979:54). The world is without inherent or intrinsic meaning.
Therefore, meaning remains negotiable because it arises through interaction. For 
instance, interactionists view objects as social objects because, for the human, they are 
isolated, catalogued, interpreted and given meaning through social interpretation. Thus, 
objects are assigned meanings. Meanings vary and ‘are not intrinsic to the object’
(Blumer 1979:38).
48
The self also arises out of interaction and, like all social objects, is defined and redefined 
in interaction. Thus the self, like all other social objects, is continuously changing. As 
Berger states, it is a: ‘ ... process continuously created and recreated in each social 
situation that one enters ... Man is not only a social being, but he is social in every respect 
of his being that is open to empirical investigation’ (1963:136). What is of importance is 
to note that symbolic interaction conceives of identities as Berger describes: ‘identities 
are socially bestowed, socially maintained, and socially transformed’ (1963:91). There is 
throughout symbolic interactionism an emphasis on process and becoming so that selves 
are rarely stable.
Mead argues that taking the role of the other is first; we come to know the other first 
before we come to know our selves. However, we do not really ‘know’ the other; we only 
have inferential knowledge about him/her. Then, with the development of self, we 
develop mind and symbols, followed by more complex role-taking, or taking the 
perspective of the other. Taking the role of the other, asserts Mead, is important for the 
emergence of the self because: ‘(t)he individual experiences himself as such, not directly 
but indirectly...’ (Charon 1979:101). Taking the role of the other is viewed as being the 
basis of human symbolic communication.17
In contrast to all individualistic theories, interactionism suggests that it is not possible to 
understand the distinctly human aspects of social life unless one examines the part played 
by others in influencing and shaping an individual’s actions. The importance of others in
17The concept of role here is not used in the sense used by Parsons and Merton, i.e. in a structural sense to 
describe a set of expectations associated with a given position in society. Interactionists hold that there may 
be culturally derived cues for interpreting roles, but the actual process of role construction is an emergent, 
unstable and constantly negotiated activity. What is being described is a dynamic process.
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symbolic interactionism is featured in its key concepts such as ‘self, ‘role’ and ‘reference 
group’.
The individual’s conception of the self is one of the key elements in understanding the 
social situation in which one acts. Therefore, as Turner points out, the self is not only a 
‘product of interaction’, but it is also a ‘determiner of the course of interaction’ (Charon 
1979:72). Blumer notes that the active nature of a person arises from self-hood: ‘... he 
acts towards his world, interpreting what confronts him and organizing his actions on the 
basis of the interpretation’. The individual must analyse the situation he is in in order to 
ascertain what line of action to take, and he analyses action in the situation in relation to 
the self and adjust his acts accordingly. The ‘generalized other’ is the individual’s 
standard used to control his or her action. However, that control may be negotiated or 
resisted. Each situation we enter is different and each, to some extent, demands active 
participation by the individual in relation to the self. In addition, the human identifies 
with a number of social worlds (reference groups), learns through communication 
(symbolic interaction) the perspectives of these social worlds and uses these perspectives 
to define and interpret situations that are encountered. Each situation is unique to some 
degree and, to be handled appropriately, demands some definition and some self- 
direction. Although recurrent action does become unreflective and habitual, action that is 
purely habitual is dysfunctional in most situations.
We engage in reflective activity throughout everything we do, interactionists argue. 
Therefore this covert reflective activity, which Mead sees as a ‘temporary inhibition of 
action wherein the individual is attempting to prevision the future’, plays a role in overt
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human activity. Mead’s four stages of the act (Impulse, Perception, Manipulation and 
Consummation) draw attention to the fact that humans are goal directed. That is to say, 
we plan our acts around our goals. Therefore, humans actively perceive, define and 
manipulate their environment to achieve goals. When goals change, objects take on new 
meanings and our action changes direction (Charon 1979).
According to interactionism, we construct action, we define self and situation, we 
establish goals, we define lines of action toward objects and then overt action takes place. 
Moreover, all those phases of action affect and influence one another. Action involves a 
constant interplay between overt and covert minded activity. Each situation is unique to 
some degree. Goals are not static and lines of action are constantly shifting. Therefore, 
the relationship between the individual and the environment has a dynamic and 
interdependent character (Rock 1979). The environment continually changes, and the 
individual engaging in activity in relation to it is continuously redefining it and self in 
relation to it. As Warriner remarks, the: ‘ ... stream of action is complex, manifold, 
multiplex ... with many aspects, characteristics, features, dimensions and 
interconnections’ (Charon 1979:112). Hence, action is never static and the direction of it 
shifts in response to a number of variables such as the meanings we attach to it.
Affinities between the consultantsJ rationale and symbolic interactionism
The consultants’ attribution of a centrality to the role of perceptions and the handling of 
communications in a specified manner is comprehensible within interactionism. The 
interactionist description of how individuals communicate is similar to the consultants’ 
recommended method of handling communications, where communications are based on
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an assessment of the likely perceptions of the various audiences and the actions taken are 
based on presumptions about how an audience is likely to react. Consultants attribute 
significance to areas that interactionism also considers central: the importance of 
symbols, communications, identities, of the ways in which we influence others and others 
in turn influence us. A major shared theme is that distinctly human worlds are ‘not only 
material, objective worlds but also immensely semiotic, symbolic ones’ (Plummer 
2000:194).
How interaction takes place is a major concern for both symbolic interactionists and the 
consultants. However, while symbolic interactionism outlines the manner in which 
interaction is conducted, the consultants do not take great pains to state that interaction 
takes place in a particular manner. They are, however, concerned with achieving a 
particular outcome (influencing perceptions) by identifying how interaction takes place 
between an organisation and its various publics. And the recommendations made by 
consultants are implicitly based on a particular view of the interaction process that is very 
similar to that proposed by interactionists.
The communications/interaction strategy that consultants recommend is based, like 
interactionism, on the belief that the attitudes of others can be both presumed and 
responded to (existing perceptions are firstly established and then directed through 
communications). In both the academic and the lay account, a central role is attributed to 
others and their ability to influence the actions taken. Interactionism observes that ‘taking 
the role of the other’ is the basis of human symbolic communications, and the consultants 
advocate a similar communication strategy. The basis of crisis communications is held to
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be the perspective of others. In that way, the consultants’ formula for conducting 
communications assumes and reproduces the process that symbolic interactionism itself 
outlines.
Both accounts also share an interest in the nature of meanings and how they arise, and the 
consultants’ identification of the process involved in the construction of meaning is also 
akin to the description interactionists provide. The importance consultants ascribe to 
perceptions indicates that they consider the meanings held about a matter (perceptions) to 
be pivotal. And, as demonstrated above, their advice presupposes that perceptions are 
malleable and can be influenced. The negotiated nature of meanings is a central postulate 
of interactionism and is fundamental in the consultants’ arguments about crisis 
management. In both accounts, meanings arise through interaction and are negotiated. 
Thus, it is arguable that for both accounts the world is without inherent meaning.
Just as meanings are socially generated and changeable through social interaction, so are 
identities. Interactionism represents the self as arising through interaction and as a 
determinant of the course of interaction. Consultants take a similar view of corporate 
reputations or identities and assume that perceptions of organisations arise during 
interactions. Indeed, that assumption leads to their claim that organisations must pay 
greater attention to the management of perceptions during crises, as such situations often 
involve a higher level of interaction between an organisation and its various significant 
publics/audiences. Consultants also suggest that the perception held of an organisation 
can be redefined by managing interactions. The process involved in the redefinition of the 
self, according to interactionism, and the redefinition of the organisation, according to
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consultants, is based on the same assumptions concerning the nature of identities. The 
consultants maintain that redefinition can be carried out through an assessment of the 
perceptions of others and actions being taken on this basis. Berger’s (1963) claim about 
the nature of identities - that they are socially given, sustained and transformed - is 
assumed and upheld in interactionism and by the consultants.
The nature of relationships between (for symbolic interactionism) the individual, or (for 
the consultants) the organisation, and the environment in which they exist and operate is 
depicted, in both accounts, as interdependent. The interactionist view of how social 
action creates and recreates the environment as well as the self is one which appears to be 
closely analogous to the consultants’ deliberations on the interrelated nature of 
organisations and their environments.
Mead (1969) argues that we plan our acts around our goals through the selective 
perception, definition and manipulation of our environment. The relationship between the 
individual and the environment is seen as being interdependent and dynamic because the 
environment and the self change as the individual constantly redefines the environment 
and the self in relation to it. The idea that there is interdependency between an 
organisation and its various publics is also fundamental to the consultants’ case. The 
notion of significant others is central to interactionist theory and, in terms of achieving 
certain organisational goals (such as successfully dealing with crises), consultants 
identify a considered response to the views of those involved in an organisation’s 
environment as being highly significant to the eventual perceptions of that organisation. 
Symbolic interactionism outlines a reflexive process which precedes goal-directed action.
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Consultants promote a similar model for the organisational management of crises that 
draws on similar notions to those that interactionists identify.
What have we learnt about crisis management and about symbolic interactionism? The 
comparison of claims made by the consultants’ lay account of social action and an 
academic theory about the symbolic construction of the world reveals the kind of 
assumptions consultants make in advising companies to employ a particular type of 
communication strategy in order to manage impressions.
Moreover, the two accounts tend to support each other. Interactionists and consultants 
alike are interested in ascertaining what is involved in interactions, how communication 
is conducted, the development of meanings and how social reality is created, albeit for 
differing purposes. The consultants’ account of how organisations should manage 
interactions with their audiences is one that promotes their crisis management method. 
Nevertheless, their claim that their recommendation is based on observations (of different 
ways in which organisations have interacted with their significant others with varying 
outcomes), and their advocacy of a method of interaction (which is also described by 
symbolic interactionism), suggests that consultants have observed much the same world 
as that described by theorists. In this respect the two accounts corroborate each other.
Although symbolic interactionism largely deals with the individual and consultants are 
concerned with the organisation, the finding that there is a confluence between these 
accounts is a significant one suggesting similarities between how perceptions of 
individuals and organisations arise.
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One clear consequence of this confluence is that the consultants’ claim that their method 
of managing interaction in order to manage perceptions is well informed, is given a 
degree of academic credibility. In particular, the consultants’ belief that possibilities exist 
for manufacturing desired outlooks through an understanding of how an organisation 
interacts/communicates with its audiences is bome out by the interactionist observation 
that meanings are negotiated and created through interaction. The interactionist 
observation that meanings are mutable supports the consultants’ argument that 
organisations can fashion advantageous views. Further, the consultants’ claim that 
organisations must identify and respond to perceptions is sustained by the interactionist 
finding that an individual interacts on the basis o f‘taking the role of the other’, that is, by 
basing actions on an assessment of what he assumes the other thinks. Interactionism 
views ‘taking the role of the other’ as the basis of human symbolic communication and 
consultants recommend that approach, which they argue is more effective given that the 
desired goal is to communicate more efficiently and in a manner that is beneficial to the 
organisation.
My argument that crisis management is in some ways a pragmatic construction is 
significant to a consideration of the similarities between it and symbolic interactionism. 
The way in which consultants manage crises is a pragmatic undertaking designed to 
influence perceptions and prevent risks to reputations. Therefore, consultants must 
believe, or act on the belief, that companies can control their reputations and influence 
perceptions, and that these can be directed by organising action in a particular manner. 
The consultants must assume, in other words, that perceptions are governable and that 
meanings arise as a consequence of and within the interaction process. The very
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manageability of crises - according to the consultants’ formulation - is conceivable 
because they believe that there are possibilities for an engineered reality.
What the consultants’ viewpoint imparts to symbolic interactionism is an empirical 
experience that appears to sustain the claims of that sociological perspective with regard 
to how interaction takes place and how meanings and social reality are constructed.
That crisis management, a new phenomenon, is explicable within an interactionist 
framework also shows how ‘quietly endurable’ this social theory is (Plummer 2000). As 
Plummer argues, it is ‘far from dead or obsolete’ (2000:193-223). As he also suggests, 
the theory can be shown to sit well with the current interest in identities and the media.
Crisis management for organisations also demonstrates that impression management is 
not exclusive to individuals, and it would seem that organisational efforts are not 
dissimilar to the way in which individuals manage such affairs. The finding that 
impression management strategies utilised by individuals and organisations correspond 
sheds an interesting light on the subject.
It should be bome in mind, however, that the exact method for conducting 
communications prescribed by consultants is not necessarily that which organisations 
actually use. In fact, the consultants’ criticism of corporate communications is focussed 
precisely on their failure to adopt the course of action consultants recommend. It would 
be a mistake, therefore, to conclude that organisations actually interact in the manner 
consultants advocate. Still, the finding that organisations are encouraged to take an 
approach bearing such evident affinities with symbolic interactionism is intriguing.
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In summary, the finding that (despite the existence of differences - most significantly in 
intentions and the subject of study) the consultants’ and the interactionists’ views both 
qualify and supplement each other provides a better understanding of what is involved in 
directing perceptions.
Why is crisis management here?
The consultants’ explanation that crisis management exists because it is now necessary 
will be elucidated in this section. With reference to the risk society thesis (see pages 61 - 
63), the parallels that account has with other independent, authoritative accounts will also 
be demonstrated. Beck (1992) and Giddens (1999) would concur with the consultants’ 
argument that crisis management arose because of a need for it in contemporary society.
The consultants ’ explanation
In interviews and in their publications consultants distinguish two ‘trends’ which they 
claim makes crisis management necessary and explains its existence.
The fact that the acknowledged experts of crisis management knew each other and were 
familiar with each other’s work and thinking explains why consultants so regularly and 
uniformly cited the two trends. It became apparent in interviews that the consultants also 
had similar backgrounds; for instance Michael Bland and Michael Seymour had 
previously had military careers. Many consultants also worked in public relations 
departments of companies before specialising in crisis management. For example, 
Michael Regester worked at Gulf Oil and Michael Bland at Ford. They subscribed to the
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same publications (such as PR Week), belonged to the same associations (such as the IFR 
and the PRCA), read each other’s books, and attended the same conferences. Michael 
Regester was also regularly invited by consultancies to participate in their presentations 
to clients. Worldviews can easily be disseminated and gain currency in the small world of 
crisis management consultancy.
The first trend is identified as a change in attitudes towards authority. The consultants 
cite the emergence of consumerism, the increasing presence and power of pressure 
groups, a widespread mistrust of corporations and a belief that they are only concerned 
about profit and socially and environmentally irresponsible, as a consequence of a wider 
societal trend towards the right to question, influence and dispute:
‘...the role of government and corporations in society is being challenged to a 
much greater degree than before ... We are less trusting of those in authority.
[There is] a big increase in activism ... In the past ten years, the proliferation of 
single-issue groups has outstripped anything in the past... This vocal and energetic 
movement is growing in line with corporate unpopularity ... they have the power to 
inflict long-term damage on companies and, like shareholders and politicians, they 
need to be factored into corporate planning and decision making’ (Regester and 
Larkin 1997:13-23).
The second trend is said to be the impact of the contemporary media on the corporation:
‘The contemporary media are technologically sophisticated and are now more 
intrusive, and extensive. Corporate and institutional behaviour is under much closer 
scrutiny. The media are very important audiences ... Ignoring the media is a big 
mistake’ (Michael Regester, in interview: July 7,1997).
These circumstances, consultants argue, give rise to greater scrutiny, litigation and 
adverse publicity. The two trends are also interdependent, they maintain. An instance of 
such interdependency is that because of a disposition to question and contest, there is a
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greater probability that the ubiquitous media are likely to reflect and amplify such views 
which, in turn, creates a greater threat to the perspectives of those who traditionally 
occupy positions of authority.
Various commentators view contemporary society as decentered and as giving rise to 
difference, ambiguity, pluralism and heterogeneity, and have talked about the decline in 
deference and the proliferation of risk. For instance, Macnaghten and Urry (1998), 
commenting on the Brent Spar case, argue:
‘Greenpeace’s campaign to stop Shell dumping the Brent Spar ... related to the 
globalization of risk and the ability of the NGO to operate globally’ (1998:68).
And:
‘The role of NGOs is of special significance in a period where they are often trusted 
more than government, and where industry is trusted hardly at all’ (Macnaghten 
and Urry (1998: 73).
Macnaghten and Urry also point to the emergence of new patterns of environmental 
protest which involve an ‘inventiveness in method’ (1998:70), such as the use of new 
technologies in Greenpeace’s Brent Spar campaign.
Further, a central observation of postmodernism is that ‘the postmodern condition is one 
of micro contexts and micro struggles in which a variety of social groups attempt to 
“wage war” against the totalising and centralising power of the modem state, 
multinational companies and bureaucratised science and technology’ (Swingewood 
2000:223). That is quite central to and supports the consultants’ views.
Ericson’s (1989) argument that the media police irregularities in corporate behaviour, and 
focus on bad news and signs of procedural deviance and wrong-doing, also backs the
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consultants’ claim, as does his observation that: ‘managing news is important because 
meanings are assigned to events, processes or state of affairs’ (1989: 377). Ericson’s 
contention that attempts are made to achieve ‘preferred versions’ and that ‘legitimation 
work has become a most legitimate expense for organisations’ (1989:18), explains 
practices such as crisis management and points to circumstances that increase risks to 
reputations and require organisations to manage media representations.
While there may well be congruence between consultants’ claims about the world and 
other sociological perspectives, I pay close attention to the similarities with the view of 
society proposed by the risk thesis outlined below because that appears to me to be the 
most striking and noticeable. An examination of analogous observations made by 
sociological perspectives illuminates what the consultants expound and, regardless of 
whether or not what the consultants say is ‘true’, this examination shows that it does at 
least chime with other authoritative accounts, and has a plausibility, which is relevant to 
the question of how the consultants gain credibility and business.
The ‘risk society’perspective
The idea of the ‘risk society’ was proposed by Beck (1992) and seconded by Giddens 
(1998). They argue that society is now entirely different as a result of a globalisation 
process involving technological, economic, political and cultural changes: ‘There are 
good, objective reasons for believing that we are living through a major period of 
historical transition’ (Giddens 2000: 1). He, like Beck, is of the view that contemporary 
society is one that is characterised by risk: ‘this apparently simple notion unlocks some of 
the most basic characteristics of the world in which we now live’ (Giddens 2000: 21). For
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Beck (1992) and Giddens (1999), the rise of the risk society is driven by a process 
initiated by modernisation. Beck argues that the risk society is characterised by an 
advanced modernity within which ‘the social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by a social production of risks’ (Beck 1992:19). He claims that such risks 
are a consequence of techno-economic development and are new in terms of their global 
scope; they present global dangers.
Beck and Giddens identify a specific type of risk: ‘manufactured risks’, which they 
define as those which arise from developments in science and in technology, thus: ‘they 
are created by the very impact of our developing knowledge of the world’ (Giddens 2000: 
26). Because of the unintended and unforeseen consequences of technological 
development, technological innovations have in reality increased risks, they argue.
They also associate risk with the development and advance of knowledge, which is seen 
as having created a greater awareness of previously unseen hazards. Thus, there is a 
greater consciousness of risk and that too is a defining characteristic of present-day 
society. They also maintain that risk consciousness is compounded by conflicting and 
changeable scientific and technological information, which is also a new aspect of 
society. Beck and Giddens view science and people’s relation to science as having 
changed, as conclusiveness in scientific findings is now acknowledged to be increasingly 
elusive. Hence, risk calculation and our ability to accept scientific discoveries are 
affected by that new condition. Moreover, that condition also intensifies the problems of 
trust that they observe.
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Other academics examining risk, such as Douglas (1992) and Furedi (1998), contest the 
equation of technological advances with risk. Furedi (1998), whilst agreeing with 
Giddens and Beck that the development of knowledge has increased sensitivity to unseen 
hazards, disputes the view that contemporary society is, in actuality, more risky: ‘It is 
striking that despite the many problems that face humanity, we live in a world that is far 
safer than at any time in history’ (Furedi 1998: 54). He sees the association of risk with 
technological advances as a symptom of another phenomenon: that of an augmentation in 
scepticism and cynicism about human intervention and endeavour. Whereas for Beck 
scientific and technological developments have produced new dangers, Furedi claims that 
there is a cynical belief that society cannot find solutions to its problems and that there is 
an exaggeration of the destructive outcomes of human activity.
Risk cannot be defined objectively because what is seen as a risk depends on values held 
by individuals and groups, maintain Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). Douglas (1992) 
argues that risks are socially constructed and that risk and danger are culturally 
conditioned notions - there are cultural differences in what is seen to constitute a risk.
Although there is diverging academic discourse about risk and disagreements on 
fundamental issues, there is agreement that contemporary society is one which is severely 
concerned with risk and, as a result, also characterised by it. There is an analogy between 
the risk society theorists’ identification of the fundamental characteristics of society and 
that which the consultants propose, and it is this identification that is discussed in the 
following section.
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Zones of convergence
The worldviews of academics and consultants meet where both accounts see the 
construction of risks as active and influenced by power and public trust; view the media 
as playing an important role in the construction of risks and in contemporary society; 
identify a greater level of public scrutiny in contemporary society; assert that there is a 
greater level of scepticism; and describe a greater need for those traditionally occupying 
positions of power and authority to justify their actions and policies.
Both consultants and risk theorists view risks as emergent and open to social definition 
and construction. Consultants recognise that the risks claimed to be posed by a particular 
corporation’s action are open and vulnerable to diverse interpretations. It is because of 
this that groups offering contrary definitions (such as pressure groups) have such 
significance in crisis management. Arguing that ‘... new risks emerge, the degree of 
existing risk changes ... a new perception of risks can occur’ (Regester and Larkin 
1997:25) and that communicating about risks can control how risks are viewed, 
consultants accept that risks are malleable. Their attempts to influence perceptions of 
risks by managing communications about risks are based on this premise.
The construction of risks is seen as active, purposeful and for particular, desired ends. 
Which particular interpretation of risks will be the dominant one is recognised as variable 
by both perspectives. Undisputed by both accounts is the centrality of ‘how many people 
become convinced of a particular interpretation and take action upon this basis’ (Giddens 
1996:11). Nevertheless, both standpoints assert that questions of power (who is best 
positioned to exert the greater influence) and trust (who has the greater share of public
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trust) take on a central role in their ability successfully to influence definitions. Both 
versions also acknowledge that the media play a central role in defining risks and 
knowledge about risks. In order to show these conditions, consultants point to the Brent 
Spar case, where different definitions of risks were simultaneously made by Shell and 
Greenpeace but, according to them, one party used a better communication strategy, 
commanded greater trust and thus was more successful than the other:
‘Shell was forced to change course over Brent Spar because certain audiences ... 
believed what Greenpeace told them. They went on believing the interest group 
even when it was revealed that Greenpeace’s original allegations on the level of 
contaminants [in Brent Spar] were overestimated’ (Seymour and Moore 2000:171).
Both accounts similarly classify the situation that perceptions of risk play a central role in 
the construction of risks and even determine whether something comes to be seen as a 
risk. Consultants argue:
‘Once a risk is perceived then it is real because the perception is that it is. In 
communicating about risks it is the perceptions of risk that have to be addressed’ 
(Michael Regester, in interview: July 7, 1997).
Beck observes, as do consultants, that there are two issues involved in knowledge about 
risks: the risks themselves and ‘public perception of(them)\ 18 Beck argues that ‘it is not 
clear whether the risks have intensified, or our view of them [but]... perceptions of risk 
and risk [are] one and the same’ (1992:55) because the issue can be described by the 
‘well known sociological sentence: if people experience risks as real they are real as a 
consequence’ (1992:77). Therefore, both parties maintain that public perceptions play an 
influential and determining role in considerations about risks. Consultants argue that
l8 All the following emphases in the quotations from Beck appear in the original.
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public perceptions of issues and risks play a principal and influential part in whether a 
particular corporate action and/or policy is accepted. Beck’s observations on how risks 
are constructed support the consultants’ argument on the matter.
The second area of similarity centres on Beck’s and the consultants’ attribution of a 
central role to the media in the definition of risks and in presenting opportunities for 
influencing the definition of risks. The definition of risks, claims Beck, is done within 
and through the mass media and is malleable because risks are:
‘... based on causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms of the 
(scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, 
magnified or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly 
open to social definition and construction’ (Beck 1992:23).
Consultants take the view that, because of the analysis of risk being dependent on the 
knowledge held about the risks, assessments of risk can be influenced by managing 
information. Consultants recognise that knowledge is mediated and, upon this basis, crisis 
management initiatives attempt to influence that process. Beck argues that the media 
present opportunities to influence the definition of social problems, and political spheres 
can only ignore published opinion at the risk of losing voters and supporters. The 
consultants encourage companies to influence interpretations within the media and that 
recommendation is based on the recognition that views aired in the media about a 
corporation cannot safely be ignored by that entity.
Beck also attributes a further significance to the role of the media in publicising issues.
He states that the media also perform an important monitoring function with regard to 
political decisions:
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‘... the legal protection and substantive fulfillment of freedom of the press, which in 
combination with the mass media (newspapers, radio, television) and new 
technological possibilities, brings about multiply graduated forms of publicity.
Even if these certainly do not pursue the exalted goals of the Enlightenment, but are 
also and even primarily ‘servants’ of the market, of advertising and of consumption 
(whether of goods of all sorts or of institutionally fabricated information), and even 
if they possibly produce or exacerbate inarticulateness, isolation, even stupidity, 
there still remains an actual or potential monitoring function which media directed 
publicity can perform with regard to political decisions’ (1992: 193-4).
Given this function of the media as well as the power of the media to structure and 
disseminate knowledge, Beck goes so far as to state that the risk society is ‘also the 
science, media and information society’ (1992:46). Giddens too believes that the risk 
society is also the information society. Consultants, like the risk thesis, attribute a central 
role to the media within contemporary society. They do so because of the monitoring 
function of the media and because they recognise that the media have a significant 
influence on perceptions of corporations and their activities.
Giddens argues that the contemporary media may create a greater democratization, yet he 
also identifies a significant aspect of the media which might confer certain dangers to 
such a democratisation as well as presenting specific dangers such as hampering the 
discussion of complex issues:
‘On the one hand ... the emergence of a global information society is a powerful 
democratising force. Yet, television, and the other media, tends to destroy the very 
public space they open up, through a relentless trivialisation and personalisation of 
political issues’ (Reith Lecture 1999: www.reith.bbc.co.uk/reith 99).
In this way, Giddens identifies a characteristic of the media that consultants also observe 
i.e., that certain aspects of media reporting of issues require a greater corporate effort, 
both to defend themselves from media trivialisation of matters important to them and to
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provide a defence of their actions and policies. Consultants claim that corporations have 
to work harder to gain coverage and support of their views.
Beck (1992) argues that the media might be used to perpetuate ‘institutionally fabricated 
information’, and he sees this as being a problematic aspect of society. Crisis 
management, which seeks publicity for a particular corporate viewpoint, may be viewed 
as a form of such ‘institutionally fabricated information’. However, the consultants’ 
argument that such actions are necessary is also based on their identification that such 
practices are routinely present in contemporary society. As we have seen, the consultants’ 
contention is that corporations must publicise their own perspective in response to, and to 
curtail, hostile views perpetuated in the media. Hence, both accounts point to similar 
processes.
The risk thesis identifies the monitoring function of the media as having a variety of 
consequences. One such consequence also claimed by consultants is the opening up of 
the political sphere; i.e. a ‘sub-politics’ emerges and takes centre stage. It is characterised 
as a new political culture wherein citizens, initiative groups, social movements ‘... are 
able to utilize all the media of public and legal control and consultation to protect their 
interest and rights’ (Beck 1992: 185). The effect of such actions, the risk thesis maintains, 
is that techno-economic development loses its non-political status and becomes sub­
politics because:
‘[t]he direction of development and the results of technological transformation 
becomes fit for discourse and subject to legitimation... business and techno- 
scientific action acquire a new political and moral dimension that had previously 
seemed alien to techno-economic activity’ (Beck 1992:186).
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Therefore, Beck echoes a central claim made by the consultants: a greater level of 
discourse and debate regarding the actions and policies of corporations, which require 
them to stand up for themselves. As also maintained by consultants, the risk thesis 
identifies a new type of pressure developed for business:
‘(t)he public gets a say in technical details. Businesses that had long been pampered 
in a cozy capitalist consensus because of their fiscal benefactions and their 
charitable creation of jobs, suddenly find themselves on the witness bench, or more 
precisely, locked in the pillory, and confronted with the kind of questions that were 
previously used to prosecute poisoners caught red-handed’ (Beck 1992: 76).
Therefore, both perspectives state that businesses in contemporary society are faced with 
a new type of risk: a societal disposition to question, criticise and disbelieve their claims.
Both descriptions of society also observe that there is a greater level of public scrutiny 
that is facilitated by the advances in communications. Giddens points to a central and 
interdependent role of communications and an increased level of public debates. He 
argues that contemporary society is ‘an age of instantaneous communications which has 
produced more active and reflective citizenries than had existed before’ (The Reith 
Lecture, 1999: www.bbc.co.uk/reithl999). Beck writes that whereas ‘in an earlier stage, 
[the risks of techno-economic developments] can be legitimated as “latent side 
effects’”(1992:13), they no longer can be sanctioned as such as they are subject to public 
discourse, criticism, scientific investigation and achieve a central importance in social 
and political debates.
Additionally, Beck’s claim that there is a greater investigation of economic and 
technological developments within ‘the light of a new ecological morality ... ’ (1992:77)
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is parallel to the consultants’ argument that there is a greater tendency to hold business 
socially and environmentally responsible. Moreover, the consequences of ignoring this 
new consciousness are also similarly identified by consultants as by Beck: ‘... market 
shifts, political pressures [develop], checks on plant decisions, recognition of 
compensation claims, gigantic costs, legal proceedings and loss of face [occurs]’ (Beck 
1992:77).
The loss of trust which academics point to is also observed by consultants. Giddens 
contends there has been a death of ‘traditional deference and respect’ in contemporary 
society, arguing that politics and business previously depended on a passive form of trust 
which no longer exists. Consequently, he claims, there is now a greater need for 
businesses and governments to generate a more active form of trust (The Reith Lecture, 
1999:www.bbc.co.uk/reith). That identification of a new requirement for organisations 
especially businesses and governments, corresponds with consultants’ similar estimation 
and claim that, given the corrosion of traditional forms of deference, there is a greater 
requirement now for corporations to defend their stance and create a renewed acceptance 
and public empathy.
Furedi (1998) also suggests that there is a disposition to distrust those in power and he 
accounts for why this may be so:
‘There is a presumption [about the dangers involved] that what is visible or 
quantifiable is only the tip of the iceberg. Such conclusions often make sense, since 
many people expect that those in authority are unlikely to tell the truth. That people 
so readily expect cover-ups and hidden agendas is in part an understandable 
reaction to past experience. However, it has also contributed to a climate in which 
the most extreme claims about virtually any issue can be taken seriously - at least 
until they are disproved’ (1998:34).
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Furedi’s conclusion that even the most radical claim might now be taken seriously 
supports the consultants’ argument that corporations are now compelled to take a greater 
effort to safeguard their claims and views.
The higher level of scepticism, Beck observes, is also ‘extended to the foundations and 
hazards of scientific work and science is thus both generalised and demystified* 
(1992:14). Giddens argues that there is a greater recognition that knowledge and, within 
this, scientific authority is also open to doubt: that ‘all claims to knowledge are corrigible 
has become an existential condition in modem societies’ (1996:42). Furedi (1998) also 
maintains that there has been a loss of trust in a variety of domains that were traditionally 
prestigious:
‘(t)he loss of trust in authority does not merely pertain to the domains of politics, 
religion and culture. Many of the professions e.g.- doctors, scientists - have also 
lost prestige and authority ... Suspicion towards science is particularly intense. 
Instead of trusting the expert opinion of the scientist, many people are disposed to 
look for a hidden agenda. Indeed, the loss of public trust in science is one of the 
most striking expressions of the general erosion of legitimacy and authority. A 
tendency to mistrust scientific claims has helped fuel public unease about the 
consequences of technological developments. Many of the panics about 
environmental and health-related issues demonstrate an explicit rejection of the 
claims of scientists on the subject. Mistrust of science is one of the most visible 
elements of the growth of risk consciousness itself (1998: 130).
Contrary to Giddens’s and Beck’s position that expert systems have lost the ability to 
command trust, Furedi argues that society has not entirely shed trust in all expert systems, 
rather that there is a selective relationship with expertise:
‘... what is at issue is not a general mistrust of expert systems, but rather of 
particular types of expertise ... The recent dispute between Shell and Greenpeace 
[over the Brent Spar] indicates that certain types of expert can always count on 
public confidence’ (1998: 132-3).
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Furedi points to a significant risk to corporations which consultants also note: he argues 
that because there is a loss of trust in those in positions of authority, other claims are 
taken more seriously than would have been the case if traditional sources of authority still 
held esteem. Thus, a greater trust in groups such as Greenpeace might be a consequence 
of a loss of faith in authority, as it is likely that trust might be conferred to those who are 
often in direct opposition to those in whom the public have lost confidence. Furedi’s 
observation mirrors the consultants’ claim that the public and the media may be more 
sympathetic to the allegations of pressure groups. Further, as there is a loss of trust there 
might also be a tendency to believe bad news - which companies would wish to minimise 
- rather than good news, which may be seen as self-serving and exaggerated.
Both consultants and academics observe a greater need for those who have lost public 
trust to justify their actions and policies, and they interpret that as a contemporary 
element of society. Beck saw such attempts to cultivate support as now regularly taking 
place. That is reflected in his argument that ‘sub-politics’ (a third entity between politics 
and non-politics) has taken over from politics in shaping society. Such sub-politics, he 
argues, is ‘under the jurisdiction of business, science and technology...’ (1992:14). 
Giddens also argues that new responsibilities arise for businesses and governments as a 
consequence of being subjected to a greater level of questioning, and identifies a 
requirement for businesses and governments to exercise greater efforts to explain and 
justify their activities (Reith Lecture 1999: www.bbc.co.uk/reith99). Not only does that 
parallel the consultants’ case, but also the risk thesis’s identification of this feature of 
contemporary society explains the rise of and the very existence of practices such as 
crisis management. The main objective of the new field of crisis management is to create
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public acquiescence. The risk thesis recognises that objective, and the fact that it is 
necessary, as characteristics of contemporary society.
The conditions of contemporary society that Beck and others describe are similar to those 
described by consultants, who catalogue those very factors as being central to the 
management of crises. For instance, Beck declares:
‘(a)ccess to the media becomes crucial. The insecurity within industry intensifies: 
no one knows who will be struck next by the anathema of ecological morality.
Good arguments, or at least arguments capable of convincing the public, become a 
condition of business success’ (1992:32).
Beck forsees that practices such as crisis management will arise and prosper. He sees the 
rise in the role and need for corporate communicators and spokesmen and views this as 
another aspect of the risk society: ‘(p)ublicity people, the ‘argumentation craftsmen’, get 
their opportunity in the organization’ (Beck 1992:32). He says this is a response to the 
need to achieve public acceptance, which is a condition of contemporary society that both 
the risk thesis and consultants observe.
The promotion of crisis management
Consultants depict crisis management merely as a coincidental response to an exigency, 
and the risk thesis shows how there might be a need for it, but one important reason for 
the existence of crisis management is that consultants actively create a demand for it.
A view o f society as requiring crisis management
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Although the consultants’ description of society is paralleled in other authoritative 
accounts and has a plausibility, it also serves their interests because their account of 
society attempts to convince corporations of the existence of threats and to persuade them 
that there is not only a need to deal with such eventualities but also that the consultants 
can control identified risks to businesses and know how to go about doing so. Consultants 
demonstrate that there exists a need for their recommendations and, even if that may well 
be the case, the measures taken to demonstrate such a need also attempt to create one. 
That is particularly manifest when what they present is not a mere chronicle of conditions 
but an argument that a need has arisen and a service to deal with that circumstance is 
matched to it:
‘You are more likely to experience a crisis than the person who last held your job 
... Your crisis is more likely now that the world is more demanding about what you 
do ... the outside world is taking a greater interest in a business’s operations ... The 
most sophisticated management teams have problems appreciating how readily 
borders are ignored or jumped by media ... In a crisis, communication technology 
may turn against you. The media, the Internet, the telephone all thunder down the 
information highway to besiege the company ... And it is what you have to say, 
and how you say it, that will shape the crisis’ (Seymour and Moore 2000: xiv).
From the above, we can see that a problem is first identified and then a solution is 
provided. The solution, significantly, is presented as being a greater communications 
effort, which is precisely the consultants’ area of work. The consultants use a rhetorical 
argument to produce a demand for their services.
It is curious that most consultants, in interviews, began by citing the two ‘trends’ 
mentioned previously (changes in attitudes to authority and the contemporary media). It 
is debatable whether the circumstances they classify are trends or not, or whether they are 
the two key directions of and/or the conditions of contemporary society. But these
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questions are not as relevant for my purposes as the fact that consultants present this as 
being so. It is the case that the two trends they identify are ones that are not only 
significant to the practical elements of their work but also to the promotion of their 
enterprise. The two areas they evoke promote crisis management because they are said to 
be the reasons why corporations should engage in it. That also explains why they are 
given such a central position and why consultants begin their case by referring to them. 
The two trends allow consultants to portray corporations as under siege and it is 
pragmatically advantageous to them to do so. The excerpt above illustrates this depiction 
of a dangerous world. It is from the opening pages of a text on crisis management written 
by one of its prominent consultants and it illustrates my point that consultants routinely 
begin the presentation of their case by describing circumstances which they claim 
necessitate their services. Kieser saw this as a customary consultancy practice, arguing: 
‘consultancies who compile a new management concept also construct the business 
problems for which the offered solution fits’ (2002:180).
There seem to be three main explanations for why the consultants’ claims about the 
nature of society are so similar to those put forward by the risk society thesis: that risk 
theorists and consultants are responding to ‘identical’ events in the same way; that their 
common arguments are just a coincidence - a matter of serendipity; or that they have 
influenced one another. Arguably, all three possibilities contributed to the situation, but it 
is impractical to establish the extent of their influence.19
19 Although the question of why such similarities are there is compelling, I am not confident that 
conclusive answers to the question of why are attainable - 1 have demonstrated how those similarities are 
there. One could, however, speculate and I have done so.
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Kipping and Engwall would not find the parallels unusual, as they argue that the three 
main groups in what they called ‘the management knowledge industry’, i.e., the media, 
academia and consultants, although sometimes combative, also have a cooperative 
relationship and routinely support each other (2002:9). And, just as the consultants take 
up academic ideas they, in turn, diffuse those ideas in the course of their work. There are 
mediated accounts of risk that turn empirical studies into theory and theory into practice. 
The means of doing this in this case would probably be conferences, journals and 
newspapers.
Most consultants, however, disclaim any knowledge of the similarities with the academic 
ideas I discussed. Nevertheless, Regester and Larkin writes that their perspective is like 
that proposed by the risk society thesis (Regester and Larkin 1997:24). Although they 
wrote this in a textbook on crisis management and Regester expressed this view in 
interview, I cannot say how thorough their understanding of that thesis is. But as it is the 
case that consultants do not ‘operate in a void’, it is not so unusual that they are aware of 
leading discourses of the times (Kipping and Engwall 2002:5). Beck’s 'Risk Society' sold 
over 60,000 copies worldwide and ‘produced significant reverberations, both within and 
outside academic circles’ (Mythen 2004:11). Also, in one instance I know of, although 
the consultancy concerned said that such occasions are frequent, Regester Larkin 
organised an ‘informal lunch gathering’ where a prominent risk theorist, Frank Furedi, 
was invited to lecture to a group of their clients on the nature of contemporary society. 
Kieser observed that consultancies organise seminars because they regard them as 
‘superb marketing instruments’ (2002:170). The observations made by academics such as 
Furedi allow consultants to lend legitimacy to their claims and demonstrate to their
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clients the weight of what they propound. These instances allow consultants to advance 
their proposals by making use of academic observations and support Kipping and 
Engwall’s argument. Not only does the risk thesis support the consultants’ case but the 
consultants also use such discourses to promote crisis management.
However, consultants also portray their observations as being independently made. 
Despite writing that their account of society is similar to the observations of the risk 
thesis, Regester said in interview that this similarity was coincidental, claiming that his 
description was based on observations of crises rather than being derived from a social 
theory. He, however, was enterprising in claiming that the existence of similar 
observations to that made by him, and other consultants in the field, further prove their 
claims. That statement illustrates how the existence of similar notions might be used to 
advance a case and a practice.
The citation o f cases
This allows consultants independently to create client receptivity to their claims. Their 
citation of cases, such as the Exxon-Valdez and Intel’s Pentium 1, has a function in 
promoting the consultants’ proposals as it plays a powerful narrative role in constructing 
crisis management as a project and consultants as the masters of that project. The 
consultants’ classification of characteristic ways in which corporations mismanage crises 
proposes a set of ideas regarding what constitutes effective management. By arguing in 
this way, consultants lay claim to the required expertise to deal with crises and, because 
of this, the services they provide are presented as imperative to the management of crises.
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The cases they cite reflect properties of the ‘real’ world, and the consultants’ 
identification of ways in which crises have been typically mismanaged show the 
consequences of different responses to crisis. But such classifications also constitute 
ways in which their method is advanced. For example, as is apparent from the cases I 
have referred to, although the cases are complex situations, the consultants reduce their 
explanation of those incidents to the communications strategies employed and to whether 
managers take their advice. The factors they isolate reflect the practicalities involved in 
the areas they wish to tackle, but their account is a selective one that proposes a particular 
type of explanation which demonstrates the legitimacy of their approach. In their citation 
of cases, what remains hidden is that companies are urged to adopt the consultants’ 
recommendations and this promotes crisis management.
The consultants’ explanation of why some cases are so often cited is that they were high 
profile, not ongoing (i.e. sufficiently in the past rather than being subject to 
confidentiality), contemporary and relevant. Those cases that the consultants characterise 
as demonstrative of a poor approach are also ones where there has been some 
acknowledgement and admission by the corporations involved that the course of action 
they took in handling the crisis was misguided. For instance, Exxon and Intel have since 
declared their misgivings about their approach.20 For persuasive purposes, what the 
consultants claim is made more cogent if there is agreement on what transpired. The 
same cases might be cited again and again because there may be published accounts of 
those instances and, as they become frequently referenced, they may have become
20 Andrew Grove, CEO of Intel, made this view quite clear in ‘Only the Paranoid Survive: How to exploit 
the crisis points that challenge every company’ (Grove 1999).
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established as classic cases which one can point to, or add to easily without having to go 
into much detail. However, it is also the case that, even if the consultants do not draw 
attention to it, they have prepared stories to recount. Cases are cited because they 
encompass, and more complexly, can be interpreted as encompassing, what consultants 
wish to underscore because a primary objective of citing cases is to promote their 
reasoning and approach.
By pointing to cases consultants portray the efficiency of contingency plans for the 
management of crises as being dependent on the incorporation of factors they hold as 
important: communications that address the perceptions of audiences. Although this 
characterisation flows in part from what public relations people can do, it also helps the 
consultants’ case. This is not to imply that their case is unwarranted.
Academic analyses of crises and their management have also pointed to the importance 
of paying attention to communications. Deppa et al’s analysis of the Pan Am Flight 103 
disaster21 and the company’s response to the crisis, concluded that Pan Am had paid 
insufficient attention to communications in the preparatory stages of their plans to 
manage any forthcoming crisis:
‘Prior to Lockerbie in 1988, the most recent run through of the entire Pan Am 
[crisis] plan was 1982, although exactly one week before the bombing of Flight 
103, Pan Am had been the participating airline in an emergency exercise at 
London’s Heathrow airport [however] like so many corporate efforts in crisis
21 On December 21,1988, Pan American Airways Boeing 747 ‘Maid of the Seas’ (Flight 103) crashed in 
Lockerbie, Scotland. The flight exploded as a result of a terrorist bomb, destroying 270 lives on the plane 
and on land in Lockerbie. Consultants have criticised the company for not demonstrating concern (as the 
CEO did not go to the site, did not apologise and did not attend the memorial services), for failing to 
communicate with the media and for concealing the truth that the airline, along with all carriers operating 
in Europe, had been warned about a possible terrorist attack.
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communications, the emphasis in mock scenarios at Pan Am tended to be on the 
operational response (i.e., rehearsals of putting fires out, evacuating passengers, 
caring for the injured, routes to the nearest hospital), while ignoring a critical 
element of disaster management: communication of information to key audiences in 
the outside world’ (Deppa et al 1993: 251).
Michael Bland described that tendency as the ‘King Kong’ syndrome:
‘So named after the Bob Newhart sketch in which he plays a janitor in the Empire 
State Building as King Kong is climbing up the outside. Nowhere in the janitor’s 
manual does it give instructions on what to do about a 40 foot gorilla sticking its 
toe through a 12th floor window. This is exactly how most organisations prepare 
for crisis - trying to cover every possible contingency and ending up with a vast 
crisis manual which is completely impractical and which in any case doesn’t 
contain the instructions on gorilla’s toes - which is the one unthought of crisis that 
actually strikes’ (in interview: November 4,1997).
Pointing to the significance of communications in crisis preparedness, consultants bolster 
their method of crisis management. They give a specific explanation of past crises which 
presumes the existence and availability of an efficient formula and ignores problems. For 
example, in the Intel Pentium 1 case consultants assume that Intel could have predicted 
that the issue would escalate into a crisis and therefore should have prepared for that 
eventuality, but ignore the circumstance that it may not be possible accurately to foresee 
and identify crises at an embryonic stage. As we have seen, the consultants themselves 
define crises in terms of their unexpectedness and rapid development22 - these are 
qualities that are difficult to anticipate. There are genuine problems in predicting whether 
a certain situation will develop into a crisis. One could argue that Intel took a minor risk 
in marketing Pentium 1 (the fault in the chip was not extensive and just limited to 
complex division calculations), that risk-taking is normal within any business and that 
there are innumerable calculations of risk that do pay off. Furthermore, despite the
22 See page 15.
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existence of contentious issues, according to the consultants’ own admission, many of 
these do not result in crises (Regester and Larkin 1997: 73). Therefore, predicting which 
issues will develop into a crisis is largely an inexact exercise but is easy to do in 
hindsight. Consultants often make this type of ex post facto identification by referring to 
past crises, such as the Intel case, and in doing so they create realities that fit the offered 
solutions.
Regester candidly divulged in interview that he cites and invokes cases for the purpose of 
furthering his arguments. However, consultants, including Regester, give the impression 
that they cite them for illustrative purposes only but they are, in effect, useful parables 
that allow consultants to uphold certain types of responses to crisis as better than others.
It is the consultants who specify and define; the cases do not speak for themselves. The 
citation of cases not only illustrates but also distinguishes the consequences of pursuing 
particular courses of action. Therefore, the cases serve the additional purposes of 
sanctioning the claims made by consultants and advancing their proposals.
There are also more obvious ways in which consultants promote both themselves and 
their practice. Although consultants accept that ‘a lot of the principles involved in crisis 
management have on occasions been used to great effect by people who have done so 
instinctively . . .’(Michael Bland, in interview: July 10,1997), they discourage companies 
from relying on the ‘instinctive’/self-application of crisis management principles and 
explicitly stress the importance of external consultants. Michael Seymour argued that 
‘good managers are often not good crisis managers’ (in interview: June 30, 1997) and
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described not turning to consultants as one way in which companies might be ‘heading 
for crisis’ (Seymour and Moore 2000: 17). Companies were warned:
‘Crises cannot be managed on the cheap, or on the wing. Outside consultants with a 
wider perspective on the crisis are a necessity’ (Seymour and Moore 2000: 27).
The suggestion that not asking for the advice of consultants is courting disaster is a 
blatantly obvious illustration of self-promotion. It quite clearly facilitates the 
advancement of crisis management and the consultant, and is an example of how self- 
serving consultants’ definitions of mismanagement can be.
Seymour also described ‘individuals and teams trying to go it [manage crises] alone’ as 
asking for trouble:
‘...the Chief Executive Officer may try to take personal charge of all crisis 
operations. This is a fine principle but often risky in practice ... A crisis has broken 
out when the mess becomes too big for chief executives to clear up alone’
(Seymour and Moore 2000:22).
Although consultants said that a team effort is necessary and often extolled the virtues of 
CEOs personally taking charge of a situation, the above shows that it is not just a team 
effort that is advocated but a team that includes consultants as a crucial component. And 
while CEOs may be welcomed for their role in giving a high profile to the matter within 
the corporation, and appreciated for providing a public figurehead for the company, their 
value in crisis management is clearly expressed as limited. By creating the impression 
that their concepts, if implemented with their help, will have a beneficial effect, 
consultants make their role indispensable.
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That argument also downplays routine problems with the implementation of strategy. 
Despite conceding the influence of organisational culture on actions taken to handle 
crisis, consultants give the impression that organisations can implement their crisis 
management strategy by simply hiring consultants and taking their advice. However, in 
their study of corporate strategy Johnson and Scholes (2002) argue that strategy 
development is not as simple as that. They contend that, in practice, strategy is driven by 
the organisational culture, ‘an organisation will lean towards those strategies that best fit 
its culture’ (2002: 236), and that strategy emerges rather than being selected. Therefore, 
even if an organisation has had exposure to the advice that crisis management consultants 
give, this in itself does not mean that their strategy would be adopted. The ‘organisational 
paradigm’, or the set of assumptions held relatively in common within an organisation, is 
consequential on strategy. Even when faced with pressures for change - such as a crisis - 
Johnson and Scholes hold that the influence of the ‘way we do things around here’ 
paradigm means that ‘managers first try and improve the implementation of existing 
strategy’ (2000:79). Johnson and Scholes also maintain that even when managers know 
intellectually that strategy change has to occur, and know how to make that change, 
organisational assumptions and routines will constrain them. Johnson and Scholes’s 
analysis points to the fact that the handling of crisis might have more to do with the way 
in which particular organisational cultures shape certain responses to crisis than with 
whether or not organisations act purely on consultants’ advice.
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Conclusions
This new phenomenon, crisis management, does not involve overseeing every aspect of a 
crisis, as might be assumed; it is primarily about managing impressions. The consultants’ 
definition of crisis as a consequence of antagonistic publicity quite clearly reveals that 
crisis management is a special construct and creation of consultants who are concerned, 
in part, with the kinds of practical activity a crisis entails for them. ‘Crisis management’ 
is influenced by what consultants see as important to the management of crises and is 
propelled by the pragmatic need they identify: to guide and influence perceptions through 
communication strategies. One could argue, as consultants do, that since a company 
relies for its existence on consumer perception, the role of the consultants inevitably 
focuses on those aspects of a crisis. In short, it could be argued that it is simply not the 
consultants’ role to be concerned with the broader aspects of the crisis, and that to imply 
criticism of them on that basis is misconceived. The strategies they uphold are for the 
purposes of ensuring that a desired perception of a crisis and the company involved can 
be achieved. It is in this way that consultants view crises as being ‘managed’. Others 
would disagree with this interpretation but this is what crisis management refers to. We 
have seen that consultants emphasise the notions of risk and trust but, important as these 
are, crisis management is not just about such issues; it is very much about the 
advantageous positioning of companies and influencing views of them in order to create 
perceptions that benefit them.
With the aid of symbolic interactionism, the assumptions and the reasoning that underpin 
consultants’ proposals have been outlined in this chapter. The consultants spell out a
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communications strategy that has an affinity with symbolic interactionism’s description 
of the process involved in interaction, and the two approaches have many parallels. Not 
only is symbolic interactionism expedient to describing crisis management but it also 
illuminates the consultants’ case.
What might help these consultants to advance their case and line of work? The sociology 
of the professions suggests that professionalisation is a distinct process with identifiable 
characteristics. One important feature is that a central objective of all professional 
accounts of action is to demonstrate the validity of a certain sanctioned course of action 
above others, and that professions in the making try to cast their knowledge and practices 
as expert (Macdonald 1995; Haskell 1984; Abbott 1998; Gerver and Bensman 1995). 
Crisis management, as an area of public relations, benefits from the authority afforded to 
public relations. Nevertheless, that authority is not secure (White and Mazur 1995; 
L’Etang and Pieczka 1996). The public relations industry is young, not entirely 
established, and has self-consciously sought professional status in an effort to distance 
itself from perceptions of propaganda at first and then, later, ‘spin doctoring’ (Ewen 
1996; Grunig 1992; Cutlip et al.1994). Yet the consultants’ claim that they are the best 
equipped to deal with communications is buttressed by the expertise of managing 
communications being traditionally held by public relations. That consultants said in 
interviews that, even though management consultancies such as McKinseys have started 
to advise clients on managing crisis communications, clients will still approach them 
because they, rather than management consultancies, are seen as the public 
relations/communication experts demonstrates this. So their association with public 
relations helps consultants to gain support for their case but, as I have demonstrated, there
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are other avenues by which consultants independently further and seek legitimacy for 
their proposals.
Given that much consultancy work in various fields involves creating client receptivity 
and countering client resistance, it is not surprising that the crisis management 
consultants promote their ideas and their area of work with these issues in mind. Client 
resistance, Johnson and Scholes (2002) and Kipping and Engwall (2002) argue is 
considerable:
‘... consultancy firms face quite an uphill struggle when it comes to putting their 
knowledge into practice. They certainly try to exploit the uncertainty of managers 
and their need to justify themselves with respect to their peers, and succeed to some 
extent. At the same time, they have to convince managers and other stakeholders in 
companies of the value they might add ... Often ... they have to overcome 
considerable reluctance, resistance, and cynicism, particularly from lower levels of 
management and or workers’ (Kipping and Engwall 2002:8).
The consultants market crisis management as a way of managing risks to reputations, 
which, they say, are quite extensive. That in itself exploits and speaks to the uncertainty 
of managers, raises the level of anxiety in companies and makes them more receptive to 
their offers of assistance. Kieser (2002) argues that consultants routinely play to clients’ 
sense of fear and insist that they can generate a greater level of control. The claim that 
potential crises are perennially present (the dormant, creeping crisis) also seeks to create 
insecurity and thereby solicits investment in crisis management. This claim also shows 
how the consultants’ construction of crisis and its management is very obviously 
potentially lucrative to the consultant. The consultants’ argument about a proliferation of 
risks also helps them to sustain their construction of crisis management as necessary 
whether crises are there or not.
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The notion of risk continually arises in the crisis management discourse. Both the 
illustration of typical ways in which crises are mismanaged and the classification of 
characteristics of society involve an invocation of the risks involved. Whilst it is useful to 
consultants and to crisis management to depict the world as presenting extraordinary 
dangers and hazards, a depiction that makes strategies to control and minimise risks 
desirable, this also reveals how the notion of risk can be commercialised and indicates 
why risk management has become so marketable. Beck’s and Giddens’s analyses show 
how crisis management might resonate with current preoccupations with risk and risk 
management. Indeed the very marketability of risk is determined by a wider concern with 
it and with its control.
With reference to symbolic interactionism, the risk thesis and cases I have suggested that 
the consultants’ recommendations are consistent with processes seen as occurring in the 
world. I have demonstrated how the consultants’ claim about the symbolic construction 
of the world is explicable within symbolic interactionism, and how the risk thesis 
corroborates their claims about the nature of contemporary society. There is a 
correspondence between what consultants and other commentators say about the world, 
and these parallels provide intellectual support for the consultants’ worldview and lend 
greater weight to their recommendations.
According to the risk discourse, crisis management appears to be very much a part of the 
modem scheme of things, and the very existence of that discourse provides opportunities 
for the promotion of crisis management. As Foucault (1977) argued in relation to 
particular approaches to criminal justice, wider structures and ideologies provide external
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support for and, hence, assist in the advance of specific approaches. Garland (2001), in a 
historical study, also showed that responses to crime and crime control are directed, in 
part, by the dominant beliefs and rationales of the time. In addition, the consulting 
industry as a whole is highly ‘faddish’ (Kipping and Engwall 2002), and crisis 
management consultants might be positioning themselves to take advantage of the current 
popularity of risk management.
I have shown that consultants are certainly not alone in identifying similar characteristics 
of society or in arguing that, in response to these conditions, corporations ought to behave 
in a specific manner. But have these types of discourse brought a greater corporate 
awareness of the identified societal conditions? The answer is yes.
The power of pressure groups to shift public opinion against a company and its products 
is now widely acknowledged by heads of corporations. For instance, Monsanto, a 
company involved in the production of genetically modified foods, stated that 
Greenpeace had contributed to the backfiring of its promotion of genetically modified 
foods in the UK through its campaign efforts, which gained considerable media coverage 
(Financial Times, April 13,1999: 14). Lezaun (2004) observes: ‘...the United Kingdom 
was the first market where genetically modified foods failed, on a massive scale ... the 
explosion of public debate and consumer resistance took place in the United Kingdom at 
a critical moment in the commercialization cycle of the new products’(2004:190).
On the basis of the 1996 MORI ‘Business and the Environment ’ survey, which sought the 
opinions o f‘captains of industry’ (of whom 74% were Chairman, Managing Director
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and/or Chief Executive Officer) from a sample taken from the ‘Times 500’ largest 
companies, MORI concluded that captains of industry:
‘ . increasingly realise that green pressure of legislators presents a challenge that 
they will likely be responsive to, [and] that many captains of industry in Britain and 
elsewhere are acutely conscious of a long-term decline in public trust and 
confidence in business organizations that represents a drain on the well of goodwill 
that all companies strive to conserve’. 23
Corporations recognise that their reputations are valuable assets, Sklair (2000) argues, 
maintaining that the contemporary level of monitoring corporate activities is historically 
unprecedented, and that corporations themselves as well as their opponents are attentive 
to the issues of global corporate citizenship.
There is some evidence to suggest that big business is aware of the conditions that 
consultants identify, and this is beneficial both to the advancement of crisis management 
and to creating receptivity to the claims consultants make; the consultants’ citation of a 
problematic environment may thus be sympathetically received by those who are inclined 
to believe it. However, as Garland (2001) and Giddens (2001) note, the notion that we 
are now encountering an immensely different world remains controversial. Even so, the 
argument that consultants and others make is phenomenologically consequential, i.e., it 
has an influence, even if it might be wrong - it is significant in the advancement of the 
consultants’ proposals and significant in explaining how crisis management can be 
sustained.
23 ‘Business and the Environment", an article by MORI published in Green Futures, November 1996.
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It seems plausible that this area of work evolved in response to a growing concern with 
risks and risk management, as consultants have suggested. Yet it is also the case that its 
development cannot be explained simply as a response to external societal conditions; it 
is also a consequence of active promotional work by the consultants. Amongst other 
things, the examination of the Brent Spar incident and its handling in subsequent chapters 
will contribute to an analysis of why crisis management is here and what might sustain it.
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Chapter 2 BRENT SPAR - SETTING THE STAGE AND THE ‘EMERGING’ AND 
THE ‘IMMEDIATE’ PHASES OF THE CRISIS
The following three chapters reflect, in relation to this case, on the nature of crises and 
the consultants’ formulation of crisis management.
This chapter deals with the two phases to which consultants limit their account of this 
case, but because Shell, engaging crisis management consultants, continued to manage 
this crisis beyond these stages, my case study will examine what I classify as the three 
phases of the crisis, i.e. the events leading up to the crisis situation, that situation itself 
and what happened afterwards. I was curious as to why the consultants’ rendition of this 
case disregards Shell’s use of crisis management principles after the crisis and why they 
do not call attention to the company benefiting from their advice.
An introduction to Shell and Greenpeace, the two main parties involved in this case, will 
be provided here. Their actions prior to the crisis, the claims they made about the 
situation and the consultants’ account of this case will also be described. A descriptive 
and analytical account of events follows, focusing on how the situation regarding the 
disposal of the Brent Spar became intense. The area explored in this chapter is 
particularly significant to the examination of the consultants’ main argument that Shell 
could have prevented this crisis by managing issues early on.24
24 The terminology I employ to describe these two phases of the crisis, ‘emerging crisis’ and the 
‘immediate crisis situation’, are similar to the consultants’ description, but unlike them I am employing the 
terms with hindsight and not to imply, as the consultants did, that all crises can be expected to follow a 
foreseeable course.
91
On the different conceptualisations of this case
Like the consultants, Shell also views the crisis as having two phases but differs in their 
classification. Shell amalgamates the two phases the consultants identify into one, and * 
calls this the first phase of the crisis. The second phase, according to Shell, started after 
the abandonment of sea disposal:
‘The first phase of the crisis started from Greenpeace’s occupation of the Spar and 
continued until Shell decided to abandon deep sea disposal. The crisis then moved 
on to a second phase. Within that second phase, Shell had to deal with the 
repercussions of the first phase of the crisis’ (John Wybrew, Director of Public 
Affairs, Shell UK, in interview: November 18, 1999).
Was this case a ‘sudden’ or a ‘creeping’ crisis? The view that it was of the first type is 
supported by Shell, as the company claims to have been unaware that a potential problem 
existed until Greenpeace occupied the Spar and thereby initiated its campaign. That 
Greenpeace induced the crisis for Shell is demonstrated in my analysis as opposition 
followed rather than preceded Greenpeace’s protest.
Although consultants also maintain that Greenpeace provoked the crisis for Shell, they 
claim that the crisis was of the second type. They argue that the situation was one where 
Shell’s lack of attention to a potential problematic issue (sea disposal) precipitated a 
crisis situation as Greenpeace simply raised an issue that already had the potential to 
become problematic. It is interesting that this view favours the consultants’ claim that the 
best way to manage crises is by early management of issues. And, by ignoring the efforts 
Shell later made and what effects such efforts might have had, consultants can represent
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this case as confirming their argument. My analysis of this case demonstrates this, 
particularly the attention I give to the aftermath of the crisis.
An introduction to Shell
Royal Dutch/Shell Group25
The Royal Dutch/Shell Group was formed when two companies Royal Dutch and the 
Shell Group, merged in 1907. The motive was to survive and prosper against the price- 
cutting of Standard Oil in the Far East (Greene 1985). The three equal partners were 
Marcus Samuel’s Shell, Deterding’s Royal Dutch and Paris Rothchilds, who supplied 
Russian kerosene to Shell and Royal Dutch (Greene 1985). Greene argues that the 
alliance in 1907 enabled Royal Dutch and Shell to merge their interests while keeping 
their identities separate. He also maintains that Royal Dutch/Shell is a group of 
companies and not a corporation, as commonly perceived, and that the Shell Centre in 
London and the offices in the Hague are its central offices, and not corporate 
headquarters (Greene 1985). This is primarily because the operating companies are 
coordinated, but not managed, by the central offices. The operating companies, located in 
more than 130 countries around the world, are responsible for the management and 
performance of its own operations. Nevertheless, they can draw on the Service 
companies, whose main business is to provide advice and services to other Shell 
companies (http:www.shell.com).
25 This description of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group relates to how the multi-national was structured at the 
time of the Brent Spar crisis (in 1995). Following the 2004 scandal over the misrepresentation of its proved 
oil reserves, on October 28,2004, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group proposed to its shareholders the unification 
of the group of companies under a single parent company, Royal Dutch Shell pic. and instigated reforms in 
management and governance structure.
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The Royal Dutch/Shell Group consists of two parent companies: the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company and Shell Trading and Transport Ltd, which hold stock in a 60:40 
ratio in two holding companies, one Dutch (Shell Petroleum NV, Netherlands), and the 
other British (Shell Petroleum Company Limited, UK). According to Shell:
‘... as parent companies, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the Shell 
Transport and Trading Company pic do not themselves engage in operational 
activities ... The parent companies directly or indirectly own the shares in the 
Group Holding Companies but are not themselves part of the group. They appoint 
Directors to the Boards of the Group Holding Companies, from which they receive 
income in the form of dividends’ (http:Wwww.shell.com).
Shell Petroleum Inc. USA is a separate concern dealing exclusively with the USA. Shell 
Petroleum Company Ltd UK and Shell Petroleum NV, Netherlands hold all shares in the 
Service companies and, directly or indirectly, all group interests in the operating 
companies other than those held by Shell Petroleum Inc. USA.
Shell described the activities of its operating companies worldwide as: ‘finding, 
producing, transporting, refining, and selling oil, gas, and petrochemicals. Some are 
involved in mining, transporting and selling coal, as well as renewable energy businesses 
and forestry’ (http:Wwww.shell.com). The operating companies are largely independent 
and responsible for their own management and performance, and for ensuring the long­
term viability of their own operations.
A Committee of Management Directors (CMD) is responsible for the overall Group 
policy and strategy. The Committee normally comprises six members who are 
individually responsible for the different areas of business of Royal Dutch/Shell and 
collectively responsible for its strategy and policy. The CMD is also finally responsible to
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the 600,000 shareholders of Royal Dutch and the 273,000 shareholders of Shell Transport 
and Trading.26
The companies within Royal Dutch/Shell are relatively autonomous as long as the 
financial results are satisfactory. As Greene argues in an analytical and historical study 
examining the strategies and policies of the ‘Majors’,27 Royal Dutch/Shell is 
decentralised in comparison with the other ‘Majors’ but quite centralised in comparison 
with other multinationals ‘like Unilever and Nestle’ (Greene 1985: 211).
Greene argues that Shell’s decentralised structure is its strength:
‘The considerable effort at Shell in diplomacy required to coordinate and preserve 
national identities has yielded an advantage in political acceptability and therefore 
long term viability... Its diplomatic style of management and the indigenousness of 
its local subsidiaries are greater strategic investments in political acceptability, if 
lower in profitability, than other Majors have chosen to make i t ... It is the United 
Nations of oil companies, as that body wishes it could function’ (1985: 212).
While that is an enthusiastic account of Shell’s decentralised structure, the difficulties 
Shell had, during the crisis, in preventing contradictory statements being made by its 
executives shows how decentralisation has its drawbacks. A direct consequence of the 
crisis faced over the Brent Spar was a centralisation of communications and crisis 
management within the corporation (John Wybrew, in interview: November 18, 1999). 
Shell’s later strategy was to encourage individual companies to refer immediately any 
likely controversy to the Corporate Centre, which is operated by the Service companies.
26 The figures are according to the 1997 Annual Report.
27 This term refers to the seven largest oil companies in the world.
95
The aim was to manage problematic issues better by centralising communications and by 
developing an overall central strategy for that end.
Although Greene argues that historically Shell was unlike the secretive and closed 
organisations that oil companies were perceived to be, this opinion was not generally 
shared in the 1990s. Greene maintains that Deterding’s (Chairman of Royal Dutch/Shell 
in 1907) practices stood ‘in contrast to Standard’s [Standard Oil] secrecy, secret 
companies and secret deals’, that the corporation’s annual reports were ‘models of 
lucidity and candor [and] openly [stated] Shell’s intentions and policies’ (1985: 223). But 
confidential opinion polls conducted by MORI in 1995 and then again in 1998 on behalf 
of several oil companies, showed current opinions to be very different.
The poll tested UK oil and energy journalists’ views of the oil companies.28 The MORI 
survey of 1995, which took place after the Brent Spar incident, reveals that journalists did 
not perceive Shell to have an open communications policy and that it was precisely 
Shell’s communications that journalists identified and criticised as having exacerbated 
that crisis. Robert Corzine, a senior oil and energy journalist working for the Financial 
Times, had this to say about Shell UK’s media relations:
‘As a journalist, if you wanted to question them, you couldn’t just call them. You 
would have to write to them with a letter from the editor of the FT and then it 
would go through the company - it is very bureaucratic - and then finally you would 
get a reply saying that an interview could not be given at the time, perhaps next 
year etc. So media relations were very bad’ (in interview: October 26, 1999).
28 These polls were conducted by MORI on behalf of several oil companies but because of their 
confidential nature, I am only allowed to state findings of the surveys pertaining to Shell as I gained access 
to the surveys with permission from Shell on condition that I used material limited to that company. I 
gained full access to the 1998 poll (from Shell) but only partial access to the 1995 poll (from MORI, which 
withheld material on the other participating oil companies).
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The 1995 MORI poll shows that Shell was not, at that time, viewed as being open.
Shell UK and Shell Exploration and Production
Shell UK was the Royal Dutch/Shell company at the centre of the crisis. Its main oil and 
gas producing subsidiary, Shell Exploration and Production (Shell Expro), was the 
operating company in charge of Brent Spar. Shell Expro itself was a joint venture 
between Shell and Esso, so Brent Spar was 50% owned by Esso, a division of Exxon. 
Nevertheless, throughout the crisis Esso and Exxon remained out of the situation by 
claiming that, as Shell Expro was the operating company and the legal owner, Brent Spar 
was its responsibility. Therefore, Shell UK and Shell Expro dealt with the crisis.
In 1994, Shell Expro was responsible for approximately one quarter of all UK oil and gas 
production. The situation in the 1990s was that the production of the giant first generation 
North Sea fields, holding billions of tons of recoverable oil and gas reserves, was starting 
to wane. Moreover, gas production had taken over from the production of oil as being the 
major concern for operators in the North Sea. A study of the Brent Spar case argues that:
‘The ageing facilities (in the North Sea) had become costly to maintain and the few 
newly found reserves were increasingly located in small fields which were difficult 
to exploit economically (in 1995, a barrel of oil was one third its 1980 price in real 
terms). Additionally, gas production had gained more importance and platforms in 
the North Sea were being modified to produce gas rather than oiT (Winter and 
Schweinsberg, ‘The Brent Spar Platform Controversy', International Institute for 
Management Development 1996: Section A: 2-3).
Shell Expro had over the course of three years contracted a number of feasibility studies 
for the disposal of the Spar and had consulted a number of not-for-profit organisations 
and five different commercial fishing associations. All of them had accepted the position
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of Shell UK, i.e. that deep sea disposal was more favourable than land disposal in safety, 
cost and environmental terms.
Brent Spar
The Brent oil and gas field is located in the northern North Sea and was discovered as an 
oil and gas producing site in the early 1970s. Since the discovery of the site, Shell and 
Esso had spent an approximate £7 billion on development and operation. In 1995, they 
were investing a further £1.3 billion to redevelop the field. This redevelopment involved 
changing the management of the reservoir so that the field would increasingly produce 
gas rather than oil, which meant that Shell Expro’s three production platforms in the 
Brent field required extensive alterations. The disposal of the Brent Spar, an oil storage 
and loading facility, was a stage in the process towards the concentration on gas rather 
than oil in the North Sea. The Spar was to be decommissioned as it had been made 
obsolete by the Brent pipeline. It was also old, having been installed in 1976; it was in 
operation until 1991, when it was decommissioned and plans were initiated for its 
disposal.29
Although oil companies had previously undertaken sea disposal of derelict structures, the 
sea disposal of the Brent Spar was the first time that an installation of its size was to be 
disposed of in such a manner.
Shell’s description of the Brent Spar emphasised its size and uniqueness:
29 At the time, this was referred to not as a ‘disposal’ but an ‘abandonment’ plan. Shell later changed the 
terminology. It is quite likely that the company eschewed using ‘abandonment’ due to its connotations, 
which reveals an attention to perceptions. I use the term ‘disposal’ because, as Shell might have also 
estimated, it is a value-free term, as Harre, Brockheimer and Mulhausler (1999) point out.
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‘Like an iceberg, most of its bulk, mainly the six segmented storage tanks, is 
beneath the water's surface. At 14500 tonnes, the Spar weighs about the same as 
two thousand double-decker buses, and with a height of 141 metres, it is longer 
than a football field floating on its end. Its huge tanks displace 66500 tonnes of 
water - a capacity that means they could hold the equivalent of almost four Big 
Bens. Apart from the waters to the North of Shetland, most of the North Sea is too 
shallow to accommodate it. The Brent Spar...acted as a tanker loading facility for 
the whole of the Brent Field’ (Shell UK ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, internet site: 
http://www.shellexpro.brentspar.com).30
The company’s description of the Spar countered Greenpeace’s claim that it would set a 
precedent for disposing of other redundant structures in the North Sea. Moreover, because 
of the size of the Spar, and as it was in waters deeper than 75m, it did not, according to 
national and international regulations, need to be removed in its entirety. ‘The Troll’, the 
largest oil storage buoy in the world at the time, was owned by Norway and weighed a 
million tonnes. It was Norway and the UK, the only countries with structures in waters 
deeper than 75m, which strongly defended sea disposal and a case-by-case approach. 
Greenpeace wholly rejected this stance; for Greenpeace, the sea disposal option was 
totally unacceptable in any circumstance.
When Shell again had to review other options for dealing with the Spar, after the sea 
disposal plan was relinquished in June 1995, the Norwegian government gave Shell 
permission to moor it in their waters. The Brent Spar was towed to and remained in 
Erfjord, north of Stavanger in the Rogoland county of Norway, from 1995 till 1999. In 
January 1998, Shell Expro announced that a re-use solution proposed by Wood - GMC, 
an engineering company, was the preferred Best Practicable Environmental Option
30 Shell launched this Internet site in 1996 and it was terminated in 1999.
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(BPEO).31 The plan was to cut the hull of the Brent Spar into slices and use these as the 
foundation for a new quay at Mekjavik in Stavanger, Norway. This plan went ahead 
without disruption and the deconstruction of Brent Spar was completed on July 10, 1999, 
when the last cut and cleaned ring sections of the buoy’s hull were placed on the seabed 
to form the base of the quay.
The cost of the dismantling project carried out by Shell/Wood - GMC was £41 million 
and, ‘taking into account the cost of the original aborted deep sea disposal project... the 
total cost of decommissioning Brent Spar amounts to £60 million’ (Shell Expro Press 
Release: September 1, 1999). The decommissioning of Brent Spar had taken a total of 
eight years to complete and a sea disposal project originally anticipated to proceed 
without interruption had exerted a pecuniary cost as well as damage to relationships and 
reputations. Events had not proceeded according to plan and an environmental campaign, 
that subsequently became renowned for its efficiency, was largely responsible.
Greenpeace and its campaign
Since its establishment in 1971, Greenpeace had cultivated a reputation as an altruistic 
guardian of the environment, and as a force to guard against corporate and governmental 
activities that could harm the environment.
In 1995, Greenpeace had 40 offices worldwide and employed approximately 900 people. 
The national organisations were autonomous and were linked to Greenpeace
31 This was the regulatory standard against which the UK government judged all licences for 
decommissioning oil installations.
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International, Greenpeace’s headquarters based in Amsterdam, through a licensing 
agreement. Winter and Schweinsberg (1996), in an academic examination of this case, 
argue that decision-making in Greenpeace was concentrated within a small group of 
elected representatives; for example, the German organisation’s steering committee 
consisted of 40 voting members, in contrast to its country-wide membership of 507,000.
Through its environmental activism, Greenpeace had experience of how to gain publicity 
for its views through dramatic direct actions:
‘From its “Save the Whales” campaign to its protests of French nuclear tests in the 
South Pacific, Greenpeace members were seen - via television and newspapers - 
selflessly and bravely putting their lives on the line for environmental causes. With 
virtually every campaign, they gained public support and credibility’ (Winter and 
Schweinsberg 1996: Section A:6).
Winter and Schweinsberg’s argument is that Greenpeace knew there was a direct 
relationship between media coverage of its protests and the amount of contributions it 
received; in 1995 Greenpeace was experiencing a lull and therefore stood to benefit from 
a campaign that could attract publicity, and it was for this reason that Greenpeace 
campaigned against the Brent Spar disposal.
Greenpeace, since the campaign, has directly taken issue with this interpretation, stating 
that it is:
4... one of the most widespread myths of the Brent Spar ... [that] it was a good 
photo opportunity for an organization faced (in some countries) with a decline of its 
membership and its visibility’ (Rose 1998: 40).
Nevertheless, Greenpeace accepts that ‘the Brent Spar campaign is the single most 
obvious Greenpeace success of recent years’ (Rose 1998:18). That the campaign was
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beneficial to Greenpeace need not deny Greenpeace its claim that it campaigned on the 
basis of a principle that was very important to the organisation: not using the oceans as 
rubbish tips.
Still, Greenpeace decided to campaign on the basis of careful consideration of whether a 
campaign would be successful. The Director of Greenpeace Germany in 1995, Thilo 
Bode, explained how he made the crucial decision to initiate the Brent Spar campaign:32
‘We have a checklist at Greenpeace that helps us evaluate potential campaigns. 
There are fifteen possible requirements and the Brent Spar fulfilled all of them. 
There was a clear goal with a feasible solution; the issues were easy to understand; 
the Spar was a powerful visual symbol; the protest would destroy the image of the 
opponent; and so on ...\33
From the outset there were plans to conduct this campaign visually and dramatically with 
the aim of attracting media interest and, in particular, television coverage. The very 
existence of a checklist, which lists the qualities desirable for efficient campaigns as ones 
that seek to attract media coverage, demonstrates how media ‘savvy’ and media-centred 
the organisation was. It was decided that the campaign ought to be run from the Spar 
because this would be sensational and would provide a platform from which Greenpeace 
could air its views. The occupation of the Brent Spar by Greenpeace was considered to be 
more effective than other strategies:
‘By getting there before Shell started moving the ‘Spar, and stopping them, we 
could hope to challenge and expose ... in a way which was impossible in the melee 
of White Papers, green TV debates and earnest reports on environmental auditing’ 
(Rose 1998: 9).
32 After the Spar campaign he became the Executive Director of Greenpeace International and his 
promotion might further indicate Greenpeace’s view of the campaign as having been an efficient operation.
33 Quoted in Winter and Schweinsberg (1996:Section A:8).
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Greenpeace’s Brent Spar campaign director, Chris Rose, recalls how the occupation plan 
came about and his decision to send video pictures digitally from the Spar to television 
studios:
‘A proposal to occupy it [the Brent Spar] for as long as possible with an “Antarctic- 
style base camp” came first from Rick Le Coyte, a campaigner in Greenpeace UK, 
and Gijs Thieme, a gentle giant Dutchman...They wrote: “Rationale: Essentially a 
sea-dumping issue. The proposed dumping represents a dangerous precedent for the 
disposal of 60 other UK North Sea off-shore oil and gas installations and 
approximately 40 Norwegian installations.” I wrote on my copy: “Looks great to 
me - can I come? Who’s going to pay? Does the logistical capacity exist?? How 
about turning it into a TV station by putting the squisher on it?” (The “squisher” 
compresses video pictures for satellite relay)’(Rose 1998: 10).
Greenpeace’s plan was to direct media attention to the planned disposal, and they 
succeeded in doing this.34 Shell had announced its disposal plan on February 16, 1995 
and this had received some media coverage which mainly announced, not criticised, what 
Shell intended to do. It was not until Greenpeace began its campaign that the media 
reported the sea disposal plan as problematic. Extensive media interest in the Brent Spar 
followed rather than preceded Greenpeace’s action, which demonstrates what often 
precipitates crises, especially for organisations such as Shell. The media had not initially 
considered the disposal to be a worthwhile story. Chris Rose admits this to have been the 
case:
‘Even though environmental correspondents who were “experts” in their own 
domain had decreed that it [the disposal of Brent Spar] was not an issue, the public 
campaign [initiated by Greenpeace] had created the largest environmental issue for 
years’ (Rose 1998:138).
34 In order to gain maximum media coverage, Greenpeace even carefully selected the activists who would 
‘occupy’ the Spar from four different countries, argue Winter and Schweinsberg (1996: Section A: 9)
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Greenpeace, in effect, ‘created’ the story as a consequence of its action in boarding the 
Spar. For instance, the day after the ‘occupation’, the British press and television news 
reported that move, headlining Greenpeace’s action.35 Moreover, Greenpeace planned to 
remain on the Spar for as long as it took to change Shell’s decision:
‘The Greenpeace “Spar Crew”...[had] set up a radio room and a wind generator ... 
and imported tomato seeds and compost in preparation for a long stay. After a few 
days I left the Spar for the diminutive Moby Dick, which served as the Greenpeace 
support vessel. From there we could talk to the world ...’ (Rose 1998: 13).
Talking to the world was the central concern in a campaign which intended to make 
Shell’s plan problematic and, in doing so, put pressure on Shell to relinquish it. The 
media were essential for Greenpeace because they could publicise its claims and gain 
support for its views and, as a pressure group with experience of campaigning tactics, 
Greenpeace was proficient at gaining media interest and responding to media requests for 
information.
The campaign was consciously media-directed and the pressure group was also aware 
that their campaign techniques would work with the media, a sentiment expressed by 
Thilo Bode: ‘Many media like sensation. They like the spectacular side of our work.’ 36 
Thilo Bode admits that Greenpeace is an organisation that works with ‘pictures, images 
and emotions’.37 Greenpeace is also aware that their campaigns exert pressure on 
corporations, and claims that it intends to attack a company’s image and mobilise public 
opinion against it:
35 See chapter 3.
3  ^Financial Times, April 13,1999:14.
37 Ibid.
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‘Corporations are very susceptible to public opinion and vulnerable to consumer 
pressure. Companies face a trade-off between the cost of addressing an 
environmental issue and the cost of damage to their image if they do not. Our 
interest is to make image a very expensive issue.’38
Greenpeace focused its campaign on Shell rather than the UK government, perhaps 
because it was perceived to be easier to influence a company than a government. 
Additionally, even though the campaign was publicised worldwide, Greenpeace focused 
its campaign efforts on the UK and Germany. In both countries, the main claims 
discussed below were the basis of the campaign. However, Winter and Schweinsberg’s 
(1996) analysis of this campaign argues that Greenpeace emphasised different elements 
of the claims in the UK and in Germany. They maintain that in the UK the level of 
toxicity within the Spar was the angle taken and scientific studies were cited to refute 
Shell’s case whereas in Germany the campaign took the line that the Spar was a 
figurehead o f‘today’s waste society’ (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996 Section B: 2). The 
authors argue that Greenpeace took strategic decisions in choosing the targets for their 
campaigns.
Firstly, they contend that Greenpeace targeted Germany because of its accurate deduction 
that the German population was sensitive to environmental issues and, in particular, 
favoured recycling, which meant that in Germany Greenpeace’s case would gain a 
sympathetic reception. This view proved correct, as it was in Germany that consumer 
boycotts and protests were most visible, and the German government was one of the first 
to support Greenpeace’s views.
38 Ibid.
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A second strategic decision that Greenpeace made, Winter and Schweinsberg argue, was 
the targeting of Shell Germany because it considered Shell Germany to be a good ally 
which could influence Shell UK. Shell Germany had a limited involvement in the 
production and distribution of oil and gas products, while also being an important 
organisation in the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Therefore, Greenpeace calculated that Shell 
Germany could and would exert pressure on Shell UK to abandon the sea disposal of the 
Brent Spar, ultimately the responsibility of Shell UK. That too proved an effective 
strategic decision.
As I have indicated, Greenpeace made other strategic decisions in order to ensure that the 
campaign was a success. The decision to conduct a visual campaign by using technology 
to relay images from the Spar to TV studios, for instance, was one such tactical decision 
that would prove to be influential. The organisation also used seemingly every 
communication medium. By publicising their claims on ‘Greennet’, the worldwide 
database used by Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, WWF and other groups, it enabled 
every activist in the world to have access to the issue and campaign quickly. Aboard the 
Brent Spar, Greenpeace Press Officer Desley Mather kept a diary of the occupation and 
the daily entries were accessible to anyone on the Greenpeace website. Greenpeace 
pursued publicity because this is a routine, and indeed a central, component of campaign 
procedure; the success of a campaign is directly contingent on the amount of favourable 
publicity that can be gained for it (Wilson and Andrews 1993).
Claims and counterclaims: An outline of the claims made by Greenpeace and Shell
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Both Greenpeace and Shell had their own interpretations and each sought to frame the 
issue accordingly.
Greenpeace’s campaign was based on the following arguments:39
- the method of disposal was unacceptable; the ocean should not be used as a 
dumping site for oil industry installations, which was an act akin to littering;
- there were other available ways of dealing with the Brent Spar on land and 
that the other options were not properly considered by Shell because of 
concerns about costs;
- in choosing the sea disposal method, Shell had taken the cheapest option and, 
therefore, had put cost considerations above environmental considerations;
- the sea disposal of the Brent Spar would set a precedent for the disposal of 
other decommissioned installations in the North Sea, which would result in 
mass contamination of the oceans;
- no independent investigation was made into the contents of the Spar and, 
because of this, the environmental impact could not be properly assessed.
Additionally, as the campaign progressed, Greenpeace maintained that its samples from a 
storage tank, taken during the Spar occupation, showed that the Spar contained 5500 
tonnes of oil which would be sunk along with it. Greenpeace also stated that the Brent 
Spar contained toxic materials which would damage the marine environment.
Shell responded to each of these claims by stating:
‘Shell UK ensured that the Spar disposal would be carried out in the most 
responsible way possible by undertaking careful analyses of the options - some 30 
studies, many of them by independent third parties, over three years. These studies
39 Greenpeace’s case is obtained from Brent Spar, WWF (1995) and The Turning o f the ‘Spar, Rose 
(1998).
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concluded that disposal of the Spar in deep water was the best option on all 
considerations - environmental, safety, occupational health and economic.’40
Therefore, Shell’s riposte to Greenpeace was that:
‘As with other Shell decisions concerning the environment, cost was not the 
determining factor. Although deep water disposal would indeed be cheaper, the 
other factors (environmental, safety, occupational health) all favour deep water 
disposal.’
In all of its communications Shell emphasised that the disposal would take place in ‘deep 
water’/‘deep sea’. That was because the depths of oceans determine the type of marine 
life present, their resilience to the effects of the disposal and hence also the extent of 
environmental damage.
Secondly, Shell claimed:
‘It is not the case and never has been that the Spar should set a precedent. The Brent 
Spar is a most unusual installation - arguably unique; there is no comparable 
structure elsewhere in the North Sea. The vast majority of North Sea structures will 
be completely removed, brought ashore and dismantled.’
Shell also drew attention to the regulations governing disposals, thereby defending its 
stance and countering Greenpeace’s suggestion that the Spar would set a precedent:
‘All but 50 of the 220 installations in the UK North Sea are in less than 75 metres 
of water and, in accordance with international guidelines, are required to be totally 
removed. The remainder of the installations in deeper water will be approached on 
a case by case basis - looking at environmental, health and safety and cost 
considerations. The majority of these will also end up on land.’
40 Unless otherwise indicated, the following citations of Shell’s claims are derived from ‘Brent Spar - The 
Way Forward. Your Questions Answered’, a Shell UK publication, 1995.
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Shell’s claim that the disposal of Brent Spar would not set a precedent was backed by UK 
government regulations. However, Greenpeace continually stated that sea disposal of the 
Brent Spar would set a precedent. It was a powerful contention that stressed the damage 
that could result from allowing the disposal of the one instance of the Spar.
Thirdly, Shell disputed Greenpeace’s claim that the Spar contained vast amounts of toxic 
substances and oil:
‘...Greenpeace claimed that the Spar was 14500 tonnes of toxic litter (14500 tonnes 
is actually the weight of the Spar and its ballast), contained 5000 tonnes of oil 
(what company would throw away oil worth half a million pounds?) and was to be 
sunk or blown up in the North Sea. None of these statements are true’ (Brent Spar, 
WWF 1995:9).
Furthermore, Shell argued:
‘All the studies on the Spar were carried out by experts in their field, including 
independent scientific institutions. An extremely detailed inventory of the Spar’s 
contents was prepared, containing hundreds of individual items. It was submitted in 
full to the UK government and detailed information from it has been widely 
publicly available.’
While Shell had compiled an inventory of the Brent Spar, following Greenpeace’s 
sampling and claim that the storage tanks contained a certain amount of oil, Shell could 
not credibly provide the evidence to dispute this claim without having an independent 
party re-check its inventory and the contents of the Spar. That subsequently happened 
but, at the time, Greenpeace’s claim about the amount of oil in the Brent Spar assisted its 
case.
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In response to Greenpeace’s allegation that the disposal would damage the marine 
environment, Shell claimed that the environmental impact would be negligible, 
predominantly because of the depth at which it was to be sunk:
‘It is known (through scientific research into deep sea biology) that enormous 
natural disturbances occur in the deep oceans, far greater than any disturbance 
likely to have been caused by the sinking of the Spar. Many experts agree that 
creatures of the very deep ocean are able to deal with environmental disruption on a 
vast scale compared to the impact the Brent Spar would have caused.’
Shell’s position was that the environmental impact of its plan would be ‘negligible, 
localised and inaccessible to the food chain’ (Shell Expro Press Release: May 31, 1995). 
In this way, Shell was not denying that there would be an environmental impact but was 
justifying its action as one that would make minimal impact. Greenpeace too used the 
issue of how much of an environmental impact sea disposal would have in order to 
further its case against the disposal. But Greenpeace also maintained that the issue of 
what the impact would be was not as important for Greenpeace as its position that it was 
wrong, in principle, to discard unwanted structures in the seas (Rose 1998).
Still, and as a consequence of the campaign being fought on the grounds of 
environmental impact, Shell showed that other methods of disposal might be more 
environmentally harmful. In particular, Shell pointed to problems with what Greenpeace 
proposed, i.e. disposal on land:
‘Onshore disposal would mean that the Spar, which is longer than a football field, 
would need to be rotated to a horizontal position. This would involve the risk of 
breaking up under the strain and causing a more damaging environmental impact in 
shallow waters full of marine life. Waste materials would only be buried in landfill 
sites. Recycling the metal would require a great deal of energy - such as to offset 
any saving of natural resources. The Spar is minute in relation to the Atlantic Ocean
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[the site of the planned disposal] - it would be like placing a pin head in a football 
stadium!’
Shell wanted to persuade people that its chosen route was not only the best option but 
also of little environmental impact; for persuasive purposes, that argument was 
sometimes couched in metaphorical terms, as the above citation indicates. At the crux of 
Greenpeace’s campaign, however, was that it found sea disposal to be unacceptable in 
principle as Ulrich Jurgens, Director of Communications, Greenpeace International, 
argued:
‘I don’t care about scientific arguments. I don’t care if there are ten or thousand 
tons of hazardous waste on the platform. The question is, how does our society 
cope with their waste? And our message is: don’t litter!’41
But it is not true that Greenpeace was unconcerned about the scientific estimations of the 
environmental impact of Shell’s plan, as Jurgens suggested. That issue was consistently 
raised. However, by not focusing only on the environmental impact of the disposal of the 
Spar itself, Greenpeace made a sound strategic decision as it provided the organisation 
with more criticisms than the purely scientific arguments about the level of 
environmental impact the Spar’s disposal would cause. Greenpeace cleverly anticipated 
that, as Shell had commissioned scientific impact studies, the company could and would 
find scientific support to counteract Greenpeace’s claims about the environmental impact. 
Yet, it was very much the case that Greenpeace used a ‘dual strategy of producing 
scientific evidence in favour of disposing of the oil rig on shore, and in mobilising public 
opinion’ (Macnaghten and Urry 1998:79).
41 Quoted in Winter and Schweinsberg (1996:Section A:8).
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Greenpeace also created certain impressions that benefited its case. It consistently 
claimed that Shell was showing ‘arrogant’ disregard for the environment by ‘dumping’ 
the Brent Spar. By using specific terminology such as ‘dumping’ to describe Shell’s 
project, Greenpeace, as Shell also did, tried to frame the issue in an advantageous 
manner. The impression Greenpeace cultivated was that Shell was wantonly and 
clandestinely throwing away its waste. This is manifest in Chris Rose’s statement:
‘.. .here in the northern North Sea was the Government42 slipping through the gate 
at the end of the national garden, and conniving with Shell to dump the 'Spar at sea 
rather than re-use or recycle it - behaving for all the world like a couple of bad 
neighbours who creep out at night and craftily wheel a rusty old car into the village 
pond’ (1998: 9).
The language utilised and the impressions created were evocative and attempted to direct 
perceptions in a manner favourable to the campaign.
It is for this reason that Shell took issue with Greenpeace’s terminology. In doing so, the 
company also intended to promote its own interpretation:
‘Dumping (throwing away without care or thought) would be unacceptable, as is 
throwing litter on the street or abandoning an old car. Responsible disposal means 
carefully managed disposal after looking at different alternatives, making the best 
overall choice and then carrying out disposal with due regard to health, safety, 
environment and cost. There are no simple solutions to managing waste materials 
whether on land or at sea’ (Brent Spar, WWF 1995:9).
Greenpeace’s allegations were to have a vital impact on Shell’s efforts to manage the 
crisis. The allegations not only questioned Shell’s case but were also damaging to Shell’s 
desired reputation for being environmentally responsible.
42 The UK government was also criticised for allowing Shell to carry out the disposal.
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Consultants’ claims about this case
I pay close attention to the case made by Regester and Larkin (1997: 63-75), although 
other consultants also argue in the manner they do. They have a published critique of this 
case and their consultancy, the only company in the UK specialising in crisis 
management, advises many oil companies; prior to the Brent Spar crisis, it also advised 
Shell UK on crisis management (but, as Michael Regester and John Wybrew said in 
interviews, the consultations that took place were not in specific relation to the Spar 
disposal).
Although the consultants credit Greenpeace with instigating the crisis for Shell, they cite 
two main impetuses for the crisis: Shell’s failure to prevent the crisis through issues 
management and Shell’s failure adequately to handle developments during the crisis. A 
dominant view that consultants frequently volunteered in interviews, which is also found 
in Regester and Larkin’s analysis of this case, is that Shell would not only not have 
encountered a crisis, but also that its management of the crisis would have been more 
efficient, if the company had followed their recommended courses of action.
The main argument is that there was no early management of the issue of sea disposal, 
and that this precipitated the crisis and exacerbated its handling. Regester and Larkin’s 
description and critique of this case argue that this was an instance that indicates that ‘an 
issue ignored is a crisis ensured’ (1997: 63-75). Consequently, the consultants’ account of 
this case is one that quite neatly ties up their claim regarding the value of issues 
management and their promotion of crisis management as an ongoing effort, necessary 
whether or not a crisis is present. Furthermore, the above argument places much of the
113
responsibility for the crisis on Shell. This outlook also favours their stance that 
organisations can take action to prevent and handle crises better.
The general observations the consultants make are as follows.
Regarding Greenpeace, consultants argue that Greenpeace’s objections, expressed in a 
sensationalist way, made Shell’s plan problematic. Greenpeace was more successful than 
Shell in gaining media coverage for their claims. The media coverage given to 
Greenpeace’s claims and activities eclipsed that given to Shell’s perspective and, thereby, 
affected Shell’s ability successfully to gain support for its case. Greenpeace’s campaign 
gained the support of the media, general publics and politicians.
Regarding Shell, the consultants claim that the company managed the crisis inefficiently 
because the factors they identify as crucial to the successful management of crises were 
ignored and neglected. Shell, they allege, did not comprehend public perceptions, 
mismanaged its communications and thus could not successfully make its case to a wider 
audience. According to them, Shell had been ignorant of the societal conditions they 
identify and thus could not respond effectively. For instance, Shell wrongly assumed that 
because it had complied with regulations, and because its plan was lawful, problems 
would not be encountered. Shell had not planned for the eventuality that the mode of 
disposal might be disputed.
All these observations deal with and draw attention to matters they customarily highlight, 
that is, communications and perception management, because the consultants’ portrayal 
of this case aims to gain support for their argument. They repeatedly suggest that this
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case illustrates the importance of following their recommendations, but what I find 
pertinent is that consultants do not view the sorts of problems Shell encountered as 
irresoluble. My case study asks: is the handling of crisis as straightforward as consultants 
present it as being?
The emerging crisis
Shell's activities prior to the protest
During September 1991 Brent Spar ceased to operate and in the following month Shell 
initiated decommissioning studies. A year later in, September 1992, Shell UK began 
discussions about the disposal of the Brent Spar with the UK regulatory authorities. 
During 1993 the decommissioning studies continued, and in February 1994 an Aberdeen 
University study endorsed deep sea disposal as the best option. On the basis of this study, 
Shell conducted formal consultations with the UK government, conservation bodies and 
fishing interests in the UK. In October 1994, a final draft of the BPEO and Impact 
Hypothesis was submitted by Shell to the UK Government’s Department of Trade and 
Industry. In February 1995, the UK Government announced its intention to approve deep 
sea disposal and notified the other 13 contracting parties (12 nation states and the 
European Union) who were signatories to the Oslo Convention covering the protection of 
the marine environment. On the announcement of the decision for the sea disposal of the 
Brent Spar to European Union governments and the media, no objections were raised, no 
countries protested and dissent was not expressed. Why then did Shell face a crisis?
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I have suggested how consultants answer that question and, given the importance they 
attach to this period, its investigation is particularly crucial forjudging their claims.
How Greenpeace discovered the campaign
In January 1995, Gils Thieme, a Dutch Greenpeace activist, discovered the Shell- 
commissioned Aberdeen University study. Thieme approached Tim Birch, who was 
coordinating the Greenpeace involvement in the North Sea Protection Conference. That 
conference was the fourth of its kind. The conferences had begun in 1984 and were 
concerned with the environmental protection of the North Sea. While they were primarily 
for environment ministers of the countries bordering the North Sea, four non­
governmental organisations were also included, one of which, from 1987, was 
Greenpeace.
Thieme tried to persuade Birch to take up the disposal as an issue for protest and told 
him:
‘We have to do something here. This will be a big story for the summer. It has 
everything you need for a real scandal: visually exciting, symbolic and a strong 
opponent.’43
Birch did not consider the disposal of the Brent Spar as deserving much attention and 
chose instead to focus the protest on chlorochemical dumping in the North Sea, note 
Winter and Schweinsberg. Chris Rose states that, in meetings on drafting the Declaration 
that ministers were to sign at the North Sea conference, Greenpeace had proposed that it
43 Cited in Winter and Schweinsberg (1996:Section A: 7).
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should address problems of the offshore industry, but ministers had not shown any 
interest:
‘This proposal had met with very little support indeed; as late as April 1995 the 
draft Ministerial Declarations to protect the North Sea (a region with approximately 
600 offshore installations!) did not make any specific reference to the offshore 
industry’ (Rose 1998:44).
Not only was there little political interest in the disposal of oil installations but 
Greenpeace too had initially shown little interest in this type of operation. At that time 
Greenpeace had focused its campaign efforts elsewhere, despite being concerned with the 
wider ‘ocean dumping’ campaign which, it maintained, had been an ongoing concern 
since the summer of 1978 when a Greenpeace ship intercepted a radioactive waste 
dumping vessel in the Atlantic (Rose 1998).
Despite his initial failure to create interest in the disposal of the Spar within Greenpeace, 
Thieme remained convinced that this would be a good issue for protest and made a series 
of trips to Greenpeace offices in London, Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Hamburg seeking 
support for a protest campaign. He found such support in Thilo Bode, Director of 
Greenpeace Germany, who decided to take up the issue. Chris Rose, responsible for 
determining campaigns in the UK, recalls his sentiments when he was first shown the 
plans of the Brent Spar and Shell’s decision for sea disposal:
‘My reaction was simple incredulity: “They can’t be serious - they can’t be going to 
dump something so vast.” It simply beggared belief, after a decade of ever tighter 
international agreements against dumping all sorts of waste at sea, that Shell, the 
“Better Britain”44 oil company, was going to commit the world’s biggest act of
44 This is a reference to Shell UK’s corporate environmental and social responsibility programme of the 
same name.
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littering. At that point our idea was simple: get onto it and thereby stop them from 
sinking it. [There were logistical problems.] Even so, I felt a strong urge to go 
there. The idea of simply stopping this extraordinary gross act just by being there 
had an attraction and simplicity ...’(1998:8-9).
On April 30,1995, nearly four months after Greenpeace had first heard about the plans 
for the Spar, and three months after Shell’s public announcement, Greenpeace activists 
accompanied by some journalists boarded the Brent Spar.
Events
February 16,1995
Outlining the manner in which the company had reached the decision to opt for sea 
disposal, and stressing that this was the best available option having considered for 
environment, cost and safety, Shell issued a news release announcing its plans for the 
Brent Spar. It is worth quoting from this news release at length because it is Shell’s first 
public communication about the disposal and illustrates the initial stance taken by the 
company:
‘Disposal of the Brent Spar ... has been the subject of extensive discussions 
between Shell UK Exploration and Production and the Department of Trade and 
Industry for many months. During that period a range of disposal options has been 
considered ... Shell Expro has now received from the DTI approval for 
abandonment45 of the Spar, which will involve ... a clean-up operation, and towing 
it to a designated deep water site in the North East Atlantic for disposal... 
Preparations are in hand to enable the plan to be put into effect in the summer of 
1995.
One possible option, which was investigated closely, was onshore scrapping. 
However, it was concluded that this approach, involving reversing the installation 
process, would be technically complex ... would give no environmental benefit
45 Shell’s earlier terminology can be seen here.
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compared with deep-water disposal, and would involve a significantly higher cost 
than the approved option.
Relevant parties, including environmental and fishing interests, were fully 
consulted.
The detailed environmental impact analysis for the deep-sea disposal option ... 
shows ... [a]ny environmental impact of deep sea disposal would be negligible ... 
This method of disposal has been supported by independent evaluation.
Balancing safety, environment and cost factors, deep sea disposal is the best 
practicable method of disposal’ (Shell UK Ltd, News Release: February 16,1995).
The above shows that Shell considered it important to emphasise that land disposal was 
‘closely’ considered and that ‘independent evaluation’ had judged that the environmental 
impact o f ‘deep’ sea disposal would be ‘negligible’. In doing so, in my estimation, and 
contrary to the consultants’ claim, Shell addressed perceptions of sea disposal as wrong 
even at this early stage.
At the time of this announcement Shell did not encounter any opposition.
April 30
Heralding the start of its campaign, Greenpeace occupied the Brent Spar.
The Press Association in London announced that ‘Greenpeace protesters board disused 
oil platform’. 46 A consequence of the media coverage of the direct action Greenpeace 
took (boarding the Spar) was a concomitant coverage of claims that questioned what 
Shell intended to do. That was a situation that had not previously existed.
4  ^Media coverage is assessed in chapter 3.
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May 2
Greenpeace Germany held its first press conference on the Brent Spar situation, 
publicising its intention to protest at the upcoming North Sea Protection conference.
May 5
The UK Government granted the formal disposal licence to Shell UK. In February the 
government had informed Shell UK that the licence would be issued.
May 6
Media reports started to link the North Sea Conference (scheduled to be held in June) 
with the disposal of the Brent Spar.
May 9
The German Ministry of the Environment protested against the disposal plan, sending a 
note to its British counterpart stating that the land disposal option had not been 
adequately examined, and citing prominent German scientists who cast doubt over Shell 
UK’s studies of the environmental impact of sea disposal (Winter and Schweinsberg 
1996). The reason for this sudden protest, as previously no opposition to the plan had 
been voiced, might have been Greenpeace’s protest and boarding of the Spar. Greenpeace 
concedes that this was the case:
‘On 24 March 1995, at the third meeting of the working group to draft the 
Ministerial Declaration, the offshore industry was off the agenda ... none of the
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countries’ representatives showed an interest and the meeting ended. Not long after, 
a fourth preparatory meeting was held in Denmark, and in the meantime the 
occupation of the Brent Spar had started. The mood had suddenly changed. Several 
delegates had been instructed by their ministers to push for the inclusion of a 
section on the offshore industry in the Ministerial Declaration, and to demand - 
specifically - that the dumping of decommissioned offshore installations be 
prohibited’ (Rose 1998:44).
Given that European environment ministers had not shown much interest in this issue 
until after the Greenpeace protest on the Spar, it can be concluded that Greenpeace had 
raised political awareness of this issue and made ministers question the legitimacy of the 
sea disposal.
Although there was media interest in the story at this time, Greenpeace was unhappy with 
the extent of the coverage and uncertain that its campaign would be a success:
‘Bode was not comfortable with the amount of media interest that Greenpeace’s 
protest had received. Everyone on the platform was bored; Bode wondered if the 
activists would need to stay out on the platform until bad weather in the autumn 
necessitated calling the action off. The support provided to the protesters was 
expensive, and financially he doubted they could hold out that long. As it was, he 
feared that the up-front investment was lost [it had cost DM 2 million just to get the 
activists onto the Spar]’ (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 3).
May 12
1. Shell assisted two Aberdeen sheriffs to board the rig; they carried a court injunction for 
the evacuation of the protesters. At this stage the court injunction did not require the 
sheriffs to remove the activists physically. But the injunction required the protesters to 
leave and to identify themselves, and required vessels providing provisions to the 
activists to stop doing so. Shell’s first response to the situation was to take legal measures 
against the activists. I asked John Wybrew, Director of Public Affairs, Shell UK, why this
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route was chosen. Why, for instance, did the company not speak or negotiate with 
Greenpeace? He replied:
‘Negotiation was not considered because at the time we strongly believed that 
this was the best strategy - Greenpeace’s action was illegal’ (in interview: 
November 18,1999).
From the outset, Shell’s press releases would compare the legality of all its actions with 
the illegality of Greenpeace’s. In doing so, the company suggested that the chosen plan 
for the Brent Spar was the right one, whereas all Greenpeace’s actions and claims were 
wrong.
2. The activists remained on board.
3. According to Shell’s chronology of events, outlined in its Internet site on the Brent 
Spar crisis: ‘Several independent UK scientists begin expressing support for deep water 
disposal as a balanced decision.’ Shell, in fact, asked many of the scientists involved in 
the Aberdeen University study, which was the basis of Shell’s decision for the disposal, 
to comment on the situation and, in doing so, lend legitimacy to the company’s case.
4. The Danish government condemned Shell’s plans for the sea disposal.
5. Greenpeace urged the British government to withdraw the licence ‘to dump’.
May 15
Shell Germany sought the advice of their public relations consultants. According to 
Winter and Schweinsberg the company concluded that:
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‘...the situation did not necessitate a campaign to counteract Greenpeace’s 
activities. While surveys showed some negative consumer reactions, they were 
interpreted as being neither representative of the public at large or presenting a 
significant danger for the company. The (PR) agencies recommended that Shell 
support the British (scientific) studies and prepare material for Shell employees and 
service stations’ (1996: Section B: 4).
These conclusions would soon prove to be wrong and while they seem to have recognised 
that the service stations may have become a possible target for protest, although perhaps 
not a target for violence, the recommendations made soon proved to be ineffective. I 
would suggest that this situation, as with most, shows how difficult it is to predict 
developments. At this time, it was not anticipated that things would get worse or that 
protests would escalate.
Consultants argue that if Shell had taken an offensive stance at this stage, events might 
have proceeded differently and to Shell’s advantage. My examination of Shell’s press 
releases supports the consultants’ allegation that the company counteracted Greenpeace 
allegations as and when they arose, a reactive policy that placed them in a defensive 
position. Shell also chose to attack Greenpeace’s strategy as ‘alarmist’, ‘sensational’ and 
involving ‘misinterpretations’, at a late date and only at the immediate crisis stage. 
Consultants claim that, had Shell gone on the offensive at an earlier stage, it might have 
succeeded in framing the issue rather than surrendering to Greenpeace, who triumphed in 
providing the frame within the media coverage of this dispute.47
A second aspect of Shell’s communications strategy that consultants criticise is that the 
company concentrated on reiterating the soundness and objectivity of its scientific 
studies. They suggest that this might have been advantageous as it demonstrated that
47 Chapter 3 tests the claim whether Greenpeace in fact succeeded in framing the issue in the media.
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Shell had conducted independent and objective analyses, but that nevertheless the 
strategy was wholly ignorant of the subjective and ideological dimensions of the sea 
disposal method. Those, they argue, Greenpeace utilised with success.
My analysis of Shell’s news releases show that the company did indeed emphasise that its 
plan was based on scientific analysis and that independent scientists had arrived at the 
decision that the sea disposal was the least environmentally damaging option. In doing 
so, Shell justified its plan by evoking the legitimacy and authority afforded to science and 
independent scientific opinion. Consultants argue that the communications employed by 
Shell were unsuccessful in influencing perceptions because protest against Shell was due 
to an ‘emotional’ response to the sea disposal method. They assert that, by contrast, 
Greenpeace’s campaign actively addressed and mirrored those subjectivities.
Greenpeace’s campaign did indeed focus on the use of the ocean as a garbage dump for 
the oil industry’s installations in the North Sea, and the terminology used within the 
campaign was intentionally highly evocative. It appears that Shell also was, to an extent, 
attuned to the effect of language as Shell had initially used the term ‘abandonment’ (as is 
evident in the first news release), which was subsequently replaced by ‘disposal’. The 
observations of Mary Douglas (1966) are helpful in understanding the situation where the 
form of communication used by Greenpeace could have been more successful than that 
used by Shell. Douglas (1966) suggests that responses to risks are shaped by accepted 
ideas of purity and danger. Greenpeace both appealed to and evoked these notions, 
whereas Shell did not.
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Both parties sought to attain dominance of their own interpretation over the other, but, 
unlike Shell’s communications, Greenpeace’s resonated and spoke to people’s ideas 
about what was pure (oceans) and impure (unwanted and possibly contaminated oil 
industry equipment ‘dumped’ in the oceans).
May 16
Shell issued a press release in response to the UK Labour Party’s (the opposition party at 
the time) criticism of the company. This is the first press release of its kind, as it 
addressed many of the criticisms made of Shell, and is therefore worth examining in 
depth. The above observations regarding Shell’s description of the disposal are also 
illustrated therein.
In that press release, Shell replied to the criticism made by Frank Dobson, the Shadow 
Environment Minister:
‘Shell UK strongly refutes the Labour Party's claim that the Government-authorised 
plan to dispose of the Brent Spar ... compromises accepted environmental 
standards for short term economic benefit.
... disposal in the deep Atlantic, some 150 miles from land and at a depth of over 
6000 feet... has been independently assessed as the best option from an 
environmental point of view, and in terms of several other considerations including 
health, safety and economic efficiency.’ 48
The press release also addressed a number of criticisms made by Greenpeace. Shell 
devoted more attention to this than it had before as dealing with these criticisms also 
addressed those of other critics.
48 This and the following citations are from Shell UK News Release: May 16, 1995.
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In an extensive ‘Notes to Editors’ Shell explained how the plan had been arrived at. In 
doing so, it tried to influence journalists’ and editors’ understanding of the process of 
decommissioning and, in that way, attempted to direct their representation of the 
situation. In this press release, Shell not only defended itself against the criticisms that 
were made but also attempted to sway media framing of the issue.
Firstly, the company stressed that the Brent Spar was ‘not typical of offshore petroleum 
installations’ and that it would not have set a precedent as Greenpeace alleged.
Secondly, Shell described the decommissioning process, implying that the process it had 
followed was routine, that it had acted in a responsible manner by consulting external 
interests (who had given their support), and that the company also had the authorisation 
of the Government.
Thirdly, Shell stressed the amount of preparatory work it had done to find the best 
disposal option, and the scientific considerations involved in reaching the decision for 
Brent Spar:
‘The Government endorsed the plan for the Brent Spar after several months careful 
consideration of the options and more than three years of painstaking analysis by 
Shell, the completion of fifteen separate studies on their environmental and 
engineering aspects, taking independent surveys and advice into account, and the 
careful weighing of all the environmental, safety, health and economic 
considerations.’
Fourthly, Shell stated in the press release that it had gained governmental approval and 
had followed all the legal requirements:
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‘Every aspect of UK law and regulation has been followed to the letter and to the 
spirit. The Government is entirely satisfied that it is also complying with the 
relevant aspects of international law and conventions.’
All this attempted to lend authority and legitimacy to a plan that had by then become 
contentious.
Furthermore, the press release also responded to Greenpeace’s claim that the disposal of 
the Spar should be dealt with on land, by maintaining that scientific studies had shown 
onshore disposal to bemore environmentally risky:
‘The independent analysis of disposal options ... has shown that onshore disposal 
would increase the risk of an accident or an environmentally damaging incident by 
order of six times. Much of the waste material would end up in landfill. The options 
would cost four times as much, but this has not been the sole consideration. The 
environmental effect of the proposed deep water disposal... where the water depth 
is more than 6,000 feet - is independently assessed to be negligible and very 
localised. There is in any event very little fish life at this extreme depth.’
Shell addressed the criticism that sea disposal was chosen because it was economically 
attractive in order to counter the impression given by Greenpeace.
Responding to Greenpeace’s claim that the Spar contained environmentally damaging 
substances, and that it posed a risk to the marine environment, the company also told the 
media about the contents of the Spar and the extent of environmental damage that those 
might cause:
‘Before tow-out... the structure will be stripped of almost everything on board, and 
the residual sources of contamination will be minimised. The irreducible sources of 
possible contamination left before disposal will consist of the paints and sacrificial 
anodes on the structure itself and up to 100 ... tonnes of sludge, consisting of 90% 
sand and 10% oil residues ... ’.
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Moreover, the account Shell gave minimised and made relative the environmental risk 
involved in the sea disposal:
‘Altogether these represent such low levels of radioactivity that they fall many 
orders of magnitude within international standards. The level of radioactivity, for 
example, will be no more than would emanate from a group of granite buildings in 
a city such as Aberdeen’.
The ample ‘Notes to Editors’ included in this press release supplied a defence of Shell’s 
plan by presenting background briefings and, in providing this account, Shell sought to 
influence media representations of the company and its (by then, controversial) plan. But 
this is the first instance where Shell’s communications actively addressed the media and 
sought their help in getting the company’s messages across.
At this stage all public relations activities concerning the Brent Spar were still being 
conducted from Aberdeen and not from the central office in London, indicating that Shell 
did not conceive that the situation required a new response. Matters were left in the hands 
of Shell Expro (the legal owner of Brent Spar) to handle in a very routine way. At this 
time, Shell did not centrally control communications or launch a coordinated offensive 
action, possibly because the company did not envision that the situation could heighten. 
But protest grew and the situation worsened.
May 18
Shell UK returned to the Court of Session in Edinburgh, seeking a court order for the 
Greenpeace activists to be evicted.
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May 19
The Scottish Court granted the order for eviction, ruling that Shell had the right forcibly 
to remove the protesters from Brent Spar.
May 23
1. Shell workers and the police removed Greenpeace activists, accompanying journalists 
and other protesters from the platform.
2. Greenpeace Germany organised protests across Germany and the German media 
provided extensive coverage of the protests and of the claims made by Greenpeace.
3. In the Hague, Greenpeace expressed its opposition to the plan and blocked the 
entrances to Royal Dutch headquarters.
4. Shell Germany asked Shell UK to move its public relations operation from Aberdeen 
to London in order to manage the situation better, and so that Peter Duncan (Chairman of 
Shell Germany) and Chris Fay (Chairman of Shell UK) could take further decisions 
based on their daily informal contacts.
5. The German Environmental Minister, Angelika Merkel, condemned Shell’s plans.
6. Shell UK issued three press releases during the course of the day.
The first stated that at 06.07, Shell had ‘reoccupied’ Brent Spar and that the ‘illegal 
occupiers’ were being removed ‘in a safe and controlled manner’ on to the Shell vessel
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Stadive which had been due to start the final preparations before the disposal (Shell UK 
News Release: May 23, 1995).
The second press release announced that, at 17.00,20 people had been removed from the 
Spar and two remained. It also responded to allegations that violence was involved:
‘In fact it was very peaceful... There was no real resistance just passive 
obstruction’ (Shell UK News Release: May 23, 1995).
The third and final press release of the day confirmed that all protesters had been 
removed from the Brent Spar ‘after a team of workers gained access to a heavily 
barricaded area in the lower decks’ (Shell UK News Release: May 23,1995).
May 24
1. Greenpeace’s petition in London for a court injunction against the sea disposal was 
unsuccessful.
2. Calls for a boycott of Shell service stations started in Germany, initiated by the Junge 
Union (the youth organisation of Germany’s ruling conservative party), and several other 
organisations followed suit.
May 29
Winter and Schweinsberg record that:
‘Angelika Merkel [the German Environmental Minister who had previously 
condemned the sea disposal which the UK government supported] endorsed the 
British decision. After some discussion with her British counterpart John Gummer,
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she stated that the decision had been made according to international law. She 
added that she would be happy if the decision was reversed, but nevertheless she 
publicly accepted the British position’ (1996: Section B: 5).
This endorsement of the British government’s and Shell’s position that the decision was 
according to international law on this matter, as it stood at the time, was a possible result 
of political pressure applied by the British government to other European governments 
publicly to acknowledge the legality of the disposal.
May 31
Shell issued a news release expressing its rejection of all the accusations Greenpeace had 
made in a letter to Shell and, in doing so, aimed to persuade critics and the media that the 
company was following a legitimate, normal and responsible course. That was, once 
again, reiterated:
‘The disposal plan has followed on every count the procedures, principles and 
standards of best international oil industry practice, within a UK regulatory regime 
which is amongst the most scrupulous in the world.
The disposal options have been analysed with care, rigour and independence.
The environmental, safety, health and economic considerations have been 
responsibly balanced ... The disposal plan has not become public knowledge 
because of a Greenpeace protest; consultations were held in 1994, the independent 
analyses supporting the Shell proposal were made publicly available, and all 
governments party to the Oslo Convention were notified months ago.
The Shell reply rejects all the assertions made in the Greenpeace letter ...’(Shell 
UK News Release: 31 May 1995).
The company restated all of the above in order to counter Greenpeace’s suggestion that 
the disposal plan was a cheap and inconsiderate judgement. Again, Shell emphasised the 
greater environmental and other risks of onshore disposal. But, for the very first time,
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Shell also strongly attacked Greenpeace and its strategy, denouncing Greenpeace’s 
campaign tactics as alarmist and its objectives as simplistic:
‘Dr Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell UK Limited, has replied to a 
letter from Greenpeace International which makes a number of incorrect and 
unjustifiably alarmist assertions ... Specific Greenpeace statements about the 
contents of the Spar are overstated and irresponsibly alarmist... Dr Fay's letter 
concludes:
"I unequivocally reject your assertion that Shell UK is prepared to treat the 
environment with 'contempt'. Such a comment ignores the facts relating to our 
careful and positive environmental management. It also highlights the contrast 
between those of us who are engaged in die painstaking process of seeking 
responsible balanced solutions and those, like yourselves, who focus only on the 
problems"’ (Shell UK News Release: 31 May 1995).
Those statements indicate Shell’s more combative posture as the company alleged that 
Greenpeace had distorted, manipulated and impeded accurate interpretation of its 
disposal plan, which it continued to defend. This is a more proactive position, and one 
that consultants consider to be a good manoeuvre, but Shell took this position only at a 
late date. By the time Shell attacked Greenpeace’s campaign, Greenpeace’s allegations 
had been widely publicised.
June 1
Greenpeace Germany’s Director, Thilo Bode, and Shell Germany’s Chairman, Peter 
Duncan, met to discuss the situation. Winter and Schweinsberg (1996) observe that 
Duncan congratulated Greenpeace for the physical agility shown by those Greenpeace 
members who boarded the Spar. Duncan also conveyed to Greenpeace that he had no 
influence over Shell UK and had no say in Shell Expro’s decision to dispose of the Brent 
Spar. Bode is said to have replied that Greenpeace was not responsible for Shell’s
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corporate structure and suggested that Duncan speak to Chris Fay, Chairman of Shell 
UK, as Fay was refusing to speak to Greenpeace Germany.
Bode conveyed to Duncan that Greenpeace would continue its protest for several weeks 
and, was not about to back down. He outlined what this protest would include: 
demonstrations at Shell service stations, letter-writing campaigns, advertisements, and 
that Greenpeace would accompany the Spar as it was towed towards its site of disposal (a 
ten-day journey from the North Sea to the Atlantic). Bode also showed Duncan a 
Greenpeace-commissioned survey in which 85% of German car owners said that they 
“would support a boycott of Shell”. (Greenpeace never officially called for a boycott - 
but then there was no need to as one had already begun.)
Duncan stated that he would convey the contents of the meeting to the Hague and 
London, but he also explained that he would not act against his colleagues or make 
controversial statements in public (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996). Peter Duncan’s 
statements to Greenpeace have been viewed as illustrating an empathy he felt with 
Greenpeace, a sentiment which he was later to make explicit in a series of public 
expressions o f‘understanding’ the position of Greenpeace. Duncan’s comment about 
how he commiserated with Greenpeace conveyed to Greenpeace, and to a wider 
audience, that Shell was divided over the disposal. This may have given Greenpeace 
greater confidence that the disposal plan could have been forsaken if Shell Germany 
could convince Shell UK to do so. It seems to have been for this end that Greenpeace 
continued to exert pressure on Shell Germany. Furthermore, as the boycott had gained 
momentum in Germany, strategically Greenpeace was in a better position to apply
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pressure to Shell Germany rather than Shell UK. Duncan, however, was at a later date 
reprimanded by Shell UK.
Additionally, as the consultants argue, Shell appeared uncoordinated. The situation over 
Brent Spar did not, at this stage, suggest to Royal Dutch/Shell that a coordinated response 
was needed between the Shell companies, especially between Shell Germany (the country 
where much of the protest took place) and Shell UK (the owners of Brent Spar). The 
traditional structure might have suggested to Royal Dutch/Shell that it was sufficient for 
Shell UK to handle the situation. As we have seen, Greene (1984) views the decentralised 
structure of Royal Dutch/Shell as its strength, but in the situation with the Brent Spar its 
structure appears to have hindered its ability to act efficiently and co-ordinate its strategy 
at an early stage. This did eventually happen during the crisis stage but not at this time.
June 3
Shell UK announced that it would not take any legal action against the protesters who 
had boarded the Spar.
June 6
The boycott of Shell in Germany continued to gain momentum.
June 7
Greenpeace tried to reboard the Spar, while Shell took action to repel this attempt by 
using water cannon. Consultants argue that this event gained extensive media coverage
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worldwide as it provided visually dramatic footage (in the case of television) and (for the 
press and TV news) was an event that symbolised the conflict.49
Shell’s press release once again upheld its position and branded Greenpeace’s claims as 
‘alarmist and incorrect’ (Shell UK News Release: June 7,1995).
June 8
1. The North Sea Protection Conference, attended by environment ministers of the 
countries bordering the North Sea, began in Esbjerg, Denmark amidst considerable media 
attention.
As intended from the start of the campaign, Greenpeace used this event to publicise its 
protests against Shell and even constructed a replica of the Spar at the entrance to the 
conference. Despite having earlier failed to influence the conference agenda, Greenpeace 
in effect set the agenda of the conference as it was entirely devoted to the Brent Spar. The 
official conference agenda was to have focused on the pollution of rivers.
While Greenpeace was very visually present protesting at the conference, and was also 
attending the conference, Shell had to rely on the UK Environment Minister to argue the 
company’s case. The conference was a governmental forum and, unlike Greenpeace,
Shell had not been invited to participate.50
49Chapter 3 asks whether television coverage of this did create a bias towards Greenpeace’s position, as
consultants and Shell later argued.
50 See page 116.
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Greenpeace’s campaign gained a crucial footing at the conference and Bode, Director of 
Greenpeace Germany, later remarked:
‘It was astonishing the effect we had at the conference. Usually it is boring with a 
sad routine - the proceedings wouldn’t even make the newspapers ... [Greenpeace] 
showed that such conferences can and have to be influenced’ (Winter and 
Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 6).
2. Shell Germany’s Board of Directors met with employee representatives and trade 
unions to discuss the controversy surrounding the Brent Spar. The Royal Dutch/Shell 
CEO, Cor Herkstroter, did not want to engage in open dialogue about the situation 
(Winter and Schweinsberg 1996). The Board debated whether Shell should engage in a 
more proactive public relations campaign that criticised and made problematic the nature 
of Greenpeace’s campaign:
‘The second half of the meeting’s agenda focused on the possibility that Shell 
Germany should begin a proactive PR campaign against the Greenpeace protest - or 
at the very least should change its strategy from a reactive campaign to a more 
offensive counter-campaign. Shell could publish a position statement and urge a 
more reasonable public debate. Shell Germany could also focus on the sensational 
nature of Greenpeace arguments against Shell Expro’s original scientific studies. At 
the end of the meeting, however, the Shell directors decided that it was too late to 
begin a major media campaign and that the company should continue as before’ 
(Winter and Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 6).
However, as I have demonstrated above, for some time before this Shell UK’s press 
releases had taken a more aggressive tone, in particular the news releases on May 16 and 
31. Therefore, there is some indication that, although Shell Germany might have 
officially decided that it was too late for a major media campaign, Shell UK had to some 
extent begun to criticise the nature of Greenpeace’s campaign and its assertions.
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June 9
1. Greenpeace disclosed a confidential study conducted in 1992 (as part of Shell’s 
commission of scientific investigation into the best disposal solution) which advocated 
land disposal as the least expensive method for the Brent Spar.
2. Shell countered that the study was outdated and meaningless.
3. On the second and final day of the North Sea conference all states except for the UK 
and Norway (who were the only countries to have large North Sea installations in waters 
deeper than 75m and, as a result, were allies in this matter), agreed that all future 
disposals should take place on land. Greenpeace had gained governmental support for its 
position and many European politicians appealed to the UK government to change its 
mind and revoke the licence for sea disposal.
June 10
1. Shell prepared to move the Brent Spar to its disposal site which was expected to take 
ten days to reach. Greenpeace activists tried to prevent Shell from separating the Spar 
from the anchors which had held it in place.
The consultants observe that these activities, once again being visually dramatic, gained 
extensive media coverage. Television coverage was virtually guaranteed, they maintain. 
In addition to the tugs, three Shell security boats, two of which were supposed to prevent 
Greenpeace from boarding the installation, surrounded the Spar. The third Shell ship had 
the sole objective of observing Alt aire, Greenpeace’s ship. A Royal Navy vessel
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monitored marine traffic in the area. Shell’s two security boats hosed the Spar and 
surrounding areas with water cannon in order to inhibit Greenpeace’s attempts to board 
the installation. According to Shell, water cannons were used only as a measure of self- 
defence, to protect their property. Consultants argue that Shell, in taking the decision to 
use water cannon, did not appreciate the symbolism of this action because, visually, it 
suggested a ‘David and Goliath’ combat which created compassion for Greenpeace and 
portrayed Shell as hostile. ‘Whatever the reality of the situation, Shell found itself 
floundering on the shoals of worldwide media perception’, argue Regester and Larkin 
(1997: 134). They maintain that this was because ‘one image was left with many 
viewers’, the television and newspaper pictures showed water cannon being sprayed at 
Greenpeace, who were consequently portrayed as ‘brave’, ‘determined’ and ‘bullied’ 
(1997:134). It was the symbolic nature of what happened, and the importance that 
consultants place on the effect of symbols that make this a central aspect of their criticism 
of Shell’s handling of the crisis:
‘Emotional symbols - water cannon jets aimed at Greenpeace activists ... aerial 
shots of the [Exxon ValdezJ oil spill in Alaska, the cloud hanging over Chernobyl, 
debris floating in the water off Long Island following the crash of TWA flight 800 
...- can overwhelm and totally negate scientific fa c f (Regester and Larkin 1997:28, 
original emphasis).
Consultants argue that the symbolic imagery of this event surpassed the company’s 
presentation of its case. They criticise the company’s lack of attention to others’ 
interpretations of its actions, and the creation, however inadvertently, of damaging 
impressions. Winter and Schweinsberg observe that ‘the responsibility for the transport 
was assigned to Shell UK in London, where a number of engineers were responsible for 
handling the crisis’ (1996: Section B: 7), engineers who may understandably have been
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ignorant of the symbolic and presentational elements of actions taken in a situation with 
such extensive media coverage.
2. Shell UK announced that the disposal would take place according to schedule.
June 11
1. As the Spar continued its journey to the Atlantic, two Greenpeace boats carrying 30 
activists and journalists followed. Shell warned Greenpeace that attempting to cut the 
towing cables would imperil the ships towing the Spar.
2. In Germany media coverage of the situation was becoming increasingly sympathetic to 
Greenpeace’s viewpoint (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996).
3. Shell service station owners in Germany voiced concerns about the safety of the 
stations, as well as concern for their own personal safety.
4. A meeting of the Oslo-Paris (Ospar) Commission, an intergovernmental organisation 
responsible for the prevention of marine pollution in the North Sea and the North 
Atlantic, met in Brussels and supported a moratorium on sea disposal of decommissioned 
offshore installations. One purpose of the North Sea conference was to decide what the 
Ospar Commission would address. The UK and Norway again opposed the 
recommendation for a moratorium. Under the terms of the Ospar Commission, 
unanimous approval of a proposal was necessary in order to bring it into law.
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June 12
1. In Germany, interest groups, politicians, religious groups and one automobile 
association called for a nationwide boycott of Shell service stations.
2. Peter Duncan appeared on several television programmes to defend Shell’s standpoint. 
He claimed to have been disappointed by the many public figures who called for a 
boycott without having any information on the issues and without fully considering 
Shell’s case.
3. Media reported that Esso owned 50% of Brent Spar. Esso appeared to distance itself 
from the controversy surrounding the disposal, as its sole response was that ‘every action 
taken by Shell is according to law’ (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 7). 
According to Esso, as the Brent Spar was operated by Shell Expro it was that company’s 
problem. It has been suggested that fearing a rerun of the situation the company faced 
over its Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989, wherein the company came under criticism, Esso 
chose to remain out of the public eye:
‘One could argue that, whereas Shell completely mismanaged the Brent Spar crisis, 
Esso managed that crisis very well - the company stayed out of it. Shell came out of 
it with damage to its reputation but Esso was untarnished’ (Geoffrey Hyde, Director 
of Crisis Management, Burson-Marsteller, in interview: August 9,2000).
Esso quite rightly pointed out that Shell Expro was the operating company legally 
responsible for the Spar, but that company was a joint venture between Shell and Esso. 
And here was the reputation of the whole of the Royal Dutch/Shell group of companies
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taking a beating while Esso, and Exxon, escaped criticism and managed to do so by 
putting the spotlight on Shell. In any event, Shell took the heat.
4. Bomb threats were made at Shell Germany headquarters and several service stations. A 
letter bomb arrived at Shell Germany headquarters addressed to Peter Duncan.
Events had reached crisis point. Media attention increased worldwide as neither 
Greenpeace nor Shell retreated (Regester and Larkin 1997) (Winter and Schweinsberg 
1996). Criticism of Shell intensified.
Over the course of the period described above, Shell seemed to be fighting a lone battle, 
although it had scientific backing and the support of the British and Norwegian 
governments. The impression conveyed within some sections of the media was that Shell 
was stubbornly and selfishly plodding ahead without any support for its sea disposal plan.
That period also saw the greatest amount of protest against Shell coming from Germany 
(where boycotts appeared to have effect as Shell Germany admitted losing sales), which 
would also be the situation during the immediate crisis.
Peter Duncan and Thilo Bode were in frequent contact. Duncan was convinced that 
Greenpeace would not back down and Bode believed that Duncan had met with 
Chancellor Kohl, who had told him that he would not defend ShelPs position (Winter and 
Schweinsberg 1996: Section B).
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The German government had complained to the UK government. Bode was not sure 
whether Shell UK would back down. On June 20, while Shell was deciding whether to 
abandon its plans or not and:
‘... as the Royal Dutch/Shell [Committee of Managing Directors] meeting was 
starting in The Hague, Bode called Duncan’s office in Hamburg. Duncan 
returned his call and again asked for his patience and assured him that they would 
soon find an acceptable solution. Bode, who had received the same promises over 
the previous twenty days, was somewhat sceptical. In addition he was very 
worried about the possibility of Shell using violent methods against the 
protesters. He urgently appealed to Duncan for Shell to stop its show of force. 
Bode recalled: “nearly every day for two weeks, I had spoken with Duncan. 
Almost every day, our conversation was the same. Duncan would be upset about 
the situation in Germany and I worried about use of violence against the 
protesters at sea. He would assure me that Shell would find a solution’” (Winter 
and Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 10).
Peter Duncan was also in daily contact with Chris Fay. However, communications
between Shell UK and Shell Germany were often lacking.
For instance, Shell Germany’s Director of Corporate Communications, Klaus-Peter 
Johanssen, learned of the Greenpeace occupation of Brent Spar the day after the event, 
when he was asked to comment on the situation by a television journalist. Peter Duncan 
found out about the events from the television. Shell UK had not informed Shell 
Germany of the previous day’s events. All this demonstrated a lack of an overall 
communication strategy. Another instance was that, while Greenpeace was asserting that 
the sea disposal of the Brent Spar would set a precedent for future disposal and was 
occupying the Brent Spar, Shell Germany was not only unaware of this but had also just 
launched a high profile media campaign about its concern for the environment. It 
contained the message ‘Shell Wants to Change Something’. This was a dangerous
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message to issue when Greenpeace was arguing that the disposal of the Spar would set a 
precedent.
Greenpeace’s protest campaign against Shell seemed to be effective. Consultants argue 
that the effectiveness of the Greenpeace campaign was largely due to Shell’s 
incompetence in anticipating possible Greenpeace protest activities. Greenpeace’s 
occupation of the Brent Spar had attracted media attention, as had its demonstrations and 
picketing of Shell petrol stations in Germany. Indeed, what may have retained media 
interest on the topic could have been the other activities carried out by Greenpeace, rather 
than just the occupation of the Spar (Hansen 2000).
A significant instance that demonstrates both Shell’s inability to predict Greenpeace’s 
protest activities and Greenpeace’s targeting of sites other than the Brent Spar, in order to 
publicise its views, was the protest at the North Sea Protection Conference at Esbjerg. 
There, as we have seen, Greenpeace’s protest was phenomenally successful.
The events preceding the crisis situation contributed to the heightened momentum of the 
events during this time. It is also a period characterised by the emergence of troublesome 
issues, as consultants observe.
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The immediate crisis: June 14 - 20,1995
During this week events took a dramatic and cumulative turn and Shell faced widespread 
opposition and protest, which all contributed to a crisis situation for the corporation.
June 14
1. Two gunmen fired at a Shell service station in Waldorf, Germany.
2. In the Netherlands, Shell initiated an advertising campaign in which the company 
focused on the minimal environmental impact of the disposal of Brent Spar.
3. Shell began an internal discussion about strategies for handling the difficult 
circumstances it faced. One possibility discussed was the option of aborting the project. 
However, this was not publicly stated, as Shell continued to maintain that it would go 
ahead. Additionally, there were differences of opinion within the various operating 
companies in the Royal Dutch/Shell Group as to the best method of handling the 
disposal. For instance, Shell Germany and Shell Netherlands, which were o f the opinion 
that the sea disposal should be halted, tried to persuade Shell UK to stop its contentious 
disposal plan. Shell UK was immovable, backed its plans and publicly reprimanded Peter 
Duncan for saying that he ‘understood’ Greenpeace’s position. However, the internal 
uncertainty within the corporation created internal confusion and complicated the 
corporation’s ability to coordinate its response to the crisis.
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June 15
1. The German press reported that Cor Herkstroter (Royal Dutch CEO) was personally 
taking charge of the situation. Herkstroter scheduled confidential meetings with 
representatives from the UK and Germany. The meetings took place over the coming 
weekend.
2. At the G7 meeting in Canada, Chancellor Kohl pressed John Major to stop the sea 
disposal.51 Major defended Shell’s decision, stating that all its actions complied with 
regulations and treaties, and that the disposal would go ahead as planned because this was 
the best possible environmental option.
3. Greenpeace claimed that a disposal report commissioned by Shell (the Smit Report) 
showed that the Brent Spar could be scrapped on land for £10 million.
Shell issued a press release refuting this ‘allegation as untruthful and irresponsible* (Shell 
UK News Release: June 15, 1995). The press release stated that the Smit Report was an 
earlier study which had not considered various critical factors (safety, environment etc). 
Shell said that such factors were considered by later studies, such as the Aberdeen 
University study, which demonstrated that deep water disposal was the best option. Also, 
Shell again asserted that the Aberdeen University study was the basis for its decision.
51 Kohl protested because he feared the loss of voters in the upcoming election, allege Winter and 
Schweinsberg (1996).
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June 16
1. In Hamburg a Shell service station was firebombed. ‘The attackers wrote “Shell to 
Hell” on the wall of the station - a slogan Shell remembered from the 1980s, when it 
attracted widespread attention for its business proceedings in South Africa’ (Winter and 
Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 8).
2. In a press conference, Thilo Bode condemned the firebombing.
3. In Germany, politicians, religious groups, unions and small businesses endorsed a 
boycott, while the German press reported the enthusiasm of boycotters across Germany 
(Winter and Schweinsberg 1996). That was also a subject extensively reported by the 
British press and television reports.52
4. Shell gave statements to the effect that Shell Germany had lost market share. For 
instance, a 'Newsnight ’ programme broadcast by the BBC on June 15 showed Peter 
Duncan stating that there had been a decline in business as a direct result of the Brent 
Spar controversy. He said: ‘In terms of tangible business effects, we have very significant 
measurable losses of business not only with our service stations but with many o f the 
other small businesses within which we work’. On a Channel 4 News programme 
broadcast on June 20 (following Shell’s repeal of its contentious plan), John Toalster of 
SGST Securities, a brokerage firm, speculated how much money Shell might have lost.
He argued that the loss of business was quite insignificant in terms of the total earnings of 
the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies:
52 See chapter 3.
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‘Their finances are quite strong with the group having £8 billion in cash on deposit 
and Germany, of course, is not particularly important in world terms as far as 
gasoline sales are concerned - very low profits. We could assume perhaps they 
might have lost about £20,000 a day, which would work out to about £7 million a 
year. So if [the boycotts] continued for a whole year, [losses] would be very modest 
in group terms but the main cost [of the incident] has been the loss of prestige, 
status ...’ (Newsnight, BBC2: June 15, 1995).
That view echoed Peter Duncan’s statement on the Newsnight programme, where he 
argued that, in addition to loss of business, loss of public confidence in the company was 
a further and equally damaging result of the dispute over the disposal of the Brent Spar 
(Newsnight, BBC2: June 15, 1995).
5. In response to the escalating boycott of Shell in Germany, Greenpeace Germany 
threatened Shell Germany with its intention to make a further financial impact:
‘Bode informed Duncan that if Shell did not call off its [disposal] plan 
immediately, Greenpeace would communicate that Shell was also present in the 
heating oil market [of which Shell Germany had 35%]; a market that had so far not 
been affected’ (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996: Section B: 8).
Although Greenpeace never called for a boycott of Shell, its campaign made maximum 
use of the boycott that came into effect, as can be witnessed by the above quote.
6. In a Shell Germany press conference, Duncan again expressed a certain amount o f 
sympathy for the protesters - a sentiment Shell UK had already reprimanded him for 
expressing. Duncan also incorrectly declared that the sea disposal would be postponed for 
some time. Shell UK denied Duncan’s remark and stated that the sea disposal would take 
place as scheduled, on June 22. Duncan later claimed that he had been stating a personal 
view that it should be postponed. This instance illustrated that the different companies 
within Royal Dutch/Shell Group had diverse opinions about how best to dispose o f Brent
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Spar. While Shell UK claimed to be confident about its plans, there were many instances 
where Shell Germany publicly questioned Shell UK’s plans for the Brent Spar and 
appeared to agree with Greenpeace’s position.
Instances such as this very starkly demonstrate not only that Shell was not a unitary body 
with a single voice - it is unreasonable to assume that it would be - but also that Shell had 
difficulty representing itself as such.
Winter and Schweinsberg (1996) note that the German media criticised Shell for its lack 
of coordination as contradictory information was reported. At this time, British press and 
television news reports also frequently represented Shell as divided.
So Shell did not present itself as speaking with one voice, a condition consultants claim is 
vital for handling crises. Subsequently, however, Shell attempted to adjust this situation. 
A direct consequence of the disparity in communications displayed that day was that 
Shell Germany, acting on the advice of Shell UK, stopped issuing its own press releases 
on the Brent Spar and from then on issued only Shell UK press releases.
7. Greenpeace, chartering a helicopter, airlifted two activists on to the Brent Spar.
8. Greenpeace cameramen filmed Shell security boats using water cannon in an attempt 
to prevent the helicopter from landing on the Spar. This was an image that television 
studios frequently used.
9. Cor Herkstroter, Chris Fay and Peter Duncan scheduled a Committee of Managing 
Directors (CMD) meeting for June 20, two days before the scheduled date for the
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disposal. Herkstroter wanted to come to a final decision on the day. Should the CMD 
decide to abort the plans to sink the Spar, he would need the approval of the Chairman of 
Exxon, Lee Raymond, as Esso owned 50% of Shell Exploration and Production (Expro), 
the legal owner of the Brent Spar. It did not, however, seem that this approval would be 
difficult to obtain as, throughout the crisis, Esso had left matters in Shell’s hands and 
publicly stated that position.
The decision to hold this meeting indicates the very real internal dissension on this matter 
and also that, internally, the disposal plan was being re-examined and the possibility of 
termination was being considered. Publicly, however, Shell reported that it was confident 
of its stance, and press releases (such as the one cited below) continued to report this. 
Although the impression Shell wanted to create was that the corporation still resolutely 
backed the disposal, public inconsistencies of opinion that arose, most evidently between 
Shell Germany and Shell UK, damaged that effort.
10. Shell issued a press release which stated that the company remained committed to 
going ahead with its plans. The press release, once again and as others would also do, 
emphasised that the plan was legally right, would not set a precedent and had been 
scientifically proven to be the best option:
‘Shell UK Ltd. remains convinced that the sinking in the deep Atlantic is the most 
responsible way of disposing of the Brent Spar...
In compliance with all the related national and international regulations ... 
independent analysis [shows] that in these special circumstances the deepwater 
offshore disposal option represented the most responsible balance of environmental, 
safety, occupational health and economic considerations’ (Shell UK News Release 
June 16, 1995).
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An additional press release commented on the criticisms of various governments and 
prominent individuals and stated that, as a consequence of such criticism, Shell had 
reviewed the results of the scientific studies, re-examined its decision and remained 
confident about its plans. While this, previous and subsequent press releases reiterated 
that Shell had objectively carried out independent, scientifically sound studies and had 
consulted with interested parties in the UK who supported Shell, and that all its actions 
were according to international regulations, Shell’s communications did not explicitly 
address the perception that sea disposal was wrong in principle.
The company’s communications were ineffectual because they were faulty, consultants 
argue. They contend that what the company stated did not make any difference because it 
did not address the fact that a large number of individuals and groups found the sea 
disposal method to be wrong in principle. Consultants claim that this is why people 
protested, not because they did not fully appreciate the procedures Shell had taken, i.e. 
what Shell’s communications emphasised.
However, the type of statements Shell made might have been an attempt to deal with that 
very issue. Shell’s communications did not explicitly state this but, nevertheless, may 
have addressed the perception that sea disposal was wrong by pointing to the legal and 
scientific case. But consultants allege that, although Shell reiterated those arguments, 
people would not have eventually come to accept the company’s case as they did not care 
for this type of argument.
How consultants determine that most people protested because they believed sea disposal 
to be fundamentally wrong is not clear. It appears that consultants speculate that this was
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so. Whether everyone opposed to Shell’s plan was opposed on that basis is presumed and 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, consultants draw attention to an important point: the format 
of Greenpeace’s communications and the types of claims made might have been more 
successful than Shell’s for reasons other than what Shell said in its press releases. This 
could explain the difficulty Shell had in gaining support for its case, and the following 
chapter discusses this.
June 17
1. Greenpeace issued a press release stating that the Brent Spar contained 5500 tonnes of
oil. Greenpeace based its claims on samples taken by activists during the May occupation 
of Brent Spar. An independent analysis of these samples by the University of Exeter had 
revealed that Shell’s estimate of the oil remaining in Brent Spar was wrong, Greenpeace 
stated.
2. Shell immediately countered Greenpeace’s statement in a press release stating that the 
accusations were totally false, and also criticising Greenpeace:
‘Shell... totally refutes allegations from Greenpeace that over 5000 tonnes of oil 
remains in the storage tanks of the Brent Spar.
The contents of the storage tanks on the Spar were flushed out into a tanker in 1991 
when the facility was decommissioned, leaving only seawater.
Samples ... were taken from the storage tanks ... and the results included in the 
submissions to the Government. These results have also been made public and have 
been widely reported.
Shell UK believes that this is yet another example of how Greenpeace are wilfully 
misleading the public with false and unsubstantiated information’ (Shell UK News 
Release, June 17, 1995).
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3. In a further press release Shell again criticised Greenpeace and expressed faith in their 
customers and appealed to them not to base their judgements on Greenpeace’s 
allegations. Once again, Shell repeated the legality of its actions, and that its decision on 
the disposal method was based on sound scientific investigation as well as consideration 
for the environment. And Shell also took an offensive stance against Greenpeace:
‘It would appear that the so called day of action at Shell service stations called for 
by Greenpeace has barely occurred. It appears that demonstrators arrived at only a 
handful of service stations. This has been yet another attempt by Greenpeace to 
alarm people with inaccurate and misleading information. We believe our 
customers are capable of balancing the inaccurate and alarmist claims of 
Greenpeace against the facts, which are that disposal of the Brent Spar in the deep 
Atlantic poses negligible threat to the marine environment, and is the best all-round 
solution ... Disposal onshore would have no environmental benefit while safety and 
occupational health risks would be six times greater. This solution has been 
painstakingly analysed by independent experts and approved by the UK 
Government in accordance with all its international obligations. Shell is 
sympathetic to concerns which misleading allegations may have raised amongst 
customers and will reply and explain fully to any customer who contacts us’ (Shell 
UK News Release, June 17, 1995-6.00 pm).
Shell at this stage can be seen to be trying to contain the crisis. It clearly did not want to 
see the same type and scale of protests taking place in the UK as were occurring in 
Germany. The company also appeared willing to communicate directly with its 
customers; a commendable strategy, according to consultants. It was one that was 
designed to be a preventative measure against boycotts.
June 18
1. Greenpeace placed a tender offer in several European newspapers for bids on the 
dismantling of the Spar. Within this advertisement for tender, the financial gains to be 
had for onshore industries in banning the sea disposal method are explicitly stated:
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‘Greenpeace is inviting commercially competitive tenders for on-shore dismantling 
of Brent Spar in order to expose [Shell’s] costs.
Greenpeace believes that once these costs are made public, Shell’s justification for 
off-shore disposal will collapse.
Once the sea-disposal route is closed, installations will be dismantled on land.
Some 400 other off-shore installations will become available for dismantling over 
the next few decades.
The advantages to the on-shore industries of this possibility are obvious.’53
2. Greenpeace cited another study commissioned by Shell (the HeereMac study) as 
evidence that onshore disposal would involve lower costs.
3. Shell rejected this in a press release, claiming that once again the study was taken out 
of context and distorted by Greenpeace.
The Greenpeace strategy of using scientific studies commissioned by Shell and 
reinterpreting such findings is one which Shell came up against throughout this period, 
and this was an effective Greenpeace tactic because it burdened Shell. Every time 
Greenpeace reported such a study, Shell had publicly to explain why the company had 
rejected it. Not only was this time-consuming, but it also complicated the issue because 
of the complex scientific nature of the studies. Shell had to explain the science and its 
decision, whereas Greenpeace questioned it without having to explain it to the extent 
required of Shell.
Both parties had scientific backing for the claims and the claims they both made about 
the environmental risks of the disposal were conducted in and through science. Despite 
Greenpeace’s claim that its campaign was not just about scientific risk analysis, but about 
the principle of sea disposal, scientific arguments were used to ‘disprove’ Shell’s case.
53 Source of Greenpeace’s advertisement: Winter and Schweinsberg (1996: Section B: 13).
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The scientific discourse that Shell and Greenpeace employed, partly because of its 
necessity in demonstrating environmental impact, created problems for Shell. The way in 
which science and scientists arrive at the calculation of risks as a matter of probability, 
within which scientific uncertainty is a condition of the exercise, was a factor that made 
Shell's argument problematic by making it questionable. The (in-built) uncertainty 
allowed Greenpeace to cast doubt on scientific findings that the deep sea disposal method 
was the best environmental option.
Greenpeace’s attack on the scientific basis of the disposal method chosen by Shell, 
through scientific arguments of its own, was an attack on the fundamentals of Shell’s 
case. Moreover, the claims and counterclaims regarding the scientific validity of Shell’s 
plan complicated that plan by creating confusion and distrust about whether it was as 
appropriate as Shell claimed.
The observations of Beck (1992; 2000) and Giddens (1996; 2000) regarding risk 
construction are helpful in understanding the situation Shell encountered, in which its 
arguments were open to criticism despite being scientific. Their analysis of the 
construction of risks centrally considers the use of scientific discourse, which they view 
as being necessitated by the condition that risks are scientifically calculated. They argue 
that the use of a discourse, with its inherent uncertainties, leaves risk construction 
particularly open and malleable. A condition of that, they observe, is that the 
understanding of risks is ultimately dependent on factors other than the scientific 
arguments about them. That observation explains how Greenpeace was able to counteract 
and create problems for Shell’s case (that the sea disposal would not damage the marine
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ecology) despite the company’s appeal to science to justify its action. The wider 
implications of this will be discussed in the following chapter but the immediate effect 
was Shell had difficulty in persuading people of the merits of its case, and consequently 
in managing the crisis.
4. Shell cancelled its planned 25th anniversary celebration of the Shell Better Britain 
Campaign, a corporate social and environmental responsibility initiative. The campaign’s 
principal activity was to support conservation projects carried out by volunteer groups in 
the UK by providing grants, information and advice. In a second press release issued on 
the day, Shell explained the reasons for the cancellation:
‘The decision to postpone was taken by Shell UK, not because of any reluctance by 
our environmental partners to attend, but because an alarmist and inaccurate 
campaign by Greenpeace ... has led to an emotional and confused climate in which, 
for the present, it would not have been appropriate or considerate to the Campaign's 
many partners to be invited to celebrate the very real environmental achievements 
of the Shell Better Britain Campaign over 25 years’ (Shell UK News Release June 
18, 1995-6  p.m.).
The press release went on once again to repeat that the disposal plan was based on 
scientific studies which demonstrated that it was the best environmental option.
5. In a third press release Shell responded to UK opposition politicians’ criticisms. The 
politicians had supported Greenpeace's campaign and called for boycotts of Shell. Shell’s 
growing disbelief and exasperation about the situation is evident in its criticism of this 
new development:
‘It is disappointing that some opposition spokesmen, including Mr Dobson, are not 
prepared to acknowledge and defend the established framework of policy,
155
regulation and standards which is the essential basis for business enterprise, 
investment and employment.
Dr Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell UK, said: “It concerns us that 
some politicians appear to be suggesting that we should not take account of safety 
and occupational health risks in reaching a disposal decision.”
The deepwater disposal plan ... which the Government has authorised, complies 
fully with established international regulatory principles and standards and is the 
most responsible course available to us’ (Shell UK News Release June 18, 1995 - 6 
p.m.).
In Germany, there were new media reports of Shell service station firebombings in the 
German towns of Buxtehude and Brandenburg (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996). UK 
press and television reports also focused on the intensifying character of the situation. In 
the UK, protests and boycotts of Shell were on a smaller scale than elsewhere. Protests 
and boycotts were taking place in continental Europe but were most acute in Germany, 
where protesters threatened to damage 200 Shell service stations. Fifty were subsequently 
damaged, two firebombed and one raked with bullets.
June 19
1. The Brent Spar, which had been on the move towards its disposal site for the preceding 
nine days, was, on this day, approximately 100 km from the chosen site in the Atlantic.
2. John Major defended Shell’s position and announced that the disposal would take 
place according to schedule on the evening of the 22nd.
3. Greenpeace maintained its stance and its activists remained on the Spar. A Greenpeace 
spokesman asserted that Tf Shell wants to sink the platform with two Greenpeace 
members on board, they can do it. We will not leave the platform.’ The impression this
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conveyed was damaging to Shell because it suggested that the environmental risks of 
Shell’s planned operation were as damaging as Greenpeace claimed - worth dying for. 
Also, a negative image of the corporation may have been conveyed as it proceeded with 
the operation despite the presence of activists willing to sacrifice themselves.
Shell UK referred to the Greenpeace strategy as highly irresponsible and initiated 
confidential plans with the UK government to remove the Greenpeace members from the 
Spar. Neither party backed down.
June 20
1. Two more Greenpeace activists were lowered by helicopter on to the Spar.
2. Shell again used water cannon to repel Greenpeace’s protest efforts.
3. Greenpeace stated that the Spar contained 4500 litres of Glyoxal, a highly toxic 
chemical substance, which legally had to be disposed of on land. Greenpeace called for 
an immediate halt.
4. Shell UK, with the help of the UK government, had arranged for two chartered 
helicopters at a naval base on the Isle of Lewis to carry an anti-terrorist unit from the 
Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service. Their assignment was forcibly to remove the 
activists on the Spar. An RAF plane circled the area and sent reconnaissance reports back 
to the air base. The unit of twelve men were on standby to storm the Spar. (This plan was 
not public knowledge at this time, but immediately after Shell gave up its planned 
disposal UK press disclosed it.)
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5. The Royal Dutch/Shell meeting of the Committee of Managing Directors (CMD) took 
place in the Hague. They discussed possible strategies for dealing with the situation they 
faced. As I have said, whilst Shell had publicly expressed that it would proceed with the 
original plan, internally there was much dissent as to whether this was the best method, 
given the amount of protest encountered. The CMD meeting on this date decided the 
matter. Upon its completion, Chris Fay returned to the UK and proceeded directly to see 
the Energy Minister, Tim Eggar, at the Department of Trade and Industry, to inform the 
British Government that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group had formally decided to terminate 
its scheduled plan for deep sea disposal of the Brent Spar.
While the CMD meeting was taking place in the Hague, the British PM, John Major, who 
had been assured by Shell that it would proceed with its plan, defended the disposal in the 
House of Commons. Shell’s new decision thus caused much embarrassment to the UK 
government, who had believed all along that Shell remained firmly committed to the sea 
disposal plan.
A Shell press release issued on the day explained the reasons for the decision to abort the 
original plan and outlined the future actions that needed to be taken. Chris Fay also 
publicised the views stated in the press release at a press conference and in television 
interviews throughout the day. The press release explained:
‘Shell UK Limited still believes that deep water disposal of the Brent Spar is the 
best practicable environmental option, which was supported by independent 
studies. Shell UK ... [and]... the UK authorities ... have handled every aspect of 
the approval process in accordance with established national and international 
policies and standards. As the disposal involved the Atlantic deep water, other 
governments have taken an interest and voiced strong objections. Notwithstanding 
the efforts to convince these governments of the validity of the approach, most of
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them remain strongly against deep water disposal. The European companies of the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group find themselves in an untenable position and feel that it is 
not possible to continue without wider support from the governments participating 
in the Oslo-Paris Convention. Shell UK has decided to abandon deepwater disposal 
and ... [to consider] again the options for disposal. The Spar is still under tow ... 
and is now moving slowly towards Norwegian territorial waters [where it will be 
anchored]... The next stage in the process will involve conducting further studies 
... and will take many months. Any decision ... will depend on the outcome of 
these studies, further consultation with the UK government and extensive 
discussions with other external bodies. The resulting disposal plan will then have to 
be licensed by the UK government’ (Shell UK News Release, June 20,1995).
Shell’s new terminology for describing its plan as one that was now ‘untenable’ is an 
interesting one. As can be seen from the above statements, Shell still firmly believed that 
the sea disposal method was the right, and environmentally sound course. Thus they still 
found it defensible, despite no longer feeling that it could be retained because of external 
circumstances. It is perhaps this central dilemma that has made this case of great interest 
to many people. How can companies proceed when confronted with situations such as 
this? What factors contributed to what was a careful scientific plan being made 
questionable and finally untenable? The consultants claim they have the answers. The 
following chapter will consider their solutions.
Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates that events grew into a crisis and that problematic issues arose, 
gained momentum and became severe.
My study shows that, although Shell had made considerable efforts to safeguard the 
smooth operation of their planned action, had ensured that it was agreeable to potential 
critics and had gained the acceptance of what the company believed to have been its key
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publics, the company still faced a situation where its planned action became controversial 
and ignited criticism of the company.
Greenpeace contributed considerably to creating this crisis for Shell; it was after their 
campaign that the company met with opposition. Greenpeace’s version of the planned sea 
disposal created problems for Shell by not just questioning Shell’s intentions and 
methods but also by gaining support for their interpretation. The opposition to Shell 
indicated that Greenpeace was more successful than Shell at communicating their case.
Shell was faced with challenging and unexpected circumstances. My examination reveals 
many of the conditions that consultants identify as characteristics of crisis situations: an 
escalating situation, a loss of control and unexpected developments. However, it also 
indicates that problems were not set from the beginning; they surfaced. I believe the 
emergent nature of events is, as revealed by this case, one of the most defining aspects of 
crises.
Shell had not anticipated opposition from certain groups, or that its key publics would 
change from those the company had consulted (whose approval was necessary and 
obtained) to Greenpeace and critical publics in Europe (particularly Germany), all of 
whom disapproved. There was an emergence of publics who were previously 
insignificant to the disposal but subsequently became very significant. Opposition too 
emerged, as can be witnessed in the dissension of European governments who had 
previously accepted the company’s position. These were new circumstances and they 
raised a whole new set of problems for Shell. It is not clear how the company could have
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forecast these developments, suggesting that it is the very unforeseen and emergent 
nature of crises that make them difficult to control.
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Chapter 3 MEDIA COVERAGE AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSULTANTS’ 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE
This chapter considers the consultants’ criticisms of how Shell handled the crisis and, in 
doing so, assesses their proposals for efficient crisis management.54
A large part of this chapter looks at how press and television covered the Brent Spar story 
and, given the centrality of media representations to crisis management, this analysis is 
important and allows a consideration of the consultants’ thinking. Further, this 
examination shows that the consultants’ account of news coverage of the crisis was, in 
part, a construction manufactured by them to support their own interpretation of this 
crisis and their own work.
The adequacy of fit between the consultants’ claims and the situation under study will 
also be appraised in this chapter. The assessment of those arguments in the light of the 
Brent Spar crisis, which they also cite, allows examination of this expert knowledge 
system - crisis management.
Press and television coverage of the Brent Spar story
The differing claims of media bias that Shell, Greenpeace and consultants make are 
described and assessed below. The analysis is informed by what media studies observe 
about bias and by the literature on the construction of news. An outline of the objectives 
and methods of this study of media coverage, which pertain to all the phases of the crisis
54 The next chapter also adds to that subject.
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under consideration, will also be presented here. This chapter, however, only deals with 
how the media covered the period already discussed, while chapter four looks at the 
aftermath of the crisis.
Claims made about media coverage
These claims relate to all phases of the crisis.
Shell’s claims55
While the company initially maintained that there was a clear media bias favouring the 
views of Greenpeace, Shell presented a more sophisticated case after the immediate crisis 
was over.56 At first Shell argued:
‘This is the problem: there is a lot of misinformation. Am I supposed to react every 
day to misinformation the media takes in and spend all my time arguing against that 
misinformation when the media does not want to take in the whole story?’ (Chris 
Fay, Chairman of Shell UK, Newsnight, BBC2: June 20, 1995)
Shell later argued that it was not the case that the media had completely failed to cover 
the company’s views but that the extensive use of Greenpeace footage by television news 
overrode the accurate portrayal of the situation in both television and press coverage. 
Therefore, Shell credited the use of Greenpeace’s footage by the media as giving rise to a 
bias against the company’s case.
The company made much of Greenpeace’s production of video footage:
55 These assertions have been gathered from what has been publicly said in publications and speeches by 
the company’s directors, as well as in interviews I conducted with John Wybrew.
56 As I argue subsequently, this was a condition of the company’s crisis management after the crisis.
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‘Greenpeace have revealed that during their campaign they spent almost £350,000 
on recording and transmitting television pictures alone - over a quarter of the £1.4 
million total budget. On the Spar the activists installed a complete video-editing 
suite as used in television studios. Backed by a media base in Frankfurt, the 
Greenpeace communications machine used satellite transmission and sophisticated 
advanced computer and telecom techniques [to] transmit pictures ... .’57
Why was it that this footage was so damaging? John Wybrew, Director of Public Affairs 
at Shell UK, said:
‘Our task was to explain the reasons. The problem was that the arguments in favour 
of deep sea disposal were more complex and rational; it was difficult to stand up to 
Greenpeace’s graphic pictures and their images, such as the David and Goliath 
imagery. The German media were hysterically opposed to [Shell]. The UK media 
was better balanced but there still was an emotional leaning towards Greenpeace 
and its case based on pictures’ (in interview: November 18, 1999).
Basically, Shell’s argument was that the footage (that Greenpeace provided and television 
studios used) prevented accurate media portrayal of the dispute by symbolising it.
As the next chapter shows, by advancing a specific rendition of what had taken place, 
Shell sought to curtail damage to its reputation. An argument that contributed to that 
objective was what Shell said about the media coverage: it might have created a more 
volatile situation than needed to be the case.
In addition to offering a specific account of how the media were biased, Shell also argued 
that its view that television coverage was biased was justified by the television 
executives’ own admission that this was the case. Two months after the crisis, at the 1995 
National Television Festival at Edinburgh, television executives said that they should not
57 Brent Spar, a magazine published by Shell, 1995: 8.
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have used Greenpeace footage because this had compromised their objectivity.58 It is 
interesting that the case Shell subsequently made about media bias rests on this 
admission.59
A year after the crisis, on May 20, 1996, at a conference on the media at Cardiff 
University, Chris Fay, Chairman of Shell UK, advanced a further explanation for the 
media bias. He declared that the media’s ‘search for simple truths may obscure the 
uncertainty of reality’.60 He went on to argue that there was a need to create a better way 
of reporting the complexity of environmental issues which ‘were not always achieved by 
the media in reporting on the Brent Spar’. He also maintained that Greenpeace intended 
to influence and were effective in influencing media coverage because its arguments were 
simple, whereas Shell’s were complex.
The situation here is very similar to an observation Tumber (1995) made when he wrote 
that, paradoxically, the accusations of corporations - that the media overplay conflict, and 
oversimplify issues, and do not give enough information to the public - are similar to the 
ones levelled by the more liberal and radical critics of the media. But it was also the case 
that the argument Shell made about inaccurate media coverage was conducive to the 
reinvention of the crisis in terms favourable to the company.
In Shell’s view, media coverage had greatly contributed to the crisis:
58 See pages 273-274.
59 The following chapter will address this issue.
60 His argument is examined in the following chapter.
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‘From April 30, when Greenpeace activists and a group of mostly European 
journalists illegally boarded the Spar in a Greenpeace International operation, the 
pressure group waged an expensive, all-out publicity campaign. They used 
powerful modem global communications technology to speed images and messages 
- many of them inaccurate and exaggerated - around the world’. 61
The company claims that there was a media bias against its case. We shall see whether 
this was so.
Greenpeace’s claims^1
Greenpeace’s view of media coverage is different from that of Shell. Greenpeace does 
not say much about how the media covered the immediate crisis but focus on how the 
media covered the aftermath.63
When it won the campaign against the decision of Shell and the UK government, 
Greenpeace argues, there was a government backlash against Greenpeace that was 
reflected and conducted through the media. Rose maintains that, immediately after the 
planned sea disposal was terminated, Greenpeace was unfairly criticised for the way in 
which the organisation had conducted the campaign. He also claims that the UK 
government engineered this:
‘After the Spar turnaround it was rumoured that ministers rang around television 
bosses and gave them a roasting for “their part” in the Greenpeace campaign. One 
well informed source (who like others will not be named) says that both senior 
executives of the BBC and TIN (including Channel 4) were called up by ministers 
and tackled over the use of Greenpeace footage ... Whatever actually happened, the
61 Brent Spar, a Shell UK publication, 1995:8.
62 This was gathered from the Greenpeace publication on the Brent Spar campaign written by Chris Rose 
(1998), Greenpeace UK Campaigns Director, which addresses media coverage at length.
63 That focus might have been necessitated by Shell’s crisis management efforts, which criticised 
Greenpeace's methods.
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BBC in particular certainly behaved as if it had something to atone for and a major 
debate erupted within television over the use of Video News Releases’ (1998: 155- 
6).
Attacks from the government came at a difficult time for television as it dealt with 
decreased budgets and technological advances, Rose argues. In so claiming, he gives an 
account of how the governmental criticism might have impelled media criticism of 
Greenpeace. The government criticism meant that television executives not only had to 
admit publicly to using Greenpeace’s footage but also had to argue that they had been 
‘co-opted into misleading the public and governments’ (1998:156), Rose contends. 
Greenpeace, therefore, explains how television executives had come to make the 
statement that their coverage had been biased. The coverage was not in fact biased, Rose 
claims, but the (forced) admissions that it was, intended to damage Greenpeace and its 
past campaign.
Rose contests the television executives’ statement by arguing that it is no simple matter to 
ascertain whether the use of Greenpeace footage resulted in a biased or deceptive 
coverage, and that this argument was inherently flawed:
‘This [allegation that television had used Greenpeace footage] was of course partly 
true, and if you assumed that there had been deception, then it appeared to be 
evidence for, or proof of that’ (1998:156).
Greenpeace further declares that the organisation’s well-intentioned admission of a 
mistake in calculating the amount of oil and its apology for having made this error was 
widely interpreted in the media as amounting to an apology for the whole campaign - a 
view Rose vehemently disputes. The case Greenpeace puts forward is that the 
government and the media used its admission of a mistake, along with the television
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executives’ declaration, to promote the view that the organisation’s methods were 
always, and fundamentally, deceitful:
‘In August [television executives claimed they had been manipulated by 
Greenpeace] and September [Greenpeace apologised for its inaccurate oil estimate] 
as most of Greenpeace’s exhausted campaigners were on holiday or engaged in the 
struggle with the French military over nuclear testing in the Pacific, events 
conspired to create the perfect opportunity for the organization’s critics to bash 
Greenpeace over the Spar campaign’ (Rose 1998:142).
Greenpeace also claims to have suffered a loss of credibility with the media, which was a 
direct consequence of the Brent Spar campaign:
‘ . some people in the media now [after the Brent Spar campaign] see it as their 
role to attack everything that is said in favour of an environmental campaign; where 
possible to ignore protests or actions on the grounds that they are “for publicity”; 
and to compensate for past gullibility by simple prejudice against Greenpeace 
(Rose 1998: 164).
Despite winning the Brent Spar campaign, Rose argues, Greenpeace subsequently faced 
criticism and damage to its reputation, and ‘the ramifications of the debacle over the BBC 
and n W s  coverage have lasted to this day’ (1998:162).
Consultants * claims
The media played a major part in the crisis for Shell, consultants maintain. They argue 
that the media did not convey Shell’s case and suggest two explanations for that.
The first is that the media are biased:
‘It is inevitable that because of our increasing scepticism and lack of trust in big 
things, i.e. corporations and institutions, sections of the media may be biased in 
favour of campaign groups ... There is ... a tendency by the media to call for and
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critically scrutinize a company’s arguments and supporting data to a much greater 
degree than that of a pressure group’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 72-3).
This claim by consultants unintentionally raises a question about their advice: what can 
companies do in the face of media ‘bias’ which prevents and excludes their perspectives? 
This problem is also compounded because consultants do not suggest what companies 
can do given this ‘bias’, beyond stating that it is imperative that companies communicate 
in a format favoured by the media.
Opinion research supports the claim that some groups are more trusted than others, and a 
survey conducted by MORI, Survey On The Views Of Oil And Energy Journalists (1998), 
demonstrates that at the time of the crisis Shell was perceived by these journalists to be a 
closed and often difficult organisation from which to obtain information.64 Although 
consultants cite diminished trust in Shell and a greater trust in Greenpeace as reasons for 
why the latter’s case was successful, it will be seen later in this chapter whether the 
media failed to convey Shell’s case as consultants allege.
The consultants’ second explanation for what they see as the failure of Shell’s 
communications was that Greenpeace knew how to gain media attention and for this 
reason gained media coverage; Greenpeace’s communications appealed to the media. 
They claim that the format of Greenpeace’s campaign prevented Shell from presenting its
64 This survey was based on 40 interviews with journalists and editors. The following were the 
participants. From the national/weekly press: Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Guardian, Observer, 
London Evening Standard and the Sunday Telegraph. From broadcasting: two sources who requested 
anonymity and the NorthSound radio. Several interviews were also conducted with specialist press e.g., 
Petroleum Review, International Oil and Gas Journal, and with periodicals and the wire service e.g., 
Reuters, Bloomsberg LP. In addition, seven freelance journalists were also included.
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case to the media, who were more interested in the performance put on by Greenpeace 
and in covering the sensational allegations made by that organisation:
‘Shell seemed unable to counteract the powerful visual icons offered by a very 
media aware single issue pressure group’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 72);
‘...the concept of a “David and Goliath” combat provides mouthwatering potential 
for sensational editorial’ (ibid.).
In contrast to Greenpeace, Shell communicated in a format that did not particularly 
interest the media:
‘Shell had difficulty explaining detailed scientific analysis succinctly, meaningfully 
and swiftly. By the time that some allegations were refuted more were made. In 
contrast, Greenpeace recognised the power of such symbolic visual images and it 
was the images of Greenpeace members aboard the Brent Spar being attacked by 
plumes of water fired from nearby vessels, which made instant news and more 
interesting broadcast viewing than scientific experts “dryly” assessing the merits of 
the proposed decommissioning plan [Shell’s chosen format for communicating its 
views]’ (Regester and Larkin 1997:71).
What the consultants and Shell suggest, in a sense, is similar to media studies’ 
observation of how sources influence news by appealing to news values. In a study of 
news access, Cottle (1999) argues that the way in which groups such as Greenpeace 
appeal to the media construction of news stories may allow them to frame news. Cottle’s 
classification of the nature of published/broadcast voices in news as along two 
dimensions: private (addressing an individual’s own circumstances, familial world and 
relationships)/public (addressing the world of public affairs and collective concerns), and 
experiential (emotionally charged or based on experience)/analytic (advancing a 
rationally engaged form of argument or perspective), calls attention to the fact that:
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environmental pressure groups also appear to deploy “experiential/public”, as 
well as “analytic/public”, forms of address when accessed by the news media’ 
(Cottle 1999: 38).
He concludes:
‘Perhaps this tells us something about the green agenda and its deliberate framing 
within, and appeal to a more personalised, localised and “human scale” of political 
action (from Schumacher’s earlier “small is beautiful” to Greenpeace’s more 
recent, “think global, act local”). In other words, the evolving green agenda may 
well benefit from an “elective affinity” with the news media’s own evolving and 
professionally inscribed epistemological appeals’ (1999: 38).
By engaging processes in the media construction of news stories, sources can exert an 
influence. Consultants suggest that this is what Greenpeace succeeded in doing, whereas 
Shell did not do so.
According to the consultants, Greenpeace’s views gained representation and favourable 
coverage whereas Shell’s did not; there was an unambiguous media bias. Yet, was it the 
case that the media, who were entirely one-sided towards the views of Greenpeace, did 
not cover Shell’s side of the story? Is Regester and Larkin’s argument (and that of other 
consultants) that Shell’s case was not represented by the media and was overridden by 
Greenpeace’s case accurate?
On the claims of media bias
It is difficult to believe in the idea of a monolithic media response, which makes one 
wary of the charge of media bias variously made by Shell, Greenpeace and consultants. 
As described later in the chapter, the media are varied and structured according to 
different imperatives, governing principles and political leanings. That circumstance, if
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nothing else, makes uniform coverage doubtful. Also, the charges of ‘media bias’ might 
be motivated as that claim expedites and assists the advancement of other claims made by 
the three parties. For both Shell and Greenpeace, the claim that media accounts were 
biased can allow those accounts to be dismissed and in that way deal with unfavourable 
reporting. By alluding to media bias consultants can further their own account of what is 
now necessary in contemporary society.
Charges of media bias are quite serious matters for media practitioners who are keen to 
prove their objectivity and the factuality of their news reporting to their audiences. 
Objectivity is a canon of journalism and is the key professional ethic. However, whether 
objectivity can be practically achieved is a notion the sociology of the media has 
challenged (McNair 1999).
Gaye Tuchman (1972) suggests that the media are dependent on establishing objectivity 
in order to pursue their professional goals, and she observes that journalists routinely 
employ a particular format - the representation of opposing views - to suggest that 
coverage is impartial and objective.65 Tuchman calls this process a ‘strategic ritual’
(1972: 661) used to achieve a self-serving goal for journalism as that profession seeks to 
establish credibility. Schiller (1981) notes that journalists habitually utilise that format to 
escape ‘charges of bias or distortion, or other criticisms’ (1981:3). Therefore, even if 
news reports are partial to a particular view, efforts are made to suggest objective 
coverage because objectivity is necessary to create authority and legitimacy in the view 
of the audience.
651 later elaborate on Tuchman’s outline of the conventions journalists use to suggest objectivity.
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The notion of objectivity is quite a recent phenomenon, Schudson (1978) argues, because 
journalism was openly partisan in the nineteenth century. The origin of ‘objectivity’ is 
imprecise, but it emerged as a professional standard in journalism. Schiller (1981) argues 
that by the end of the nineteenth century, propelled by the (positivistic) belief in an 
objective ‘knowable’ universe, journalists assumed the existence of a world ‘out there’ 
which could be accurately appropriated and made known through journalism. Journalism 
assumed that the objective world could be objectively reported. That idea was 
subsequently challenged as positivist ideas declined. Furthermore, Schudson (1978) 
reasons that certain developments in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the emergence of 
fascist dictatorships, propaganda and the new industry of public relations, also cast doubt 
on the idea of objective accounts. The notion that neutrality was attainable became 
questionable. These developments meant that objectivity as an attainable journalistic 
condition became replaced with the idea that objectivity was a journalistic ideal 
(Schudson 1978).
The criticisms of objectivity broadly fall into two categories (McNair 1999). The first 
claims that there is a possibility of objective journalism but that this is not being realised 
as journalism is consistently biased. This claim adheres to the view that journalism 
deliberately shapes content and presentation of the news so that certain interests and 
ideologies are advanced, and is therefore biased.
The second critique of objectivity is that there can be no objectivity. Objectivity cannot 
exist. It is impossible to be objective as there is a plurality of viewpoints and more than 
one account may be valid. According to this perspective, journalism is not, nor will ever
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be, a neutral, value-free representation of reality. This view is central to the sociology of 
the media, which views news and journalism as social constructions:
‘... news is never a mere recording or reporting of the world “out there”, but a 
synthetic, value laden account which carries within it the dominant assumptions of 
the ideas of the society within which it is produced’ (McNair 1999: 37).
News values are seen as varying across cultures and also across media. News reporting 
will be influenced by and will thus vary according to the news values held.
Unlike the first critique of objectivity - which sees objectivity as attainable - the above 
perspective that objectivity is impossible sees ‘bias’ as taking place in a different way:
‘... journalism, regardless of the integrity of individual journalists and editors, is 
always a selective, partial account of a reality which can never be known in its 
entirety by anyone’ (McNair 1999: 38).
However, as McNair also states, despite the above view, the assumption of objectivity 
remains powerful and prevalent among journalists. While it is acknowledged that 
attaining objectivity might be difficult, even impossible, it is still upheld as an ideal.
Given all this, it is difficult to sustain the notion of a media bias as proposed by the three 
main parties whose claims of media bias are being investigated here. Media bias, in the 
sense that particular interests are being actively and deliberately advanced, is 
problematic. What might have happened instead is that certain newspapers/television 
news could have reported the situation with Brent Spar according to their individual 
outlooks, values, organisational structure and culture. We shall see whether this occurred.
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In analysing the claims of bias, I shall talk about ‘framing’ narratives and how accounts 
lean towards this or that position because, for reasons explained below, that approach 
could lead to a better understanding of how the media covered the story of Brent Spar.
On the making of news
This analysis of the media coverage will be informed by the literature on news-making, 
and so a brief consideration of this is presented here.66
Studies of the making of news differ in their description of the factors influencing news 
content; some emphasise the constraints on the news-making process while some point to 
other factors, such as the economic and the political. It is possible to take them all as 
adding to the understanding of the processes involved in the construction of news.
Those who own newspapers and broadcasting services, Milliband (1972) proposes, 
influence the journalism produced in such a manner as to serve their interests. He 
believes that not only do proprietors exert an influence on news content, but also that they 
attempt to ensure that their values and ideas are routinely reproduced and, in so doing, 
safeguard their prosperity and survival. Thus, a dominant class ensures that their ideology 
is diffused and pervasive in society (through what is said, written and shown by the 
media) and thus ensures its, and hence also their, dominance. Hartley (1982) also views 
economic and political factors as exercising an influence on news content. He argues that 
news poses as impartial, and must be seen as such, because it is through this condition
The account I give below derives much from McNair (1999).
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that the dominant ideology is produced. For Hartley, news acts, alongside other agencies, 
in making the dominant ideology appear natural and creating consent for hegemony.
The views listed above are exemplars of a perspective that draws on the outlooks of Marx 
and Engels. For Hartley and for Milliband the economic base (ownership and competition 
for advertising revenue) determines the form of the cultural and ideological 
superstructure of which journalism is a part (McNair 1999). Evidence exists to suggest 
that ownership and control of the news media are concentrated in the hands of a few 
corporations and individuals: ‘four corporations control about 90% of the British press; a 
handful control the commercial broadcasting organisations’ (McNair 1999: 52). And 
there is also evidence to indicate that some owners seek to influence news content in a 
way favourable to them. Therefore, it is indisputable that the owners of the media have 
power, yet it is uncertain whether they always exercise that power.
A different account of the factors influential on news making, which is in some 
opposition to the above account, argues that accenting the political and economic side of 
news production says less about the output than if one were to look at the routine 
constraints on the news production process. From this perspective, the constraints of time 
and space influence what journalists produce (Rock 1973). Other examples of 
‘constraints’ are audience expectations, demands of deadlines, resources etc. According 
to this outlook, an examination of the different constraints on the various medium 
comprising ‘the media’, and on individual news outlets, would explain the news content. 
Hence, the organisational structure influences news making.
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Many scholars also argue that, in order to understand media content, one must look at the 
format and how the format structures content (Ericson 1987; Snow and Altheide 1991). 
They propose that content is secondary to format and that differences in format produce 
variations in content (Snow 1995). McLuhan (1964) argues that technological differences 
among the media influence the way in which a message would be interpreted, expressed 
in his famous adage ‘the medium is the message’. Snow (1995) contests that view, 
arguing that content variations from one medium to the next are not the result of the 
technological character of the medium but of format or how technology is used to present 
content. Thus, he proposes that ‘the format is the message’ (1995: 83). The argument is 
that each medium utilises a particular format which leads to differences in how 
knowledge is collected and transmitted, which in turn has consequences for the 
knowledge structure of society (Ericson 1995).
In addition to the organisational structure, this perspective also sees the professional 
culture of journalism as exercising an influence on news. As discussed above, journalists 
must be seen as being objective and in order to achieve this there are a number of 
conventions that are used in constructing news stories. Tuchman’s (1972) account of the 
routines involved in news construction is useful. It can be outlined as follows:
■ Journalists must present both sides, or all sides (that are seen as credible), to the 
story;
■ they must present supporting evidence;
■ sources that are (once again, seen as) authoritative and credible must be quoted;
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■ opinions must be presented as someone else’s and (in broadcasting) the 
newsreader will not give opinions directly as that would break with the 
conventions of objectivity;
■ ‘facts’ are separated from ‘opinion’ and ‘news’ from ‘editorial comment’.
As noted by Tuchman’s description of journalistic conventions serving a ‘strategic ritual’, 
they are observed for the purposes of signifying to the audience that objectivity is being 
upheld and, therefore, the news report can be trusted.
That journalists are influenced by their culture and environment is something McNair 
(1999) sees as to be expected. But a key benefit in seeing the influence of organisational 
structure and professional culture on news is in explaining the existence of set formats in 
how news is presented by newspapers and television (this was evident in my data and is 
discussed later), and how that may influence understandings. Furthermore, as Rock 
(1973) suggests, the rituals involved in the creation of news stories explain why news is 
characteristically event driven and less about processes.
However, this account of how news is created was criticised for presenting an overly 
deterministic account of news construction, where constraints and overriding culture 
decide news content.
A further perspective, termed ‘culturalist’ (McNair 1999; Curran 1989), emerged, 
attempting to synthesise and develop the observations of both the above standpoints. This 
position views ‘news’ as a product of the interaction between news organisations and 
their (competing) sources, and other social institutions. Hence, news is not just a product 
of economic and political factors or professional practices and customs.
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Hall et al (1978) draw attention to how sources may influence news content. They 
suggest that the powerful exert a greater degree of influence over the shaping of news as 
a result of a preference given to them by the media as a source of information. Thus, the 
powerful have better access to the media, which in turn sustains their power. The 
powerful were thus conceived as ‘primary definers’ and the media as ‘secondary 
definers’, a result of their circulation of those definitions.
Later models of news-making, drawing on but also criticising the work of Hall et al, 
emphasise the role of sources and their definitional (social) power. Schlesinger (1991) 
argues against Hall et al’s conception of a structural ‘bias’ towards the powerful, arguing 
that the notion of primary definition, as they developed it, was too close to the idea of a 
dominant ideology. He contests the idea of primary definition on the basis that there is 
often no single definition of an issue or an event’s meaning. Schlesinger (1991) also 
suggests that the structure of access to the media (the route by which primary definitions 
come forth) is not fixed and varies. Different social actors compete, negotiate and contest 
to encourage the reproduction of their outlook by the media, Schlesinger (1991) 
maintains. According to him, there is a struggle for access and primary definition is the 
result of a complex process.
The value of this approach is in the proposition that various attempts, from a variety of 
sources, with the possibility of varying degrees of success, endeavour to influence media 
representations. Further, this viewpoint also emphasises the active role played by the 
media in the news construction process, as journalists are seen as holding certain values 
and making certain assumptions. Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) argue that news is a
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product of communicative relations between journalists and their sources, and that the 
interests of both parties appear in the news. In stating these conditions, this approach to 
the study of the making of news emphasises the complexity and dynamism involved in 
that process. Although Schlesinger and others who hold this perspective concede that 
access to the media is inequitable, they avoid being overly deterministic by emphasising 
competition between sources and their competing ideological positions. McNair (1999) 
observes that their account also explains why hegemonic worldviews break down and are 
transformed.
Moreover, this approach is particularly valuable within the context of this study, as it 
accounts for the existence of activities such as public relations and crisis management 
that seek to mould news. It gives attention to ‘the various categories of source 
professional now active in the public arena - public relations professionals of various 
types, who are paid to shape the news agenda and to persuade journalists that certain 
definitions of events (certain ‘spin’ on things) are preferable to others’ (McNair 1999:
64). Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock identify investment in media and public relations 
by a given actor as being ‘extremely important’ (1995: 99) in determining source 
advantage. They also add that there has been a developing process of news source 
sophistication.
My approach to the study of how the story of the disposal of Brent Spar was reported is 
informed by the above discussion of the literature on news reporting and also by my 
description of the academic observations on the making of news (covered in chapter one). 
The position employed in this study is to assume that ‘the media’ are not simply
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interchangeable social actors but corporations with strong political and narrative cultures 
and traditions. And, following Schlesinger (1991), it will be assumed that the way in 
which the different newspapers and television reports reported the crisis was the result of 
a complex process wherein different claim-makers sought to shape news content in a way 
that furthered their own objectives. It will also be assumed that claim-makers and their 
claims can achieve legitimacy and credibility through media coverage, or coverage might 
undermine them (Allan et al. 2000). Holding to that notion accounts for how media 
coverage of the crisis might have affected or influenced the crisis.
In order to investigate whether the media reports favoured a particular interpretation of 
the story, Tuchman’s (1972) observation of framing will be heeded and the types of 
frames employed and the prominence of different frames in the various news reports will 
be analysed. How claims and claim-makers were framed will be examined. Whether the 
media themselves engaged in definitional work will also be explored. Finding that they 
did, how that took place will be described. Also, an analysis of how claims were 
inflected, elaborated and interpreted by the newspaper and television reports will identify 
what kind of ideological work the different media engaged in.
As we have seen in the case of the Brent Spar, there were contending groups/claim- 
makers who attempted to win support for their views by offering their own ‘frames’. As 
described, it will be held that the news media also took part in this process by accepting 
or rejecting the frames offered or by offering their own interpretations of the story. It will 
be assumed that this has consequences for the arguments of the claim-makers. The 
analysis of the news reports according to their coverage of the claims made and frames
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employed facilitate an understanding of how the media represented the crisis over the 
Brent Spar.67
Objectives and methods of analysing media coverage of the crisis and its aftermath
This analysis of media coverage is, for reasons of economy and practicality, restricted to 
UK press and television coverage of the news story of the Brent Spar in the year 1995.
Press coverage is examined through a selection of three newspapers: the Daily Mirror, 
the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. Television coverage is analysed through an 
examination of BBC, TTV and Channel 4 news programmes that covered the story of the 
Brent Spar.
The examination is separated into two distinct periods, i.e. the immediate crisis and its 
aftermath (see chapter four), because my objective is to test various factors that require 
an examination of both time periods.
The objectives of investigating press and television coverage of the immediate crisis 
period68 are to consider the consultants’ claim that there was a media bias towards 
Greenpeace’s perspective, and to test their argument that Greenpeace’s case gained 
representation and favourable coverage whereas Shell’s case did not. That examination
67 In his study of claims-making in the Brent Spar controversy, Anders Hansen (2000) examined British 
newspaper coverage of the immediate crisis using much the same approach as I did. Unlike his study, 
however, mine deals with a longer period of time and with television as well as newspaper coverage.
68 That is from the beginning of press and television attention to the Brent Spar disposal until Shell’s 
decision to relinquish the disputed plan.
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also addresses Shell’s claims about media coverage as there is much overlap between 
what Shell and consultants have said about this matter.
Media coverage after Shell changed its course is also examined (in chapter four) because 
my argument is that Shell later managed the crisis by promoting an advantageous account 
of the crisis situation it had faced. The main objective of that analysis is to discover 
whether the types of arguments that Shell subsequently made - its crisis management - 
were being represented in the press and television and whether these received favourable 
coverage.
Content analysis was chosen as the method of this study of media coverage because it 
was the most suited for the practical task of assessing and summarising the messages of 
television and press news content. The analysis of the texts of both press and television 
news is guided by the news framing approach.69 Some, such as Neuendorf (2002), would 
argue that this study is better described as a text analysis rather than a content analysis 
because it is an exclusive study of limited concerns. The term ‘content analysis’ is used 
loosely, as attention is clearly not given to every possible ‘content’ but to specific areas, 
as explained below. The type of content analysis conducted here is also descriptive 
because my aim is to comment on and add to the already existing findings/claims of 
consultants.
Using the news framing approach used by Miller et al (1998) and Hansen (2000), the 
news reports were investigated in relation to certain constructed categories (described
691 use ‘text’ to refer to both words and images, which were examined in the case of television news. Press 
coverage only examined the words as pictures are not included in the Lexis-Nexis database.
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below) that relate to how the press and television framed the story of Brent Spar. In 
examining the claims of media bias the concept and methodological tool of frame 
analysis is useful for the reasons already stated. The decision to analyse the frames 
employed in television and press reporting of the crisis was also a response to the fact 
that there is a notable difference in whether a case gains representation and whether it 
gains favourable representation.
The coding scheme used for both press and television coverage was: (a) how the news 
reports framed Shell and Greenpeace; (b) the risks of and scientific opinion of Shell’s 
plan; and (c) the protests against that plan. These categories of frames were developed 
before observation and selected because these areas were conceived as the main themes 
of the story as well as the key issues that can reveal media representation of the situation 
and the parties involved.
Although the formats of the presentation of press and television coverage (in both 
periods) differ, the analytical approach to examining television and press news reports 
according to how main parties and issues were framed is the same.
The contexts of the newspapers and television news
A consideration of the contexts is helpful in understanding the content of news, and here 
some background information is provided about the different media (press and television) 
and the different newspapers and television news on which my study focuses.
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The three newspapers inspected are two broadsheets and a tabloid (Guardian, Daily 
Telegraph and Daily Mirror) each of which have their individual traditions, readerships 
and political leanings. For practical reasons, these three were chosen as representative of 
the traditional styles and formats of the British national press.
Stephen Koss (1973), a historian of the British press, argues that the press have always 
been partisan. However, he maintains that the post-war period brought greater press 
independence from political parties and government. Koss sees newspapers as having 
become less partisan because of changes in ownership. The new proprietors were 
motivated not by politics but by commercial incentives, Koss argues. Consequently, their 
publications were guided by purely financial concerns.
Others disagree with this view. McNair (1999) argues that the British press have always 
been, and have always been expected to be, partisan. Changes in ownership, he claims, 
did not have any effect on this. Curran and Seaton (1991) contest the view that 
proprietors are only interested in profit-making and argue that some proprietors are active 
interventionists in news coverage, seeking not only to improve their economic standing 
but also to toe certain political and ideological lines. Proprietors, they claim, were not 
simply market-led pragmatists but also partisan and interventionist. They argue that Koss 
and other media historians overstate the extent to which political partisanship declined 
during the post-war period. National newspapers became markedly more partisan from 
1974 onwards, Curran and Seaton observe, arguing that newspapers consistently 
supported certain political parties and views.
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Editors and journalists would defend the maintenance of particular viewpoints on the 
basis that they have a duty to appeal to and reflect the views of their readers. Dependency 
on securing a distinct readership sustains that practice. Therefore, newspapers have their 
own traditions, established political leanings and market differences (these, within the 
three papers examined, are demarcated below). This is acknowledged and is the norm.
Founded in 1903, the Daily Mirror became radically left leaning during World War II. 
Churchill even called for its ban in a cabinet meeting, but instead achieved the opposite 
effect when that call provoked a press rally to defend the paper (Curran and Seaton 
1991). However, Curran and Seaton argue that one of the immediate consequences of 
Churchill’s attack on the paper was that it became less radical. This stance was to 
continue, but for a different reason. The paper took this position, Curran and Seaton 
observe, as a response to a decline of radicalism in the wider society and as its readership 
became more socially and politically heterogeneous. Therefore, it was a response to the 
market and to changes in public opinion. Although the paper’s radicalism was muted in 
the post-war period, it continued to operate in a popular left-of-centre tradition. When 
Robert Maxwell took over ownership from Reed International, which had run the paper 
during the 1970s and 1980s, in a bid to maximise sales he de-radicalised the paper, and 
its campaigning (of which it had a long history) declined. However, Curran and Seaton 
argue that the Mirror remained committed to the Labour party, as it had always been, but 
showed that commitment by ‘opposing the Conservative Party rather than positive 
advocacy of a socialist alternative’ (1991:111).
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A consortium of banks and other financial institutions owned the paper at the time of the 
Brent Spar crisis in 1995 and, although it had lost an interventionist proprietor 
(Maxwell), the paper maintained its long-standing tradition of a political leaning towards 
the left.70 Out of the three papers examined, the Mirror had the highest circulation figure 
at 3,266,000.71 In 1995, the Mirror had the second highest circulation figures of the daily 
tabloids.72 The paper was at the commercial tabloid end of the British press and had a 
populist, macho, working-class appeal typical of tabloids (Tunstall 1996).
That the paper followed a ‘popular’ rather than a ‘quality’ format has certain 
consequences for how news is presented. The ‘popular’ format is simple in structure and 
strongly opinionated and contains particular characteristics: brief items on simple themes, 
extensive use of iconic elements such as pictures, and emotive presentation of issues in 
simple vocabulary or what Ericson describes as ‘colloquial expressions and parochial 
interests’ (1995:18).
The Daily Telegraph, in contrast to the Mirror, took a right-leaning political position. 
Founded in 1855, it has tended to support the Conservative Party. Conrad Black, a right- 
wing Canadian businessman, acquired the Telegraph in 1985. Curran and Seaton suggest 
that he exercised a more direct control on the paper after establishing a base in England in 
1989. In 1995 the paper was owned by Black’s Hollinger Group and had the highest 
circulation figures amongst what is termed the quality press. In that year the Telegraph
70 The paper was owned by Robert Maxwell’s Mirror Group Newspapers, which, as a consequence of 
Maxwell’s illegal financial dealings, was subsequently owned by the consortium.
71 The figures are for January to June 1995, and compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulation. All the 
circulation figures I cite are derived from McNair (1999).
72 Tabloids consistently maintain higher circulation figures than broadsheets.
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was the only quality/highbrow paper to have a circulation figure (1,066,000) at the 
million mark.
The Guardian, the Telegraph and the Times are seen as the big three ‘quality’ 
newspapers. Of the three, the Guardian had the lowest circulation figure: 400,000 in 
1995. The paper was founded in Manchester in 1821 as the Manchester Guardian. It was 
renamed in 1959 and relocated to London in 1976. The paper takes a self-defined left- 
leaning position: ‘in the increasingly polarised climate of the late 70s and early 80s, the 
Guardian* s position as the voice of the left was unchallenged ... the coverage of 
industrial disputes including the 1983 Miners’ strike defined the paper’s position’
(History o f the Guardian, www.Guardianunlimited.com). McNair (1999) suggests that 
the paper remains ‘independent’ in so far as it is not owned by the large publishing 
organisations such as Rupert Murdoch’s News International, but by shareholders 
organised in such a way as to guarantee the editorial integrity of the paper. The paper has 
a tradition of being politically left-leaning but also of often taking an independent and 
liberal stance.
In addition to the differentiation of these newspapers according to their varying political 
character and ownership, there are further characteristics that arise from whether they are 
broadsheets/quality or tabloids/popular. Tabloids are more popular and appeal less to a 
generalised readership than do the quality press:
‘... quality newspapers were protected from the economic pressure to build large 
circulation figures because over two-thirds of their revenue came from advertising 
secured by reaching small, elite audiences. Advertising thus discouraged quality 
papers from adopting popular editorial strategies by making it financially
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disadvantageous for them to dilute the class composition of their readership’
(Curran and Seaton 1991: 58).
Tabloids, therefore, depend far more on circulation figures than do the broadsheets, and 
also, because they are far more commercially oriented, tend to appeal to the lowest 
common denominator. Consequently, tabloids tend to be more populist and their 
coverage contains more entertainment news rather than a concentration on ‘big’ issues 
such as the economy.
The format differences arising from market differences (popular and quality), exercise an 
influence on how news is presented and reality constructed. Ericson (1995) argues that, in 
contrast to the tertiary (emotive) understanding presented in ‘popular’ formats, ‘quality’ 
formats employ primary (factual, ‘what happened’) and secondary (explanatory) 
understanding presented in an ‘objective’ tone. In contrast to the simple structure, 
vocabulary and parochial understandings o f‘popular’ newspaper formats, ‘quality’ 
newspapers have greater complexity in structure and vocabulary, and have longer news 
items and continuing stories on complex matters affecting business and political elites.
We shall see whether the newspapers’ contexts, such as their individual outlooks, 
traditions and narrative conventions, influenced the way in which they covered the story 
of Brent Spar. However, it is imperative to note that, as earlier argued, objectivity is a 
journalistic ideal and, although newspapers often take a particular line, which they see as 
both reflecting and appealing to certain groups and (ideological/political) perspectives, 
they still strive to present news in an ‘objective’ manner. But the fact of the matter is that 
the British press are expected to be somewhat partisan, which is quite unlike what is 
expected of the television broadcasters. Moreover, television news is also
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characteristically different from press reports in format, time and space constraints, and 
objectives.
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), established in 1926, was to operate under 
the provisions of a Royal Charter that constituted the BBC as a ‘public service’ funded by 
public taxation. From the outset the BBC interpreted its public service role to mean that it 
should be a major provider of information, devoting a large proportion of its resources to 
news and current affairs broadcasting (McNair 1999). The BBC had a monopoly of 
televised news until 1955, when Independent Television (1TV) was launched.
The way in which the BBC was set up was to have an impact on the demands and the 
construction of television news. The BBC was supposed to be independent of market 
forces and of manipulation by politicians and political parties, McNair (1999) argues. It 
had a remit to be free from influence. However, he observes, relations between 
government and the broadcasters were never without difficulties and, in some respects, 
those rifts provided opportunities for the BBC to demonstrate their much vaunted 
independence to their audience. Efforts to show objectivity, as mentioned earlier, are 
routinely and strategically undertaken by journalists in order to prove their credibility and 
legitimacy to their audiences. The notion of impartiality was built into the creation of the 
BBC and was also extended to U N  news.
ITV, unlike the BBC, was a commercial network created by several companies. JTV 
produced its own news and current affairs programmes through Independent Television 
News (777V), which was jointly owned by all the /7T companies. However, 777V was run 
on a non-profit-making basis and in 1981, when Channel 4 came on the air, 777V won the
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contract to provide that channel’s news. At the time of the Brent Spar crisis, the same 
provider {1TN) provided news to Channel 4 and ITV.
Although ITV companies could operate on a fully commercial basis, deriving their 
income from the sale of advertising space, ITN ‘was subject to the same constraints in 
coverage as the BBC's news and current affairs service’ (McNair 1999: 78). This meant 
that news had to be impartial. It also meant that both the BBC and TIN operated under the 
public service broadcasting remit, which meant they were protected from abuse by 
commercial or political interests.
The BBC was state ‘owned’, funded by public taxation and had its political independence 
from government constitutionally guaranteed. ITV was a commercially backed 
broadcaster which was allowed to make profits for its shareholders but was tightly 
regulated to prevent biases arising in its journalism. The public service principles laid 
down for the BBC in the 1920s extended to commercial broadcasting. Owners, 
advertisers and other interests were not meant to interfere with or put pressure on ITNs 
editorial decision-making process.
The different factors governing both gave rise to individual characteristics and traditions, 
McNair argues. He claims that politicians’ attitudes to ITV were different from their view 
of the BBC. Although the BBC was independent, politicians frequently quibbled with the 
broadcaster, whereas because ITV was not publicly funded they appeared to think that 
ITV was less easily to be censured on political grounds. Consequently, McNair argues, 
ITV news developed a strong investigative journalistic tradition. In contrast, BBC News
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sought to give an impartial account of events: ‘For the BBC, unlike the newspapers with 
their openly declared biases, there was to be no taking sides’ (McNair 1999: 78).
Television news was also characteristically different from newspaper accounts in several 
ways. For one thing, there was less time in television news and it was therefore typically 
‘thin’ in content. ‘Many more “bits” of information can be contained on the front page of 
a broadsheet newspaper than can be broadcast in a twenty minute television news 
bulletin’ (McNair 1999: 20). But, of course, the pictorial is a powerful source of 
information. However, the requirement for television news to be structured in time means 
that there are few items per newscast and that they are brief (Ericson 1995). Newspapers, 
structured in space, have scope for longer items in larger numbers. Brevity in broadcast 
news, Ericson (1995) argues, indicates that television news is much more limited in 
discursive potential than newspapers.
Ericson (1995) also observes that, unlike newspapers, which are directed at their own 
readership (a more limited audience), television news is directed at a mass audience and 
this has several consequences. One is that television news appeals to ‘the lowest- 
common-denominator mass audience’ (Ericson 1995: 20). As television competition is 
for a share of the total audience, Ericson (1995) argues that the popular formula of drama 
and entertainment is adopted. However, Ericson (1995) also proposes that research has 
repeatedly shown that, unlike the differences and variations in newspaper coverage, 
television news production and products are quite similar. Hence, he concludes that the 
‘quality’ and ‘popular’ news products and the organisational differences associated with
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them may be more applicable to radio, and especially to newspapers, than to television 
news, which is more homogenous.
That television news is thin in content is an observation that could initially be made by 
viewing the news reports on the Brent Spar and comparing them with the press reports. 
That TV news follows a set format across the different channels and that there are greater 
differences in format within the press was also readily observable. As will be 
demonstrated, the governing principle of impartiality in television news also gives rise to 
a set format in the way television news is presented, which is different from how press 
coverage took place. Further, attention will be paid to the visual relaying of televised 
news because the use of Greenpeace footage was seen to have symbolised the dispute.
While much is made of differences in format both across and within media, Ericson and 
others point out that media formats also influence each other. Ericson (1995) cites 
Postman’s (1985) comment that we are led to ‘amuse ourselves to death’ as indicating 
that the entertainment format, prevalent in television, is dominating other media and 
exercises the biggest influence on other formats. He also notes that this tendency is 
particularly evident in newspapers adopting ‘the peculiar conception of objectivity 
fostered in broadcast news, where an allegation is quoted from one source, a counterpoint 
is made by a spokesperson for the organisation subject to the allegation and truth is held 
to reside somewhere in between’ (1995: 39). Ericson believes that this (television’s) 
approach has increased the expectation of impartiality in all media. Hence, even though 
newspapers are traditionally partisan, an approach suggesting impartiality and objectivity
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may be taken up. This study shows many instances where, even in the most partial 
accounts, an objective tone was employed.
While this investigation is concerned with examining how the press and television news 
represented the Brent Spar crisis, what this instance might reveal about the more central 
properties of media representations and how they may influence crisis management will 
also be considered. To that end, and for the consideration of news reports on the Brent 
Spar, a brief account of the contexts of both television and the press and the different 
traditions and narrative styles under which they operate have been provided. An 
understanding of the influences on the construction of news will facilitate a 
comprehension of how individual newspapers and broadcast news covered the situation 
over the Brent Spar.
Press coverage
The text data examined in this analysis consist of all the articles containing the words 
‘Brent Spar’ in the three newspapers in the year 1995.73
The Daily Mirror search revealed a total of 33 articles. The coverage began on May I and 
ended (earlier than the other two papers) on July 28. The Guardian had 113 articles and 
their coverage began on May 6, and continued until the end of the year, as did the 
coverage of the Daily Telegraph which had 106 articles.
73 I employed the Lexis-Nexis search engine using the search term ‘Brent Spar’. The Sunday editions of 
these papers are also included.
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Both the Daily Mirror and the Guardian started their coverage o f the story in May 
following Greenpeace’s ‘occupation’ of the Brent Spar, whereas the Daily Telegraph 
began their coverage on February 17, when Shell announced its plan for the sea disposal 
of the Brent Spar.
Framing Shell
During the immediate crisis, the Daily Mirror repeatedly framed Shell as being a 
‘stubborn’ and ‘greedy’ company which was trying to ‘dump’ its waste on the cheap:74
‘WE SHELL NOT BE MOVED’ (June 20);
‘... stubborn refusal to heed pleas’ (June 20);
‘[Shell] raked in millions and won’t pay to clean up’ (May 1).
The Mirror1 s first article on the subject was headlined: ‘MURDER AT SEA’ (May I). 
Another article had the headline: ‘GREED THAT’S POISONING OUR SEAS’ (June 
20). The Mirror portrayed Shell as ‘a fantastically rich company which has made millions 
from the North Sea. It should not be trying to dump rigs on the cheap’ (June 20). On the 
whole, the Mirror saw Shell as an irresponsible company solely concerned with profit 
and as following an environmentally-damaging course of action.
In many ways, the Mirror’s representation of Shell conformed to its political traditions 
and to the narrative conventions of a popular/tabloid news reporting. For example, the 
depiction that Shell was ‘controlled’ by the ‘management in Holland’ indicates the
74 All the following capitals were in the original.
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narrative conventions typical of tabloids. From the first article on the subject, it was quite 
clear that the paper opposed Shell’s plan and it showed this partiality by invoking the 
negative stereotype o f ‘big business* as stubborn and greedy.
The Daily Telegraph took a very different view that reflected its political leanings. It 
framed Shell as a company that had good reasons for proposing a plan the paper thought 
was ‘reasonable’ (June 20). Despite supporting the company’s case, the Telegraph 
observed that Shell needed to gain public approval:
‘Shell has a powerful economic and ecological case for dumping, but a company 
with a brand image needs to win the public relations battle too’ (June 17).
The Telegraph also emphasised the care the company had taken in arriving at their 
decision. The argument was that ‘[Shell] is not free to discard the Brent Spar however 
and wherever it pleases’ (June 20) but had to follow a series of international agreements 
and conventions. Nevertheless, public approval was something the paper thought was 
important for Shell to attain:
‘Shell was caught off guard when Greenpeace first occupied the Brent Spar, 
perhaps because the case for bringing the thing ashore, as Greenpeace demanded, 
was such a poor one. Shell is now hitting back with fact sheets, briefings and press 
releases. It can only hope that an informed debate eventually beats dramatic 
television pictures when it comes to winning public approval’ (June 20).
In the above quotations, which are typical of how the Telegraph framed Shell and the 
disposal plan, it is obvious that the Telegraph agreed with Shell’s plan and supported the 
company. And despite claiming that Shell did not have public approval, the Telegraph 
framed this as a dilemma faced by many businesses and, in doing so, placed this issue in 
a wider context and took the spotlight away from Shell:
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‘However much it may think it has right on its side, Shell needs to sell to its 
consumers, and those who may vaguely believe that Greenpeace is right - some of 
them merely on the basis that big business must be wrong - can cause the company 
inconvenience at best or lasting commercial damage at worst. Shell is by no means 
the first business to be put through this particular mincer’ (June 20).
While this argument, that any business might encounter the difficulties faced by Shell, 
may have been a consequence o f ‘quality’ newspapers taking a more abstract view of 
events, one of the effects of this was to represent Shell as not being responsible for the 
situation, and as a victim of circumstances. The Telegraph* s uncritical view of Shell’s 
plan is also evident in instances where the Telegraph directly copied Shell’s news 
releases and, thereby, reproduced Shell’s claims:
‘The Brent Spar contains about 100 tons of sludge, the bulk of it sand. About 10% 
of it is heavy oil residue, like bitumen on roads...’(June 21).
This instance (one amongst many), where the Telegraph employed the same similes (like 
bitumen) that Shell used in its news releases, indicates how much ‘news’ derives from 
press releases, the influence of sources on news content and also the paper’s empathy 
with Shell. Clearly, the preferred source for the Telegraph was Shell.
It is significant that at the time of the above article, which listed the contents of the Spar, 
Greenpeace had announced that there was 5500 tonnes75 of oil contained in the Spar, a 
figure that was contested by Shell but was as yet not proven to be false. Yet, in the
75 ‘Ton’, the imperial measurement (equivalent to 1016kg) and ‘tonne’, the metric measurement 
(equivalent to 1000kg), both appear in discussions of the contents of the Spar. In citing Greenpeace’s and 
Shell’s statements (in all the chapters), I have used ‘tonnes’ or ‘ton’ when and where they do and have done 
the same for the citations from the press. With regard to the citations from TV reports, having had to rely 
on the verbal account, I have cross-referenced news reports’ reference to Shell or Greenpeace’s estimates 
and followed Shell or Greenpeace’s terms. When TV news did not state the source of claims made, I have 
used ‘tonnes’. The most important measure to get right, as it played a main part in this crisis, was 
Greenpeace’s estimate of oil contained in the Spar. Greenpeace and Shell consistently described that 
estimate as ‘5500 tonnes’ and I have reproduced that.
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Telegraph's article listing the contents of the Spar there was no mention of Greenpeace’s 
contention. Greenpeace’s allegation was ignored and excluded while Shell’s case was 
reproduced.
The Guardian began its coverage of the immediate crisis by stating that Shell ‘is lying 
low’ while its ‘lawyers pounce’ and quoted Jon Castle, Greenpeace captain, as saying 
that Shell ‘has a big PR image and likes to pretend it cares about the environment when it 
is lying through its teeth’ (May 6).
Like the Telegraph, the Guardian also highlighted the necessity of gaining public 
approval but, whereas the Telegraph explicitly supported Shell’s plan, the Guardian was 
more sceptical:
‘Their [Shell UK and UK government’s] case is watertight, they believe. The law is 
on their side; they have chosen what they call the “best environmental option” and 
considered everything from health to future risk. They brand their opponents “liars” 
and “hysterical”. The trouble is that consumers don’t think like multi-billion dollar 
corporations; business as usual is not enough for the nineties. Shell and the British 
government are seen throughout Europe to be out of touch when it comes to 
corporate and governmental accountability’ (June 17).
The Guardian also reported that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group might be willing to call off 
the plan and, unlike the Telegraph, the Guardian reported on the discord within the 
corporation.
Like the Telegraph, the Guardian framed Shell as a company, like many other 
companies, which could be adversely affected by bad publicity. Both the broadsheets 
took a wider view of the situation (and, thus, placed the situation in a broader context) 
which was in sharp contrast to that of the Mirror, which represented the situation in quite
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simplistic terms: all blame could be assigned to the greedy multinational that stubbornly 
maintained a malevolent course of action. In a typically ‘popular’ manner, the Mirror 
represented the situation very simply.
The Guardian did not support Shell’s plans and the paper consistently emphasised that 
companies had to behave in a responsible manner; by so arguing the implication was that 
Shell was not behaving in such a way. The paper took the view that Shell had paid 
insufficient attention to what the public would consider an acceptable way to dispose of 
obsolete oil installations. As I have said, the Guardian was politically left-leaning and its 
characterisation of Shell as behaving irresponsibly might have been a consequence of 
that. Also, this framing of Shell was quite similar to the Mirror's, although the latter’s 
characterisation of Shell was far more critical.
The way in which the three newspapers framed Shell was also influenced by and 
illustrated within their frame of the main opponent to the company’s plan: Greenpeace.
Framing Greenpeace
Throughout their coverage, the Mirror characterised Greenpeace as being disinterested 
defenders ofpublic interest. Greenpeace members were seen as ‘daring* (May I), ‘brave’ 
(June 20) and ‘ready to risk their lives’ (June 20) and those who boarded the Spar were 
described as ‘commandos* (MayI) and ‘Greenpeace fighters* who, on the Spar faced a 
‘bitter protest of terrible physical hardship’ (June 20). In a manner reflecting its tradition 
for campaigning, the Mirror bolstered Greenpeace’s campaign as it promoted and 
reproduced Greenpeace’s view of the situation.
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In response to Greenpeace’s occupation of the Spar, both the Mirror and the Guardian 
covered Greenpeace’s claims. The Telegraph did not, and took a different route in 
reporting the news. It described an encounter that gave the information that Greenpeace 
had occupied the Spar in protest but did not illustrate why Greenpeace had launched the 
protest. Thus, while it reported the news of Greenpeace’s occupation, it did so in a way 
that was not advantageous to Greenpeace. It is worthwhile to quote this vignette in full as 
it indicates the approach the paper would subsequently take in covering the crisis:
‘A Greenpeace stunt fell flat at a drinks party held by John Gummer, Environment 
Secretary. A portable telephone was handed to Gummer by an activist at the do 
with a smirking “it’s for you”. On the line was Greenpeace’s Chris Rose, talking 
from the disused oil rig Brent Spar which Greenpeace is occupying ... Rose clearly 
asked Gummer what he was going to do about the Department of Trade’s plans to 
dump old rigs ... Gummer went, spectacularly, on the offensive. Rose was told 
sharply that rigs were NOT the minister’s top priority for next month’s North Sea 
Conference. “I wish campaigners would get around to the fish stocks of the world”, 
barked Gummer ... “The most difficult thing about the environment was to retain a 
sense of priorities”. And with that the Secretary of State hit the “off” button and 
with a look of a man who had just squashed a mosquito, handed back the mobile* 
(May 12).
This article is illustrative of the Environment Minister’s view of Greenpeace but, 
significantly, it is also quite typical of the angle the Telegraph took as subsequent articles 
argued that Greenpeace’s protests were ‘distracting’ from the ‘real’ issue of industrial 
over-fishing: ‘This far more serious problem [modem fishing methods] is almost 
completely ignored by Greenpeace in favour of Brent Spar type stunts’ (June 20). 
Interestingly, this was also what the government minister had said in the above quote.
The Telegraph's coverage of the dispute would continue to parallel the UK government’s 
view, which was also a perspective favourable to Shell.
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While the protests against Shell’s plans grew, the government tried to shift media 
attention onto what it wanted to portray as bigger environmental problems - and the 
Telegraph did this. For instance, when Greenpeace reoccupied the Spar on June 8, the 
Telegraph gave minimal attention to an event that otherwise gained extensive press and 
television coverage. On that day the Telegraph reported: ‘SCIENTISTS SAY NORTH 
SEA COD IS FACING EXTINCTION’ (June 8). Despite this article focusing on the 
depletion of North Sea cod, it did not however completely ignore Greenpeace’s 
reoccupation of the Spar. A very brief announcement was made in the last three sentences 
of the article.
Similarly, at the North Sea conference, when European government ministers protested 
about the Brent Spar, the Telegraph chose instead to focus on another aspect: ‘BRITAIN 
WINS FISH STOCK AGREEMENT’ (June 10). In that article, the paper made a token 
mention of the fact that the Danish minister had protested about the Brent Spar, while 
focusing on a concern the UK government had identified as more worthy of attention. 
The Telegraph represented and reproduced the UK government’s view of the situation:
‘GREENPEACE DISTRACTIONS’
‘Greenpeace’s warm welcome to the declaration of the North Sea conference in the 
Danish port of Esbjerg should serve as a warning that there is much wrong with it 
... Greenpeace ... distracted the conference [from discussing fish stocks] with its 
campaign against the dumping of the Brent Spar, a huge oil platform which will be 
difficult to dispose of by any means ... The suspicion remains that Greenpeace 
chose not to campaign about industrial fishing because it might have challenged the 
prejudices of its angst ridden supporters in Holland, Germany, and Denmark, who 
are obsessed with pollution. And that could have led to a reduction in donations. 
One should always remember that a primary objective of a modem pressure group 
is its own perpetuation. That is not always best achieved by making people think 
about the really important issues’ (June 12).
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By arguing that Greenpeace’s protests were mere ‘distractions’ and by claiming that 
Greenpeace was somehow not really concerned about the environment but instead 
concerned only for itself, the Telegraph suggested that there was a sinister side to 
pressure groups:
‘The damage [resulting from the Braer oil spill] was minimal. Everyone was 
mightily relieved, although some detected a twinge of regret in the response of 
some of the more extreme eco-warriors, as the publicity value of such a catastrophe 
in a beautiful part of the British Isles was so cruelly wrested from them. The 
prospect of pitifully damaged furry creatures dying on camera on the one hand, and 
those rapacious oil companies seemingly answerable to nobody on the other, would 
have guaranteed public outrage. Such opportunities do not occur often - perhaps 
because the oil companies and other big businesses which could cause catastrophe 
try quite hard to avoid them - and so Greenpeace has had to create one. It has 
chosen the Brent Spar.’
The Telegraph repeatedly argued that Greenpeace had no real reason to protest against 
the disposal of Brent Spar and that Greenpeace was merely using the disposal to further 
other objectives and persistently employed this frame. The first instance in which the 
Telegraph represented Greenpeace’s views was on June 20. It did so, however, as a two- 
part examination of the case for and against deep sea disposal: ‘SEABED MUST NOT 
BECOME RUBBISH TIP - AGAINST’76 (June 20) and ‘30 STUDIES IN FAVOUR OF 
DUMPING - FOR (June 20). Greenpeace’s claims simply did not obtain representation in 
the Telegraph, even though attempts had been made to give an appearance of objectivity, 
as the two articles above indicate. In spite of these articles giving the appearance of 
objectivity, which is important to journalists in establishing credibility with audiences, 
they still favoured Shell’s case by framing the issue in a manner favourable to Shell.
76 This article represented the case against Shell’s plan, and was followed by another article representing 
the case for that plan.
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The Guardian described the Greenpeace activists who occupied the Spar as ‘eco- 
guerrillas’ and as ‘pirates’, but this frame was not as firmly retained as the frames utilised 
in a rhetorical way by the other two papers. The Guardian seemed impressed with the 
way in which Greenpeace conducted its campaign, frequently describing it as ‘efficient’ 
and ‘immaculately planned’, but the paper stopped short of overtly supporting or 
opposing Greenpeace.
Although the Guardian argued, like the Mirror, that Shell should not proceed as planned, 
unlike the Mirror the Guardian distanced itself from Greenpeace, the principal group 
also taking that stance. In doing so, the Guardian maintained greater distance between 
itself and the conflict, which was quite unlike the stance taken by the Mirror and the 
Telegraph. This served the paper’s desire to portray itself as unaffiliated and impartial - 
an outlook that corresponded with the traditions of the paper.
Framing risks and scientific opinion
The Mirror framed Shell’s disposal plan as posing unquestionable risks to the marine 
environment. The Spar was described as a ‘toxic time bomb’ and the paper urged Shell to 
‘spare the environment another killing blow’. According to the Mirror, Shell’s plan 
constituted an ‘environmental hazard’ (June 20) and the first of its kind as it insisted that 
there were ‘hundreds of other Brent Spars’ (June 20).
The Mirror’s discussion of the risks of sea disposal was limited to stating that it 
definitely constituted a risk to the marine ecology and, in a manner typical of tabloids, its 
discussion of the scientific arguments of the case was very restricted. The differing
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scientific views were not explained; instead the paper stated that Shell’s scientific 
findings also supported Greenpeace’s scientists, who provided evidence that dumping 
would damage the marine environment. This was backed up with the statement that 
Shell’s scientists also showed that the Spar contained ‘tons of toxic sludge’, ‘tons of 
waste oils’ and ‘tons of radioactive scale’. Hence, the Mirror framed Greenpeace’s 
science as being firm and, in doing so, supported Greenpeace’s case. The Mirror also 
reported Greenpeace’s measurement of the amount of oil contained in the Spar without 
questioning this amount: ‘it contains an estimated 5000 tonnes of oil’ (June 20).
Despite sustaining Greenpeace’s claims about risks, the Mirror did, on the day of Shell’s 
change of plan though before this took place, acknowledge that there was scientific 
opposition to Greenpeace’s argument. However, that observation was deployed to argue 
for the termination of Shell’s plan:
‘Some scientists support Shell’s actions as the best way to get rid of Brent Spar. 
But with so much opposition and so much uncertainty, the sinking should not go 
ahead...’ (June 20).
Even though differing scientific opinion was now represented, it was done so in a self- 
serving manner, as the paper’s position was to halt Shell’s plan. That representation also 
shored up Greenpeace’s case.
Once again in stark contrast to the Mirror, the Telegraph backed Shell’s case in its 
discussion of risks and scientific opinion. The Telegraph focused on the risks of onshore 
disposal and did not give much attention to the risks of sea disposal, i.e. the risk of
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Shell’s plan was not discussed whereas the risks of what Greenpeace proposed (onshore 
disposal) was emphasised.
The Telegraph promoted the view that ‘scientists’ supported Shell’s plan and often 
suggested that expert opinion was on Shell’s side:
‘Do oil rigs dumped at sea damage the environment? ...The answer, according to 
marine scientists, is that the deep sea is a perfectly reasonable place to get rid of the 
oil industry’s largest structures’ (May 31).
The risks of deep sea disposal were minimal and ‘immaterial’, the Telegraph also 
claimed:
‘Whether it [the Brent Spar] has a few tonnes of sludge in it as Shell maintain, or 
several hundred tonnes as Greenpeace allege, is irrelevant. In the vast volume of the 
sea, its effects will be immaterial, and the heavy metal trace elements will be 
detectable only thanks to the extreme sensitivity of modem measuring methods’ 
(June 20).
Dr Tony Rice, one of the scientists who supported Shell, was often quoted by the 
Telegraph at the expense of other scientific opinion:
‘Dr Tony Rice, an independent deep-sea biologist... said that the most likely 
impact was the death of a number of worms on the sea bed .. .’(June 20).
The Telegraph promoted the view that Greenpeace was exaggerating the risks, arguing:
‘Perhaps Greenpeace can be forgiven its fanaticism but Mr Kohl should surely 
know better. He is guilty of gross exaggeration in telling Mr Major that dumping 
Brent Spar in deep water raises serious ecological questions’ (June 17)
And:
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‘The large metal storage buoy will contain radioactive muds, but these were 
naturally occurring and have only been concentrated by drilling activity. There may 
also be traces of oil, but Dr Rice says the effects should be local and limited to 
within a few hundred metres ... ’(May 31).
The Telegraph insisted that ‘there is scant evidence that dumping the Brent Spar would 
cause more environmental problems than are caused by building a quarter mile of road’ 
(June 12) and viewed the situation as:
‘... a storm in an Atlantic tea cup. Greenpeace have made a mistake and they 
cannot admit i t ... for this structure, at this moment in time, this is the best 
environmental option’ (June 20b).
The Mirror and the Telegraph advanced opposing views of risks and scientific views 
because they both supported one of the two main parties involved in the dispute. The 
Guardian took a completely different view of the situation from that of the other two 
newspapers, arguing that what to do with the Spar was not really a scientific argument:
‘...just like last year’s Anglo-German furore over BSE ... the battle lines are more 
cultural than scientific’ (June 17).
For the Guardian, the real issue was not the scientific arguments but how Shell and the 
UK government responded to public sentiments. The paper was also careful to prefix 
claims made by Greenpeace about the contents of the Spar that could pose risks to the 
marine environment with a ‘Greenpeace claims’. However, in its first article on the 
subject, the Guardian appeared to support Greenpeace’s argument that the planned 
disposal would set a precedent:
‘Greenpeace sees this week’s action as the start... that could ultimately determine 
the fate of 60 major ageing installations in the central and northern North Sea ... 
they all contain tons of hazardous and radioactive wastes specifically outlawed by 
two conventions on marine dumping’ (May 6).
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Later articles reported Shell’s argument that the UK government’s policy was to consider 
disposal on a case by case approach. But the first report on this policy is on May 30, 
whereas the first article about the Brent Spar (May 6), and subsequent ones, had 
suggested that this form of disposal was applicable to the other oil installations in the 
North Sea. In doing so, the Guardian reproduced Greenpeace’s claim and downplayed 
Shell’s denial that the Spar would set a precedent. Thus, once again we see another 
instance where the conventions of demonstrating objectivity were employed (attaching a 
‘Greenpeace claims’ to statements which the paper also reproduced and promoted), 
whereas the paper’s coverage in fact leant more towards one side of the dispute rather 
than the other.
Framing protests
The three papers framed protests in quite distinctive ways. The Mirror saw the protests 
against Shell’s plan as a remarkable expression of democracy at work:
‘... campaigners, men and women, from Britain and several other countries were in 
control’ [as they erected the] “Save the North Sea” flag’ [on the Brent Spar which] 
‘flew triumphantly’ (May 1).
According to the Mirror there was a ‘huge groundswell of protest’ and ‘voluntary 
boycotts’ as opposition grew to Shell’s plan (June 20).
The Telegraph, in contrast to the Mirror's framing of civil protest as an expression of 
democracy, saw it as an expression of civil disobedience and the rise of a public 
willingness to be unlawful:
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‘PROTESTERS TAKE LAW INTO OWN HANDS. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: 
Campaigns have targeted poll tax, animal exports and new motorways. More and 
more demonstrators are willing to act illegally to further their various causes ... 
Protest groups agitating for every conceivable cause ... have used civil 
disobedience to promote their views’ (June 5).
The nature of protests and protesters in England and on the Continent was described 
differently by the three papers. After the firebombing of Shell garages in Germany, the 
Mirror differentiated between two types of protests and protesters, arguing that the 
‘Green terrorists’ in Germany, where ‘Wild West scenes’ took place, were in contrast to 
protests in England and to Greenpeace protesters. A Shell station worker in Germany is 
quoted as having said that ‘the whole country has gone mad’ (June 20). The paper’s 
framing of the different types of protest in England and in Germany helped Greenpeace 
because other newspapers had criticised Greenpeace for spurring on the violent protest in 
Germany - an allegation that Greenpeace denied.
The Guardian also reported a variance in the type of protest taking place in England and 
in continental Europe:
‘On the Continent, the Brent Spar now has been front page news for weeks, here 
consumer protest is building slowly’ (June 17).
The Guardian also published a letter on the different public attitudes in England and on 
the Continent (‘LETTER: ONE NATION FACING CATASTROPHE WITH 
QUIETUDE - AND A PINT IN ITS HAND’), which argued that there was ‘an apathy 
and lack of foresight by the majority of the British public when confronted by even the 
most major potential catastrophe’ (June 19). That view succinctly illustrated the paper’s 
position on this matter.
208
Like the other two papers, the Telegraph also reported on the different types of protest in 
England and on the Continent but, unlike the other two papers, the Telegraph had a 
specific gripe against German protesters:
‘ANTI-BRITISH MOOD RISES IN GERMANY’
‘There were signs yesterday that German criticism of the plan ... was becoming 
another excuse for the release of anti-British feelings’ (June 21).
The impression that Germans were anti-British was furthered by subsequent articles in 
the Telegraph which strongly criticised that population. While the other two papers 
interpreted continental opposition to Shell’s plan as being a consequence of their 
sentiments towards the environment and values regarding corporate responsibility and so 
forth, the Telegraph saw it as a consequence of an ‘anti-British’ predilection. That 
representation reflected and promoted the paper’s view of the protests as baseless.
Observations on the press coverage
Strong organising perspectives clearly existed in the case of the Mirror, which supported 
Greenpeace’s claims, and the Telegraph, which supported Shell’s plans. The Guardian 
appeared more aware of an apparent need to be objective, even though it also promoted 
the view that Shell should relinquish a poorly supported plan. My analysis shows that the 
Telegraph also attempted to appear objective. That might have been a result of the two 
being ‘quality’ broadsheets, which are expected to be partisan, yet more impartial than 
the tabloids. The one paper that was not so concerned with the posture most clearly 
adopted by the Guardian was the Mirror but, as I have argued, this might have been a
209
consequence of its overtly stated partisanship, its tradition of campaigning and its 
‘popular’ format.
My analysis shows that all the news reports were value laden.
A key finding of this study - one that Hansen (2000) also found in his examination of 
newspaper coverage - is that newspapers covered the crisis in very different ways and 
employed quite distinct frames of the main parties and issues involved. This discovery 
contests the view that ‘the media’ covered the crisis in a uniform manner. My 
observations do not support the consultants’ and Shell’s claim that there was a media bias 
against the company.
The three newspapers had their individual views about the situation, and two of the three 
examined supported - though in varying degrees and under different positions - 
Greenpeace’s call for an abandonment of the sea disposal and the one supported Shell’s 
plan. The different politics, narrative cultures and traditions of the three newspapers was 
described earlier. My analysis shows that these factors exercised an influence in how 
news was constructed and reported because the way in which the newspapers represented 
the main parties and issues conformed to their individual contexts.
Observing the situation whereby news reports leant towards this or that position was 
facilitated by an examination of how issues and entities were framed. This analysis shows 
that certain newspapers reflected and emphasised the views of some claim-makers over 
others and, in doing so, presented those views as legitimate. That the different papers 
sought to legitimate different claims was demonstrated.
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If we compare these findings with what Schlesinger (1991) maintains about how different 
groups (sources) compete to gain representation of their outlook, and that the media 
accept or reject the ‘frames’ offered by sources or invent their own frames, my findings 
provide examples of the three possibilities. When, for instance, we look at how the papers 
treated Shell’s claims, it is evident that the Telegraph accepted much of what Shell 
claimed and (reproduced reports that appear to be influenced by how the government 
wanted to frame the issue.77 The Mirror rejected Shell’s claims and instead accepted 
those offered by Greenpeace. And the Guardian offered its own interpretations/frames 
(that the real issue was not scientific argument but cultural expectations).
This study also demonstrates that the newspapers engaged in their own definitional work. 
Even when the Mirror and the Telegraph supported the two main parties involved, 
(Greenpeace and Shell respectively), their coverage was not merely a case of reproducing 
their views but also furnishing them through the advancement of supporting arguments. 
Thus, for example, the Telegraph saw the protests against Shell as civil disobedience and 
the Mirror argued, towards the end, that because there was so much scientific uncertainty 
(which the paper had not previously mentioned), Shell’s plans should be abandoned. And 
with regard to the invention of their own frames and definitions, the Telegraph’s view of 
Greenpeace as posing a threat to democracy and indicating the rise of civil disobedience 
reveals this as these interpretations were the paper’s own. These frames were not 
provided by a primary source but were invented by the paper. Therefore, in addition to
77 Throughout the crisis, the UK government supported Shell’s plan and the Telegraph’s reproduction of 
their frame was advantageous to Shell.
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the reproduction and legitimisation of claims, the press also engage in offering their own 
interpretations of the situation and offer their own definitions that support that outlook.
My findings not only dispute the contention that there was a media bias but also do not 
support the assertion that Shell’s case was not represented. The Guardian and even the 
Mirror, although deeply opposed to Shell’s plan, represented Shell’s claims. The 
strongest contention of the consultants’ claim is evident in the Telegraph's coverage of 
the crisis. With the exception of one article that came towards the end of the crisis, the 
Telegraph did not cover any of Greenpeace’s claims. The paper excluded opposing views 
and not only represented but also reproduced, promoted and endorsed Shell’s position.
The finding that representation of claims took place even though news reports favoured a 
particular interpretation conforms to Tuchman’s (1978) and Schiller’s (1981) 
observations regarding the journalistic conventions employed to suggest that accounts are 
factual and impartial and, therefore, credible.
In addition to the finding that the individual papers’ subscription to specific partisan 
perspectives is reflected in what they produced - by how they framed issues and groups - 
my study also reveals that these frames were consistent from the beginning. Hansen 
(2000) also found that condition and his study corroborates mine. Certain frames were 
preferred and prominent from the outset, and it was also the case that these were 
sustained in each newspaper as events developed. Thus, I found that the coverage of the 
crisis within each paper did not vary as the initial frames employed remained and did not 
change. One could draw from this situation the conclusion that news construction is a 
process driven and greatly influenced by the wider context (such as the political leanings,
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organising structure, traditions and the outlooks) of the individual newspapers. This has 
consequences for the capacity to influence or control the way claims are framed by 
individual newspapers, an observation that Hansen also makes in arguing that there are 
‘limits to claims-maker influence’ (2000:71). Therefore, while journalists can secure 
legitimacy towards a certain claim/viewpoint, ensuring that that legitimacy is obtained is 
rather uncertain. This has repercussions for what consultants advocate because measures 
to influence news coverage - through crisis management - might be quite constrained and, 
hence, achieving the intended effect might be far from straightforward.
Television coverage
Television coverage of this story began much later than the press coverage and ended 
earlier. The time constraints and greater competition for TV news time seemed to 
influence the coverage. In comparison with TV news, press coverage also seemed more 
in-depth and less event-led. None of this contradicts what media studies isolate as typical 
characteristics: television news is less in-depth than press reports, and is dominated by a 
popular format because of its ‘visuals’, simplifying features and a concentration on the 
dramatic (Ericson 1989).
Coverage in the year 1995 began on May 22, and the last television news item on the 
subject was on September 5.78 There were in total 18 BBC News programmes (ten during
78 A list of the BBC programmes that covered the Brent Spar story was obtained from BBC Archives using 
the search term ‘Brent Spar’. As 777V did not have a similar archive service to that provided by the BBC, the 
ITV and Channel 4 news programmes on the Brent Spar were identified following an examination of all the 
news programmes in the period of my search and selecting the ones that covered the Spar story. All the 
news programmes were obtained by and viewed at the British Film Institute. I also transcribed the full 
dialogue of all TV news reports.
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the immediate crisis), five Channel 4 News programmes (two during the immediate 
crisis) and five ITVNews reports (two during the immediate crisis).
Television news, across the three channels, followed a very set and typical format 
identifiable as the formal features of news in this medium. It would begin with the news 
presenter announcing the item to the accompaniment of a still photo. The report would 
then proceed to a ‘voice over’ and or a video of a correspondent who would have ‘the 
report’, i.e. a more in-depth account following on the introduction by the presenter in the 
studio. Typically, the Brent Spar coverage would begin with the studio presenter, who 
would have behind him a still photo of the Brent Spar, sometimes accompanied by the 
Shell and Greenpeace logos with a caption such as ‘Dispute’ or ‘Brent Spar’. The 
reporter would be introduced and would take over relaying the news, which would be 
accompanied with video material that coincided with what was said. For example, when 
reporting about firebombed Shell garages in Germany, the video would show those 
garages. That conformed to the observations of media research that using visuals helps to 
establish factuality and objectivity as they authenticate what is reported (Fiske 1987) 
(Graddol 1994).
The visual relaying of news is one part of the two-part (visual and verbal) equation 
involved in televised news; it ‘binds messages to context’ (Ericson 1995:6) and is 
particularly important not only because it is a significant component of how the story is 
told in this medium but also because consultants, Shell and television executives draw 
attention to this aspect, arguing that it contributed to the creation of bias. In order to 
investigate their claim that the inclusion of Greenpeace video in television news created
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bias, I generally paid attention to the visual communication of news and gave specific 
attention to the Greenpeace video. I was also attentive to whether any sort of labelling of 
footage existed because television executives suggested that bias was created not just by 
the use of the Greenpeace footage but also because they had not labelled the source of the 
material. At the 1995 Television conference at Edinburgh, where BBC and ITN 
executives admitted to biased coverage, they argued that in the future any external video 
material ought to be labelled on its first frame. The suggestion was that this was not done 
and that the broadcast of Greenpeace material, especially without a label, created bias.
The news reports during the crisis did typically contain a visual scene that consultants, 
Shell and television executives describe as a source of bias. I will term this the ‘Spar 
scene’. It showed the Brent Spar with nearby ships hosing the areas surrounding the Spar 
with water, a Greenpeace ship and some Greenpeace dinghies navigating around the 
structure. When Greenpeace reoccupied the Spar by landing two activists on the 
installation by helicopter, television news also carried a video of this. This, like the Spar 
scene video, was produced by Greenpeace. As is evident through their description of it, 
the contentious Greenpeace video, the use of which Shell and television executives claim 
gave rise to biased television coverage, was not the ‘helicopter’ one but rather the Spar 
scene video.
The contentious video, like most other visuals in television news, was used in 
conjunction with a verbal report and, in my view, what was said in that report can 
influence interpretations of that video. Therefore, particular attention was paid to how this 
video was used, that is, what was said while it was shown. It is not unreasonable to
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suppose that the verbal account could guide the impressions drawn from the video, given 
that videos are used in television news typically to illustrate and exemplify the report.
This investigation will not assess how everyone ‘decoded’ this video, which is not 
possible. Media research suggests that people decipher visuals very differently (Liebes 
and Katz 1990) and this presents a problem with the claim that the visuals created a 
distinct, uniform view of the situation. The claim of bias will be investigated by looking 
for what could be drawn from the video. Bearing in mind the argument that news 
accounts are ‘metaphorical reconstructions’ (Fiske and Hartley 1978; Ericson 1989), it is 
interesting that the use of Greenpeace video was singled out for criticism. Why were the 
visuals blamed for the allegedly biased coverage? Why not just blame the simplifying 
features of television news, for instance? Could it be that blaming Greenpeace was 
advantageous for those who did so? For example, the television executives were not 
disinterested commentators and they did have to make a defence against Shell’s 
accusations of biased news reporting, which they could do by holding Greenpeace 
responsible and, in that way, dodging the critical spotlight. And, as I subsequently argue, 
it was in Shell’s interest to claim that there had been a media bias.
Yet, the claim of media bias appears convincing, given media researchers’ observation 
that television news scenes are imagistic and symbolic (Carey 1989; Dyan and Katz 
1992; Liebes and Curran 1998). Further, in the context of the researchers’ observation 
that television news is guided and determined by what can be shown, the Greenpeace 
provision of footage appears quite significant. So the case might have been credible - that
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is necessary for it to be taken seriously - but credibility, by itself, does not mean that that 
is in fact what happened.
The greater imperative for television news to be impartial and the conventions reporters 
use to suggest impartiality were observable in the television coverage of the Spar story 
and, hence, my analysis points to problems with the case that consultants, Shell and 
television executives put forth.
BBC
That there was an overriding concern with appearing objective and impartial was 
suggested by a formulaic approach to presenting the news: reporters withheld judgement, 
abstained from supporting a particular argument and spokespersons for both sides of the 
argument were shown making their statements. Representation of the two standpoints is a 
part of the ritual of impartiality practised by the media, where one viewpoint balances 
another. Most of the BBC News programmes delineated both sides of the dispute, as did 
BBC current affairs programmes.
A good example of this concern to appear objective, and the employment of the 
traditional format of one viewpoint balancing the other, was the Breakfast with Frost 
programme on June 18. There both sides of the dispute were covered as Chris Rose (CR), 
Greenpeace Campaigns Director, and Tim Eggar (TE), Trade and Industry Minister, 
responded to the central issue of the environmental risks of the planned action:
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DF:79 Is it actually dangerous or not, in your opinion?
CR: We believe it is, yes. There’s a lot more toxic chemicals and oil [aboard the Spar] 
than the government was led to believe by Shell. There’s 5000 tonnes of oil on it and 
Shell said there’s about 40 tonnes. We [obtained the estimate] from a sampling that 
happened when we went on the Brent Spar the first time ...
TE: Chris talks about trace contaminants in the Brent Spar. Leaving this morning I picked 
up this [shows a small medicine bottle]. It weighs 100 grams. There’s about 200 grams -  
two of these [holds up bottle] in weight of trace contaminants on the Brent Spar. So 
Greenpeace is grossly exaggerating the problem, completely misconstruing the 
independent studies that have been carried out - the independent experts [his emphasis] 
who have looked at this very much support the government and Shell’s approach.
CR: Well I think that’s just wrong. I’ve got here a sworn affidavit from a worker [hands 
the document to Frost and then to Eggar who ignores it] who says that he was asked to 
seal in 3500 gallon barrels of chemicals that aren’t on the inventory - they are entombed 
in concrete - they are going to go down with the Brent Spar and we think that there is a 
lot more chemicals in there that you [looks at Eggar] don’t know about.
An incident on this programme also illustrated the presenter’s concern to appear impartial 
and thus conform to the governing principle of television news to be objective. David 
Frost, the presenter, ended the discussion thus:
‘OK [interrupts the debate between Eggar and Rose] we are going to leave it there. 
Thank you both for a very, very lively debate. You have dramatised the different 
issues very well. Ultimately everyone wants their own way ... we leave it to you 
[addresses camera]. The verdict, as they say on television, is yours’ {BBC 2: 
Breakfast with Frost, June 18).
Frost parodied that television convention, yet also conformed to it.
Quite dominant in the BBC coverage was the formulaic approach to news reporting, 
where both sides of the dispute are represented, but there were four exceptions.
79 David Frost.
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The On the Record programme (June 18) was one such exception in having 
spokespersons only for Greenpeace’s case. In that programme Frank Dobson, Shadow 
Environment Secretary, and the Liberal Democrat Matthew Taylor were both very critical 
of Shell and both supported a boycott of the company. Dobson said:
‘... we believe that it’s wrong of Shell to propose to just dump their spare 
equipment, their clapped out equipment... here you have got a multi-million pound 
multinational company being allowed the cheapest option: dumping at sea.’
The two ministers saw Shell very much in the same way as characterised by Greenpeace 
and On the Record did not present a different depiction of Shell from that put forward by 
the ministers.
Even though this programme represented a partial view of the situation, an incident took 
place that revealed the programme makers’ and the presenter’s very self-conscious 
aspiration to be objective. The presenter, John Humphreys, had asked Frank Dobson 
whether he was calling for a boycott of Shell, but Dobson had been evasive. When he 
finally received the answer: ‘Yes I think they should’, the presenter expressed his 
approval but was immediately concerned that his reaction might be mistaken for 
agreement with the minister’s position, and thus construed as bias. So, he explained and 
drew attention to that not being the case:
‘Right. Good. I didn’t mean “good I agree with you” but thank you for answering 
my question.’
The BBC wished to appear objective even in a programme that presented views critical of 
Shell.
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The presenter also brought up, for the very first time on the BBC, the legality of 
Greenpeace’s protest activities, which meant that the report did not entirely lean towards 
Greenpeace’s position. These factors once again show that demonstrating impartiality 
was considered important.
The second BBC News report on Brent Spar, BBC 9 O’Clock News, June 12, was also an 
exception to the dominant mode of BBC's coverage. The report suggested that the Spar 
contained toxic substances that would damage the marine environment and that its 
disposal would set a precedent for the disposal of other installations and, in doing so, 
echoed Greenpeace’s claims. These issues were presented as fact rather than being 
fiercely contested. Moreover, the traditional ploys employed to suggest impartiality (in 
this case, the attribution of that view to Greenpeace and stating that Shell claimed 
otherwise) were also absent. The report inclined towards Greenpeace’s position and 
ended with the observation that ‘more rigs are likely to be dumped at sea’, which once 
again reinforced Greenpeace’s position.
The third exception was the BBC 9 O’Clock News, June 18, which excluded claims that 
Greenpeace had earlier made on Breakfast with Frost, yet repeated counter arguments to 
Greenpeace made on that same programme. These were Eggar’s criticism of Greenpeace 
for ‘not representing the facts’ and his admonishment that: ‘you [referring to Greenpeace] 
are completely misconstruing the independent studies, and misrepresenting the situation 
of Brent Spar, and as an organisation you’re behaving highly irresponsibly’ (BBC 9 
O’Clock News, June 18). However, the news item did not cover what Chris Rose of 
Greenpeace, had said to Eggar on the earlier programme: Greenpeace’s disclosure that
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their measurement of the oil remaining on board the Spar far exceeded Shell’s estimate 
and that Greenpeace had a sworn affidavit from a Shell worker who claimed to have 
followed orders and sealed toxic waste into the structure of Brent Spar for a secret 
disposal of these toxic substances. These two claims did not gain coverage in any of the 
BBC news programmes and it appears that this was not just for the reason that the news is 
supposed to deal with fresh events rather than recycle the old, because Eggar’s criticism 
of Greenpeace (previously broadcast material that also was advantageous to Shell) was 
subsequently repeated.
Greenpeace’s claims about the high level of oil and the toxic substances supposedly 
hidden in the Spar did not gain coverage by the BBC despite receiving press coverage, 
and the central nature of these claims to Shell’s disposal plan and their exclusion is all the 
more unusual given that television favours the sensational and the dramatic. That may 
point to a deliberate exclusion of those claims rather than an accidental one.
Although one side of the dispute was more favourably framed, the programme included 
the rival view. Again, this was to suggest that the report was objective, but the manner in 
which this was implied (a representation of a critical view of Shell counterbalanced with 
a view supporting Shell) suggested impartiality but also leant towards Shell’s position.
I have said that most of the BBC news programmes presented both sides of the dispute, 
but that position was entirely eschewed on June 19 when the BBC explicitly ratified and 
legitimised Shell’s case. The BBC science correspondent argued in this programme that 
Shell’s case was the more scientifically sound and better argument, which also had 
support from scientists. In describing what the Spar contained, the report ignored
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Greenpeace’s oil estimate and its claim about hidden toxic waste and concurred with 
Shell’s account:
‘It’s now full of sea water but at the bottom of its tanks 100 tonnes of sludge. 
According to Shell 90% of it is sand, the rest is a heavy oil like bitumen. The 
sludge also contains some heavy metals.’
Much news may simply be a recycling of press releases, but the reporter’s use of the 
same comparison that Shell used in its news releases to describe radioactivity emanating 
from the Spar as ‘it’s ... no more than occurs naturally in the granite houses in 
Aberdeen’, indicates that the preferred source was Shell.80 And Greenpeace’s claims 
regarding risks to the marine environment were, implicitly, discredited.
The report gave some concession to Greenpeace’s argument but its presentation 
suggested that it was overridden by the scientific opinion on the subject, which was 
depicted as supporting Shell’s case. Moreover, Greenpeace’s claim that new findings 
regarding the contents of the Spar increased the environmental risks of Shell’s plan was 
once again excluded. Further, the science correspondent also furnished Shell’s claim that 
the environmental impact would be small and harmless:
‘Compared with the millions of tonnes of shipping sunk in the Second World War 
the impact of Brent Spar will be small. Many experts admit it will cause damage to 
the local environment and kill organisms but they are not worried’ {BBC 9 O’Clock 
News: June 19).
Partiality was evident in the way that certain claims were ignored but, typically, most 
BBC news programmes represented both sides of the issue. And, even where reports leant
80 The reporter’s statement duplicated Shell’s news release (May 16) and later news releases that repeated 
that comparison. For example, see page 128.
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towards one side or, in some cases, represented one side of the dispute, the fact that there 
was a different side to the argument was noted. I have suggested that such inclusions of 
opposing views may have been attempts to demonstrate objectivity while a particular 
viewpoint was in fact advanced.
ITV
The IJ T s  news coverage of the crisis was limited to two news programmes, both on the 
same day: June 16 (Lunchtime News and News at Ten).
The ITV coverage began at a time when the issue had already developed to a heightened 
stage and the news appeared very much to be event-led. The two events that gained 
attention and coverage, the firebombing incident in Germany and Greenpeace’s activities 
in re-boarding the Spar, were both dramatic and appealed to the popular format. ‘[T]he 
pattern for ITV more closely approximates to the pattern displayed by the tabloid dailies’, 
note Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock (1995: 113), and that might explain why the 
coverage was event-led and centred on the sensational. The decision to cover these events 
and examine the story at a time when opposition had intensified was influential on the 
coverage because the central theme in both /TF news programmes were the protests 
against Shell - they both began and ended with that.
ITV Lunchtime News led with the picketing of Shell’s petrol stations:
‘Petrol stations owned by Shell are being picketed today because of the company’s 
controversial operation to dump the redundant Brent Spar oil rig in the Atlantic.’
And that report ended with the announcement of more protest:
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‘The campaign to stop the Brent Spar will come closer to home tomorrow when 
Greenpeace mounts a mass picket of Shell’s stations across Britain.’
ITVNews at Ten also began its coverage with the announcement of opposition to Shell’s 
plan:
‘Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl is under intense pressure from 
environmentalists to oppose the plan’ {ITVNews at Ten, June 16).
And the news report ended with the repetition of Greenpeace’s plan to picket Shell’s 
stations the following day.
Although there were instances in both programmes where conflicting views on a matter 
were represented - through the standard manner of signifying objectivity - balance was 
mostly achieved not so much within each individual news programme but when the two 
were taken together, because the two programmes (on the same day) each represented the 
two positions. The first news programme drew attention to Greenpeace’s perspective and 
the second concentrated on Shell’s.
The first programme initially gave equitable coverage to both Shell and Greenpeace’s 
claims regarding the risks of Shell’s plan in the typical manner which I have described:
‘Shell says the decommissioned hulk will cause minimal environmental damage 
when it is dumped in 2000 metres of water. But Greenpeace claim it is a toxic 
firebomb’ {ITV Lunchtime News, June 16).
However, the report then included a clip reproducing Greenpeace’s view while excluding 
Shell’s. Chris Rose from Greenpeace was shown claiming:
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‘The Brent Spar has long-life industrial toxic chemicals on board. There is about, 
we believe, 130 times more oil than Shell has claimed, about 5000 tonnes. That will 
be oil pollution, there’s [aboard the Spar] heavy metals pollution, PCBs which 
cause long-term changes in mammals... .’
The only representation of Shell’s position in this news report was in the inclusion of 
John Major’s statement that:
‘As far as I am aware the disposal of the Brent Spar is in accordance with 
international law’.
Despite minimal representation of Shell’s views in this programme, the next (News at 
Ten, June 16) focused on Shell’s views. It included a clip of Chris Fay, Chairman of Shell 
UK, responding to Greenpeace’s action in airlifting two activists on board the Spar and 
arguing that Greenpeace’s action was probably ‘outside the international rules of flying’, 
and that this type of protest ‘is indeed evident of the types of things they have tried to 
do’. The reporter had earlier claimed that Shell had stated that the action was 
‘irresponsible’ and, in keeping with television news conventions, the quote from Chris 
Fay was used to illustrate that view.
Unlike the first news report, this one did highlight that Greenpeace’s claims about the 
disposal was ‘far from universally accepted’ and included a clip of Dr Tony Rice, who 
was a key scientist supporting Shell and frequently quoted in the media:
‘Oh, I think they [Greenpeace] are honest in believing [his emphasis] that the 
impact will be greater in the deep sea. We are saying that they are wrong and they 
are simply giving the wrong impression to the public’ (News at Ten, June 16).
In spite of giving a greater representation to a particular position in each of the two 
reports, ITV also presented the news in a way that suggested impartial coverage. The
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news reports simply outlined both views and refrained from analysing them. Although 
the other channels also did this, ITV did it to a far greater degree. This lack of analysis, 
suggesting a mere recording and announcement of developments, worked towards 
indicating objectivity, and this route was perhaps taken in order to create that impression. 
Try’s focus on events (such as the firebombing and pickets), rather than the arguments 
for and against sea disposal, also functioned towards signifying that the news coverage 
was impartial.
Channel 4
Channel 4 News began coverage of the issue more or less at the same time as ITV, that is, 
on June 15 and 16. Although the dispute between Shell and Greenpeace was reported, 
Channel 4 News did not consider the story to be a major one. The first report on the 
matter maintained that the dispute was a distraction from the bigger issue of the situation 
in Bosnia. That programme reported Kohl’s decision to raise the issue of the disposal of 
the Spar with Major at the G7 summit:
‘Chancellor Kohl has come in here [the G7 summit] saying that he has something 
of a bone to pick with Mr. Major, insisting that the British government should not 
allow the Shell oil company to sink that oil platform, the Brent Spar out in the 
North Sea and that he will be making an issue of it with the Prime Minister’
(Channel 4 News, June 15).
The report depicted Kohl’s decision to bring this up with Major as giving undue attention 
to a not very big issue, arguing that other matters should concern the G7:
‘So much talk but a sense already of how little will be achieved here [at the G7 
summit] if world leaders choose to side-step the number one issue: Bosnia.’
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In sharp contrast to BBC and /TFnews, Channel 4 News on June 15 said nothing about 
Greenpeace’s claims or its actions and nothing was shown about its campaign and direct 
action taken against Shell. And it is only from a video of Kohl stating that ‘people in 
Europe and especially in Germany are unhappy with Shell’s decision’ that one gets a 
sense that Shell faced opposition. This lack of interest in the specifics of the altercation 
was a consequence of the report’s view that it was not an important story. The second 
news report also took that stance.
That programme placed the wrangle over the Spar in a wider context, as the situation was 
represented as a challenge faced by the oil industry in its operations in the North Sea. The 
main theme of that report was outlined as follows:
‘We examine the legacy of twenty years of North Sea o il... Has North Sea oil been 
the godsend we thought it would be?’ {Channel 4 News, June 16)
And, after some discussion on the protests against Shell in Germany, the report once 
again returned to a broader context:
‘The row [over the Brent Spar] is just the latest in a series of controversies 
generated by the exploitation of North Sea o il... Our [report] assesses now who’s 
gained, who’s lost from the exploitation of Britain’s black gold.’
The main topic was the history of North Sea oil:
‘Ironically today should have been a day of celebration for the oil industry. It is 
almost twenty years to the day that the first North Sea oil came ashore.’
Following an examination of that history - which did not include any material on or 
pertaining to the quarrel between Shell and Greenpeace - the news report concluded:
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‘For environmentalists, politicians and technicians alike, North Sea oil has always 
thrown up fresh challenges. For the [oil] industry the future looks as bright as it 
ever has. But only if it meets the environmental challenges of the nineties with the 
inventiveness it has always shown.’
In this way the dispute over the Spar was represented as a minor issue (a ‘challenge’) and 
linked with what was characterised as the bigger story: the history of the oil industry’s 
involvement in the harvesting of North Sea oil. It is quite possible that Channel 4 had 
archive material on the North Sea that it could use, but the decision to cover the conflict 
between Shell and Greenpeace in a very minimal way meant that, relative to BBC and 
ITV news, very little attention was given to the specifics of the row.
The traditional format of Channel 4 News (a longer examination of fewer stories rather 
than several headline stories and almost an hour as opposed to BBC and /TPs 25 minute 
news slots) allowed for an in-depth examination, yet an extended consideration of the 
claims Shell and Greenpeace made was not undertaken. This reflected Channel 4,s lack 
of interest in the matter.
Despite not examining the particulars of the situation, the report did represent the two 
main contenders in specific ways. Both Shell and Greenpeace were depicted as steadfast 
and resolute in their efforts to achieve their conflicting goals. Shell was portrayed as the 
aggressor:
‘Greenpeace helicopter comes under attack by Shell as the company tries to dump 
an oil platform.’
Although little was said about the situation, Channel 4 deployed certain standard 
conventions. For example, the June 16 report stated: ‘[Shell’s plan is] endorsed by
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Britain’s offshore industry’ and then, in order to establish that, quoted Dr Harold Hughes 
of the UK Offshore Operators Association defending Shell’s stance. And a clip of a 
Greenpeace spokesman, Chris Rose, maintaining the contrary view, followed that 
statement.
After an examination of the visual coverage of the crisis, I will consider what my 
observation of the deployment of certain standard narratives in television news means for 
how this crisis was covered, and will discuss what that means for the claims made about 
television coverage.
The visual coverage of the crisis
That television news used Greenpeace footage was clearly discernible because the source 
of some videos was labelled as Greenpeace. In view of that labelling, it is odd that 
television executives claimed otherwise and this circumstance suggests that there may 
have been other reasons for that claim.
A particular Greenpeace video that consultants, Shell and television executives isolate as 
creating bias: the ‘Spar scene’,81 was frequently shown. Essentially, they maintain that it 
portrayed Shell as the malevolent, thoughtless aggressor and Greenpeace as the 
benevolent, courageous victim. Whether ‘the public’ interpreted the material in such a 
way is speculative, yet largely assumed in that argument.
81 See page 215.
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The argument that the broadcasting of this material resulted in biased television coverage 
is simplistic. In order to examine the issue of whether the visual coverage of the crisis 
and, in particular, this video created the symbolic imagery they claim, I focused on how 
the videos were used, paying particular attention to the accompanying verbal reports, 
because those narratives, I believe, play a role in the portrayal and the understanding of 
the situation shown by the visuals. Having taken that approach, my observations call into 
question what the consultants, Shell and television executives maintain with regard to the 
visual coverage of the crisis in general and the use of Greenpeace footage in particular.
With regard to the labelling of the controversial footage, my findings from investigating 
BBC, ITV and Channel 4 news are that the Spar scene video was sometimes shown 
unlabelled by all three channels, but was either labelled when it was subsequently shown 
or had been labelled at previous times. Greenpeace footage, other than that video, was 
also often labelled. The suggestion that Greenpeace material was not labelled is not true.
The claim that a lack of labelling led to bias is further problematic because, although 
television executives made much of the labelling of the footage, I wondered whether it 
made much of a difference. They assumed that it did or they might have felt they had to 
state that it did, but it is not certain whether audiences notice the labelling of the source of 
a video and, even if they do, it is not certain whether they make the appropriate 
adjustments to their judgements. For instance, Ericson (1989) argues that the television 
viewer, unlike the newspaper reader, has no chance for retrieval unless news is recorded, 
which is not how television news is normally consumed. And research suggests that, even
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if it is held still and motionless (on ‘pause’) and not watched in the ‘normal’ manner, 
different reactions to television news can be obtained (Ericson 1989).
Whether the Spar scene conveyed the symbolism and imagery that consultants, Shell and 
television executives claim was not, I felt, as uncomplicated and tangible as they suggest. 
Furthermore, my examination of the verbal reports that went along with the video on the 
BBC and ITV programmes did not support consultants’, Shell’s and television executives’ 
claims about the promoted impressions of Greenpeace and Shell.
The BBC used the video in combination with a description of what was taking place. That 
description stated the reason why Shell was using the water hoses and, in doing so, gave 
an account of the situation that did not support the wicked Goliath fighting the well- 
meaning David imagery, cited by consultants, Shell and television executives as creating 
a biased view:
‘The water cannon deters sabotage dinghies launched by a Greenpeace vessel 
Altair, itself engaged in a game of cat and mouse with a patrol boat’ (BBC 9 
O’Clock news, June 12);
‘Protected by water cannon at a support vessel the Brent Spar rig is continuing its 
slow progress towards its proposed graveyard in the Atlantic’ (BBC 9 O’Clock 
news, June 18).
The verbal report accompanying the visual portrayed the situation as one where Shell 
‘protected’ the Spar and ‘deterred’ ‘sabotage’ attempts by Greenpeace. Therefore, the 
view that the dominant Shell attacked the powerless Greenpeace was not promoted, in 
contrast to what consultants, Shell and television executives uphold.
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The BBC's use of the visuals as a description of Greenpeace’s protests, rather than just 
Shell’s actions, also contradicts what they claim. Contrary to what has been said 
regarding the depiction of Shell and Greenpeace, the descriptions that accompanied the 
contentious video characterised Greenpeace rather than Shell as the more potent, 
aggressive and powerful party in the conflict:
‘After a weekend of conflict at sea, Greenpeace is now trying for another 
opportunity to try and block the sinking of the Brent Spar and, with more rigs likely 
to be dumped at sea, these scenes seem certain to be repeated’ (BBC 9 O’Clock 
news, June 12);
‘A Greenpeace ship continues to shadow the rig as it tows towards its disposal site’ 
(BBC 9 O’Clock news, June 15);
‘A Greenpeace vessel is monitoring every move. And with two of its activists on 
board the storage tank it is determined to stop Shell from sinking its redundant rig’
(BBC 9 O’Clock news, June 18).
The verbal reports did not depict Greenpeace and Shell in the manner claimed. Shell, 
rather than Greenpeace, was presented as under siege.
ITV also used Greenpeace footage, which was apparent because the source of some 
videos was labelled as Greenpeace. The Greenpeace video of their helicopter attempting 
to land on the Spar’s heli-deck while avoiding the water hoses was used, along with the 
Spar scene video, as in BBC news programmes. In total disparity with the suggestion that 
television news did not divulge the source of video footage, the ITV reporter explicitly 
drew attention to the clip of the helicopter being a Greenpeace video:
‘This Greenpeace video shows the latest clashes ... The vessels towing the rig out 
to sea surrounded it with a curtain of water. Greenpeace couldn’t get through the 
water jets so they decided to go over it instead’ {ITVNews at Ten, June 16).
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Once again, that account does not portray Shell and Greenpeace in the manner claimed. 
Instead, Greenpeace was depicted as determined and Shell as surrounding the installation 
with a ‘curtain of water’, which is not a critical description of the company or its action in 
deterring Greenpeace from boarding the Spar.
The report continued with comment on Greenpeace’s action, which included views on 
this from both sides:
‘The operation was not without risk. The Greenpeace helicopter flew through jets 
of water. Courageous, say the campaigners. Irresponsible, say Shell’ (ITV News at 
Ten, June 16).
This was followed by a video of the Chairman of Shell, Chris Fay, criticising 
Greenpeace’s manoeuvre. Here, the use of Greenpeace footage permitted Shell to argue 
in a manner that was critical of Greenpeace and, hence, worked in the company’s favour. 
That is far from the claim that the use of Greenpeace footage compromised Shell’s 
position and argument.
In contrast to BBC's and ITV s reports, the verbal reports given by Channel 4 News 
promoted a similar view of Greenpeace and Shell to that which consultants, Shell and 
television executives claim. Shell was quite clearly depicted as the aggressor in the 
description that Greenpeace’s helicopter ‘comes under attack’. The last time the two 
Greenpeace videos were shown (the helicopter and Spar scene were used and labelled), 
Channel 4 News had the following verbal account:
‘In the North Atlantic today it looked like a battle scene ... A Greenpeace 
helicopter was pounded by water jets as it approached. Even so, two protesters
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managed to get on the rig. Shell says sinking the oil rig one and a half miles under 
sea is the safest option’ (June 16).
The above account portrayed Greenpeace and Shell in a similar manner to that which 
consultants, Shell and television executives claim. That there was a ‘battle’ and that 
Greenpeace were being ‘attacked’ and ‘pounded’ does frame the main parties in specific 
ways. For example, whereas ITV had depicted Greenpeace as going over the water jets, 
Channel 4 portrayed Shell’s water hoses as attacking the helicopter. However, as 
previously observed, Channel 4 News's reports of the situation did represent the views of 
both sides of the dispute, as is also evident in the above quotation which included the 
representation of Shell’s views.
Despite not entirely invalidating what has been claimed about the visual coverage of the 
crisis and the use of Greenpeace footage, my observations point to certain problems with 
that argument, not just because the source of the video was often identified but also, more 
importantly, because the verbal reports that went with the video did not always guide 
perceptions in the way consultants, Shell and television executives claim. That finding 
has consequences for the claims about how television news scenes symbolised the dispute 
between Shell and Greenpeace. Even if we consider the possibility that the visuals 
supported the imagery claimed by consultants, Shell and television executives, the 
finding that BBC, ITV and Channel 4 news reports did not support that depiction, coupled 
with the finding that the BBC and ITV’s verbal adjuncts to the visuals also did not support 
that imagery, is significant to the accusation that television coverage was biased and to 
the question of whether that was how television news represented the crisis.
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Observations on the television coverage
My examination of television coverage of the crisis, as with the press coverage, does not 
support the consultants’ and Shell’s claim that there was a bias and that the company’s 
case did not gain representation. What we have principally learned from the examination 
of television coverage of the crisis is that television news was quite concerned to be 
impartial and also to demonstrate it. That the television news was more impartial than the 
press coverage is also discernible.
Earlier, I stated that both the BBC and ITN, the news provider for Channel 4 and ITV, 
operated under the public service broadcasting remit and had a governing principle to be 
impartial. Impartiality is not only expected from television news but is also a valued goal. 
I have demonstrated that BBC, ITV and Channel 4 news coverage employed certain 
conventions to suggest impartiality. Thus, we have seen how that principle exercised its 
influence on the way in which the crisis was reported, because the format of most news 
reports covered the conflicting views of the situation and all were concerned to appear 
objective.
I found that ITV and Channel 4 news coverage did not appear to lean towards any party 
involved in the dispute. Most BBC News programmes, as with ITV and Channel 4, were 
also characteristically impartial. Nevertheless, there were instances where coverage leant 
towards one side of the dispute. Quite significantly, towards the later stages of the 
immediate crisis, BBC News favoured Shell’s case. That observation of a leaning towards 
Shell’s views is in stark contrast to the nature of bias as held by Shell and consultants,
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who accuse television coverage of a bias towards the views of Greenpeace. My 
investigation shows that this was not the case.
Determining the validity of consultants’ and Shell’s claims regarding bias in television 
coverage is complicated, but not entirely hampered, by what they have said about the role 
played by the exhibition of a Greenpeace video. I have suggested that, as it is widely 
acknowledged that television news scenes can be imagistic and symbolic that claim could 
be made, yet it is by no means certain that it is valid. However, it seems that it is not 
necessary to prove that something actually was the case but credibly to argue that it could 
have been.
I will later elaborate on how my observations on television and press coverage are 
consequential to crisis management.
On the consultants’ interpretation of this case
This section compares the case with the consultants’ recommendations and the specific 
arguments they make about this case.
The previous chapter demonstrated that events were not only unforeseen but also had an 
openness and emergent quality that made prediction difficult. Almost everything was 
open to interpretation, changeable, and constituted by the situation as it unfolded. My 
analysis of this case draws on that line of reasoning, which bears on the consultants’ 
argument that Shell could have better managed the issue to prevent crisis, and that the 
crisis itself could have been better handled. Could Shell’s difficulties in managing the
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crisis be explained in terms of the difficulties involved in predicting the future? And are 
consultants’ criticisms a case of hindsight being twenty-twenty? If so, what does that 
reveal about the criticisms they make and about their recommendations?
The outline of the consultants’ recommendations I use below and in the next chapter 
(rationales 1 to 5) is one that is compiled from an examination of the consultants’ account 
of crisis management described in chapter one.
Rationale 1: Prevent crises through issues management. Coordinated and centrally 
controlled responses have to be made and managed at an early stage as contentious issues 
arise. The organisation facing a crisis must present itself as united.
Situation: Despite accepting that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group was entirely taken by 
surprise when they faced a crisis over the Brent Spar, consultants argue that the company 
should have foreseen opposition but did not. They claim that, because the company did 
not recognise potential problems, it did not effectively manage troublesome issues, which 
ultimately resulted in the full blown crisis. Moreover, consultants propose that Shell’s 
earlier response to the situation damagingly revealed that the corporation was divided 
over the issue of how best to dispose of the Spar. My examination of this case lends some 
justification to these claims, but there are problems with them.
Firstly, Shell had not encountered any criticism when its sea disposal plan was publicly 
announced two months before Greenpeace’s protest activities. Thus, before Greenpeace’s 
occupation of the Spar and before opposition, Shell was unaware that its plan could 
become controversial. As I demonstrated, the first sign of protest that Shell encountered
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was when Greenpeace occupied the Brent Spar. Shell was oblivious to the existence of an 
‘issue’ that required management. On the face of it, this seems to justify consultants’ 
criticisms, but the fact that Shell was unaware and therefore unprepared poses problems 
for the maxim of addressing issues at an early stage. How does an organisation go about 
managing issues of which it is not aware? Furthermore, before Greenpeace’s protests 
there were no indications that the sea disposal plan would become contentious.
The lack of early preparation by Shell, according to consultants, was a central reason for 
the crisis situation. Nevertheless, there is a dilemma that exists within this. The company 
may have imagined that, once the Greenpeace supporters had been removed from the 
Brent Spar, the disposal would proceed smoothly. Moreover, the company may also have 
supposed that the protests would blow away once the public and critical politicians came 
to see the efforts Shell had taken in arriving at its decision, which it repeatedly outlined in 
its news releases. Of course this did not happen, but it is often no simple matter to 
determine the outcome certain courses of action would have until after the event. 
Macnaghten and Uny argue: ‘... many interventions ... generate unexpected and 
unpredictable reactions which can escalate the issue and the problem far away from what 
is apparently intended’ (1998:249).
Consultants maintain that key personnel should have a visible presence, pay attention to 
potentially problematic issues and get involved in handling the crisis because without 
such ‘focus at the absolute top of the organisation reputations and performance are 
quickly threatened’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 69-70). They argue that ‘the chief 
executive did not make these decisions at an early stage’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 70).
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This claim is justified as Cor Herkstroter, Royal Dutch CEO, decided only at a later stage 
of the crisis, on June 15, i.e. a week before the scheduled date for the disposal, to take 
charge of the situation personally. Consultants attribute to this aspect a determining 
causality, and Regester and Larkin correctly argue that this is one significant reason why 
Shell found it difficult to handle the crisis.
There should have been a coordinated communications effort at an early stage, 
consultants argue:
‘... faced with managing an issue, a company must never appear divided. 
Perceptions matter. The perception was that Shell did not speak with one voice ... it 
is imperative that... there is always a single, consistently communicated position 
on an issue, with authorized spokespeople assigned to represent that position’ 
(Regester and Larkin 1997: 73-74).
That Shell did not communicate a single consistent view of the situation at an early stage 
is demonstrated in my examination of the case. Even when Greenpeace occupied the 
Spar, Shell UK did not communicate this development to the other European companies. 
But neglecting to inform other companies was a result of the structure and the culture of 
the corporation; Shell UK and its subsidiary, Shell Expro, were the only companies in the 
corporation which were meant to make decisions concerning the Spar. That oversight, 
however, showed disregard for the fact that what was said about ‘Shell’, in a worldwide 
debate of the Brent Spar issue, affected the image of the whole corporation. Responses to 
control that circumstance could not be coordinated and managed at an early stage because 
senior management did not have knowledge of the situation and, therefore, could not 
make strategic communication decisions and protect the image of the corporation.
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Furthermore, it was not until nearly a month after the first Greenpeace occupation of the 
Spar that the public relations operation for handling the situation with Brent Spar was 
moved from Aberdeen to London (on May 23), even though Peter Duncan was in daily 
communication about the volatile situation in Germany with Chris Fay, who was based in 
London. A lack of coordinated communications meant that a series of contradictory 
public announcements were made which complicated the situation.
In hindsight we can see that the absence of an earlier coordinated response had damaging 
consequences, but for the corporation that was not apparent at the time. While such a 
strategy makes sense, it was nevertheless difficult to put into practice given that the 
corporation was structured in a decentralised way and different approaches to business 
and different operative cultures were very much a part of the culture of the organisation. 
Consultants criticise ‘Shell’ for having taken this or that action but, in reality, ‘Shell’ was 
not one entity with uniform views, as the conflicting attitudes of Shell Germany and Shell 
UK quite distinctly showed. Contradictory communications also emerged because the 
corporation was in actual fact divided over the issue - they were not just a result of a 
mistake but expressions of differences of opinion within the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of 
companies. Given such fragmentation, it is difficult to envisage that one view of the 
situation could have been disseminated at an early stage, though a uniform view of the 
situation did emanate from the organisation at a later date, as my analysis shows.
Perhaps this state of affairs was inevitable, for how are decentred organisations to portray 
themselves as a single unit with uniform views when the fact of the matter is that each 
component is differentiated from the others? And even though an organisation might
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accept that such a posture is necessary in an abnormal situation, recognising that an 
abnormal situation has arisen which warrants that response is not always feasible. That 
indicates problems with the consultants’ advocacy of early management. In retrospect it 
is quite easy for the consultants to pinpoint the stage at which Shell should have centrally 
controlled its communications. For the corporation, operating at the time, this was not so 
clear.
While what I have stated above does not refute the consultants’ argument that the 
company followed a misguided course, it does show the problems involved in identifying 
which courses of action would be beneficial and which damaging as events are taking 
place.
The consultants’ argument about the necessity of early management of contentious issues 
appears sensible but as can be seen though Shell’s experience, knowing what will become 
contentious is inherently uncertain. And, when contention arises, what actions need to be 
taken in such circumstances are also unclear.
Rationale 2: Understand and respond to public emotions and perceptions of the issue. 
Consultants maintain that negative perceptions demand a response, even if the company 
feels that the issue is not very serious or that the perceptions are wrong.
Situation: Regester and Larkin take the conventional view amongst consultants that in 
this instance a crisis arose because Shell had not assessed and responded to perceptions of 
sea disposal at an early stage. Shell is depicted as having completely failed to understand 
and respond to perceptions.
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Having examined the circumstances, I would claim that it was not quite this simple. Shell 
did not entirely fail to respond to perceptions and there are difficulties in ascertaining 
whose perceptions are important and must be addressed.
Firstly, the initial circumstances assured Shell that there was no problem. All the 
regulatory and legal procedures had been followed. Under the UK government’s 
guidelines for the disposal of an offshore installation Shell was required to carry out 
consultations with various interested groups. For the company at the time, those groups, 
together with the governmental organisations, were its key audiences. All the company’s 
key publics, at this time, had accepted the position of the company and no opposition or 
protest followed the public announcement of its plan. Given this situation, it is incorrect 
to state that at this stage, Shell had not addressed perceptions of the issue because there 
was no indication that there were negative perceptions of the plan.
Although Shell had consulted and gained the acceptance of those who were key 
audiences (at the time), consultants argue that the problem was that Shell had not 
consulted widely enough. However, determining how widely to consult is not 
straightforward. Deciding who your key publics are is a complex venture, as they not 
only differ according to a company’s disparate activities but they may also change as 
events develop.
The circumstances of this case confirm that certain publics become key as events 
develop. The general public in the UK and elsewhere became significant to Shell as 
public protest emerged and as Greenpeace addressed that public in its campaign. And the 
same can be said of the German public. The fact that the German public, along with the
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general public elsewhere, later protested and thus subsequently evolved into key publics, 
points to problems with the consultants’ argument. Clearly those publics emerged as key 
ones as events developed. Predicting that is not necessarily feasible. Consequently, this 
case illustrates how the relevance of certain groups may change according to 
circumstances. Whether it is possible to prevision and predict this process is not as simple 
as consultants suggest. There are some very real practical difficulties with the proposal 
that perceptions have to be assessed and addressed. A relevant observation of symbolic 
interactionism is that ‘significant others’/key publics emerge and are constituted by the 
situation as it develops (Rock 1979). They are not necessarily there initially and thus 
cannot always be discerned at the outset.
Consultants argue that an organisation such as Shell, which operates on an international 
level, should have been familiar with a variety of diverse publics in various markets 
especially with the dominant views on environmental matters, an issue on which the oil 
industry is particularly susceptible to criticism. But as Herbert Blumer argues in his 
writings on public opinion, public opinion crystallises around issues as they emerge; it is 
not static (Shibutani 1970; Blumer 1986). Hence, had Shell conducted a poll to ascertain 
public opinion on sea disposal, and proceeded with its plan on that basis, the company 
might still have faced the same situation because public opinion fluctuates. The situation 
is even more complex when groups such as Greenpeace seek to influence public opinion, 
as happened in this case.
Consultants argue that in contrast to Shell, Greenpeace’s campaign addressed different 
audiences in different ways, and in doing so incorporated and appealed to their diverse
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views. Winter and Schweinsberg (1996) certainly argue that this was so. That 
Greenpeace’s campaigns in the UK and in Germany had different focuses shows that 
Greenpeace assessed and responded to the different perceptions of these distinct 
audiences. Mary Douglas (1998) observes a situation very much borne out by the Brent 
Spar case, that is, that perceptions of risks are cultural ; different cultures have dissimilar 
ideas about what constitutes dangers. Accordingly, there were different responses to 
Shell’s plan in Germany and in the UK.
The consultants ask the loaded question that if Greenpeace had recognised that the 
German population is more susceptible to environmental issues, why had Shell been slow 
to appreciate this? But it is not as uncomplicated as they suggest.
Shell did not predict that the disposal of the Brent Spar would become a worldwide issue, 
or even one that would be considered questionable, and there are very real problems in 
foreseeing that. As demonstrated by this, it is often unclear at an early stage who would 
become ‘key’ publics, and when that is apparent and manifest, responding to those 
perceptions might also be compromised due to such responses being overdue.
Consultants recognise that when Shell encountered opposition it was too late to review, 
assess and respond to the German public but they do not allow for the fact that key 
publics emerge as events develop.
With regard to the consultants’ contention that Shell’s communications failed to respond 
to perceptions, after examination of Shell’s news releases it does not seem as if the 
company completely failed to address perceptions of the situation, despite outwardly
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failing to respond to one crucial perception. Greenpeace’s opposition to the disposal of 
the Brent Spar was very much based on the claims that:
(a) it would set a precedent;
(b) sea disposal would endanger the marine environment and land disposal would be 
environmentally less damaging;
(c) sea disposal was wrong in principle.
Shell’s news releases denied (a), stating that the options for disposal available to the other 
oil installations would be considered on a case by case approach, and responded to (b), by 
presenting its scientific studies that demonstrated that this would not be the case but 
seemingly ignored (c). While Shell’s communications did address the sea disposal 
method and argued that this method was preferable in the instance of the Spar, they did 
not explicitly address the perception that sea disposal was wrong in principle.
Consultants claim that Shell did not address the perceived seriousness of the sea disposal 
method as it continued to believe that there was no real reason for the opposition. Shell 
reiterated in its communications that all its actions had been lawful and considerate of the 
environment. The consultants assert that this type of statement ignored the basis of much 
of the opposition, which was based on a perception that it was not all right to throw 
industrial waste into the sea. My analysis of Shell’s press releases show that Shell failed, 
to an extent, to see that people might believe that sea disposal was undesirable, 
unacceptable, and even immoral. But, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Shell may 
have intended to address that view by presenting its scientific and legal case. Perhaps 
Shell was responding to the moral dimensions of the opposition by proposing that
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scientific methods (such as environmental impact studies of disposal at sea) were better 
responses to the problem of disposal than moral ones. The company’s argument, 
however, was not a moral one, nor would it necessarily address moral responses to the 
chosen disposal method.
Shell may have failed to take account of the following. The disposal was seen as 
polluting, and pollution, as Douglas argues, critically hinges on moral and cultural 
questions of boundaries, purity and transgression. Her book, Purity and Danger (2001), 
argues that what a particular culture considers unclean and unacceptable is determined by 
what that culture endeavours to achieve, i.e. ‘the ideal social order’ (2001: 73), as she 
calls it. Following from that, considering the sea disposal of the Spar as unacceptable and 
wrong is determined by what a particular society finds acceptable and right. Thus, it is a 
moral issue. Douglas’s analysis of pollution helps in understanding the opposition against 
Shell as she showed that people respond to pollution concerns on a symbolic and moral 
basis. Protests against Shell prohibited the company from carrying out an act that 
contravened the ideal social order. The protests were attempts to create, maintain and 
sustain a particular culture - a culture that did not look favourably on sea disposal. The 
claim that Shell’s planned action was dangerous also related to that endeavour because 
Douglas shows that evoking danger attempts to prohibit actions that might imperil the 
ideal social order. Therefore, Shell’s argument that the sea disposal was not dangerous, 
made with reference to scientific findings, could not address what was really at issue.
As we have seen, Shell certainly proffered and reiterated its case, which was based on 
rational scientific arguments about the limited risks the Brent Spar would pose to the
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deep sea, and the greater risk to safety and the environment posed by land disposal. But 
this argument was ignorant of the symbolic and moral power of notions of pollution and 
danger to the environment which were elements driving the opposition to Shell’s plan. 
What Shell’s communications did not do explicitly was counter the perception that sea 
disposal was fundamentally wrong. In following this course, Shell failed to address a 
crucial perception that Greenpeace’s campaign relied on and made use of. But it was not 
at all the case that Shell wholly failed to address perceptions, as the consultants maintain.
The consultants view what happened in this case as illustrative of what they claim 
typically happens in most cases involving risks. They uphold a particular construction: 
people often respond to risks in an emotional and irrational manner, attitudes to risks are 
driven by perceptual elements that may be based on irrational assessments of risk, and 
crises and issues are frequently triggered and fuelled by public fear and anxiety (Regester 
and Larkin 1997; Seymour and Moore 2000; Bland 1997). These irrational elements, 
consultants argue, decide perceptions of company reputations and corporate 
responsibility.
Some sociologists who have made similar observations support this view. In their studies 
of a growing concern with risk, Beck (1992; 2000) and Giddens (1996; 2000) view 
responses to risks as often being not entirely rational. They would argue that the limits of 
rationality are revealed very starkly in situations such as the disposal of Brent Spar, 
where rational responses to risks, such as the scientific, were overridden by other 
concerns that were equally, if not more, powerful and relevant. Similarly, in Contested 
Natures (1998) Macnaghten and Urry argue that ‘nature is a hugely significant concept in
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western culture’ (1998: 253), there is no single nature, only natures, ‘each is contested ... 
no one nature is more obviously natural than any other’ (1998: 250) and that ‘how people 
value nature is often highly ambiguous and contradictory; that values only appear to 
inhere in nature in particular and context-specific way ... [vjalues are not free-floating 
but intertwined with senses of insecurity, globalisation, anxiety, individualisation, 
mounting mistrust with politics and scientific expertise, the enhanced role of the media, 
and so on’ (1998:250-251).
Although consultants prefer to see things along the lines of rationality and irrationality, 
and use the contrasts of emotional versus rational in interpreting this case, the 
circumstances of this case are better understood through studies which highlight the 
symbolic and moral power of pollution and the contested nature of ‘nature’. Mary 
Douglas’s observations also express some of the issues consultants wish to emphasise 
and are not entirely unlike what they wanted to propose, i.e. she suggested that what is 
seen as dangerous and polluting is determined by factors other than what might actually 
be the case. However, one must also bear in mind that the consultants’ evocation of the 
notions of emotional versus rational implies that one approach is better than the other. 
And arguing that Greenpeace appealed to emotion whereas Shell was more rational (an 
argument that consultants and Shell retrospectively make), belittles Greenpeace’s claims. 
As I later elaborate, the retrospective use of that argument by Shell is beneficial to the 
company as that view disparages the opponent and justifies its own approach.
Consultants also state that the success of claims about risks is also determined by trust, 
suggesting that this is why Greenpeace’s claims were believed. Through reference to this
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case, Furedi (1998) argues similarly, claiming that who the public trusts determines what 
interpretations of the situation are likely to be believed. Even so, the consultants do not 
see this as an unassailable problem, arguing that what is essential in communicating 
about risks is to respond to perceptions of risks, but clearly, and even in their view, there 
are other issues involved. Furedi’s and consultants’ observations about trust make 
communicating about risks a difficult enterprise, especially for corporations, who are 
often not trusted (Survey On Public Attitudes To Big Business, MORI: 1998). That 
responses to risks are by no means limited to scientific findings and arguments (a 
circumstance the consultants also identify) also shows the difficulties involved in 
influencing perceptions of risks.
I have argued that there are problems with assessing perceptions, but if Shell had found 
the existence of the perception that sea disposal was wrong prior to the crisis, the 
company would have faced three choices: ignore it, discount sea disposal alltogether, or 
raise this issue and convince a wide audience of the merits of sea disposal. Consultants 
advocate the latter approach, arguing that because Shell did not convince the public about 
the merits of its proposed plan at an early stage it lost a lot of money and risked its 
reputation as an environmentally concerned company. But there are problems with that 
argument. Consultants downplay the fact that the existence of views against sea disposal, 
especially strong views couched in morality and expressed symbolically, would mean 
that reversing such a perception would not be a simple matter and might in any event 
have made sea disposal problematic. Furthermore, by raising the issue, the company 
might have inadvertently precipitated the very same crisis it wanted to avoid. That aspect,
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as I have previously said, is most often disregarded in the consultants’ proposal to 
manage issues at an early stage.
Rationale 3: Cultivate knowledge of all relevant audiences, especially that of opponents 
and their agendas and ‘how they are likely to behave’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 72). 
And communicate with such key publics in order to gain their acceptance.
Situation: As discussed above, Shell had trouble isolating, verifying and handling the 
views of all its relevant audiences and there are tenacious difficulties involved in doing 
so. An audience/group that became important for Shell was Greenpeace. According to 
consultants, Shell’s lack of intelligence about Greenpeace’s planned campaign seriously 
compromised the company’s ability to respond successfully to the crisis when 
Greenpeace cast doubt on the disposal plan. Regester and Larkin argue:
‘Shell appeared to have no knowledge of the planned campaign by Greenpeace and 
was [when Greenpeace occupied the Spar] seemingly taken by surprise ... [Shell 
should have had an early warning system which] involves gathering information on 
all relevant audiences, however peripheral in the beginning’ (1997:72).
Greenpeace is a perennial ‘other’ for Shell, and oil companies in general, as the 
organisation had an ongoing position against oil exploration and production. Central to 
the environmental group was an imperative to pressure big oil companies to invest in 
non-polluting renewable energy sources, such as solar power, instead of fossil fuels. 
There had been earlier Greenpeace campaigns against Shell and other oil companies.82
82 At the same time as the Spar campaign, Greenpeace also opposed Shell on human rights and ecological 
issues in Nigeria - a crisis the company would face later that year when the Nigerian government executed 
Ken Saro Wiwa, a human rights campaigner. Incidentally, Greenpeace even made a ‘satellite phone 
link...between the occupiers of the Spar and a demonstration concerning Ken Saro Wiwa, going on outside 
the offices of Shell International in London’ (Rose 1998:102).
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Moreover, as Greenpeace divulges, they had, on previous occasions, used a similar 
strategy to that used in the case of Brent Spar of contesting disposal of the by-products of 
industries to stop the main activities of such industries:
‘Greenpeace had fought a successful campaign to limit the production of nuclear 
materials and the spread of nuclear energy by closing off options for nuclear waste 
disposal... There were obvious, though incomplete, parallels with the Spar... A 
similar “back-end” strategy, in which the industry was made to take away all its 
wastes and pay to deal with it, would force the oil industry to internalise costs 
currently externalised at the expense of the environment and the taxpayer and put a 
brake on oil expansion into the oceans.83 This was one of many rationales for 
campaigning against the dumping of the Spar ...’ (Rose 1998:184).
However, and as Greenpeace admits, much of its activity at this time had focused on the
sea disposal of industrial waste rather than that of oil installations:
‘When the Ospar convention [which regulated the sea disposal and land based 
pollution in the North East Atlantic] was negotiated [in 1992], it is true that 
Greenpeace did not actively campaign to prevent the adoption of the rules in Annex 
III [which allowed the sea disposal of obsolete oil installations]... Greenpeace was 
focused on campaigning for the prevention of the dumping of radioactive wastes ... 
For Greenpeace, as for the rest of the environmental community, the dumping of 
decommissioned offshore installations was still perceived as an issue “for the 
future”’(Rose 1998:43).
It is conceivable that even if Shell had expected Greenpeace to protest (the company 
denies this), the success of that protest might not have been expected. Also, it was 
obvious that Shell had not expected the protest to be conducted from the Spar, as revealed 
by the company’s lack of preparation for it. Further, although Greenpeace was, for oil 
companies, an ‘other’, Shell might not have expected that organisation to emerge as a 
significant other in the particular instance of the Spar disposal. Moreover, as Shell had 
not initially met with opposition and had countered the potential opposition of quite a
83 This is a reference to the tax breaks offered by the government to the oil industry.
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number of other groups, the company was understandably unprepared for the situation 
that arose.
However, consultants insist that Shell would have known that Greenpeace would not find 
the plan acceptable if they had paid sufficient attention to this public:
‘In the case of issues relating to health, safety and environmental protection it is 
essential that organizations pay particular attention to special interest groups. 
Building a profile of the working methods and organization of such groups through 
examining the characteristics, style and approach to campaigning, membership 
recruitment, funding, promotional activities and current agenda setting, will provide 
valuable intelligence for planning purposes’ (Regester and Larkin 1997: 72).
It was not, however, the case that Greenpeace’s campaign plans were publicly accessible.
The Director of Public Affairs at Shell UK, states:
‘Personally, I was quite friendly with Greenpeace and knew Peter Melchett, 
Director of Greenpeace UK, quite well but Greenpeace kept its plans well hidden’ 
(in interview: November 18,2000).
After the crisis, Shell did engage voluntarily in consultations with various interested 
parties, including Greenpeace. By that time, circumstances had made Greenpeace a key 
public and made it easy for Shell to recognise that.
In the crisis management activities that followed the crisis, Shell stated that:
‘We accept that we could have consulted more widely and earlier in the original 
Spar disposal process - but this does not refer just to Greenpeace. We aim to 
communicate openly and listen to people’s concerns and to take part in an industry­
wide effort to do this’ (Brent Spar-The Way Forward, Your Questions Answered, 
Shell UK: October 1995:4).
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In making that statement, Shell agreed with the consultants’ allegation that the company 
should have been better prepared and should have communicated with all its audiences. 
But, as I subsequently elaborate, what Shell said later was part of the company’s crisis 
management and statements such as the above were made in order to represent Shell as a 
company willing to listen and accommodate its critics. The fact that what Shell said 
matched consultants’ proposals might have more to do with the company constructing 
rhetorical realities than with denoting that these proposals are feasible.
However, consultants do capitalise on statements like the above to justify their stance:
‘[Shell] later looked back on its Brent Spar experience in an insightful and 
refreshingly frank [manner]. The lessons Shell learned are applicable to all 
companies facing an issue with the potential to become a crisis. Managers at Shell 
concluded that: the company should have consulted a wide range of stakeholder 
groups; it failed to appreciate the need for ... dialogue; it should have considered 
people’s emotional reactions ...; it should have realised that the general public 
would be interested ...; it needed to adjust its messages for different cultures ...; it 
needed to educate its key audiences, particularly the media, before the crisis 
occurred ’ (Seymour and Moore 2000:16).
Whilst Shell certainly made statements to that effect (see chapter four), it is telling that 
the consultants draw attention, and attach the greatest significance, to those statements 
that agree with their own outlook.
In concluding their examination of the Brent Spar crisis Regester and Larkin quote Shell:
‘Ruminating on the consequence ... Shell UK’s director of public affairs wrote: 
“Businesses will now... have to come to grips with ... symbolic gestures’” (1997: 
75).
And that is a point that consultants also underscore.
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However, the fact of the matter is that no one can know who the ‘all* are before the event. 
Identifying who key publics are, and when ‘others’ would become ‘significant others’ 
and in what circumstances, is a persistent problem and will always be a liability for 
businesses, especially those as large as the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies with 
numerous audiences, in various and often disparate countries.
Rationale 4: Present and communicate the case clearly, quickly, repeatedly and succinctly 
for the message to be effectively conveyed via the media.
Situation: Consultants argue that Shell failed in communicating its case to the media, and 
hence also to a wider audience, because the company communicated scientific and 
technical details too complex to be conveyed by the mass media:
‘Reliance solely on the availability of scientific or technical data without 
communicating clear messages that distil key findings in a manner that responds to 
potential public concern about a particular risk is simply not enough to prevent or 
win the debate ... clear message points repeated over time help to make sense of 
complex issues ... the avoidance of complex language and statistics is essential... 
instead the use of analogies to emphasize the low degree of potential risk to the 
environment, coupled with basic facts, message points and illustrations are effective 
mechanisms for making a clear and compelling case. This type of approach ... is 
about focussing on a few points, and constantly and consistently communicating 
those points to secure understanding and ultimately, support ...’(Regester and 
Larkin 1997:71).
Consultants claim that their experience led them to this maxim, but it also reflects their 
notion of what is the best way to influence media coverage and is based on a logic of 
public relations familiar to them.
My analysis of Shell’s news releases shows that Shell’s communications at the time of 
the crisis did in fact follow the very course Regester and Larkin (1997) later claimed the
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company should have taken but did not. Their critique of this case recommends that Shell 
follow this course: repeat messages, present analogies, ‘demonstrate the remoteness and 
depth of the disposal location’, ‘the potential for marine life to colonise the structure over 
time’, and ‘the health and safety benefits of offshore disposal’ (Regester and Larkin 
1997: 71). That Shell did follow those suggestions is demonstrated below.
Shell continually repeated its message that deep sea disposal was the best environmental 
option:
‘... deepsea [sic] disposal of the Spar has been independently assessed as the best 
option from an environmental point of view, and in terms of several other 
considerations including health, safety and economic efficiency’(Shell UK news 
release: May 16).
‘The careful weighing of all the environmental, safety, public health and economic 
considerations shows that the deep-water sinking of the Spar is the best solution’ 
(Shell UK news release: May 23).
‘The environment, safety, health and economic considerations have been 
responsibly balanced ... the responsible balance for the Brent Spar ... is carefully 
managed deepwater [sic] disposal’ (Shell UK news release: May 31).
‘Aberdeen University have concluded that deepwater [sic] disposal is the best 
practicable option from an environmental point of view and that deepwater [sic] 
disposal is up to six times safer’ (Shell UK news release: June 15).
‘... deepwater [sic] disposal is the best practicable environmental option’ (Shell UK 
news release: June 18).
This message was repeated throughout the crisis situation and even on June 20, after 
deciding against the plan:
‘Shell UK Limited still believes that deep water disposal of the Brent Spar is the 
best practicable environmental option which was supported by independent studies’ 
(Shell UK news release: June 20).
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Additionally, conforming to Regester and Larkin’s recommendation and contrary to their 
criticism, Shell presented analogies:
‘The irreducible sources of possible contamination [left on board the Spar] 
represent such low levels of radioactivity ... the level of radioactivity ... will be no 
more than would emanate from a group of granite buildings in Aberdeen’ (Shell 
UK news release: May 16).
The consultants’ criticism that Shell did not refer to the remoteness and depth of the 
disposal location can also be disproved because that was frequently cited and implicit in 
Shell’s repeated description of its plan as ‘deep water disposal’:
‘... deepwater [sic] disposal [will take place] at a location some 150 miles out in 
the Atlantic where the water depth is more than 6000 feet’(ShelI UK news release: 
May 16).
‘... the designated disposal site, more than 150 miles off the west of Scotland, is in 
the deep Atlantic at a location where the water is more than 1.2 miles deep. The 
environmental impact of disposal at such a location will be negligible’ (Shell UK 
news release: June 15).
Furthermore, although the consultants claim the company did not do so, Shell often 
emphasised the benefits of sea disposal by making the very arguments consultants 
recommend, and criticise the company for not making (that marine life will colonise the 
structure and that there are health and safety benefits of offshore disposal):
‘... in the United States the government has since the mid eighties encouraged oil 
companies to use many structures as artificial reefs in place in the Gulf of Mexico, 
on which marine life has proliferated specifically to the benefit of fishermen’ (Shell 
UK news release: May 16) (Shell UK news release: May 31).
‘Numerous studies have shown that on balance there would be no environmental 
benefit in onshore disposal... while safety and occupational health risks would be 
higher’ (Shell UK news release: May 31) (Shell UK news release: June 15).
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‘... numerous independent studies over 3 years which have conclusively 
demonstrated that in the unusual case of the Brent Spar, deepwater [sic] disposal in 
water 1.5 miles deep, some 150 miles from land in the Atlantic ocean is not only 
the most responsible environmental solution but incurs six times less risk to the 
health and safety of those involved’ (Shell UK news release: June 18).
With reference to Regester and Larkin’s specific criticism of Shell’s communications, I 
have demonstrated that Shell did indeed undertake the type of recommendations they 
make. For one thing, they are wrong in arguing that Shell acted contrary to their 
recommendations when in fact the opposite was true. As I have said, the conception of 
communicating in this manner follows from a logic of public relations which is familiar 
both to consultants and to those conducting public and media relations within Shell. My 
demonstration that Shell did follow a course also recommended by consultants is 
significant in that Shell can be shown to have acted in a manner consultants advise, yet 
gained no benefit from doing so; the promised results did not emerge. Here is a clear case 
where Shell followed the communication tactics consultants suggest yet, according to 
their claim that the media did not convey Shell’s messages, the advice the consultants 
give was adopted to no avail.
Rationale 5: Communicate and cooperate with the media and understand how the media 
function.
Situation: In addition to arguing that the media did not represent Shell’s case, consultants 
also claim that Shell did not appreciate that an issue confined to a single nation could 
rapidly grow into a worldwide issue as a direct consequence of technological advances 
within the mass media:
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‘Issues that involve an international industry and regulatory environment rarely stay 
local. Transmission of information and opinion through a host of newly available 
electronic media cannot be geographically constrained. Similarly, changing 
political systems and agendas demand constant review and assessment no matter 
how removed from equivalent national institutions. Shell in London acknowledged 
that it was astonished by the depth of German feeling on environmental issues 
relating to oceans. Why? An international organisation should be tuned into policy­
making in all the markets in which it operates, particularly those that could be 
affected by a potential change or development like the Brent Spar* (Regester and 
Larkin 1997:74).
Thus they claim that, while the disposal was the legal responsibility of Shell UK, it did 
not necessarily mean that the issue was confined to the UK (which was Shell’s view) as 
events in continental Europe did influence Shell’s planned action.
The circumstances of this case have implications for the globalisation views which 
propose that a new world society is being created, connected by advanced electronic 
media and transnational economic and cultural forces (Giddens 1991; Castells 1997). 
According to such globalisation perspectives, a shared economy and culture brings about 
a greater connection, and political, economic and cultural concerns are lifted above 
national boundaries and national culture (Giddens 2001). Castells (1997) argues that one 
of the primary indicators and driving forces of globalisation is new technologically 
advanced media that allow rapid transmission of information and ideas. Yet here was an 
instance where a corporation operating on a global level did not quite behave in a global 
manner. Disparate responses from the UK and Germany also contest the view that 
transnational cultural forces operated. This situation is intriguing for it reveals that 
globalisation cannot always be demonstrated to be the case.
However, one could argue, as consultants would, that the failure of Shell to behave in a 
global manner and the resulting damage demonstrate the new requirements on
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corporations in the current globalised world. For example, the state of affairs brought on 
by Shell’s failure to recognise and react to the circumstance that opposition expressed in 
one part of the world could have an impact on another part of the world could be viewed 
as supporting ‘the social science of globalisation’ (Urry:2003:x). And it is the case that 
some conditions of this situation support the globalisation perspectives. The fact that the 
action of a company based in the UK, and acting with the consent of the UK government, 
could be opposed on a European level demonstrates a greater integration. The growth of 
knowledge about protests via a technologically sophisticated, advanced and ubiquitous 
mass media also tends to support the idea of a globalised world. Yet, perhaps it is as Urry 
argued: ‘... globalization is never complete. It is disordered, full of paradox and the 
unexpected’ (2003:x); that the situation Shell encountered over Brent Spar demonstrates 
‘the profound limitations of any linear view of the global’ (Urry 2003:x).
With regard to the consultants’ and Shell’s claims about how the media covered the 
crisis, my findings do not corroborate their claims that the media were biased and did not 
represent Shell’s arguments. The strongest refutation of those claims arises because I 
have shown that the media did not cover the crisis in a uniform way. As far as I am 
aware, consultants do not point to any studies on media coverage to support their claims. 
Whilst my examination, for practical purposes, was restricted to UK press and television 
coverage, it still exposes how the consultants’ account of news coverage is a specific and 
advantageous construction that functions in upholding their particular interpretation of 
this incident and in supporting their account of how to manage such affairs.
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Conclusions
Whilst the consultants cite the Brent Spar case to demonstrate the legitimacy and 
necessity of their approach (crises are better handled and even prevented through the 
early management of issues), my analysis of this case contests their interpretation of it 
and develops some observations on their arguments about this case and about crisis 
management.
Although most of the consultants’ arguments about this incident are borne out by 
circumstances, the criticisms they advance, the mistakes they identify and the courses of 
action they recommend, are made with the benefit of hindsight. This is significant, and 
has implications for their claims about this case and for their advice, because what they 
maintain after the event is not as clear at the time and, by the same token, there may be 
practical difficulties in applying their recommendations. The case I make here is a 
general one and does not just relate to the Brent Spar incident, because the point I make 
about the contingent and emergent character of crises is relevant to other incidents and 
also criticises the consultants’ main case: early action prior to events.84 My argument is 
that predicting which issues will develop into a crisis is largely an imprecise exercise, 
although readily identifiable in retrospect.
In relation to early identification and response to issues, I have argued with reference to 
this case that it is difficult to identify which issues will become contentious. Being 
unaware that doubtful issues exist compromises the ability to ‘manage’ and control issues
84 For example, Lezaun’s (2004) study of the strategies developed by the British food industry to find the 
‘path of least resistance’ to public acceptance of genetically modified foods showed that despite the 
concerted strategic preparatory effort, the marketing of GM foods still failed.
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from an early stage, and many issues are also dependent on opposition in order for them 
to become contentious. Even where some opposition exists and issues are disputed, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether that dispute would escalate into a crisis. In short, it is 
impractical to spot which issues will develop into crises and to confirm the effects of 
certain courses of actions until after they have taken place.
Also easily observable in hindsight but not at the time, as the Brent Spar case clearly 
demonstrates, is which publics will become key publics, as they are not initially manifest 
and surface as the situation develops. Determining at an early stage exactly which 
audiences require consultation, monitoring and attention, and the extent of the threat 
posed by these groups, is ambiguous, imprecise and tricky. Identifying key publics at an 
early stage is further complicated when large corporations such as the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group have diverse and numerous publics in countries differentiated by political, 
economic and social conditions as well as different cultural expectations.
I also took issue with the consultants’ allegation that Shell did not communicate in a 
manner endorsed by them (i.e. quickly, clearly and repeating its key messages), and 
demonstrated that Shell did indeed communicate in that fashion. It is odd that consultants 
maintain a claim so easily disproved. Conceivably they had to make this claim to support 
their assertions that the media did not cover Shell’s case and that the company failed to 
manage its crisis because it did not communicate as they suggest.
The circumstances of this case also demonstrate that learning and responding to 
perceptions is not as simple a matter as is presented by consultants. Contrary to them, I 
argued that Shell did address perceptions of the problem. What Shell appears to have
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been defeated by was the highly theatrical quality of Greenpeace’s protest (what 
Macnaghten and Urry (1998) describe as ‘camivalesque’), which was a different kind of 
communicative form from that used by the company (the press release), and 
Greenpeace’s moral case against Shell. The consultants suggest something similar by 
(incorrectly) arguing that Shell’s case did not address perceptions.
I also argued that the situation Shell faced is better described not in consultants’ language 
of emotional versus rational - it was not a simple case of ‘emotional’ arguments 
superseding ‘rational’ considerations - but in terms of the moral and symbolic basis of the 
protest. The consultants’ claim about this matter is not entirely dissimilar to that which I 
proposed, that is, both interpretations see the main reason for the protest as being driven 
by concerns other than the actual risks to the environment posed by Shell’s plan.
The consultants’ claim that Shell should have been more aware that the opposition to its 
plan was not just to do with the actual environmental risks of the disposal is, in 
retrospect, validated. However, at the time this did not seem an apparent oversight to 
Shell nor may such matters be so transparent when events are taking place. The 
consultants point to this case and say it demonstrates the prevailing circumstances of 
contemporary society but their analysis of this case sidelines the very real difficulties 
posed by these circumstances.
We can not only witness in this case the conditions the consultants and the risk society 
perspective observe in contemporary society, but also that the risk thesis shows some 
problems with the consultants’ proposals.
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Concerning the first point - the risks of Shell’s plan were clearly open to social definition 
and construction. If they were not, Greenpeace would not have been able to offer a 
different interpretation of the risks of that plan from Shell. And the involvement of 
Greenpeace points to the ‘sub-politics’ that both the consultants and risk theorists 
identify. Technology certainly played a role in Greenpeace’s campaign, and technological 
changes in the media undoubtedly facilitated the coverage given to this case. This case 
also clearly demonstrates that public acceptance was a very big issue, as consultants and 
risk theorists argue; Shell subsequently found its plan ‘untenable’. The fact that this case 
reveals certain conditions that risk theorists and consultants observe might add to our 
appreciation of what the consultants see as now being necessary, but this is a different 
matter from whether the consultants’ proposals are feasible and, therefore, this 
circumstance should not be taken to qualify the consultants’ recommendations.
I believe that the observations that risk theorists and the consultants themselves make 
point to certain difficulties with the consultants’ arguments. Consultants undermine the 
effects of the processes they identify on crisis management.
Take, for example, the consultants’ and the risk theorists’ classification of a decreased 
trust in corporations. Both parties contend that the issue of trust determines how risk is 
defined, and identify the decreased power of corporations in this matter and the growth of 
other parties more able to command trust and hence also define risks. Even so, 
consultants do not see the problem of communicating about risks to be an indomitable 
one. The consultants’ recommendation that controlled communications which address 
perceptions can influence perceptions, downplays the possibility that corporate
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communications may have little effect and that controlling perceptions, however such 
attempts may be structured, might be rather more contingent on factors external and hard 
to direct than the consultants concede.
There is little suggestion on how to counter external circumstances, which threaten the 
actions advocated. For instance, consultants say that corporations have to engender trust 
but that is something much broader in scope, time and space than the concern of handling 
crises. Also, it may simply not be in the power of the corporation to bring about changes 
in societal dispositions that might be entrenched. How corporations can gain the 
acquiescence of protesters opposing their activities on moral and symbolic bases is 
unclear and remains a predicament. Corporate communication efforts, regardless of how 
they may be ordered, might nonetheless fail due to circumstances that may be beyond the 
control of the corporation.
The consultants appear to contradict themselves. On the one hand, they identify 
conditions which they concede are intractable. On the other, their recommended actions 
assume that these conditions are manageable. I do not believe that consultants would do 
themselves out of a job if they accepted that contention, but their task of convincing 
clients of the merits of their case would be made more difficult. It is in the consultants’ 
interests to portray circumstances as not just problematic (so that crisis management 
appears desirable) but also straightforward and manageable (so that crisis management 
does not seem pointless).
This can also be witnessed in their claims about the media. Both risk theorists and 
consultants agree that the media play a central role in risk-defining, and the shared view
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that the media may be more doubtful of corporate statements, and that complex scientific 
arguments are not conducive to media coverage, compromises corporate efforts to 
explain their case. The consultants’ claim that communications with the media can ensure 
better crisis management is not certain, for the reasons that risk theorists and they 
themselves note - the restricted possibilities for influencing media coverage.
My examination of news reporting suggests that organisations may actually play a very 
restricted role in the ‘presentation of self (Goffman 1959) and their situation, which has 
consequences for what consultants promote. The findings that strong organising 
perspectives were present in the press coverage of the crisis, and that certain frames were 
set from the start and were consistently repeated, have consequences for the capacity to 
control media coverage as consultants recommend. Changing existing and preferred 
frames is not necessarily practicable.
The greater requirement of television news to be impartial creates problems for crisis 
management because that imperative requires television news to give representation to 
differing views. Although this may be merely a gesture towards appearing objective, this 
practice can diminish the particular version that crisis management measures would 
intend to circulate.
The journalistic convention of reporting views on opposite sides might be little more than 
an inert posture, as accounts can still favour one interpretation over another, but it has 
some effect in curtailing the circulation of one perspective; it detracts from its 
propagation. In doing so, this convention has a pre-emptive function, however mediocre 
and token. It also has repercussions for crisis management because this approach limits
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the advancement of a particular angle, as consultants recommend because it seems, 
particularly in television news, that a contrasting perspective will usually also gain 
representation.
However, it was also demonstrated that, in spite of the depiction of opposed views, 
television news sometimes leant more towards one side than the other and that press 
reports, which were more partisan than television news, also did so. For crisis 
management, that circumstance too suggests complications, for how does one ensure that 
a particular outlook is, in such conditions, favourably represented? Both circumstances, 
where impartiality reigns and where reports promote a particular account over others 
(examples of both conditions were shown), pose difficulties for crisis management.
What I have found with regard to the central characteristics of the mass media is that their 
traditional formats, individual traditions, political outlooks, narrative conventions, 
audiences and governing principles appear to influence how news is covered. These 
conditions constrain crisis management because such measures intend to direct news, yet 
their influence is one amongst many. Crisis management measures are further constrained 
because other sources seeking to influence news are present in the process.
Consultants’ recommendation of a tailored approach to managing communications with 
the media, which is based on an assessment of perceptions, allows for the central 
properties of mass media representations that I discerned as it recognises that news is 
value laden and that those different values and individual organisational traditions appear 
to define how news is constructed. Individualised approaches, made on the basis of how 
the different media and the varying approaches within each medium view the situation,
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might be a response to how the distinct and varied media, as my analysis shows, might be 
influenced.
Yet the very fact that the media are varied, structured according to different imperatives, 
political leanings, directing codes and formats, and that these factors appear to exert an 
influence over how news is constructed, impose restrictions on what consultants seek to 
do. My analysis suggests that directing media coverage is not as assured a matter as 
consultants often portray. This is not to say that crisis management measures have no 
value, or that sources cannot influence news (on the contrary, this study of crisis 
management shows how that is aimed for) but to point to the limitations and constraints 
on managing news. It is all the more important to distinguish this because the consultants 
do not point to these factors.
A key finding is that while the Brent Spar case shows merits in the consultants’ case, it 
also reveals its limitations. Both the consultants’ axiom regarding the early management 
of issues and their citation of this case as supporting that view are problematic. The 
consultants’ interpretation of this case as justifying their claims is questionable, and this 
attests to how consultants further a specific interpretation of past incidents to advance 
their arguments. Although a commendable approach in theory, I have questioned the 
consultants’ claim that crises are preventable, and that the escalation of a situation into a 
crisis can be curtailed through the instigation of certain measures, by showing that there 
are constraints to what can be done and that it is not as simple a matter as consultants 
maintain.
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The fact that in hindsight problematic areas and solutions are easier to identity than in the 
immediate situation casts doubt both on the legitimacy of the consultants’ arguments 
about this case and also on the adequacy of their advice. What the consultants principally 
offer is perception management but, I have argued with reference to risk theorists and 
what they themselves note, the possibilities for influencing perceptions during crises 
might be more limited than consultants portray. I also drew attention to the contingent 
properties of crises and how audiences emerge out of the process itself. My analysis of 
this case shows the difficulties involved in predicting events - circumstances were not 
static, evident from the outset and unchanging, and the situation developed and evolved 
in unforeseen ways. I would suggest that crises are often inherently volatile, complex, 
inextricable situations that may elude and complicate efforts to manage them, and it 
appears that controlling the development of crises is far more obscure and intricate than 
how the consultants depict it.
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Chapter 4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER THE CRISIS
This chapter demonstrates how crisis management goes beyond the handling of the 
immediate crisis situation, showing how Shell applied crisis management principles at 
this phase of the crisis and benefited from doing so. That examination allows a 
consideration of the consultants’ case that crisis management after crises is less effective 
and inferior to their advocated approach.
Shell publicly acknowledged that it took measures to address the remaining problems:
‘While the immediate crisis was over, several problems remained. The immediate 
situation and problem was to explain Shell’s position and change of plan. On the 
day of the decision, Chris Fay devoted the rest of the day to giving TV interviews 
and attending the Newsnight programme ... [An objective of the] “New Way 
Forward” [Shell’s new communication strategy] was ... to be extremely open. The 
difference that resulted from the Brent Spar incident was the acceptance [by Shell] 
that it was no longer good enough to explain a company’s action and position but it 
was also necessary to listen to people outside the organisation. It was a mission to 
explain and engage in dialogue’ (John Wybrew, Director of Public Affairs, Shell 
UK, in interview: November 18, 1999).
I will be arguing that Shell’s new communications strategy, or its crisis management, 
reconstructed the past crisis and that this strategy adhered to consultants’ 
recommendations.
A new communications strategy
All communications were handled internally during the crisis. However, following the 
decision to abort the original plan, Shell International sought the advice of 
communications consultants. The appointment of these consultants shows that Shell 
decided that crisis management was necessary, that the company did engage in crisis
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management measures after the crisis, and that the management of the crisis continued 
beyond the end of the immediate crisis.
The MORI Survey on the Views o f Oil and Energy Journalists (1998) reveals that Shell 
had put more effort into improving its communications and relations with the media and 
that these efforts were, at the time, fruitful:
‘Shell’s dedication to its press relations in recent times is bringing dividends ... 
Journalists ... praise Shell for making every effort to learn from its mistakes ... 
many are generally impressed. As one put it: “they are very good. A few years ago 
they would have been at the bottom of my list” ... Shell UK’s ... PR is praised by 
the majority of journalists. Eight out of ten rate [it] as good’.
Journalists are quoted as having said:
‘They [Shell] have totally changed their attitude since Brent Spar’;
‘After [Brent Spar] it [Shell] is putting more effort into the PR side. It is more 
willing to communicate ... ’;
‘They [Shell] woke up after Brent Spar and it has produced a greater 
professionalism in the way they do tilings ...’;
‘[Shell has] gone through a transformation since Brent Spar’;
‘They have dealt with the Brent Spar issue with a lot of care ... and they have put a 
lot of effort into that. So, that’s been impressive. They have gone from having 
difficulty with that subject to dealing with it.’
According to Greenpeace, the start of a greater communications effort by Shell after 
aborting its plan:
‘was the beginning of the spinning of a new history for the Spar campaign. A 
propaganda war was underway ... The result was a whole new mythology about the 
Spar campaign’ (Rose 1998: 132);
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‘This book [a Greenpeace publication on the Brent Spar written by Chris Rose, 
campaign director] tells the story of what happened afterwards as I see i t ... After 
June 1995, although it continued actively to promote a ban on ocean dumping, 
Greenpeace moved onto other things, but Shell spent millions on public relations in 
an ultimately futile attempt to rerun and win the Spar campaign’ (Rose 1998: 15).
While it is in the interests of Greenpeace to maintain that Shell did this, my examination 
backs the claim. Immediately after the decision to scrap the original plan, Shell managed 
perceptions of what happened during the crisis through the creation and instigation of the 
company’s ‘New Way Forward’ programme. One purpose of that programme was: ‘to 
develop [new] proposals for the disposal or reuse of Brent Spar’ (Shell UK news release, 
October 11, 1995). But central to that programme was the open acknowledgement that 
the company’s reputation was damaged and that it was trying to improve the situation. 
Moreover, external communication was not just recognised as important but was also 
used as an explanation for the crisis:
‘... reputation and the public trust and confidence that goes with it depend on ... 
underlying performance and [the] ability to communicate externally ... the Brent 
Spar affair has reminded us that this [external communication] is simply not good 
enough. We have to redouble our efforts to give the public at large a better 
understanding of what we are doing ...’(Heinz Rothermund, Managing Director, 
Shell Expro, ‘Brent Spar’).
Shell named ‘widespread acceptability’ as a new criterion forjudging any new proposals 
for the Spar, and whereas the company had earlier maintained that it had taken this 
approach in arriving at the original disposal plan, it now appeared to accept the criticism 
made during the crisis that it had not done so:
‘We have acknowledged that we originally set out to dispose of the Spar without 
explaining what we were doing early enough or widely enough. As the Way 
Forward develops, we aim to share information with a varied mix of interested
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parties {Brent Spar - Next Stage in New Way Forward, Shell UK Ltd., July 3, 
1996).
This stance conforms to the consultants’ advocacy of a constructive Mea Culpa in order 
to create favourable impressions of the company. Clearly, Shell wanted to rebuild 
confidence in the company.85
Two years after the crisis, in 1997, the British Association of Communicators praised 
Shell’s communications in explaining the situation with the Brent Spar. In accepting an 
award for the company’s CD-ROM on the Brent Spar, Eric Faulds, Decommissioning 
Manager at Shell Expro, outlined what was involved in the new communication strategy 
employed following the crisis:
‘It [the CD-ROM] is an integral part of a communications initiative which includes 
our dedicated Brent Spar Website [launched in May 1996], dialogue seminars in the 
UK and Europe, media briefings, speeches, articles, and helping students and 
academics with case studies. We believe all this is helping to spread wider 
understanding of the complex issues surrounding the Brent Spar and 
decommissioning in general’ (Shell UK news release May 19,1997).
The first part of this chapter analyses two ‘communication initiatives’ the company took, 
which lucidly illustrate the case Shell made after the crisis:
■ An article written by Shell UK Director of Public Affairs, John Wybrew, which 
was published in the journal of the Institute of Public Relations [Vol. 14, No.2, 
July 1995].
■ A speech delivered by Dr Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell UK, 
to a conference on the media at the University of Wales, May 20,1996.
85 The 2004 controversy about Shell’s misrepresentation of proven reserves contests Shell’s conversion to 
greater transparency. The ensuing investigations into the firm’s finances uncovered memos that suggested 
that people serving at the top also knew about the reserves cover-up (The Economist, August 14-20, 
2004:54, '"A Buyer for Shell? ’)
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An overview of events and arguments
While new disposal options were being considered, the Brent Spar was kept in Norway. 
Late in June, a scientific study published in the journal Nature concluded that Shell’s 
original studies had been scientifically sound and conducted using rigorous scientific 
standards. In July, Shell UK commissioned the Norwegian certification authority Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV) to conduct an independent audit of the Spar to verify its contents 
and re-check Shell UK's previous inventory. Until October, when DNV submitted the 
results, Shell did not have any independent way of refuting Greenpeace’s allegations 
about the contents of the Spar. However, events proceeded in a highly desirable manner 
for Shell and the company exploited these opportunities to further its case.
Firstly, on August 26, at the 1995 National Television Festival in Edinburgh, television 
executives publicly supported Shell’s view that the television coverage had been biased. 
David Lloyd, Channel 4' s Senior Commissioning Editor of News and Current Affairs, 
said:
‘On Brent Spar we were “bounced”...we [news organisations] all took great pains 
to represent Shell’s side of the argument, but by the time the broadcasters tried to 
intervene with scientific analysis, the story had by then been spun far, far, into 
Greenpeace’s direction.’86
Richard Sambrook, BBC Editor of Newsgathering, concurred:
‘I think in some sense over Brent Spar we were “had”...we need to wake up. It was 
our own fault, the media’s fault. There was never enough distance between
86 Cited in Shell’s Website and Rose (1998: 158).
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ourselves and the participants. Greenpeace had spent approximately £350,000 on 
TV equipment and feeds, far more than the BBC could have afforded’. 87
According to Greenpeace, media claims of manipulation had been forced by the UK 
government and Shell, but, according to Wybrew, Shell had not influenced or played any 
part in generating that admission.88 The very fact that Greenpeace as well as Shell 
focused on this development showed how central it was to understandings of the past 
crisis.
While we may not know for certain how the admission had come about, it was good for 
Shell. On the back of the television executives’ declaration, Shell could construct an 
efficient defence of its original stance and more convincingly claim that the problem was 
not its lack of concern for the environment but that Greenpeace had unjustly influenced 
the media against the company’s case. In doing so, the company limited the damage 
encountered during the crisis.
The second crucial event that helped Shell’s case was on September 5, when Greenpeace 
apologised to Shell UK for the inaccuracy of its claim that the Spar contained 5,550 
tonnes of oil. (This happened prior to DNV’s corroboration of Shell’s estimate, but 
Greenpeace’s motivation for this declaration might have been the fact that DNV, an 
independent body, was examining the issue and in meetings with Greenpeace DNV had 
warned the organisation about its forthcoming announcement.) While admitting a 
mistake, Greenpeace was anxious not to create the impression that it had been wrong 
about its other claims. Still, Shell’s interpretation of this admission was precisely that.
87 Cited in Shell’s Website.
88 Wybrew said this in interview (November 18,1999).
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The company suggested that if Greenpeace had made such a mistake, it must have also 
been mistaken over many of its other previous claims. This was a further argument that 
helped Shell (re)interpret the crisis.
Greenpeace downplayed their error and depicted this development as not detracting from 
their campaign:
‘Instead of the depths being measured at the top of the storage tanks they were 
taken from [sic] top of vent pipes that give access to the tanks. As a result of this, 
the estimate for the amount of oil remaining in the Brent Spar is likely to be in error 
... “Although regrettable, Greenpeace does not consider the misunderstandings in 
our calculations to be of primary importance. It does not deflect from the strength 
of our case against sea dumping,” said Sue Mayer, Greenpeace UK Science 
Director. The Greenpeace position on the Spar has never been based on kilos or 
tons, but on the principles of dumping’ (Greenpeace News Release: September 5, 
1995).
Nevertheless, Shell and others believed that this figure had helped Greenpeace’s 
campaign, and Greenpeace addressed this belief by arguing that this estimate did not 
make much difference to the campaign:
‘The results were published only five days before Shell reversed its decision to 
dump the Brent Spar’ (Greenpeace News Release: September 5,1995);
‘As well as receiving almost no publicity, the wrong oil estimate came too late to 
affect public boycotts, Chancellor Kohl’s lobbying of John Major at the G7, the 
political decisions at the North Sea Ministers [Conference at Esbjerg]... or any of 
the other key parts of the campaign’ (Rose 1998:145).
Greenpeace argued that its decision to admit and apologise for a mistake indicated the 
organisation’s integrity, and the apology for the mistake was couched in a narrative that 
criticised Shell and the UK government:
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‘Greenpeace relies on the trust of the public. Because of this we were happy to 
make it known that we had made a minor mistake. Greenpeace only wishes that 
Shell and the UK government would be as honest and publicly admit their mistakes 
...’ (Greenpeace News Release: September 5,1995).
Shell was quick to react to Greenpeace’s predicament and cast this development as 
justifying the negative characterisation of Greenpeace Shell had always maintained:
‘Chris Fay [Chairman of Shell UK] called the gesture “a step in the right direction” 
and then said the affair illustrated how easily public pressure groups could use 
“mischievous methods” to challenge a decision that had been made on a “factual 
and scientific basis’” (Winter and Schweinsberg 1996: Section C).
In a news release on the same day Shell suggested that this development proved its case:
‘We welcome this development, which provides further confirmation of the care 
and integrity which has characterised Shell UK’s approach to all aspects of the 
Brent Spar disposal over the last four years.’
Shell further implied that Greenpeace’s other claims would also be proved wrong by 
arguing that the DNV inventory would put the matter to rest.
Both Shell and Greenpeace employed the rhetorics of persuasion, as is evident in the 
above news releases. While Greenpeace acknowledged its error, the organisation 
presented itself as being honest and virtuous because these were the very conditions that 
developments had called into question. As demonstrated by what Shell now maintained, 
this development gave Shell an opportunity to imply that Greenpeace’s disclosure 
affirmed the company’s arguments and standpoint, and it also gave a greater leverage 
than before to Shell’s criticisms of Greenpeace.
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Greenpeace correctly argued that Shell used these two developments to propagate a 
particular interpretation of the past. But, in arguing that Shell applied these two 
developments for that end, Greenpeace, like Shell, sought to offer its own interpretation 
of history. Greenpeace’s publication of a book on the Brent Spar was such an exercise.
Undeniably, these two incidents presented good prospects for Shell but what is 
significant is not that these events were, in themselves, favourable to Shell, but that Shell 
gave them a centrality they might not otherwise have had. The company capitalised on 
these developments. What Shell said demonstrates this, and the fact that Greenpeace too 
focused on Shell’s response to the developments.
Shell’s case: Making external aspects problematic
The company principally managed this crisis in its aftermath by employing three distinct 
arguments that explained/reworked the crisis. (These arguments are noted here as the 
examination of the article and the speech elaborates on them.)
In general terms, Shell reconstructed history by offering a specific interpretation of how 
the crisis had come about:
‘Greenpeace acted as a catalyst and gave the deepwater disposal of the Spar a 
symbolic significance out of all proportion to its negligible environmental 
impact...’89
This interpretation not only reconstructed history but also reconstructed the other, i.e. 
Greenpeace, Shell’s main opponent during the crisis.
89 Chris Fay cited in ‘Brent Spar\ a Shell publication.
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Shell argued that Greenpeace’s campaign had given an inaccurate view of what Shell 
planned to do; had influenced perceptions of the disposal plan - those perceptions did not 
reflect reality; and that the campaign had also been successful in precipitating negative 
media coverage of the sea disposal plan. Hence, Greenpeace was blamed for having 
created opposition to Shell and for misinforming and misdirecting the public and the 
media. By pointing the finger at external factors (Greenpeace and its campaign and the 
media coverage of the crisis), and by making these problematic, the blame for the crisis 
was shifted away from the company. In that way Shell sought vindication.
But, as we have seen, Shell also publicly admitted that its response to the crisis had been 
misguided:
‘In Shell we will need to do more to take into account the views and feelings of 
external stakeholders.’90
Shell now maintained that perceptions were at the crux of the protests against its plans 
and gave perceptions a centrality in explaining the crisis. By claiming that perceptions 
gave rise to the crisis, Shell simultaneously implied that the realities of the situation 
would not have been problematic. In this way, the company belittled the opposition to its 
plan, vindicated that plan, and defended the company’s stance. Thus, the third area that 
Shell made problematic - its own approach - was, in some respects, absolved from blame.
The company advanced its arguments immediately after abandoning its contentious 
position and thus prior to the two developments I noted earlier, nevertheless, those 
developments allowed corroboration of the company’s outlook.
9® Ibid.
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Although the central, publicly stated aim of Shell’s new communications strategy, 
dubbed ‘The New Way Forward’, was to find an ‘acceptable’ solution to the disposal of 
the Brent Spar through ‘openness’ and ‘dialogue’, its hidden, but equally significant, aim 
was crisis management. The main theme of Shell’s crisis management, as will become 
evident below, was to deflect attention away from the company and on to areas other 
than Shell’s actions during the crisis. Furthermore, the explanations the company gave 
were clever and persuasive.
Brent Spar-A Public Relations Disaster? - An article by the Public Affairs Director 
of Shell UK
Published soon after the disposal was postponed, this article introduced many of the main 
arguments that Shell made after the crisis. It was part of the company’s crisis 
management and, although it was published in a specific journal, the case was being 
made to a wider audience. The article was included in the company’s website and in the 
information packs Shell handed out to ‘interested parties’, including myself.
The argument was that the situation Shell faced was not just unique to Shell and the 
disposal of the Brent Spar but could be encountered by any business; the crisis was 
symptomatic of certain difficult areas for businesses in general. Wybrew identifies 
Greenpeace’s campaign tactics - and by extension also Greenpeace - as a major problem.
He states that the messages Shell had to communicate were complicated, rational, 
scientific arguments which were:
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‘ . not a particularly simple set of messages, but nonetheless a sound case ... 
However, it is not a case which lends itself to short soundbites; nor is it visually 
dramatic. Importantly, it is a case based on sound science, reason, and careful 
balance. But it found itself under attack from an aggressive “single issue” 
Greenpeace campaign which freely exploited dramatic visual stunts, and was adept 
at packaging misinformation in ready-to-use word-snips. In many ways, this was an 
unusual clash between the head and the heart - a conflict in which scientific reason 
and careful judgement were set against the power of emotion, fear, and even myth. 
Particularly in northern Europe, Greenpeace succeeded in turning the Brent Spar 
into a symbol - a symbol of man’s misuse of the oceans, irrespective of the reality. 
They aroused powerful emotions ... European government ministers [opposed the 
plan] not on its rational merits but on its symbolic significance ...’ (John Wybrew, 
Institute of Public Relations Journal Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1995 p.3).
Sociological studies on environmental groups and on the discourse employed by those 
groups have made similar observations in suggesting that they utilise symbolic means to 
construct, represent and negotiate environmental issues. In a study of environmental 
discourse, Harre, Brockmeier and Muhlhausler (1999) argue that ‘the stand-off between 
humankind and nature is a perennial theme of environmental discourse’ (1999:188). 
Anderson (1997) also argues that the symbolic means employed by environmental groups 
are also conducive to media coverage. She maintains that environmental groups often 
formulate environmental issues in simplistic black and white terms, not just because they 
are then readily accessible and understood but also because such representations ‘fit’ 
media values. That might explain how such representations could be perpetuated within 
the media. Greenpeace would also argue that issues are simplified in order better to 
communicate them. Nevertheless, the formulation of environmental issues in crude terms 
might also account for how such representations could naturally produce a mismatch 
between image and actuality, which offers further support for Wybrew’s claim.
Whilst the argument is plausible, it is impossible to determine whether the success of 
Greenpeace’s campaign was for the stated reason that the organisation turned the disposal
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of the Spar into a symbol. However, whether this claim was validated or not is not as 
important, within the context of crisis management, as the fact that Shell argues that it 
was so. The very fact that Shell makes much of the supposed symbolism created by 
Greenpeace in explaining the crisis is significant in itself, because that explanation of the 
crisis reinterprets and reformulates the crisis as ‘unfairly’ encountered by Shell.
My contention is that Wybrew’s argument is not just an important insight that has 
parallels with some academic observations on the area, but also a significant crisis 
management measure. The very fact that the parallels were there helps the company’s 
case; an appearance of authority is given to claims made. The argument put forward 
reconstructed history and also reconstructed the other by making problematic 
Greenpeace’s actions. The argument that the type of actions Greenpeace took has certain 
implications for businesses and even society also reworked what actually happened and 
took the spotlight away from that specific situation. Wybrew wrote:
‘The real debate - and it is a vital one - centres on the role of emotive, single-issue 
campaigning in the democratic process, and on how, within a democratically 
established framework of reasoned discussion, painstaking evaluation, and 
thoughtful consultation, the best practicable environmental solutions can truly be 
reached. These are not just issues for industry and its regulators but profound issues 
for society as a whole. When the Brent Spar is eventually disposed of, they will 
remain.’
Greenpeace would have a different view of this situation. Greenpeace would argue that 
theirs is a balanced rational assessment of a dangerous situation. In protracted disputes 
the possibility that the opponent will be dismissed as irrational is there and we can see 
Shell employed that claim.
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What can also be witnessed in this article is that a specific vision of reality, which 
supports an interpretation of what had happened, is given. This outlook is also promoted 
by disregarding other views on what had occurred. For instance, excluded from the 
discussion was Greenpeace’s views about that situation. Such narratives are quite clearly 
conducive to the reconstruction of history and central to such exercises.
By stressing the effectiveness of the campaign techniques used by Greenpeace (an 
external factor), Wybrew shifted critical attention from Shell to the ‘other’ and to wider 
(societal) issues. Thus, the impression conveyed was that the crisis was not brought on by 
what Shell did and had planned to do, but by unfair and problematic (external) 
circumstances:
‘If there is a more general “lesson to be learned”, it is perhaps that businesses will 
now have to include in their planning not just the views and rational arguments of 
all concerned - whether opponents or supporters - but will also somehow have to 
come to grips with an area of deepseated emotions, subconscious instincts, and 
symbolic gestures.’
And he asked rhetorically: ‘Is this simply a matter of “PR”?’ The argument was that it 
was too ‘simplistic’ to view this incident as a failure of public relations; it happened 
‘because people don’t have a deep understanding of science, responses are often 
emotional as well as rational. And given that campaigns often appeal to emotions it 
becomes necessary to do more than to explain rationally’ (Wybrew, in interview, 
November 18,1999).
Frequently repeated in Shell’s communications about the crisis was the phrase ‘hearts and 
minds’. The suggestion repeatedly made was that, while Shell’s case had been rational
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(mind), it had not succeeded because Greenpeace had secured opposition against it by 
appealing to irrational fears and emotions (heart). The emotional vs. rational argument 
was beneficial to Shell in reconstructing the past crisis.
Not Black and White but Shades o f Green - a speech by the Chairman of Shell UK91
The two central aspects within Shell’s reworking of what had happened in June (the 
impact of campaigning tactics and news reporting) were observable in Wybrew’s article 
examined above and are also manifest in Chris Fay’s speech.
Although Chris Fay states that his intention is ‘to discuss some of the fundamental 
questions about the role of journalists in reporting environmental issues’, his speech is a 
criticism of that process:
‘Journalists seek to cut through complexity to provide the clarity and simplicity 
their readers and viewers desire. But, with issues as complex as the impact of 
human activity on the natural environment, the search for simple truths may 
obscure the uncertainty of reality.’
By arguing that the journalistic imperative to simplify matters was to the detriment of 
accurate portrayals, he makes the news construction process problematic.
Fay contends that there was a need for a ‘better understanding of complexity’ in three 
areas that are ‘central to environmental progress’. These three he classifies as science, 
technology and business management.
91 This speech was delivered to a conference on the media at the University of Wales on May 20,1996. It 
is quite possible that academic occasions such as this are chosen as they can furnish an appearance of 
authority to claims made.
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Regarding the first, Fay argues that environmental decisions should be made with ‘due 
regard to science and scientific methods ... [and] decisions must be made on careful 
scientific analysis of risks’. Communicating risks is a difficult thing to do, he argues:
‘[Scientific analysis of risks] is a complex subject which is difficult to 
communicate. Relative risks are easily misunderstood and give rise to alarmist 
interpretations ... Almost everything we do, consume, or are exposed to has some 
risks. Modem science has given us die ability to measure minute quantities of 
substances. But what is important is the extent of our exposure to them. We have to 
decide which risks require tackling, with what priority, in what way, to what extent, 
and at what cost. We can only proceed safely by balancing all the risks - taking into 
account the extent of our uncertainty and ensuring sound science underpins our 
choices. And we [cannot try] to avoid all risks. That is simply impossible.’
By arguing that scientific developments have allowed for a greater ability to discover 
risks, Fay describes a situation Beck (1992) and Giddens (1999) identify, that is, the rise 
of a greater concern with risks as a result of a greater scientific ability to detect and 
measure risks. By holding that there are risks associated with every activity and by 
claiming that certain choices have to be made regarding which risks are acceptable and 
which are not, Fay indicates and justifies how Shell went about deciding on the deep sea 
disposal method, i.e. that Shell had, on the basis of science, chosen between the risks 
posed by the different disposal methods. His claim that risks are misunderstood and cause 
unnecessary alarm depicts the opposition to the company’s plan as unjustified.
Fay criticises the media coverage of Shell’s disposal plan by contending that the basis of 
the plan had been misrepresented and misunderstood but, significantly, he does so not by 
directly claiming this but by describing how such a misrepresentation could arise:
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‘My point is that environmental science is much more complex than the impression 
we often gain from the media. I can appreciate that describing technical data and 
detailed risk evaluation is difficult for busy journalists with limited time and space.’
Next, with reference to the second issue he raised, technology, Fay argues that the media 
should rectify public misunderstandings:
‘The Brent Spar debate revealed a widespread ignorance of the technology of North 
Sea oil and gas. Media coverage has not fully reflected the industry’s impact on this 
country’s economy over a quarter of a century - or the scale of its technological 
developments ... If people are unaware of such engineering issues, or assume that 
they can easily be solved, it is natural for them to think that companies are only 
concerned about costs. I make no apologies for taking costs into account in 
environmental decisions ... But there are always many other factors and in the case 
of Brent Spar, these were decisive.’
Once again, the crisis was explained in terms of people not understanding the disposal
plan rather than there being problems with the plan itself.
This is also manifest in Fay’s third point, where he evokes, what are basically, imputed 
public perceptions of businesses, and in his argument that the media were in a position to 
develop a better understanding that could bring perceptions in line with reality:
‘Many people see business management in very simple terms. They believe that... 
the company’s environmental standards are dictated purely by regard for profits. 
There is no doubt that all companies require profits ... But management is not so 
simple. Thousands of people - staff, contractors and suppliers - are involved in the 
company’s operations. They must constantly make decisions about their work, 
balancing many different factors - technical, human safety, environmental, and, of 
course, commercial... It is those individual decisions which determine our 
environmental, and business performance.’
In saying that costs were not pursued at the expense of environmental and safety matters, 
he defends Shell against criticism of its motives in choosing sea disposal. The argument 
that the public did not understand these matters and that the media did not facilitate such
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understanding also allows him to ‘explain’ what happened with the Brent Spar and, in 
doing so, he offers a specific interpretation of the crisis. Problematic public perceptions 
as well as media representations provides the platform from which Shell’s stance during 
the crisis is defended.
Fay goes on to censure Greenpeace’s tactics, arguing that they made untrue, simplistic 
allegations that nonetheless gained media attention and coverage:
‘They [Greenpeace] knew that activists in rubber boats among the massive 
ironmongery of the North Sea made good television - David against Goliath ...
And, like all good spin doctors, they knew how to manage the debate with a flow of 
simplistic allegations ... We now know that most of those allegations were 
unsound.’
That last statement exploits Greenpeace’s admission of a mistake. Even though only one 
charge was proven wrong, the argument was that Greenpeace had run the entire campaign 
on untrue accusations, that it had achieved coverage of its claims by engaging perceptions 
(David and Goliath) and by preying on existing misunderstandings of the issues he had 
earlier made problematic.
He also uses the television executives’ admission of a biased coverage in August 1995:
‘I know that senior television executives have questioned whether broadcasters 
surrendered their independence by relying too much on one side for coverage and 
accepting too uncritically one argument. Certainly it was difficult for the complex 
details of risk analysis - which take time to explain - to make headway against such 
compelling visuals, simple arguments and sensational allegations.’
The speech ends on the following note:
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‘The most important [lesson the media could draw from the Brent Spar incident] is 
that the environment is not a simple issue, with clear rights and wrongs and easy 
answers. Society needs the help of open-minded journalists in unravelling its 
complexities if we are to make the right choices for our future.’
Thus, the crisis was portrayed primarily as a result of misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations.
Speeches such as this, and other communication initiatives, were a part of Shell’s crisis 
management strategy as the company attempted to make wider publics receptive to the 
interpretation it then offered. Still, what Shell maintained after the crisis raises a central 
issue fundamental to how that crisis could be understood: that the two organisations 
employed quite disparate communicative styles, one invoking the powerful iconography 
of pollution, purity and danger, and the other of risk assessment. The very fact that 
Greenpeace could effectively challenge Shell’s risk assessment does reveal something of 
how effective those types of communications were. And, as I have said, that might also 
account for the initial success of Greenpeace and Shell’s puzzlement at its 
communication failures.
However, Shell was not alone in applying scientific arguments to support its case as 
Greenpeace too appealed to science, both rhetorically and substantively. In environmental 
discourses, recourse to science is often for such ends (Harre, Brockmeier and Mulhausler 
1999). Why then did Shell focus on the symbolism created by Greenpeace - important as 
it is - rather than its employment of scientific arguments? One reason is that that 
explanation fit the claim that there was differential employment of ‘emotional’ and 
‘rational’ arguments. I would also suggest that it was because the argument Shell put 
forward regarding the symbolism and imagery Greenpeace created and used is plausible
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and hence also better able to persuade that it was so. Shell’s argument is conceivable and 
credible but, vitally, it is also self-serving as it proposed a particular, advantageous 
translation of the past crisis.
We shall now see whether Shell’s case was reflected in the way the media represented the 
past crisis. That allows for a tentative consideration of the company’s crisis management.
Did Shell’s case gain support in the media?
The short answer to this question is that I found it did. This analysis of press and 
television coverage after the crisis is important because, even though one could argue that 
by that time moral identities and impressions had probably stuck, it is still worthwhile to 
see whether Shell’s later attempts to counter those impressions worked.
While the Guardian and the Telegraph (but not the Mirror) examined the issue 
throughout the year, BBC, TTF and Channel 4 news coverage was quite limited. On June 
20, when Shell terminated the disposal operation, the story of the Brent Spar became 
headline news for two days in the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 news programmes. After two 
days, however, the story was abandoned until September 5, when it once again became 
headline news as all channels covered Greenpeace’s admission of an error with its oil 
estimate. This conformed to the convention of television news being event-led. During 
the preceding period, the only television coverage was by the BBC, which had two short 
news reports on June 29 and July 11. After September 5, no more television coverage 
was given to the story of the Spar in that year - which is the range of this study.
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As previously reasoned, the wider contexts and formats of televised and print news 
affects what is reported and how reporting takes place. Brevity is characteristic of 
televisions news, which is constrained by time and limited in its discursive potential. 
Impartiality is also a greater concern for televised news than for the press. A direct 
consequence of these features of news reporting is the greater opportunity for Shell’s 
arguments to be elaborated on and even endorsed in press reports rather than in television 
news. This, together with my observation that there was a greater discussion by the press 
than television, plus the greater quantity of press articles, meant that Shell’s arguments 
after the crisis did gain greater coverage in the press. I found that press accounts were 
beneficial to the propagation of what Shell maintained after the crisis. Although 
television news reports are far more bound by the greater imperative to be impartial, I 
also found that television news reporting was also advantageous to the promotion of 
Shell’s arguments.
Television coverage
BBC
There was a partiality towards Shell’s claims in the BBC's coverage during the later 
stages of the immediate crisis, and its coverage after the crisis also exhibited a leaning 
towards Shell’s views.
However, the BBC also criticised Shell for having failed to communicate its case 
successfully and for bungling its public relations. These arguments reflected those that
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Shell held afterwards. The view that public relations was pivotal in explaining what had 
happened directed attention to Greenpeace’s campaign:
‘... Greenpeace ... stole the limelight with their dramatic occupation of the Brent 
Spar. In the wake of their success ... many more businesses will now be reassessing 
the power of the pressure groups’ (Newsnight, June 20).
The nature of that attention in BBC news was a critical framing of Greenpeace.
Greenpeace was represented as having ‘dictated the public relations battle’ (BBC 9 
O’Clock News, June 20), as being an organisation very much concerned with gaining 
publicity and as being willing to disregard the actuality of a situation if it interfered with 
its ability to obtain publicity for its case:
‘Greenpeace’s communications centre has live satellite links with its boats at sea. 
Pictures are headed straight from here to TV stations and newspapers ... 
International public opinion responded to a series of high profile actions taken in 
the live sea. It’s not new. For 25 years, Greenpeace has courted publicity - here 
against acid rain [a video of a man jumping from a height, whose parachute opens 
up to reveal the Greenpeace logo]. There is funding of 100 million pounds a year 
from 3.8 million members world-wide. [A video of a Greenpeace dinghy close to a 
large ship at sea when the dinghy capsizes and the people fall in the water was 
shown accompanied by the next commentary.] But the flare for photogenic stunts 
has earned Greenpeace a reputation for overlooking scientific fact if it spoils a good 
story.’
By fostering the notion that Greenpeace habitually and deliberately ignores the facts of a 
case in pursuit of publicity, the BBC’s coverage reproduced Shell’s negative 
characterisation of Greenpeace.
My examination of BBC coverage also revealed how much news is self-referential i.e. 
news programmes appeared to be influenced by what was said on preceding programmes. 
In the instance of the BBCs coverage, this process favoured Shell’s interpretation of
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events. A Newsnight interview of Chris Fay on the day of Shell’s change of plan, I found, 
influenced what subsequent BBC news programmes said about the past crisis. This is 
discussed below.
On Newsnight Fay said:
‘This is the problem. There is a lot of misinformation, let’s just get two basic facts. 
February 16: the UK government writes to the Ospar Convention - all the European 
governments - [to inform them] of their decision to issue a licence for the deep sea 
disposal. By April 16, no answer, so you can assume that everyone agrees, at least 
they don’t disagree. They [UK government] then issue a licence. Suddenly two 
weeks after that, all of a sudden - and maybe for another agenda perhaps - 
something starts to happen. Now from a PR point of view - can you second guess 
that?’
Fay argued that the totality of an issue rather than a single issue perspective must be 
employed when arriving at decisions such as the disposal of the Spar, and also made 
problematic the media’s role in covering the dispute:
‘... the media takes in [a lot of] misinformation ... the media does not seem to 
want to take in the whole story ... I think society has to be persuaded of what is 
actually the overall picture rather than a single issue.’
The presenter argued similarly to Fay:
‘Green guerrillas have beaten big business ... No one doubts the surrender to the 
Green campaigners is the most dramatic example yet of the way single-issue 
pressure groups can sometimes beat multi-billion businesses ... [it was] a David 
and Goliath battle.’
The arguments Fay made on Newsnight influenced the following day’s news as Working 
Lunch, a current affairs programme, BBC 1 O’Clock News and BBC 9 O’Clock News, 
covered the story very much from Shell’s perspective.
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Working Lunch reported:
‘Under the great heaving weight of the Green lobby Shell have relented ... In years 
to come it will be a textbook case for business students - the defeat of one of the 
mightiest, richest companies in the world by an environmental pressure group ... it 
was the impact that Greenpeace’s campaign had on politicians across Europe which 
forced the U-turn.’
This interpretation meant that Greenpeace’s campaign gained attention. On this 
programme it received a critical frame; the programme included an interview with a 
Greenpeace spokesperson and showed a clip of Fay on Newsnight in which he said:
‘This is [an issue for] international business; it’s not just Shell. What are the rules 
under which we should act - we have to act legally. It would appear that single­
issue groups can act illegally and get their little bite in ... everything had been 
single-issue ... you have to take a balanced approach.’
The studio presenter’s questions to the Greenpeace spokesperson were along Shell’s 
suggestions and showed a partiality towards Shell’s case. He asked Paul Horsman, the 
Greenpeace spokesperson:
‘This is no victory at all if you are forcing the company to do something that is 
more unsafe and ecologically unsound.’
And the second was similarly critical:
‘Now, are there any limits to what kind of illegality you would go to in order to get 
your point across, illegality you will encourage?’
Greenpeace was, of course, given the opportunity to respond but the type of questions 
asked of the organisation framed it in an unfavourable manner. In this instance, the 
questions implied that Greenpeace had acted illegally, irrationally and irresponsibly.
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Subsequent BBC news programmes also focused on Greenpeace’s direct action and 
furthered the criticism of how the campaign had been conducted. The view Fay had 
publicised on Newsnight appeared to become established within BBC news reporting, 
which reproduced what Fay had said. BBC 1 O’Clock News on June 21 reported:
‘After more than a year of feasibility studies, the plan was submitted in 1993. Then 
in the beginning of February 16th it was passed on to the European governments 
and approved by Britain. No governments protested within the 65 days statutory 
notice period. Only at the eleventh hour, under a barrage of environmental pressure 
- the German led European protest - which yesterday resulted in Shell’s spectacular 
U-tum.’
The programme also included a diagram of the key dates of the crisis and what was listed 
as ‘key dates’ were those Fay had earlier identified. The report also duplicated Shell’s 
views.
In keeping with the necessity of appearing impartial, the news programme included an 
interview with Lord Melchett, Executive Director of Greenpeace UK, but the reporter 
was generally critical of Greenpeace:
‘Lord Melchett, isn’t there a problem with the way in which this decision [the 
abandonment of the sea disposal] was taken? Shell went through this very 
complicated procedure and in the last minute changed their minds. Should such an 
important decision be taken like that?’
That question was followed by:
‘Doesn’t it worry you that decisions like this kind should be taken in a cool and 
collected manner and you have effectively forced this decision in a very heated 
manner?’
And:
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‘Aren’t you worried that while this thing is being dragged around in the North Sea 
to an uncertain destination, it might break up?’
In maintaining that line of questioning, the reporter implied that Greenpeace’s solution 
was problematic, in particular, that it could cause greater environmental damage. That 
implication was made explicit on the BBC 9 O’Clock News on the same day, when the 
difficulties of onshore disposal were emphasised:
‘Dismantling the Brent Spar will be difficult... The Brent Spar would be toppled 
so ... it would be horizontal, it will then have to go into a dry dock - one may have 
to be specially built. The sludge at the bottom and oily scale on its sides would have 
to be removed and treated. Finally, the shell and concrete will be cut and recycled 
or dumped in landfill sites.’
The report also reproduced Shell’s standpoint that sea disposal could benefit the marine 
environment by creating artificial reefs:
‘Off the coast of Mexico some dumped installations form reefs for fish and some 
experts suggest something similar could be done here ...’
Having covered Shell’s claims and having favourably depicted the company, the report 
proceeded to criticise Greenpeace:
‘Environmentalists have said that Shell’s climbdown was a victory for European 
public opinion. It was certainly a victory for a Greenpeace campaign including 
controversial actions or what the organisation calls “direct action”. Today’s 
headlines declare Shell’s climbdown and put Greenpeace where they want to be: 
front page news. It’s a triumph for the environmental group’s publicity machine, 
which made sure that the cameras followed every move at sea.’
The argument that Greenpeace’s campaign had been motivated by publicity was again 
promoted. The fact that Greenpeace often openly states how important publicity is for
294
their campaigns facilitates this assertion. A member of Greenpeace, Blair Palese, was 
shown claiming this very thing and, thus, corroborating the argument:
‘The first rule for us is - is the story visual? If so, can we tell it with pictures? In the 
case of Brent Spar, it was just as important to get images of the rig, support ships 
hosing the activists trying to get on board as it was the action itself/
The rest of the programme was devoted to criticising Greenpeace, representing the 
organisation as having pursued publicity at the expense of the facts of the case. What the 
Chairman of Shell had said on Newsnight clearly did have an impact on what subsequent 
BBC news programmes reported but a leaning towards Shell’s outlook by the BBC was 
also earlier discerned.
The next two BBC news programmes were very brief. The July 11 programme said that 
the Norwegian government had given permission for the Spar to be kept in a fjord. The 
June 29 programme announced that new scientific evidence demonstrated that the sea 
disposal of the Spar would not have damaged the marine environment, which reinforced 
what Shell and previous BBC programmes had upheld. The decision to cover this 
development might have been motivated by that very condition because this development 
was not covered in any other television news outlet.
How the BBC covered Greenpeace’s admission of a mistake on September 5, far from 
Greenpeace’s allegation about this matter, was a model of how the formula to suggest 
impartial coverage is employed. As the BBC had previously been rather censorious of 
Greenpeace, one would expect it to use this opportunity to criticise Greenpeace further, 
as the organisation claimed the BBC had, but this was not so.
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The report began as follows:
‘Greenpeace tells Shell it’s sorry. It got its figures for pollution from Brent Spar oil 
rig quite wrong ... In an extraordinary admission of error, the Executive Director of 
Greenpeace has admitted to Shell UK’s Chairman, Dr. Chris Fay, their estimates 
for the pollutants on Brent Spar oil rig were wrong. Shell insists that its approach to 
the disposal of oil rigs has been vindicated’ (BBC 1 O’Clock News, Sept. 5).
The report also reproduced Greenpeace’s explanation of how the mistake had been made, 
which was beneficial to Greenpeace. The report quoted from Greenpeace’s letter to Shell:
‘The letter says that Greenpeace made an error in sampling the contents of the 
Brent Spar. It states: “the sampling device was still in the pipe leading into the 
storage tanks rather than in the tank itself’. It goes on: “I apologise to you and your 
colleagues’” .
The report included Greenpeace’s claim that the organisation apologised because ‘we 
wanted to do the decent thing and let people know as quickly as possible’. 92 And the 
BBC covered Greenpeace’s argument that the mistake did not detract from the argument 
that sea disposal was a wrong method of disposal: ‘Greenpeace says it’s never right to 
dump waste - an argument it insists is still right despite its mistake.’
The programme was critical of both Greenpeace and Shell. In an interview with Peter 
Melchett, the Executive Director of Greenpeace, the reporter asked:
‘Surely the words “apology” and “misunderstanding” are a bit inadequate. You said 
5500 tonnes of oil. Apparently, there is 10.1 mean this is an error on a cosmic 
scale.’
In an interview with Chris Fay the reporter said:
92 A clip of Greenpeace UK’s Science Director, Sue Mayer, making this statement was broadcast.
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‘You don’t come out of it terribly well, do you, because if you had stuck to your 
gun, if you had stuck to your figures, you might not have been defeated by the 
campaign as Greenpeace actually did defeat you.’
And:
‘It’s a terrific condemnation of your corporate affairs and your presentation. You 
had the figures on your side but you did not advance them as you should have 
done.’
This criticism of both sides, together with the representation it gave to both Shell and 
Greenpeace (they were given the opportunity to advance their case) is, demonstrably, 
very much a part of the ritual of objectivity, which was evident in how the BBC covered 
this development.
IT V
With the exception of the coverage on September 5,93 there was one ITV programme that 
covered the aftermath of the crisis: ‘News at Ten\ June 21. That report framed the 
situation as involving two main issues: the spoiled relations between Shell and the UK 
government and what Shell planned to do next. Of these two areas, the first received the 
greater coverage as the political impact of Shell’s decision was emphasised over other 
considerations. This demonstrates how the media can be selective in the way they choose 
to represent issues and thus emphasise some factors and angles over others. ITV reported 
differently from the BBC, drawing on differing issues.
ITV  focused on the UK government’s response to Shell’s decision and reported that the 
government disapproved of it:
93 Both Lunchtime News and News at Ten covered the story.
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‘John Major, who defended the principle of dumping rigs at sea yesterday, is 
understood to be furious at Shell’s decision. He said apparently that they behaved 
like wimps and he and other ministers are angry at the way events unfolded 
yesterday.’
To reinforce the extent to which the UK government supported Shell, ITV reported:
‘Tonight it appears that the government may have been prepared to go to extreme 
lengths to clear protesters off Brent Spar [as it has been suggested by a Labour MP 
that] SAS-style troopers had been flown to Stornaway prepared if necessary to 
storm the rig.’
ITV represented Shell’s explanation of its decision to halt sea disposal:
‘Shell say because of international pressure they had no other way but regret the 
way the decision was reached’ (ITVNews at Ten, June 21).
And the company’s apology to the UK government was covered. Extracts from Shell’s 
letter to John Major also characterised Shell as having expressed regret about the position 
in which it had placed the UK government.
What is most striking about ITVs coverage is the near total absence of a commentary on 
Greenpeace. That calls attention to how much of that was present in the BBC reporting. 
/TF said little about the Organisation beyond stating that it had declared a victorious end 
to its campaign: ‘the victory they claimed seemed complete’. In focusing on the two areas 
of what Shell was next going to do and the political implications of its decision, the three 
arguments Shell made after the crisis were not reflected in ITVs coverage at that time.
In contrast to the previous report (and to /TPs coverage of the immediate crisis period), 
the two ITV programmes covering Greenpeace’s announcement of an error on September
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5 focused attention on the organisation. Greenpeace was now depicted as having played a 
key role in creating opposition to Shell’s plan:
‘They [Greenpeace] have had to apologise for getting facts wrong about the Brent 
Spar oil platform after mobilising a massive international protest against Shell 
petrol company. They campaigned for Shell to abandon dumping the platform at 
sea. Then, Greenpeace claimed it contained over 5000 tonnes of oil. Now, they are 
saying their measurements were inaccurate’ {TTV Lunchtime News, September 5).
Although Greenpeace received more attention and was attributed a central role in the 
crisis, the organisation was not portrayed negatively and its arguments were reproduced.
LTV Lunchtime News represented Greenpeace’s claim that it had apologised only for the 
oil estimate and not for the whole of its campaign, and LTV*s News at Ten repeated that 
several times. These news reports also explained how the error had been made and, in 
doing so, reinforced Greenpeace’s explanation.94 Thus, Greenpeace’s argument that the 
error did not affect the basis of its campaign was reproduced in LTV news and Greenpeace 
was represented as having made an ‘honest mistake’.
Still, LTV news presented Greenpeace as having lost credibility as a consequence of that 
mistake: ‘The technical gaffe has done Greenpeace’s credibility no good at all’ (JTV 
News at Ten, September 5). And in the interview with Peter Melchett, ITV, like the BBC, 
asked questions that suggested a critical view of Greenpeace:
‘Is an apology enough? You have cost Shell millions of pounds, tarnished their 
reputation, they have had their petrol stations firebombed and boycotted’;
94 Both programmes included a diagram of the Brent Spar with a visual and verbal explanation of how 
Greenpeace had made the measurement error by demonstrating how Greenpeace had inserted its probe into 
the wrong place.
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‘Let’s get to the broader point here. Isn’t there a problem that the public have been 
misled and that the real debate about the scientific issues at stake never took place 
because of the emotive campaign that you were able to mount?’
Despite posing critical questions, as with the BBC interview of Greenpeace, it provided 
an opportunity for the organisation to promote its view of the situation which, as a 
consequence, was represented by ITV.
The new focus on Greenpeace brought another novel aspect to ITV*s coverage, namely, a 
concentration on Greenpeace’s campaign method of filming images and providing these 
to television studios:
‘Greenpeace sent their own news films of the occupation of Brent Spar around the 
world. Today, they were untypically reticent after their embarrassing gaffe’ (ITV 
Lunchtime News, September 5);
‘Pictures that Greenpeace triumphantly sent around the world: the Brent Spar 
occupied by their activists frustrating Shell’s attempts to dump it, and its contents 
of allegedly toxic chemicals, in the Atlantic. But Greenpeace today had to 
apologise. Samples they took on board the platform were, they confess, misleading 
and just plain wrong’ (ITVNews at Ten, September 5).
ITV  s portrayal of Greenpeace as having provided its film to the media was mentioned 
but not elaborated on. But it was mentioned in both reports, quite unlike the BBCTs 
coverage, which entirely ignored this aspect. Despite identifying that factor as 
problematic, ITV news did not discuss or analyse it. There was no analysis or 
examination of the organisational nature or campaigning methods of Greenpeace, as 
conducted by BBC News and Channel 4 News. Quite typically, and in comparison with 
press reports, television news carried very little commentary. But ITV news had less 
commentary than the other television news outlets. A consequence of this was that TTVs
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coverage was not conducive to mirroring the type of arguments Shell made after the 
crisis. Still, one such argument was, to some extent, reflected.
In noting that Greenpeace had supplied its own footage to television stations, ITV implied 
that media coverage of the crisis might have been problematic (as Shell upheld). It was 
only through that implication that TTT’s coverage might have helped Shell’s case. 
Additionally, ITV only paid attention to that aspect after Greenpeace’s admission.
Channel 4
In the aftermath of the crisis, there were three Channel 4 News programmes on June 20, 
21 and September 5.
As with most television news programmes, Channel 4 News reported the views on both 
sides of the dispute. This was particularly evident in the programme on June 20, which 
covered Greenpeace’s reaction to Shell’s new decision and represented Shell’s 
explanations of why that decision had been made. Even though the report conformed to 
the convention of suggesting impartiality, it did give the story a particular slant:
‘It was in the area of public relations that Shell was hardest hit by what it calls 
“Greenpeace’s campaign of misleading information”... experts say Shell has lost 
the public relations battle with Greenpeace’ (June 20).
Subsequent news reports also perpetuated this interpretation.
During the crisis, Channel 4 had not examined the particulars of the dispute, but it did so 
after the crisis.
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The news on June 21 concentrated on Greenpeace and facilitated the advancement of 
Shell’s claims about Greenpeace, even though the programme took a different view from 
that of Shell.
The focus on Greenpeace’s campaign was reflected in the main question the programme 
began with and sought to answer: ‘How real is the power of the environmental lobby in 
Britain?’ This question was followed by two more that the report also depicted as central: 
‘How did Shell and Mr Major get it so wrong?’ Attention was also given to examining 
‘new claims that [the Brent Spar] might be more of a pollution threat than first thought’.
The Channel 4 report on the ‘new claims’ of the Spar being a greater ‘pollution threat’ 
than previously anticipated was the first television news report to discuss Greenpeace’s 
claim that the Spar contained more oil than Shell admitted.95 Channel 4 News intimated 
with Greenpeace’s case by assuming that the Spar definitely did pose the level of 
pollution threat that Greenpeace had stated said. The science correspondent referred to 
the Spar as a ‘ 14000 tonne dustbin’, which was a statement Greenpeace also made, and 
argued that:
‘Shell provided [the information about what was inside the Spar] for the 
environmental impact assessment when they were given a licence to dump the rig at 
sea. But measurements taken by Greenpeace on board the Spar suggest the 
assessment may have been seriously flawed. Shell said that the oil storage tanks on 
the Spar contained little but sea water [and] a total of around 50 tonnes [of oil]. 
Greenpeace dropped probes into the tanks ... The estimate from Greenpeace 
laboratories at Exeter University - which is yet to be confirmed - is that there are 
5500 tonnes of oil and oil sludge on the Spar, 100 times more than Shell’s figures.’
95 Greenpeace had announced this on BBC's Breakfast with Frost (June 18), but BBC, ITV and Channel 4 
ignored this until after Shell’s decision.
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Despite noting that it was an unconfirmed estimate, the report sided with Greenpeace’s 
estimate rather than Shell’s. This was done by casting doubt on Shell’s estimate by 
suggesting that the Aberdeen scientists (who had arrived at the original estimate) had not 
taken their own samples:
‘The original assessment was drawn up by scientists at Aberdeen University. They 
took no samples of their own. They relied on Shell to tell them what was in the 
tank.’
In examining the question the programme had begun its report with, Channel 4 News 
gave an account of how Greenpeace operated:
‘Greenpeace have through a combination of direct action and acute understanding 
of the media captured the imagination in a way many established politicians would 
envy. It has a membership in this country of 300,000, nearly as many as Labour and 
operates, like the companies it opposes, at a multi-national level. Its tactic, as with 
Brent Spar, is to try and distil complicated issues into simple choices.’
Greenpeace was presented as knowledgeable in how to handle the media to ensure 
publicity and as successful in ‘mobilising public opinion’. This was depicted as a 
characteristic way in which the organisation functioned. As we have seen, BBC also 
focused on Greenpeace and claimed similarly to the above. Unlike the BBC, however, 
Channel 4' s account was not critical of Greenpeace and the account also seemed 
appreciative of how the campaign was conducted. Greenpeace’s ‘victory’ was attained in 
a ‘classic’ way, Channel 4 News reported:
‘It was achieved by a classic pressure group pincer movement: Shell was squeezed, 
on the one hand, by direct action on the North Sea and, on the other, a consumer 
boycott in important markets.’
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The concentration on Greenpeace and the view that the organisation had conducted an 
efficient campaign in which its messages were competently conveyed did not entirely 
mirror the critical claims Shell made about Greenpeace and its campaign, but did reflect 
the general notion behind what the company claimed. In that way, that account was 
conducive for the advancement of what Shell alleged.
The report also suggested that, although Shell’s case was scientifically sound, the 
company had failed to communicate it. The report endorsed the view that where Shell 
and the UK government had gone wrong was in misreading public perceptions, whereas 
Greenpeace successfully played on ‘emotions’ and influenced public opinion:
‘[It is the case] that you have to battle science against emotion. Here ... Greenpeace 
effectively played on emotion - dumping the rig in the sea - and effectively defied 
the science which may have been slightly on the other side ... the government did 
not get good enough environmental advice, I mean advice that did not look at the 
emotions of what was being done ... so, in a sense [it is essential] to be a pulse 
reader and someone who’s aware of the scientific implications.’
By suggesting this, Channel 4 News appeared to contradict the earlier suggestion, on the 
same programme, that Greenpeace’s oil estimate was more credible than Shell’s. The 
above statement also echoed Shell’s own acknowledgement that it had failed to 
communicate its case, respond to public perceptions, and its argument that ‘emotion’ had 
won over a ‘rational’ approach.
The description given by Channel 4 News also came close to Shell’s account of the media 
coverage of the crisis. Although Channel 4 News did not make media coverage 
problematic, as Shell did, the observation that Greenpeace efficiently communicated its
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case through the media, coupled with the suggestion that Shell had a more scientifically 
sound case, echoed the company’s claim that there were problems with media coverage.
Channel 4's report on September 5 once again presented what both Shell and Greenpeace 
said. However, the programme also accented Greenpeace’s argument that the mistake 
over the oil estimate did not detract from its campaign. The news began with this notion:
‘The oil giant Shell has welcomed an apology from Greenpeace. The environmental 
group has admitted it got its figures wrong in the battle of Brent Spar but insist its 
campaign against dumping the platform at sea was justified.’
And this view was also repeated:
‘[Greenpeace] say that it [the error] doesn’t really matter. In a letter to Shell 
admitting the error they say that “the argument was about whether it was right to 
dump industrial waste of any sort in the deep ocean”. Not the amount of oil 
onboard.’
Channel 4 News reproduced Greenpeace’s view that the mistake made no difference to its 
campaign.
Channel 4’s coverage of this occurrence, in comparison with that of the ITV and the BBC, 
was the briefest. ITV's science correspondent Lawrence McGinty, who had also given a 
similar, albeit, longer account for ITV, also prepared Channel 4’s news report. So the 
claims that Greenpeace’s credibility was damaged as a result of the error and that 
Greenpeace had ‘sent its own news films about the occupation around the world’ were 
once again made. This reflects the fact that IIN provides both channels’ news. However,
I have shown that there were differences in how television channels covered the story, yet
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this instance also calls attention to how ownership and operating structure can affect how 
reporting takes place.
How could television coverage affect what Shell proposed after the crisis?
My analysis demonstrates that television news routinely represents what disputing parties 
say, especially when there are clearly delineated opponents such as Shell and 
Greenpeace. As I explained, this is a news convention used to imply objectivity, but one 
effect of this is that conflicting claims are often represented.
1 have established and illustrated that BBC, ITV and Channel 4 identified circumstances 
that Shell also drew attention to and made problematic. That finding is significant to the 
advancement of the type of arguments Shell made after the crisis.
Although similar descriptions of conditions were made by Shell and television news, I 
also found that none of the news outlets reflected and elaborated on those conditions that 
they did identify. Also, none described Shell as having made problematic those factors 
which they also focussed on.
On the face of it, these findings suggest that Shell was unsuccessful in having its case 
reproduced by television news but, in fact, television news coverage did help Shell’s 
claims by commenting on factors that Shell also isolated and remarked on. Television 
news attention to these circumstances publicised them and, hence, assisted the kinds of 
arguments Shell made after the crisis. For example, even though Channel 4 was not very 
critical of Greenpeace’s campaign, it promoted the notion that it had been an efficient
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operation and one that had made use of the media. That account allows Shell to criticise 
the campaign and to make problematic public understanding of what the company had 
proposed. In that manner, television news’s similar focus on conditions Shell also 
identified could, however inadvertently, help Shell’s case.
Furthermore, the very fact that television news identified similar circumstances to the 
ones identified by Shell, without attributing this to Shell, gave the company’s arguments 
a greater credibility. Seemingly independent recognition of the factors Shell pointed to 
helped sustain and confirm Shell’s case.
One reasonable explanation for why there was that similarity is that they were simply 
independent accounts that happened to be analogous. However, it is just as possible that 
what Shell said after the crisis, and its propagation via the numerous ‘communication 
initiatives’, structured news reporting. A most striking instance of this was where what 
Chris Fay said on Newsnight structured subsequent BBC news reporting in ensuing 
programmes. Although it may not be possible to identify the ‘real’ reason or reasons for 
why this happened, as I showed, the fact of the matter quite clearly remains that the way 
in which television news reporting took place was beneficial to the advancement of 
Shell’s case.
Press coverage
Press coverage after the crisis greatly favoured the furtherance of Shell’s arguments. 
They were not just mentioned but also reproduced to a far greater degree than in 
television news.
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My investigation of press and television coverage during and after the crisis showed that 
the press could be more partisan than television news, and that this condition allowed the 
case Shell made after the crisis to gain reproduction in the press.
I will first outline the general trends in the way in which the newspapers covered the 
period after the crisis, and then elaborate on how I see this as affecting Shell’s case.
The abrupt end to the Mirror’s coverage
Unlike the Guardian and the Telegraph, whose comment on the crisis continued 
throughout the year, the Mirror’s coverage of this story came to an end a month after 
Shell’s decision to abort sea disposal. The Mirror’s decision that the story was over was 
not conducive to the coverage of Shell’s claims made after the crisis.
The Mirror’s response to Shell’s decision to rethink the disposal was to announce, rather 
audaciously, that the paper had played a central role in bringing about this outcome:
‘HOW WE DID IT: BRENT SPA [sic] SCANDAL WAS FIRST REVEALED BY 
DAILY MIRROR WHICH HIGHLIGHTED POTENTIAL DISASTER’ (June 20).
96
The Mirror’s account after the crisis was much more direct and personal than before, as it 
cast itself in a central role in pressurising Shell (‘Mirror quizzed Shell’ (June 20)) and 
having campaigned to gain this result. This is succinctly illustrated by the paper’s list of 
‘key dates in the battle to force Shell to scrap its plans to dump the rig’ (June 20):
96 Given that this paper referred to the Spar as ‘Spa’, I also used the search term ‘Brent Spa’ to see whether 
this would reveal more articles, but it did not.
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‘6pm: Shell announced its U-turn and revealed they will bow to pressure from 
Greenpeace, the Mirror, and the public.’
During the crisis the paper did not explicitly state that it was playing the pivotal role it 
confidently asserted after the crisis. Having taken that position, it might have been 
damaging for the paper to cover subsequent developments that favoured Shell’s original 
stance. As I noted in the consideration of media coverage during the crisis, the difficulty 
in gaining coverage of views opposed to that of a stance adopted by a paper demonstrates 
the limits to obtaining favourable media coverage (or indeed any coverage) of corporate 
claims, as the consultants recommend. The Mirror's stance after the crisis also 
demonstrates that difficulty.
That the Mirror considered the story over might not have been unusual behaviour for the 
paper; it might just be that the Mirror, as a tabloid, has a limited attention span. But that 
also indicates a problem with consultants’ recommendations, because how then can 
damaging accounts, subsequently proved wrong, be dealt with? The Mirror certainly did 
not retract its claims, and neither did the Guardian.
The Guardian’s shifting allegiances
During the crisis, the Guardian had supported Greenpeace’s argument that Shell should 
change its course. While the Guardian had written little about risks and scientific opinion 
then, after the crisis the paper corroborated Shell’s case that the sea disposal would not 
have harmed the marine environment. After the crisis, the Guardian argued that Shell had 
a good, scientific case for the sea disposal of the Spar and that Greenpeace had been 
wrong to campaign as Shell’s case had extensive scientific support:
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almost all independent experts contacted by reporters regarded the disposal - 
the proposed burial at sea - as the best, or least bad, solution for the Brent Spar ... 
according to a majority of marine experts, the floating tank could be sunk without 
anything like the environmental damage that would be caused by dismantling the 
structure and disposing of its pollutants on land. If Greenpeace has evidence to the 
contrary it should spell it out. Asserting dumping at sea is wrong is not enough’ 
(Sept. 7).
While the Guardian had noted during the crisis that Shell had scientific support for its 
plan, after the crisis, the Guardian advanced a stronger case that the company had been 
right to proceed with its plan. Moreover, after the crisis, the Guardian was much more 
direct and assured in asserting that Greenpeace was wrong. The variance in the 
Guardian's coverage of the issue favoured Shell’s case.
A favourable depiction o f Shell
Conditions favourable to the promotion of Shell’s arguments existed in the Telegraph and 
the Guardian.
During the crisis, the Telegraph had supported Shell’s plan and immediately afterwards 
was critical of Shell for having abandoned it. The paper wrote that the situation revealed 
the ‘failure of major companies to stand up to criticism’ (June 22) and that it was a 
‘victory for multinationals over national sovereignty’ (June 24). So, once again the 
Telegraph reproduced the UK government’s view of the situation. After a brief period of 
criticism for having changed course, the initial supportive framing of Shell, evident 
during the crisis, continued as the company was represented as having had little choice 
but to give in to Greenpeace, which, as before, was framed negatively. And, by the end of 
the year, the Telegraph reversed the criticism it had previously made of Shell:
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‘Faced with accusations of deception and environmental vandalism, firebombed by 
ecological terrorists and subjected to a consumer boycott, Shell capitulated and 
agreed to find an alternative method of disposal’ (September 7).
After a short period of reproach, the Telegraph held a more appreciative view of the 
decision to abort, as Shell was then, as at the beginning of the crisis, viewed with more 
sympathy and the company was presented as having responded well to a bad situation. 
The paper argued in a manner that favoured the types of arguments Shell made after the 
crisis.97
The Guardian's framing of Shell changed radically as the year progressed, and this 
change helped Shell’s case. During the crisis the Guardian had criticised Shell for being 
unresponsive to public opinion and for not having conducted wider consultations before 
arriving at the sea disposal plan. After Shell terminated that plan, the Guardian still 
maintained this view. Subsequent articles, however, framed Shell as having learned 
lessons from the episode and, in doing so, framed Shell in the manner sought by the 
company. The first instance of this was when the paper covered a speech made by Shell 
UK’s Head of Public Affairs, John Wybrew, in which he declared that the company must 
have better public relations and broader consultations. The paper also uncritically 
reproduced Shell’s statements regarding its ‘New Way Forward’ programme for the 
Brent Spar. The Guardian's framing of Shell as having learned from the crisis might 
have been a reflection of the claims made by Shell as the company too maintained the 
same.
97 This is further demonstrated below.
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Towards the end of the year, when Shell held its ‘Better Britain’ awards (postponed 
during the crisis), the Guardian praised Shell for its environmental concern. Hence, by 
the end of the year, the Guardian reinforced what was questioned and threatened during 
the Brent Spar crisis - Shell’s reputation for being environmentally concerned. The 
Guardian argued that the company’s claims about its environmental activities were 
justified:
‘Shell’s interest in the environment is no flash in the pan: the company was 
supporting initiatives in environmental education as long ago as the 1940s, and the 
campaign [Shell’s ‘Better Britain’] celebrates its 25th birthday this year’ (Nov. 22).
Whereas the Guardian had not supported Shell’s claim about environmental concern 
during the crisis, after the crisis it reproduced Shell’s desired image and presented the 
company’s claims as justified. In short, the Guardian now framed Shell in a positive 
manner that helped the advancement of the company’s case.
A critical press attention on Greenpeace and its campaign
Greenpeace obtained this type of press attention prior to the two events the organisation 
credits with prompting negative media coverage.98 The press attention given to 
Greenpeace was a consequence of the papers’ arguments about the crisis as having 
illustrated what they considered to be the true state of affairs. Their analyses were 
analogous to those promoted by Shell and similarly made problematic the type of actions 
that Greenpeace took.
98 These were: Greenpeace’s statement that its oil estimate was in error and television executives’ claim 
that Greenpeace had manipulated television news coverage of the crisis.
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The Guardian depicted Greenpeace not as a David fighting Goliath but as a key player in 
a battle between equals: ‘BATTLE OF GIANTS’ is how the paper described the past 
crisis. Greenpeace had fought an efficient campaign but lacked the scientific evidence to 
support its claims, the Guardian argued:
‘Although they [Greenpeace] have won the war they have not yet won the 
argument’ (June 22);
‘There are scientific doubts being raised about Greenpeace’s arguments for not 
sinking the Brent Spar oil rig, but these are generally lost in the sea of publicity 
which has drowned out Shell and made heroes of Greenpeace’ (June 26).
The Guardian also framed Greenpeace as an organisation that was not quite what it 
seemed and represented the environmental group as being sophisticated, powerful and 
skilful in managing communications with the media:
‘Greenpeace ... feeds off images of the state or large organisations appearing to 
bulldoze aside people or new ideas ...’ (June 22);
‘... technology came into its own [in Greenpeace’s campaign]. It may have been a 
traditional protest action, but the communications deployed were second to none ... 
the messages were kept punchy and simple and disseminated widely through press 
adverts and billboards. The campaign was even articulated in cyberspace via the 
Internet’ (June 22).
Like Shell, the Guardian also commented on the televisual qualities of Greenpeace’s 
protest activities, arguing that Greenpeace knew how to gain media attention and secure 
public support for its campaigns." By arguing in this way, the Guardian framed 
Greenpeace in a similar manner to that advanced by Shell and by the Telegraph. The 
Telegraph's framing of Greenpeace, however, was much more critical and negative than 
that of the Guardian.
"  The next section illustrates this.
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The Telegraph's derisive framing of Greenpeace was unchanged after the crisis, e.g. 
‘GREEN FOR DANGER’ (June 21). An interesting circumstance was that, whereas the 
Telegraph had not covered Greenpeace’s claims about the environmental risks of Shell’s 
sea disposal plan during the crisis it did so afterwards. This was done in order to question 
and discredit them - it was part of the Telegraph's wider programme to cavil at 
Greenpeace’s allegations. The Telegraph's depiction of Greenpeace reflected what Shell 
maintained, and that portrayal was conducive to the promotion of Shell’s view of 
Greenpeace:
‘Greenpeace’s victory over Shell UK and the Government... illustrates the 
capabilities of a highly organised and well funded international group ... One of the 
world’s few environmental groups able to mount such an operation, Greenpeace 
marshalled a flotilla of boats, including two chartered ones, a helicopter and the 
latest video and photographic equipment. It also deployed consummate public 
relations skills in ensuring that the world knew about its attempts to prevent the 
dumping ... while its activists are out trying to stop commercial whaling or the 
dumping of radioactive wastes, there are many more staff running what has become 
a successful marketing, media and lobbying company’ (June 21).
The Telegraph, like the Guardian, also commented on the David and Goliath imagery, 
claiming that ‘Greenpeace’s strength is to be seen as the David against the corporate 
Goliath’ (June 22). The paper gave critical attention to the public image of Greenpeace, 
arguing that, contrary to public perceptions, Greenpeace was not an environmentally 
concerned organisation but one that was more concerned about funding:
‘GREENPEACE: A CAUSE DRIVEN BY CASH FLOW’ (September 10). Greenpeace 
had campaigned against the disposal in order to boost its dwindling funds, the Telegraph 
maintained. That Greenpeace stood to gain financially from the campaign may have been 
true but it does not ipso facto invalidate Greenpeace’s case, although that was the paper’s 
implication:
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‘Top of the list of hypocrites comes Greenpeace, which decided to play silly games 
in wetsuits and helicopters not to save the environment but to reverse an alarming 
fall in their membership ...’(June 25);
‘... reality had little to do with the choice of the Brent Spar as an issue for 
Greenpeace-style direct action. It presented a photogenic and winnable scenario, 
which would bring new members (and even greater financial clout to this multi­
million pound global network)... Reality consistently comes way down on 
Greenpeace’s list of priorities’ (August 13).
Greenpeace was frequently represented as manipulative, deceitful, powerful, 
unaccountable and irresponsible.
A negative framing of Greenpeace was manifested in the Guardian and, to a greater 
extent, in the Telegraph prior to the two developments that Greenpeace claimed gave rise 
to an antagonistic representation of the organisation. Whilst the nature of the framing of 
Greenpeace was not new, the developments helped perpetuate that existing (critical) 
frame.
The Guardian responded to the television executives’ statement about Greenpeace in a 
manner that was consistent with the existing negative framing of Greenpeace as scheming 
and dishonest. The Guardian framed Greenpeace in a similar manner to that promoted by 
the news executives, i.e. as media savvy and technologically sophisticated, and as using 
sensational campaigning tactics to attract and manipulate media coverage. Albeit, the 
Guardian had on previous occasions discussed the proficiency of Greenpeace’s 
campaigning tactics and, in particular, had elaborated on how the Brent Spar campaign 
had solicited and captured television coverage.
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The Guardian's response to Greenpeace’s admission of a mistake also did not lead to a 
change in how the paper characterised the organisation, as Greenpeace claimed. The 
paper had previously framed Greenpeace’s allegations as unproven and had cast doubt on 
Greenpeace’s claims about the environmental risks of Shell’s plan. In contrast to the 
development of a negative frame as a result of this admission, the Guardian outlined 
Greenpeace’s claim as to how the mistake had been made and, in doing so, gave a 
sympathetic rendition that represented Greenpeace as having made an honest mistake.
Moreover, contrary to Greenpeace’s claim that its acknowledgement gave rise to a 
critical representation of the organisation, a direct consequence of Greenpeace’s 
statement was the negative representation of Shell and the UK government. In the first 
article on this subject (September 6), the Guardian not only framed government ministers 
as ‘attacking’ Greenpeace over this ‘mistake’ but also framed Shell as ‘seizing’ on this 
‘apology’ in order to ‘reopen the issue of the disposal of the North Sea installation’ and 
‘turn the spotlight on alleged misinformation by influential pressure groups’.
However, a number of articles on the subject that Greenpeace needed to substantiate and 
prove the claims it had made about the Spar appeared in the Guardian. Although the 
paper had formerly constructed that subject, what was new was how often that view was 
expressed after Greenpeace’s admission of its error. For instance, an article in October 
had the headline: ‘TRUTH AS MUCH UNDER THREAT AS THE RAINFOREST’.
Also, in one instance, the Guardian did encourage the impression that Greenpeace had 
apologised for the whole of its campaign. This, Greenpeace claimed, was a common 
media misinterpretation of its apology for the oil-estimate error. But it was the only
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example I found. It appeared in its end of the year review: ‘Greenpeace apologised for 
misleading the public’ (Dec 30). It seems as though, in that one instance, a failure to 
highlight what Greenpeace had apologised for created that impression. Nevertheless, 
prior to that statement, the Guardian had always made it clear that Greenpeace has 
apologised for one mistake rather than for the whole campaign. This situation, I believe, 
again shows the self-serving nature of claims about media coverage.
The Telegraph presented the television executives’ faultfinding claims about Greenpeace 
in a similar way to the Guardian, i.e. by reproducing their negative frame of Greenpeace 
as being manipulative. But that was also the Telegraph's initial frame of the organisation.
The first article by the Telegraph on Greenpeace’s admission of a mistake was quite 
reserved in passing judgement. Yet subsequent articles argued that this development 
indicated that Greenpeace had deliberately lied and misled the public, that Greenpeace 
had only admitted its slip because Shell would have soon found this out and that 
Greenpeace was trying to make a virtue out of the admission:
‘GREENPEACE FIASCO: Greenpeace’s apology ... is an exercise in damage 
limitation rather than an act of contrition ... Three months too late Greenpeace has 
“realised in the last few days” that its guerrillas were far more fervent than 
competent... The misleading information was worthless to scientific analysis but 
invaluable to propagandists ... But the Brent Spar fiasco need not be wholly 
regrettable if the public learns the stark lesson it teaches; that single issue groups 
are often not unimpeachable guardians of society’s best interest, but highly 
motivated and well-financed zealots who play fast and loose with the facts ... 
Greenpeace is a sophisticated organisation, adept at choosing soft targets to stir 
widespread concern. But its Brent Spar campaign has been irresponsible - a fact 
which should not be forgotten the next time it solicits money or tries to whip up 
public outrage’ (September 7).
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Even though there was no change in how Greenpeace was framed (the paper still 
disparaged the organisation), the two developments were presented as though they 
confirmed the paper’s initial criticisms of Greenpeace.
While the two developments may not have fundamentally changed each newspaper’s 
view of Greenpeace, the developments did have certain consequences as more critical 
articles about Greenpeace materialised. But Greenpeace’s contention that the two 
developments were pivotal in bringing about a negative representation of the organisation 
cannot be defended, as such a view already existed and had been propagated before the 
two statements. The existence of a critical view of Greenpeace (before the two 
statements), together with such a view being seemingly sustained by developments, 
meant that Shell’s arguments about Greenpeace were reflected in what the newspapers 
wrote. Further, the manner in which the papers framed Greenpeace validated Shell’s 
arguments as that perspective facilitated and lent a greater credibility to Shell’s 
problematisation of Greenpeace, its campaign, and its strategies.
A view o f the crisis as having displayed what the papers took to be truths about the 
status quo
This is illustrated in some of the quotations above. The newspapers had suggested a 
similar interpretation of the situation during the crisis but the articles then were more 
focused on specific events that were taking place.
During the crisis, the Mirror had urged Shell not to ignore public opinion, as public 
acquiescence was a necessary element. That was also a claim made by the Guardian in
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the presentation of its argument that companies operating in contemporary society 
required the acceptance of wider and external ‘stakeholders’ rather than just compliance 
with regulations. The Telegraph had maintained that the situation illustrated the agenda- 
setting power of pressure groups and the failure of major companies to stand up to the 
pressure groups’ appeal to emotions in their arguments. These arguments mirrored those 
which Shell advanced after the crisis. After the crisis, all three newspapers elaborated on 
their earlier accounts100. Their respective claims about the Zeitgeist proposed a particular 
elucidation of the crisis.
All three papers argued that the incident was indicative of societal conditions. Their 
description of those conditions paralleled the claims made by Shell after the crisis and 
thus benefited Shell’s case. It is perhaps within those observations that homogeneity with 
Shell’s views is most clearly manifest, because those accounts accorded with Shell’s 
identification of the three conditions the company classified as being problematic.
The Mirror was very critical of Shell and argued that the crisis demonstrated a necessity 
for companies to incorporate the wishes of the wider public. Shell’s claim that it would 
listen, engage in dialogue with and enlist the acquiescence of its external stakeholders 
was similar to what the Mirror claimed was necessary.
The Guardian and the Telegraph also argued that companies had a wider responsibility to 
external stakeholders to whom companies were accountable. Thus their accounts also 
reflected Shell’s arguments about the company’s new commitment. The Telegraph's
100 This was more evident in the Guardian and the Telegraph than the Mirror, which was principally due 
to the premature end of the Mirror's coverage.
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identification of a dissipating public trust in big business was one that Shell had also 
recognised. In short, what all three papers said about Shell’s approach was similar to 
what the company admitted and argued in the aftermath of the crisis.
As we have seen, a further aspect identified by both the Guardian and the Telegraph also 
resembled what Shell claimed, i.e. assertions regarding Greenpeace’s campaign. The 
Guardian argued that the outcome of Greenpeace’s campaign was ‘an environmental 
own goal’ (June 24) and that the campaign had been efficient but unfair. Likewise, the 
Telegraph argued that Greenpeace’s campaign had been proficient but prejudicial. Such 
arguments accorded with Shell’s claims. The Guardian's and the Telegraph's view of 
Greenpeace’s campaign was the same as Shell’s condemnation of it. They both argued 
that the campaign was a symbolic and televisual one that was more concerned with the 
presentational aspects that promoted a desired view rather than one based on an 
assessment of the actual risks of Shell’s plan. The Telegraph reported:
‘... the importance of the Brent Spar was as a symbol of the pollution of the global 
commons by vested interests with short term objectives ... To Greenpeace’s 
supporters this inexactness [of whether the sea disposal would damage the 
environment] does not matter ...’ (June 22).
Like Shell, the Telegraph viewed the situation as caused by Greenpeace’s ‘cavalier use of 
science’ and its ‘demonisation of environmental risks’ (June 22).
The Guardian too, like Shell, identified the symbolism of Greenpeace’s campaign and 
peoples’ understanding of risks as problematic:
‘...we now feel that nature itself resides in the seas and the skies. It is a romantic 
notion - the sea may be hacked up into fishing territories and when one is sitting on
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a plane one hopes that air space is well regulated - but it is a powerful one’ (June 
22);
‘We are the Risk Society in the notable phrase of the German sociologist Ulrich 
Beck, composed of people constantly calibrating risks in our personal lives and 
with a deeply established expectation that the job of the political class is the 
avoidance or minimisation of future risk for the whole society, and the provision of 
compensation when this fails’ (July 1).
The article argued, like Shell, that the Spar incident had a great deal to do with 
perceptions of risks and expert assessments:
‘The complicated relation between public perceptions of risks, expert assessments, 
and political calculations - demonstrated recently during the Brent Spar affair - 
seems to many to have become the most vital, and difficult, area in the politics of 
industrialised nations’ (July 1).
According to the Guardian, the Brent Spar crisis illustrated the new demands made on 
businesses and the rise of new societal conditions:
[Shell’s] ‘climbdown ...is not a victory for the environment but for the politics of 
refusal’ (June 22);
‘The European consumer boycott of Shell... mark a rejection of business and 
Establishment values as much as any direct protest against environmental damage 
... The grassroots cry is for respect and consideration; the tendency is to reject 
power imposed without consultation ...’(Nov. 15);
‘... what Brent Spar showed is that this new kind of politics is especially explosive 
when environmental anxieties are combined with national feeling against outside 
agencies, corporations or other governments’ (July 11).
Both the Telegraph and the Guardian maintained that the success of Greenpeace’s 
campaign demonstrated that Greenpeace and other pressure groups commanded public 
trust and faith:
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‘Environmental groups still retain the faith of the public. That is their main source 
of strength’ (Guardian, September 7);
‘The trump card in pressure groups’ hand is easily stirred public sentiments ... 
people do not trust [governments and corporations] anymore. The consequence is 
that they accept no corporate governmental evidence unless they have been party to 
it from the start. That means [winning the public debate] early ...’ (Telegraph, June 
24).
Both newspapers argued that Greenpeace’s skill and effectiveness in publicising their 
claims also explained the crisis for Shell. In maintaining that, their accounts reflected 
Shell’s claims:
‘[Greenpeace’s] well-honed skills with helicopters and small boats make for 
arresting television. That in turn attracts the attention of a public that is becoming 
increasingly conscious of environmental issues ... But it is deeply regrettable that 
such a campaign rather than reasoned and informed debate has now won the day’ 
(Telegraph, June 21);
‘There is, one senses, a coming together of many issues around this particular 
campaign. What should never be underestimated is what a beautifully televisual 
campaign this was. A battered ugly man-made structure in the North Sea, being 
buzzed by a Greenpeace helicopter caught the imagination... We may know that 
Shell is a huge multi-national exercising enormous global power, but it is difficult 
to conceive what this might actually look like. Now we have an image to go with 
the concept’ (Guardian, June 22);
‘ROUGH SEA OF PUBLICITY; Shell took a battering in the North Sea ... But can 
big business ever compete with guerrilla PR? ... Corporate Goliaths like Shell have 
been slain by adverse publicity, not only by Davids such as Greenpeace, but by 
their own lack of crisis management... Sadly, for a company with as comparatively 
strong an environmental record as Shell, this is a lesson learned too late. It is ironic 
that Shell’s three year campaign of lobbying the British government... was so 
successful... they won the lobbying battle but lost the PR war’ (Guardian, June 
26).
How might press coverage affect Shell’s case?
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Out of the three areas Shell made problematic (its own approach, Greenpeace’s campaign 
and media coverage), the first two areas received greater press attention than the third, 
even though that too was discussed in a way that approved Shell’s claim regarding the 
matter. All three papers were agreed that Shell’s approach had shortcomings and the 
Guardian and the Telegraph concluded that Greenpeace’s campaign was questionable. 
Nevertheless, Shell’s claim that there were problems with the way in which the media 
described the situation did not receive as precise and in-depth an exploration as was given 
to the other two areas. And while much was made of television coverage (as can be seen 
in the above citations), what was significantly missing from both papers’ accounts of 
media coverage was that pertaining to press coverage. And even though the Guardian 
had substantially changed its position, it did not retract or apologise for its earlier stories. 
Both newspapers claimed that how Greenpeace had used the media was problematic, yet 
these accounts were focused on television coverage, not press coverage. However, the 
notion that Greenpeace had unjustly but efficiently gained media attention and influenced 
media coverage was one that implicated the press as well as television. In advancing that 
notion, the papers supported Shell’s arguments regarding media coverage.
The absence of commentary by the press on how press coverage might have affected the 
crisis is perhaps to be expected, given that self-criticism may not be advantageous, yet it 
is conspicuous for its absence. This was also the case with television coverage. A notable 
absence in television coverage was the television executives’ admission of biased 
coverage. That development was not aired on BBC, ITV or Channel 4. Its absence in 
television coverage, and presence in press coverage, suggests that damaging information 
for television news (as the admission threatened impartiality, the canon of television
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news) was omitted. To state the obvious, this shows that television news is not always as 
impartial as it maintains it must be and that the press also protect their interests.
An important observation is that, despite the expression of analogous views to that of 
Shell, both the Guardian and the Telegraph presented that outlook as their own. Perhaps 
this reflected the necessity and presumed gains of appearing objective, or perhaps it just 
happened to be the deduction. Whichever way it may have come about, accounts of the 
past crisis, especially when presented in an apparently independent way, bolstered Shell’s 
case.
My study suggests that press coverage after the crisis was beneficial to the advancement 
of the types of arguments Shell made most forcefully after the crisis. What the press and 
Shell advanced after the crisis had consequences for how that crisis was subsequently 
viewed. As the newspapers expressed similar views to those of Shell, the company’s 
arguments were repeated by them and this gave those arguments a greater credibility.
One of the main conclusions regarding media coverage after the crisis is that both 
television and, to a greater extent, press identified factors that were conducive to the 
promotion of the sort of arguments Shell offered (after the crisis) in order to manage the 
crisis. Television news did not argue in a similar manner to Shell, as the press did, but 
television news identified constituents that helped further the case the company 
subsequently made. Press coverage did specifically propound arguments that were similar
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to Shell’s after the crisis. Hence, the conditions that prevailed within television and the 
press were favourable to Shell’s case.
It is conceivable that these circumstances may have been a consequence of Shell’s 
activities after the immediate crisis was over, as I showed earlier that the company took 
measures to address that damaging affair. It is also possible that Shell’s retrospective 
interpretation, intentionally or otherwise, articulated existing news themes and, hence, 
received coverage. Fishman (1995) argues, in a study of news media dependency on the 
police for crime news, that the police’s stories are more likely to receive substantial news 
play if they articulate a news theme. Fishman also maintains that the police are aware of 
that and deliberately play to existing news themes, publicising accounts that fit the 
formats of news discourse.
It is impractical to identify whether the news stories preceded or followed Shell’s case. 
My investigation reveals instances where the news stories and Shell’s case were 
constructed around the same time. For example, the Guardian*s coverage of John 
Wybrew’s speech signalled the beginning of a change in how Shell was framed by that 
paper. The study also reveals that some news themes existed during the crisis but were 
later elaborated in a manner that reflected the types of arguments that Shell later made. 
Shell’s arguments certainly encouraged and facilitated that elaboration. But we may 
never know which came first (the news stories or Shell’s case). What we do know, 
however, is that there was a correspondence between them and that was useful to Shell.
Even if Shell expanded on pre-existing news themes in the media in proposing a 
favourable account, the very fact that the company did so would show that it was seeking
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to manage the past crisis by managing interpretations of what had taken place. And given 
that Shell did put great effort and resources into communicating about the past crisis and 
advancing a specific rendition, it is not unreasonable to suppose that its crisis 
management might have had some effect.
However, it is impossible to establish a cause and effect relationship, and this is a routine 
condition of social scientific study. It is difficult to produce this type of correlation 
because it is impractical to meet all three criteria for causality: (a) a relationship (b) time- 
ordering and (c) the elimination of all alternative explanations. I have, at least, confirmed 
a relationship. Further, the fact that I cannot show a cause and effect relationship, and that 
Shell’s account gelled with existing news themes, should not detract from the situation I 
have demonstrated, i.e. that Shell proposed a beneficial account which was carried and 
delivered by the media.
Did Shell’s activities after the crisis reflect the consultants’ advice?
Much of crisis management, as defined by consultants, is about gaining acceptance of a 
standpoint. I have argued that Shell managed the crisis by communicating a particular 
outlook on what had happened. The actions Shell undertook after the crisis show that the 
company had indeed put some key recommendations into practice.
The consultants do not reject the possibility of engaging in crisis management after 
crises, but overlook, devalue and criticise that approach in favour of promoting crisis 
management during and prior to crises. The previous chapter showed problems with that 
approach and here a comparison of their recommendations and Shell’s crisis management
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efforts after the crisis allows a further consideration of the consultants’ preferred 
approach.
I have previously used an outline of the consultants’ recommendations and again do so 
here.
■ Understanding and responding to public emotions and perceptions
This notion structured Shell’s response to the crisis, and the company also exploited this 
conception to further its interests.
In stating a new commitment to take into account perceptions the company demonstrated 
a greater appreciation of the consultants’ diagnoses that perceptions are of vital 
importance and have consequences for crisis management. By making this pledge to be 
more considerate of perceptions and emotions Shell atoned for its past behaviour, created 
a favourable image of the corporation and solicited goodwill.
Not only did Shell apply this crisis management principle but it also reinvented the crisis 
in terms of faulty perceptions and the conflict between emotion vs. rational. By recreating 
the crisis in terms of mismanaged perceptions and misunderstandings Shell portrayed the 
opposition against the company (the crisis) as unwarranted. That also helped restore its 
desired reputation as being socially and environmentally responsible.
■ Cultivating knowledge o f relevant audiences and communicating with them
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This notion is fundamental in crisis management, and Shell’s actions after the crisis 
showed its incorporation.
As we have seen, to manage external communications better was a further promise the 
company made after the crisis. This was also in the company’s interest because Shell 
communicated with varied publics not only because the crisis was topical and was of 
interest to them - which is how the company depicted it - but also because Shell sought to 
convince those publics of the merits of its case. Through communications, the company 
publicised and sought the acceptance of its views by publics who were also able to 
further corroborate its case. I have shown that external communication was the vehicle 
for propagating a specific account of the crisis and it is principally through that route that 
Shell managed this crisis.
Also, quite significantly, it is by utilising the argument that the company had previously 
failed to communicate and thus had mismanaged the crisis that Shell explained the past 
crisis. Hence, this idea was present and central to Shell’s crisis management.
■ Understanding media requirements and cooperating with the media in granting 
information
According to journalists’ comments in a MORI survey about Shell’s media relations 
having vastly improved since Brent Spar, Shell was clearly successful in this area.101 
Although I did not examine media briefings, it is my understanding that there were many 
such occasions. From intervi ews with the members of the media who attended the
101 See page 270.
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briefings,102 and from an examination of the information Shell provided to the media (to 
which I had access), I found that Shell presented the same arguments to them as in the 
article and speech examined in this chapter. Furthermore, the exercise of having media 
briefings and releasing information to the media suggests that Shell was more 
accommodating of the media’s interest in this case, as well as actively seeking to attract 
media attention.
The media can influence readings of the past crisis and hence also views of Shell. And, as 
I have said, media representations of the past crisis were amenable to the advancement of 
Shell’s account of the crisis/its crisis management. This demonstrates that Shell could 
successfully handle the crisis after the end of the immediate crisis situation. That finding 
has repercussions for the consultants’ proposition regarding the most efficient way in 
which to manage crises as the company appears to have better addressed and handled the 
crisis after it was technically over.
■ Responses have to be made and managed at an early stage as contentious issues 
arise
■ Present and communicate the case clearly, quickly and succinctly
The first of these proposals is the basis of the consultants’ preferred line of an early 
response, and these recommendations are mostly significant prior to and during crisis 
situations. Thus, after the end of the immediate crisis Shell obviously could not be 
expected to follow these suggestions. Still, the broad principles behind these were 
applied.
102 These interviews were with environmental and oil and energy journalists and editors.
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Following the crisis, Shell was appreciative of the need to communicate and to allocate 
resources and time to discussing what had happened. Contentious issues had arisen 
earlier but they still remained after Shell ended the immediate crisis, and in then dealing 
with these controversial issues the company demonstrably responded to them. In that 
way, these two principles, mostly relevant in other phases of the crisis, were also 
incorporated after the crisis.
The examination of the emerging and the immediate crisis revealed that Shell had not 
incorporated the key elements of the consultants’ advice and that it is difficult for an 
organisation to follow many of their recommendations during those periods. On that 
basis, I questioned the consultants’ argument that the Brent Spar crisis demonstrates the 
importance of crisis management as a preventative measure. Having examined what Shell 
did after the crisis - and, in doing so, broadening the boundaries of this case - 1 have 
found that this case reveals factors consequential for what consultants say, not just with 
regard to this specific instance but also with regard to crisis management in general.
Given what consultants said about this case, what I did not expect to find, but did, is that 
it demonstrates not why crisis management should be principally used as a preventative 
and early management of crises measure (as consultants would have it, and refer to this 
case as justifying that approach) but how crisis management can be engaged and 
beneficial after crises.
Conclusions
A key finding of this chapter is that Shell did not entirely mismanage the crisis, which is 
contrary to the consultants’ conclusion. At the very core of crisis management is the
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construction and perpetuation of a desired view, and I have demonstrated how Shell did 
this. The route Shell took, reconstructing the past crisis in terms that were favourable to 
the company, is demonstrably possible and hence also available to other organisations 
seeking to manage their crises. We have previously seen the sorts of difficulties Shell had 
in handling the crisis situation and, in contrast to that period, in this chapter we have seen 
the company dealing with many issues that had also existed then. In showing the kinds of 
arguments the company proposed, and how media representations favoured the 
promotion of that case, I have argued that it is conceivable that Shell’s communication 
efforts might have had an influence.
My consideration of Shell’s handling of the various phases of this crisis suggests that 
crisis management, as formulated by consultants, might have been better achieved at this 
phase of the crisis rather than at previous stages. There were problems in instigating 
many of the consultants’ recommendations about the early response to ‘emerging’ crises, 
and in this chapter I have demonstrated possibilities for crisis management after crises. 
These observations are consequential to what the consultants’ regard as the best approach 
to crisis management because they illustrate problems in the consultants’ position that 
crisis management should precede rather than follow crises.
This chapter also demonstrates that Shell heeded consultants’ advice by embodying and 
utilising most of the principles of crisis management. From this situation, I see two main 
intriguing issues emerging.
The first is a question raised in chapter one: might individuals and organisations use a 
similar process, or a basic model, of interaction to manage impressions? That chapter
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argued that consultants upheld an interaction process that has affinities with symbolic 
interactionism’s account of the process individuals are said to employ. I have now 
demonstrated that Shell did follow a course consultants recommend. What this situation 
reveals is that, at the very least, in this instance an organisation followed the 
recommended method of impression management and, in doing so, behaved in a similar 
way to that which Interactionism holds that individuals do. The generalisation that can be 
drawn from this is that individuals and organisations may have to account for virtually 
similar factors in interacting to manage impressions. Although this is an intriguing 
detection, there are limitations to that generalisation.
The second point is that Shell appears to have better managed the crisis at this stage, and 
did so following many of consultants’ proposals, but why then do consultants not portray 
this case as one where crisis management initiatives worked and instead depict it as 
demonstrating the mismanagement of crises? It might be that consultants benefit more by 
portraying this case as emblematic of mismanagement, as that interpretation serves the 
promotion of their claim that crisis management must be engaged in regardless of 
whether or not a crisis is present. As we have seen, while they criticise the handling of 
the crisis situation, their principal criticism of Shell is for not engaging in crisis 
management measures prior to the crisis.
I believe that the consultants’ version of this case reveals how important it is to further a 
particular line of reasoning. They use this case to endorse their argument about the 
importance of early response, an argument that requires this case to be labelled as one 
where a crisis was mismanaged, when they could represent it as one demonstrating the
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value of the other recommendations made. But it is more lucrative to argue that crisis 
management is always necessary rather than only required after crises. This once again 
suggests that the advancement and establishment of a particular formula might have more 
to do with these intentions, rather than addressing the problems to which that approach is 
presented as the solution. There is an apparent disregard for the availability of 
possibilities for crisis management through routes other than the particular one that is 
most eagerly promoted at the time. This suggests how professional fields are developed 
in a coveted manner and how the scheme known as crisis management is a very specific 
creation of consultants, who, in helping organisations pursue their interests, also attend to 
their own.
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CONCLUSIONS
In many ways, the emergence and existence of this specialist consultancy practice, crisis 
management, attests to the explosion of the consulting market (Kieser 2002). I have 
demonstrated its historical roots and current home in public relations and that it deals 
with specific, restricted concerns. Yet it is inevitable that the ways in which practitioners 
seek to gain support for, and establish their authority are mirrored in the type of activities 
undertaken by consultants in the wider consulting industry. In that sense, the study of this 
one occupation is relevant to an understanding of others, specifically, how new 
professions come about, how they gain professional standing and how they are able to 
create a demand for their services.
From the outset, therefore, I was interested in examining the features whereby consultants 
gain support. That is not to say that their actions alone create a demand for their services. 
The business opportunity was undoubtedly there because there was an organisational 
demand for it, but it was exploited and shaped as crisis management grew.
What I find particularly remarkable is that the principal concept that consultants develop, 
the management of risk, is an object of public discourse. Two important issues arise out 
of this. Firstly, risk is a powerful notion to evoke in propagating actions that purport to 
control. Secondly, the very existence of that public discourse seemingly legitimises the 
measures advocated. Both aid the development of this field.
The consultants paint a portrait of the world as dangerous. It is a helpful impression 
because it creates fear and, in turn, a demand for measures to reinstall a sense of control.
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My study demonstrates how consultants not only promise control but also increase the 
fear of a loss of control. Kieser (2002) finds this to be a routine device consultants use to 
persuade people of the necessity of their counsel, arguing:
‘To achieve control over events that impinge on the realization of one’s plans can 
be regarded as one of the strongest human motives ... Consultants ... skilfully feed 
the fears of those who have not yet adopted the new idea ... The expertise of the 
presenting consultant is also underlined ... Often [that individual] quite openly 
makes it clear that intuition such as only an expert can have is indispensable’ 
(Kieser 2002: 173; 179).
Consultants feed clients’ sense of uncertainty, Kieser observes, and they also contribute 
to creating more uncertainty because there is a constant flow of new concepts that 
‘always plant the seed for new, deep-reaching uncertainties’ (2002:175) and the cycle 
continues. In some respects, by the very condition that these consultants deal with 
crises/circumstances that seem to those involved to be disastrously out of control, their 
task of persuasion is made easier.
This thesis has pointed to the many ways in which consultants convince organisations of 
their way of thinking. With the aid of the Brent Spar case study, I argued that crises do 
not appear to be the manageable situations the consultants say they are, and I have 
identified some problems with their conceptualisation of proper responses. A principal 
problem is how complex processes are reduced to plain, neat situations and given the 
appearance of manageability. This reflects more of their practical competences than 
intrinsic features of the problematic situation itself.
Kieser’s argument, that complexity is reduced because the advice then appears more 
appealing to clients, contributes to an understanding of why this is so:
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‘[Consultants’] concepts appear attractive if they reduce the perceived complexity 
of management and thereby contribute to the restoration of control’ (2002:177).
Thus, we have witnessed in the crisis management consultants’ account how there is a 
concentration on communications, and this is largely because that is the area in which the 
consultants have expertise and a wish to promote. But the consequence is that everything 
pertaining to crises and their management is related to communications, and that creates a 
one-dimensional comprehension of the character and control of such situations. It also 
points to how much impression management is the chief concern. But, in some ways, that 
may be to the detriment of a more genuine understanding of the conditions and processes 
involved.
Moreover, we have also seen how consultants present the principles of crisis management 
as being valid for all circumstances and organisations. This too simplifies and does away 
with the differences that may exist. The consultants focus on corporations but say that 
other organisations can also apply their knowledge. However, there is in fact very little 
indication of whether there are differences between, say, the public and the private sector. 
There is not only a lot we do not know with regard to what may be involved in handling 
the different crises of different organisations but there is also a lack of clarity. The 
impression I received was that the consultants intended to tackle the precise issues once 
they were hired. Kieser argues that consultants intentionally, and for their own interest, 
create this vagueness and ambiguity, and that these are normal characteristics of their 
approach:
‘The consultant who presents a concept has to maintain a certain degree of 
vagueness - of mystification - so that getting his help seems advisable ...
Ambiguity offers scope for interpretation. The reader or listener can project the
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problems she presently encounters in her organization onto the concept that is 
presented by the consultant and can thus interpret it as the solution to these pressing 
problems’ (2002:178-179).
But it is not at all the case that clients respond in the desired manner. Kieser argues that 
consultancies have made managers ‘marionettes on the strings of their fashions’ 
(2002:176), but he also points to studies indicating that some organisations exercise 
scepticism and develop a critical stance, even if they still buy into consultants’ advice 
(see Engwall and Eriksson 1999). Indeed, Kipping and Armbruster (2002) discuss 
instances where clients resisted consultants’ advice.
There are external forces that create a demand for the types of techniques consultants say 
they offer. It is not just that the consultants alone create a demand but also that their 
service appears to be a convincing solution to the practical problems organisations 
believe they face (Kieser 2002). What makes it so convincing? It is because the 
circumstances consultants point to and classify as risks are also ones organisations find 
threatening. The very existence of the risk discourse, for instance, is not just helpful to 
the consultants’ case but also shows the existence of a wider concern with the type of 
areas they evoke. As I argued in chapter one, issues were now being thought about quite 
differently and that has consequences. In the case study, I demonstrated many of the 
conditions and circumstances that both the consultants and the risk thesis describe. 
Therefore, the consultants’ claims can have resonance because of what organisations 
perceive to be true about the world. And those perceptions about the world are derived 
not just from what consultants say but from wider and, especially, leading discourses of 
the time that provide intellectual support and legitimacy for the consultants’ case. I have 
said that responses to problems are structured by the existing dominant beliefs and
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rationales (Garland 2001). Yet the consultants’ reference to these is also important in 
understanding and explaining how they are able to advance their field. There might 
indeed be a reciprocal relation between what consultants offer and what the organisations 
wish for and demand (Kipping and Engwall 2002).
The existence of crisis management clearly shows that risks have become commodities, 
and that it has become possible to trade services based on their assessment and control. 
But the veiy fact that this is viable reveals how much of a concern there is with managing 
conditions seen to pose risks.
If there is a reciprocal relationship between what consultants supply and what 
organisations demand, then organisations must perceive that there are problems with 
managing impressions. Crisis management consultants argue that organisations operate in 
a virtual reality constructed by the mass media. But, as the existence of crisis 
management indicates, the world is not just constructed by the media but also by the 
organisations attempting to influence that construction. My study shows that 
organisations strive to fashion their appearances and the contexts in which they are seen.
Crisis management is very much about exerting control over other attempts to define 
reality. It seeks to position organisations’ interpretations as dominant because in this way 
they can benefit from favourable outlooks. The veiy fact that crisis is defined as a 
consequence of the proliferation of negative views shows the significance of this. It is 
really not surprising that the parallels I have pointed to between the consultants’ account 
of social action and that of symbolic interactionism are there because both, under 
different positions and objectives, deal with how social reality is symbolically created.
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Consultants cite the Brent Spar crisis because it is meant to reveal this and prove the 
validity of what they hold to be the best approach to crises. In examining that case, I 
largely agreed with their first argument and raised problems with the second.
This incident points to the fact that most things are open to interpretation. This explains 
both the organisational anxiety and the consultants’ advice. And it does attest to many of 
the features of society that consultants point to. However, I argued that it also shows, 
contrary to the consultants’ own argument, that it is more than a little difficult to control 
these circumstances. I especially took issue with their claim that crises can be prevented 
through the early management of issues, arguing that there are practical difficulties in 
applying this strategy.
With reference to the media coverage of this incident, I argued that organisations might 
play a restricted role in the ‘presentation of self (Goffman 1959), which is a finding 
consequential to the consultants’ claim that organisations can govern that process. That is 
not to say that an influence cannot be exerted - sources seek to influence news, Ericson 
(1989) argues, and I showed that crisis management seeks that objective - but there are 
constraints on this. There are not just other actors seeking the very same objective but 
also other processes involved, I argued, and their involvement curtails the particular 
impression that crisis management measures intend to create.
From what I have examined, it appears that it is not so much a single virtual world 
created by the mass media but several coexisting and often conflicting realities 
simultaneously sustained by the mass media, which certainly construct the world,
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producing their own and disparate meanings, but also reflect the designs and creations of 
external others.
This thesis centres on the construction of appearances and it points to how important they 
are held to be. It also demonstrates the type of problems that can be encountered in 
managing impressions. Yet, despite those problems, the existence of crisis management 
indicates that there are institutionalised attempts to control how organisations are viewed, 
and its consideration shows how such attempts might be organised, how they may at 
times fail and, at other times, succeed to an extent.
I described how the consultants’ advice to create favourable impressions can be applied 
by examining Shell’s crisis management after the crisis. What that consideration 
displayed is not just how this company used their advice and benefited from it but also 
how the broad principles behind the consultants’ proposals can be applied differently 
from how they encourage. This in itself points to how particular types of reasoning can be 
utilised to develop a professional field in a preferred direction.
I have also argued that the citation of this case and consultants’ specific rendition of it 
illustrate the importance to consultants of gaining support for a particular recommended 
approach and the measures that go into persuading clients to adopt the suggested course. 
By advancing a particular line of reasoning, consultants attempt to gain support for the 
strategy they endorse and that concern is, for them, key because it is that which directs 
and establishes their occupation.
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The research also indicates that impression management is a concern operative at all 
levels of society, and it appears that it might operate in broadly similar ways at all levels. 
But just as the Interactionists pointed to the limitations involved in the individual’s 
presentation of self, there are limitations for organisations. Consultants do not point to 
these limitations, I suspect, not because they are unaware of them but because it is not 
advantageous for them to do so. We should not assume that managers are naive and 
wholeheartedly buy into crisis management. One reason for the adoption of crisis 
management must conform to what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called ‘rituals of 
rationality’ - the way in which organisations comply, and try to be seen to comply, to 
what are accepted as rational, sensible management strategies, even if, on a cold 
appraisal, they do not actually contribute much to efficiency or effectiveness.
This examination of crisis management suggested two main interrelated explanations for 
its existence. Firstly, there is the active construction and promotion of it. Secondly, there 
are external reasons as to why crisis management appears desirable. What this says about 
new professions is that they do not simply arise in response to a need. That is an 
influential factor, but it is also the case that they exist because there are efforts taken to 
launch them and ensure their continued existence. Influential factors on that survival are 
wider rationales that sustain the profession, which are also helpful in creating an 
ostensible need for it.
It would be interesting to see how crisis management progresses in the future; whether 
consultants derive new concepts and what type of arguments they use in backing those. A 
topic for research I would recommend is to see how the consultants of the future would
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describe the Brent Spar crisis, whether that representation is different from their current 
rendition, whether that reflects the new reasoning and what that might reveal about how 
management concepts and consultancy practices change and evolve.
My study shows the social construction of reality and that there are conflicting and 
contested realities which vie for attention and dominance. It reveals that the mass media 
are not just important in creating social reality, and hence also important to the task of 
impression management, but also that they are seen as fundamental in society and as 
highly influential. However, there are many sources of influence on media 
representations. I have demonstrated how organisations are politically and ideologically 
motivated, how corporations as well as environmentalists have become media-sensitive 
and reflexive to the media and how that is a consequence of the importance of gaining 
public acquiescence and influencing public understandings. Consensus-building practices 
such as crisis management will undoubtedly gain in stature.
Certain features of globalization - such as communication technologies, the ubiquity of 
the mass media and the weakness of nation states - are documented in this study but it 
also shows how globalization is incomplete; there are differences between societies and 
the cultural nature of people’s perception and judgment of risk. It shows responses to 
environmental issues to be complex and ambivalent yet also open to influence.
This study also found that it is by no means certain that a planned, strategic approach will 
have the intended results; that it will lead to the desired outcomes. The world is at times
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predictable and knowable but it is not always so. There is contingency, openness and 
unpredictability (Popper 1945). Yet the study also demonstrated that possibilities exist for 
capitalizing on circumstances in order to gain acceptance of a particular viewpoint. There 
is inventiveness and creativity in seeking support for ideological positions.
I have pointed to how the concept of risk is central in the contemporary era. My 
dissertation provides the risk thesis with an empirical experience to its largely theoretical 
observations and hence a response to the criticism made of the risk thesis for being overly 
speculative and not grounded (Lupton 1999). The study also shows how discourses such 
as the risk society perspective can not only be used as a tool to explain and justify an 
expertise, but can also help towards obtaining professional standing.
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APPENDIX A: NOTES ON METHODS
My primary aim was a study of how crisis management consultants represented their 
world, their understanding of what the handling of crises should involve and the 
justifications they employed to argue how, in their view, their approach is necessary and 
superior. An interpretive methodological stand was the most appropriate for that task.
The principal research method, ‘unstructured’ interview,103 was chosen because it was 
suited to the issue being researched: to explore the consultants’ formulation of crisis 
management.
On access and respondents: How many subscribe to the view I chronicled as the 
crisis management consultants’?
At the very beginning of my fieldwork, in May 1997, requesting interviews, I wrote to 
the 16 London-based consultancies who were members of the Public Relations 
Consultants’ Association (PRCA), and listed ‘crisis management’ as part of the portfolio 
of services provided. I received four responses. One was a positive response (from 
Michael Seymour, Director of Crisis Management, Burson-Marsteller) and another was a 
clear ‘access denied’ response: ‘Unfortunately, we are not able to disclose details of our 
crisis management work.’
Preserving client confidentiality is justifiably of paramount importance for consultancies. 
It is also the case that crisis management deals with sensitive, potentially damaging
103 See page 348.
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information and, perhaps more than other areas of public relations, is subject to a greater 
level of secrecy.104 Naturally, this has an impact on gaining access. This may also 
explain why there was a reluctance to speak about it and why non-response was high. But 
there might also have been other reasons for this, as I explain later.
The two other responses I received stated that they did not specialise in crisis 
management and that I should contact Michael Regester, who did.
Surprised to have encountered such a low level of response, I once again wrote to the 
consultancies. Still no replies were received, although some telephoned to suggest I 
contact the firm Regester Larkin, who were experts in crisis management.105
I wrote to the Institute of Public Relations (IPR), whom I had previously consulted, 
stating my position and adding that an ‘initial introduction from you to your members 
would greatly facilitate my research’. The Executive Director of the IPR, John Lavelle, 
wrote back suggesting that I contact ‘the three IPR members shown below, mentioning 
the fact that I had given you their names, as they have all lectured at the Institute, written 
books and appeared on international stages on the subject of issues and crisis 
management’. They were: Michael Regester, Michael Bland (independent crisis 
management consultant) and Peter Sheldon Green (Managing Director of Sheldon 
Communications). Clearly, I was being directed not just to those seen within the field as
104 One of the very first questions the consultants who subsequently gave interviews would ask me was 
whether I intended to publish. They also refrained from naming names during recorded interviews. I also 
found that the consultants were more generous with their description of past incidents when interviews 
were not tape-recorded and, as happened twice, when the tape had run out and they had noticed but I had 
not!
105 Regester’s name kept cropping up but it was absent from the listings in the PRCA yearbooks (Regester 
Larkin only became members in 1998).
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experts (Regester had already been pointed out by others) but to those with a specific 
type of background. They might have been highly regarded and experienced practitioners 
but I was aware that they might also have been regarded as the type of people with whom 
an academic would wish to speak. It was also the case, as it later transpired in interviews 
with them, that these three people had books to promote.106
They all accepted my request to interview them and all offered unlimited time and access.
The account I give of crisis management and the views I ascribe to crisis management 
consultants are very dependent on what those people said in interview and what they 
wrote in their publications on the subject. My report is also supplemented by an ongoing 
effort to speak to other consultants and gain views on crisis management through other 
avenues, such as attending seminars on the subject.107 Subsequently, I also gained access 
to some of the consultancies that had initially been hesitant about being questioned but it 
was very much the case that those consultants still said that they did not specialise in the 
area, and had I spoken to Michael Regester or Michael Bland?
106 Regester’s book Risk Issues And Crisis Management (the second book on crisis management by a 
British author - he also wrote the first one) came out two weeks after my first meeting with him. Michael 
Bland was writing his book Communicating Out Of A Crisis and in our initial meeting told me that it was 
the first book that dealt with all aspects of a crisis. He also gave me draft chapters from it. Peter Sheldon 
Green gave me a copy of his book Reputation Risk Management. Until Michael Seymour’s Effective Crisis 
Management, published in 2000, Regester’s two books and Bland’s book were the only ones by British 
crisis management practitioners.
107 Such seminars were organised by a company called Hawksmere which puts on one or two day seminars 
on various issues related to businesses. They are targeted at companies, attended by managers and directors 
and they were not cheap costing around £1000.
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I was glad that many cited those very people, Regester in particular, who had given me 
unconditional access.108 Surely, this showed that what they had to say about crisis 
management was important and representative. At the very least, it showed that their 
peers and colleagues saw them as experts. Still, it would have been beneficial to have had 
a higher response rate from those who had described themselves (in the PRCA 
yearbooks) as being engaged in crisis management. However, as became evident from the 
reasons given for not participating in my study, and from what Regester said about 
obtaining referrals from other PR consultancies,109 advertising the service of crisis 
management and actually engaging in it seemed to be two different things. I do not wish 
to suggest that those whom I interviewed were the only ones engaging in it, but clearly 
not all those who advertised crisis management actually practiced it themselves. And, 
even though my respondents are small in number, they are the acknowledged experts and 
specialists in a small field.
I did not have much authority or capacity to reward and consequently was not in a strong 
position to elicit interviews. But I did do my utmost, repeatedly, to enlarge the scope of 
my sample. My research focused on what was possible. What I succeeded in doing was 
speaking to the acknowledged experts in the field and, in particular, the recognised leader
108 The Public Relations Consultants’ Association’s ‘ Who’s Who in Public Relations ’ depicted Regester as 
‘a pioneer and an international authority on crisis management’ (PRCA Yearbook 2000) and described his 
book on crisis management (Regester 1987) as being ‘regarded internationally as a leading work on the 
subject’ (PRCA Yearbook 2000). That Regester Larkin was the only consultancy specialising in this line of 
work might have contributed to Regester’s expert and pioneer status (Regester headed the crisis 
management division of the firm whilst his partner, Judith Larkin, headed issues management). Moreover, 
while the large consultancies generally carry out crisis management in specialised industries, (for example, 
although Burson-Marsteller had clients from various industries, its crisis management division specialised 
in the food and drinks industry), Regester Larkin specialised in crisis management and across the various 
industries. Their clients, for instance, included Shell International, American Airlines, AOL, Marks & 
Spencer, London Electricity and Vodafone (client list provided in PRCA yearbook 2000). Regester may 
also have been so often singled out as an expert because crisis management is a small field.
109 See chapter 1.
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and specialist. Certainly, it would have been valuable to speak to those who were less 
widely thought to be expert. I have, however, managed to conduct the first exploratory 
study of its kind and others may be able to enlarge on it later.
‘Unstructured’ interviews
In total I gained access to and interviewed eight consultants with whom 21 interviews 
were conducted. In addition, 34 interviews took place with public relations practitioners, 
journalists and in-house crisis managers. Although I had prepared some basic questions, 
as I had intended, the discussion often diverged from that template.110 The questions 
were used solely to guide what was essentially a conversation rather than a structured 
interview. The interviews were in depth, designed to encourage unforced narrative and 
focused on certain insights as they arose.
I interviewed for as long as I required, there was some restriction on the length of each 
session but not on the number of sessions.111
I used a tape-recorder, especially at the beginning. I wanted to give my full attention to 
what was said so that I could follow on from that rather than being preoccupied with 
taking copious notes. I was quite aware that in the absence of much literature on the 
subject, and given my objective to report the consultants’ views, I was very dependent on 
recording what was said, not just for comprehension of the subject but also for later 
reference, citation and to register the consultants’ own phrasing of their work.
110 See pages 351 - 353.
111 In particular, the largest number of sessions was with Michael Regester, Michael Bland and Michael 
Seymour.
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Nevertheless, as I gained in confidence and experience of interviewing, and as I wanted 
to see whether its absence would make a difference to what was said, the tape-recorder 
was put aside. Instead I took notes and this usually seemed to put participants at greater 
ease and yielded better information.
Although most interviews were face-to-face at the offices or, in one case, the residence of 
participants, some interviews were conducted over the telephone. In these instances, this 
was because of physical distance and because it was requested. Overall, I gained more 
information and more discussion in face-to-face interviews than in the telephone 
interviews, some of which were subject to interruption. In one case, an interview was 
arranged with a consultant on his mobile phone. I called at the specified time and, on 
hearing a disruptive background noise, enquired whether it was a good time to speak, 
gained a positive response and proceeded with the interview. But the connection was lost 
many times, the noise was not conducive to a seamless rapport; he was on a helicopter 
journey. Subsequently, he gave me another time when I could call him when he was in 
his office.
There are problems with the interviewing method that are routine and inescapable 
(Shipman 1997; Hakim 1987). Firstly, it is inevitable that the interviewees and I would 
act reflexively, both influencing the research situation. Both also make certain 
assumptions about each other and that, in turn, influences the interview. The principal 
assumptions I made about the consultants were that they were active, enquiring and 
brought to bear their personal, political and professional beliefs to give meaning to events 
and take action. And, I took it, as became later apparent, that they knew that their
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meanings were disputed by others and seek to defend them. I expected to receive 
sophisticated responses to my questions. The assumptions I made in part determined the 
questions I asked and the inferences made about answers. Further determinants were the 
particular aspects I wished to centre on.
However free flowing I had intended the interviews to be, there was a (justifiable and 
unavoidable) concentration on what I found interesting. The consultants too wished to 
highlight and elaborate on certain areas. For example, my interest in how crisis 
management is promoted inescapably led to a greater attention on that area. But it was 
also the case that my focus on this was also a response to the circumstance that I detected, 
that is, that consultants, in interviews and of their own accord, regularly identified and 
elaborated what they held to be the factors necessitating crisis management. Clearly, they 
too played a part in invoking particular topics. I wondered why consultants stressed the 
societal conditions they said made crisis management indispensable, and my conclusion 
was that it is principally in this way that crisis management is constructed and marketed. 
And, again, my questions directed them to elaborate on that. But it was also the case that 
they did not need much encouragement to do so, as they added to that description freely, 
citing past crises that lend justification to their case. Still, my account of crisis 
management is influenced by my own interpretations arising from how I saw the 
relevance and importance of what they said. That does mean that my account is limited to 
certain matters.
Further, a condition normally present in all interview situations is that the presence of the 
interviewer influences what the subject says. The interactionist position on this is that it is
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an inevitable part of every social interaction (Rock 1979). We should expect a lack of 
candour to be normal in all interviewing, interactionists argue, and they also hold that the 
answers to our questions are often those our respondents want us to hear. Or the reverse 
could also happen; people might find it hard not to be candid in face-to-face interviews.
In both circumstances, the interviewees influence what researchers know, and researchers 
in turn exert an influence on the answers they receive. While that is a limitation, it is hard 
to see how it can be prevented. And, at times, it might not even be a limitation. In the 
context of my research interests it was, in fact, informative. My research was to do with 
how consultants wish to portray the world and crisis management, and if I had received 
(in interviews) information that seeks to convey what the consultants wanted us to 
believe to be true about the world, this circumstance is not necessarily limiting but 
enlightening. How respondents wish to depict things is, in itself, relevant and revealing.
Interview questions
These questions guided the interviews I conducted with the crisis management 
consultants.
■ What does a crisis involve?
■ What is crisis management?
■ What factors, if any, differentiate crisis management from other types of 
public relations?
■ How important is impression management in handling crises?
■ What is the single biggest problem/threat in a crisis?
■ Is there a big demand for crisis management?
■ What is involved in your job?
■ Are you called in once a crisis occurs or do you have a longer relationship
with your clients?
■ What role do you play in handling a crisis?
■ Who else is involved in handling crisis?
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■ Is there an integrated approach between all the parties involved? Is there a 
common understanding?
■ Does crisis management differ in theory and in practice? How so?
■ Edward Bemays described the role of PR as ‘the engineering of consent’. 
What do you make of that description?
■ What is being done to improve the efficiency of public relations?
■ What would you say is the public perception of public relations?
■ Has the PR profession evolved over the years? How? What have been the 
most significant changes over the last decade?
■ Are there benefits and or constraints to being members of the PRCA?
■ The IPR and the PRCA have professional codes of practice, are these useful? 
Do you have any informal codes of practice?
■ What are the biggest challenges the PR profession now face?
■ Do PR and crisis management perform a management function?
■ Is there a danger that management consultancies will usurp the functions and 
services provided by PR/crisis management consultancies?
■ What is a consultant’s knowledge based on? What is the basis of your 
strategies? Do you draw on academic theories or research?
■ How do you obtain clients?
■ What do clients expect from you?
■ Have there been changes in the way clients view public relations?
■ Are clients generally receptive to your advice?
■ Do client expectations change during the course of consulting/once they have 
had exposure to crisis management?
■ Is there a discrepancy between client expectations of your services and what 
you can realistically provide?
■ When clients approach you, do they already have plans in place to deal with 
crisis?
■ How do clients rate the efficiency of consulting? How do you evaluate the 
efficiency of your strategies?
■ Who are your clients?
■ What problems faced by the consultant are the most difficult to explain to 
clients?
■ Have you ever been asked to be economical with the truth? How have you 
dealt with this situation/How would you deal with this situation if it arose?
■ How much of your job involves dealing with the media?
■ Do you have contacts in the media? How important/useful/helpful are they?
■ What do you think are the journalist’s objectives in covering a crisis?
■ What made you join this area of work?
■ What did you do before?
■ Can you recall what first attracted you to this field?
■ How long have you worked in this profession?
■ Do you know other consultants in this field? Who?
■ Are there differences between your approach/strategy and theirs?
■ How has the field of crisis management changed over the years? How do you 
see it evolving in the future?
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Have you ever thought seriously about leaving crisis management?
Case study
Interviews were also used for the case study, which was also drawn from unpublished 
and published material. Indeed, it was in interviews that consultants drew my attention to 
the Brent Spar crisis, which they, on their own accord, described as an instance that 
justifies their advice and claims about the world. My decision to focus on this case was 
taken on the basis of how often consultants cited and elaborated on this incident.
One of the advantages in examining the Brent Spar crisis was that there was a lot of 
accessible material on the episode. As I argue, characteristics of the management of this 
crisis were that it was extended and that Shell meant to influence how this incident would 
come to be seen.112 Therefore, the company had a website on the topic of the Brent Spar 
crisis - launched in 1996 and withdrawn only in 1999 - and provided me with several 
published and internal materials pertaining to that situation. Greenpeace, the other main 
party involved in the crisis, also wished to explain and gain support for its perspective on 
the situation; a book about it was published by Greenpeace itself. So there was a fair 
amount of available information.
While that appears to be an advantage, it was also a difficulty. In the midst of attempts by 
Greenpeace and Shell to offer their own interpretations of what had happened, I had to be 
continually attentive to their attempts to convince and persuade. A lot of
112 See Chapter 4.
353
counterbalancing and a steadfast, critical stance were always required, but that is a 
routine condition that most researchers examining this type of dispute would impose.
A Shell director in charge of the Brent Spar decommissioning process and the press 
office at Shell UK provided much of the information that was not already on the website.
There was a sense, when I initially approached the company to request interviews and 
information, that this was a familiar request and that a referral to the website on the Spar 
was the routine response. There was neither surprise nor a refusal to assist. But this was 
part of its ongoing crisis management which involved a pledge to conduct ‘open 
communications’ about the Brent Spar disposal.113 My request would have been also 
unsurprising; it had been a big story in 1995 and in 1997 - when I began my research of it 
- it was still a ‘hot’ subject, as a final solution for the disposal of the Brent Spar had not 
been reached.
In addition to the material provided by the company, I also gained valuable insight into 
the crisis and its management through four telephone interviews I had with John 
Wybrew, Director of Public Affairs at Shell UK at the time of the crisis, who no longer 
worked for the corporation. He was involved in handling the situation and had been 
central to the company’s response to the crisis.
I approached Greenpeace several times requesting interviews with anyone who had been 
involved in the Brent Spar campaign but was turned down. The reason repeatedly offered
113 See Chapter 4.
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was that they were too busy with their new and ongoing campaigns.114 One of my 
attempts, however, coincided with the publication by Greenpeace of a book written on 
the incident by the Brent Spar campaign director and I was told that it put forward their 
opinion of the incident (The Turning o f the ‘Spar, Chris Rose 1998). I was sent it and a 
report published by the WWF {Brent Spar, WWF - UK 1995), where Greenpeace and 
Shell presented their cases. Principally, I relied on Greenpeace’s book on the Spar for 
their perspective.
I also interviewed journalists and editors who had contributed to privately commissioned 
(by several oil companies operating in the UK) MORI surveys on the views of oil and 
energy journalists which discussed the incident.115 They recalled covering the incident 
and their recollections were informative and provided a different perspective.
A case history published by the European Case Clearing House and written by Winter 
and Schweinsberg, two business academics, entitled The Brent Spar Controversy (1996) 
was also a useful reference and gave insight into the German media coverage of the 
dispute.116
The case study method was chosen because it allowed an in-depth examination of this 
crisis and its management. My assumption was that this method could provide useful
114 This reflected the case made by Greenpeace that Shell continued to deliberate on this matter, trying to 
change the upshot of its campaign, while Greenpeace was busy with other matters (Chapter 4).
115 Survey On The Views O f Oil And Energy Journalists MORI 1995 and Survey On The Views O f Oil And 
Energy Journalists MORI 1998.
116 The European Case Clearing House is a facility for exchanging case material among teachers of 
business administration. It is a source of management case studies provided by individual authors and by 
management teaching establishments. Its declared objectives are to provide access to cases and to support 
authors by providing a mechanism for publication (www.europeancaseclearinghouse.co.uk).
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insights because the aims were to understand what happened, how identities and 
meanings were constructed in this case and how particular people and groups made sense 
of it. This was as capable as any other method of illustrating what might be involved in a 
crisis and what might bear on its management. The case study facilitated reflection on the 
crisis management practice in the context of this crisis. It also allowed an examination of 
the consultants’ claim that this case justifies their recommendations.
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APPENDIX B: IMAGES OF BRENT SPAR117
*
G reenpeace inflatable at Brent Spar. 
Water canon used by M.V.REMBAS 
and M.V. TORBAS at b a se  of platform 
to prevent boarding. Copyright:
G reenpeace /  David Sims June 1995
117 The following first seven images were provided by Greenpeace as were the captions attached to them, 
which were impossible to detach from the images. The last three images were provided by Shell.
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BrenI Spar. 23 -5/05 . Photo h\ (irccnpcacc.
Security men and Shell em ployees are layered onto ihc Brent Spar from the 'S lA D IV I/
Brent Spar 23 /  5 /  95 - A Greenpeace protestor stands proudly 
with the Shetland flag and a Greenpeace banner with the 
STADIVE behind. Photo copyright Greenpeace.
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G reenpeace and Shell activity around the Brent Spar. 
Copyright G reenpeace June 1995.
11 July 1995l  B rent Spar arrives In Ert|ord Norway. 
Towed from dump site  in North Atlantic.
Copyright Greenpeace/Sims 19SJn.01.l5
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Deconstruction o f the Brent Spar: Top part o f the Spar separated from the storage tanks
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Deconstruction of the Brent Spar: Sliced parts o f the storage tanks being transported 
ashore
363
Deconstruction o f the Brent Spar: A sliced segment o f the storage tanks
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